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INTRODUCTION 
 
0.1 Approach to Our Thesis: The Recovery of Infused Moral Virtue  
 
0.1.1 The Return of “Virtue Ethics” 
 
About twenty-five years ago, A. MacIntyre tried to illustrate in his book After Virtue the 
actual situation of moral philosophy as follows:
1
 Imagine a world which has lost the whole 
memory of human history by a gigantic catastrophe. Only single concepts and fragments of 
former science are preserved. However, people do not recognize these pieces as isolated 
fragments of a greater whole. Consequently, they continue to practice natural sciences by 
using the relics of unknown times, assuming that the concepts portray still an unbroken 
context of facts. The result: They develop an amount of subtle pseudo-scientific theories, but 
their assertions are (as long as they do not recognize the fragmentary character of their 
concepts) incomplete and incorrect. 
MacIntyre reads that pessimistic parable as an analogy for the present situation of moral 
science: As in the thought experiment people possess only fragments of a lost whole, likewise  
 
what we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which 
now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra 
of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have – very largely, if 
not entirely – lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality.2 
 
MacIntyre claims that the vast plurality of rival ethics, which is characteristic for modern 
times, is the result from a loss of an original integrative perspective. Therefore, the 
contemporary difficulty to attain any agreement on moral issues will remain insurmountable 
as long as we don‘t try to reconstruct, return, or at least understand the former synthesis. In a 
time ―after virtue,‖ it became impossible to render intelligible the most basic principles as, 
e.g., what is meant by the ―moral good‖, what is the ultimate foundation of ―moral 
obligation,‖ etc. Whilst ancients spoke first of all about man himself, what he is, what he 
could be as agent, and as consequence, what he should be like (sc. by his actions, in respect to 
the acquisition of virtues etc.), nowadays – so MacIntyre argues – ethicists work on the 
                                                 
1
 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1981), 1-5. 
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impossible project to explain morality by means of particular aspects, by principles which are 
rooted outside their original context. 
To substantiate this assertion, we offer an example. Most current moral systems share the 
general idea of a moral obligation that binds every human being. However, there are countless 
opinions in which way such universal duty should (or could) be justified. A universal 
agreement seems impossible. According to MacIntyre, the category of moral obligation is one 
of those isolated fragments of a lost tradition that, once taken out of its original context, had 
to lose its intelligibility. Does moral obligation ground in the categorical imperative of reason 
(as in the deontological account of I. Kant) or in man‘s strife for a maximum happiness of the 
largest possible number (as in the utilitarism of J. Bentham)? Or is it simply impossible to 
found a moral debt by mere philosophical arguments, since it is originally born on a 
theological foundation (namely the unconditioned obedience regarding a commanding God) 
so that all trials to justify morality without that basis will remain a priori contradictory? 
We observe a similar problem in specific moral issues, for example, the case of justice. Many 
years before MacIntyre‘s After Virtue, G.E.M. Anscombe argued in her seminal article 
―Modern Moral Philosophy‖3 that today the content of just actions might be justified by 
concrete cases in a negative manner because everybody shares the experience that suffering 
injustice provides no happiness. However, it is impossible to define justice as positive duty or 
as unconditioned obligation by the just thing itself. For Kant it was still possible to invoke an 
(alleged) moral law in the human being that imposes upon him the positive obligation for 
specific actions.
4
 According to Anscombe however this way is barred for modern moral 
systems, since ―it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a 
law-giver.‖5 A modern ethic however has to avoid such a presumed principle if it wants to be 
universally acceptable as a moral theory. Anscombe continues: ―If such a conception is 
dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concepts of 
‗obligation,‘ of being bound or required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their 
root.‖6  The consequences which Anscombe suggests are unambiguous: ―The expressions 
‗moral obligation‘, ‗moral ought,‘ and ‗duty‘ are best put on the index.‖7 This does not imply 
                                                                                                                                                        
2
 Ibid., 2. 
3
 Gertrude E. M. Anscombe, ―Modern Moral Philosophy,‖ in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. 
Anscombe: Ethics, Religion and Politics, vol. 3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 26-42. 
4
 About Kant‘s account of the self-commitment of the agent by his own reason, see Eberhard Schockenhoff, 
―Wozu gut sein? Eine historisch-systematische Studie zum Ursprung des moralischen Sollens,‖ Studia Moralia 
33 (1995): 109-120. 
5
 Anscombe, ―Modern Moral Philosophy,‖ 30. 
6
 Ibid.  
7
 Ibid., 38. 
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that she negates the existence of moral duties. She simply wants to advert the fact that modern 
moral systems are unable to justify the pivotal position of the concept of obligation which 
they themselves concede to that term.  
 
Short Overview of the Historical Development 
It might be helpful to summarize in a couple of sentences the historical evolution of the 
mentioned problems:
8
 Neither the ancient world nor the Middle Ages knew an isolated 
discussion of moral issues, of commands and prohibitions. The investigation of good and evil 
actions was embedded in the reflection on the agent himself, i.e. of the human being. J. Pieper 
explains this understanding: ―Any ought grounds in being. . . . If you want to know and to 
achieve the good, you have to look at the objective world of beings.‖9 As a consequence, in 
the middle Ages neither philosophy nor theology treated morals as isolated discipline. Ethics, 
i.e. the issue of good and evil, were discussed in the context of origin and final end of the 
whole human life.
10
 Consequently, one of the most important issues of morals was the 
discussion (and the development) of virtues, understood as necessary dispositions for the 
realization of a life that successfully attains its proper end. 
A new approach arose from the influences of nominalism, on the theoretical side, and the 
Protestant Reformation, from the poltical side. According to William of Ockham, the 
goodness of human acts no longer relates to (or aims for) the perfection of the human being; 
                                                 
8
 For the historical development, see for example Martin Honecker, ―Schwierigkeiten mit dem Begriff Tugend,‖ 
in Tugendethik, ed. Klaus P. Rippe and Peter Schaber (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1998), 168-180. 
9
 Josef Pieper, ―Die Wirklichkeit und das Gute,‖ in Werke in acht Bänden. Schriften zur Philosophischen 
Anthropologie und Ethik: Grundstrukturen menschlicher Existenz, vol. 5, ed. Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 1997), 48. For Pieper, this is the essential characteristic for the understanding of classical morals. 
Thus, he repeats again and again his assertion; e.g. Josef Pieper, ―Über die Liebe,‖ in Werke in acht Bänden: 
Schriften zur philosophischen Anthropologie und Ethik: Das Menschenbild der Tugendlehre, vol. 4, ed. Berthold 
Wald (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996), 330; likewise Josef Pieper, ―Über den Begriff der Sünde,‖ in 
Werke in acht Bänden. Schriften zur Philosophischen Anthropologie und Ethik: Grundstrukturen menschlicher 
Existenz, vol. 5, ed. Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1997), 233; Josef Pieper, ―Glauben - Hoffen 
- Lieben,‖ in Werke in acht Bänden. Miszellen. Register und Gesamtbibliographie, vol. 8/1, ed. Berthold Wald 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2005), 318; Josef Pieper, ―Über das Gute und das Böse. Vier Vorlesungen,‖ in 
Werke in acht Bänden. Darstellungen und Interpretationen. Thomas von Aquin und die Scholastik, vol. 2, ed. 
Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001), 37. 
R. Spaemann summarized fittingly this special approach of the classical ethics: ―Als vor etwa 2500 Jahren das 
philosophische Nachdenken über Ethik, das heißt über das richtige Leben begann, da stand am Anfang dieser 
Überlegung nicht die Frage nach dem, was wir sollen, sondern nach dem, was wir eigentlich und im Grunde 
wollen. . . . Jedes Sollen muss an irgendein schon vorhandenes Wollen anknüpfen, sonst hätten wir gar keinen 
Grund, uns dieses sollen zu eigenen zu machen. Hätten wir genau verstanden, was wir eigentlich und im Grunde 
wollen – so überlegten die Griechen – dann wüssten wir auch, was wir sollen und worin das richtige Leben 
besteht. Dies, was wir eigentlich und im Grunde wollen und weswegen wir alles andere wollen und tun, was wir 
tun, nannten die Griechen das Gute oder das höchste Gut.― (Robert Spaemann, Moralische Grundbegriffe 
(Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1982), 25). 
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this would imply an illegitimate limitation of the potentia Dei absoluta. Ockham tried to 
justify the goodness and evil of specific actions by referring to obedience regarding a divine 
command. These divine determinations, however, are commanded independently of the 
internal finality of human nature.
11
  
Two centuries later this theoretical perspective became a political necessity. As a result of the 
Protestant Reformation, western civilization lost its unifying perspective of the good human 
life, the right relationship between God and man, which had been constitutive for the whole 
society over centuries. Thus, the consensus about the final destination of human beings 
(inclusive the right way to this end) was lost. The reference system, the horizon of the 
common understanding of the ―good life‖ was gone. This lack had to be filled, and it was 
filled by an emphasis on the moral obligation to obey a superior authority (the creator, human 
reason, the public state, etc.).
12
 
This historical perspective shows that the development of modern ethics took place by an 
explicit renunciation of a possible focus on the righteousness of the human being.
13
 As a 
                                                                                                                                                        
10
 See for example the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics and for Aquinas the first questions of the Prima 
secundae (qq. 1-5). 
11
 ―Omnis voluntas potest se conformare praecepto divino. Sed deus potest praecipere quod voluntas creata odiat 
eum, igitur volunts creata potest hoc facere. . . . Odire deum potest esse actus rectus in via, puta si praecipiatur a 
deo.‖ (Guillelmus de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Opera theologica, vol. 7 (Binghamton, WY: 
The Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University, 1984), 352). See thereto also Peter A. Kwasniewski, 
―William of Ockham and the Metaphysical Roots of Natural Law,‖ The Aquinas Review 11 (2004): 1-81. It 
belongs to the special merits of S. Pinckaers to have portrayed this development (Servais Pinckaers, The Sources 
of Christian Ethics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), esp. 240-253). This 
kind of thinking shapes the mind of the modern men till today. Pieper notes rightly that ―der heutige 
Durchschnittschrist kaum noch auf den Gedanken kommt, in der Moral- oder Sittenlehre sei etwas über das 
wahre Sein des Menschen, über das Menschenbild, zu erfahren. Sondern: wir verbinden mit dem Begriff 
'Sittenlehre' die Vorstellung einer Lehre vom Tun und vor allem vom Lassen, vom Dürfen und vor allem vom 
Nicht-Dürfen, vom Gebotenen und vor allem vom Verbotenen. Das also ist die erste moral-theologische Lehre 
des allgemeinen Lehrers: in der Sittenlehre geht es um die richtige Meinung vom Menschen.‖ (Josef Pieper, 
―Über das christliche Menschenbild,‖ in Werke in acht Bänden. Religionsphilosophische Schriften, vol. 7, ed. 
Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000), 95). The position of Aquinas is diametric contrary, as we 
can appreciate by the following quotation: ―Patet quod non ex hoc tantum aliquid dicitur esse iustum quia est a 
deo volitum; sed quia est debitum alicui rei creatae secundum ordinem creaturae ad creaturam. Nihil enim alicui 
rei potest esse debitum nisi ratione suae naturae vel conditionis.‖ (In sent. IV 46.1.2A; similar in Super II Cor III 
3; ST II-II 57.2 ad 3). 
12
 The resignation of another theoretical grounding was not arbitrary but rather a necessary precondition for 
finishing the European religious wars (cf. Berthold Wald, ―Abendländische Tugendlehre und moderne 
Moralphilosophie,‖ in Josef Pieper. Schriften zur Philosophischen Anthropologie und Ethik: Das Menschenbild 
der Tugendlehre. Band 4, 2 ed., ed. Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2006), 431, footnote 9). 
However, M. Luther refused the Aristotelian understanding of the virtuous man not by political reasons, but for 
theological ones. He described the Nicomachean Ethics (because of its teaching on virtue) as very corruptive and 
even as enemy of grace: ―Tota fere Aristotelis Ethica pessima est gratiae inimica. . . . Breviter, totus Aristoteles 
ad theologiam est tenebrae ad lucem.‖ (Martin Luther, Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam. These 41 and 
50, WA 1, 226). 
13
 As a consequence, human rights are justified nowadays not by reference to the human natural potentiality for 
certain perfections but as negative limit of actions, for safeguarding the ―Leben jedes Menschen in seiner 
personalen Unantastbarkeit und positiv unbeschreibbaren biographischen Einzigartigkeit‖ (see Walter 
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consequence, ethics concentrated more on the substantiation of moral obligation (as ensuring 
obedience) than on virtues (as enabling a good life). Admittedly, there were some attempts to 
reintroduce the concept of ―virtue‖ into the moral discussion. However, virtue wasn‘t 
understood as perfection of the agent as human being, but rather as right conduct, as acting 
according to a given obligation. In short, those theories were based again on a legalistic moral 
understanding.
14
 
Anscombe‘s influential article ―Modern Moral Philosophy‖ and MacIntyre‘s After Virtue 
started an increasing engagement with the ancient ethical model. Those works were – so to 
speak – the initial spark for a detailed re-acquisition of the classical theory of virtue which 
continues up to the present.
15
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Schweidler, ―Die Menschenrechte als metaphysischer Verzicht,‖ in Das Unantastbare. Beiträge zur Philosophie 
der Menschenrechte, ed. Walter Schweidler (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2001), 73-100, here 96). 
Anscombe suggested that the decay of the ancient ethics is due to the spreading of Christendom which 
substituted the inclination for perfection by the obedience towards an divine lawgiver (cf. Anscombe, ―Modern 
Moral Philosophy,‖ 30: ―Between Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law conception of ethics. . . . In 
consequence of the dominance of Christianity for many centuries, the concepts of being bound, permitted, or 
excused became deeply embedded in our language and thought.‖) However, scholars as Pinckaers have shown 
convincingly that a legalistic morality was yet a decadent form of the proper Christian ethics. Nevertheless, 
down to the present days the opinion of Anscombe is repeated in literature; see for example Richard Taylor, 
Virtue Ethics: An Introduction (New York: Prometheus, 2002) or Ernst Tugendhat, Vorlesungen über Ethik 
(Frankfurt (Main): Suhrkamp, 1993), 65-67. 
14
 For example S. Pufendorf‘s work De officio hominis et civis (1673) portrays ethics exclusively as an catalog of 
civil duties – a book published till the end of 18th century in more than 100 editions and translated in all 
European languages (Samuel von Pufendorf, Über die Pflicht des Menschen und des Bürgers nach dem Gesetz 
der Natur (Frankfurt (Main): Insel Verlag, 1994)). B. Wald describes the unsuccessful trial of M. Scheler, N. 
Hartmann and others in the first half of the 20
th
 century to reintroduce the concept of virtue into the ethical 
discussion (Wald, ―Abendländische Tugendlehre ...‖ 420-422). But as Pinckaers notes: ―It is not enough to 
assign a pace to virtue in a moral system based on concepts of obligation, duty, or utility. The nature of virtue 
calls for a specific systematization in which the other elements, particularly obligations, commandments, and 
means, play a subordinate role.‖ (Servais Pinckaers, ―The Role of Virtue in Moral Theology,‖ in The Pinckaers 
Reader. Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig St. Titus (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 290). 
15
 Today, Virtue Ethics is sometimes called already the ―third‖ ethical model besides deontology and utilitarism 
(cf. Friedo Ricken, ―Aristoteles und die moderne Tugendethik,‖ Theologie und Philosophie 74 (1999), 391). 
The literature to the modern Virtue Ethics is enormous: A good first approach offers Greg Pence, ―Virtue 
Theory,‖ in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 249-258. Besides 
Anscomb‘s Modern Moral Philosophy and MacInyre‘s After Virtue one should mention also Philippa Foot, 
Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978). 
A quite pointed comparison of modern ought-ethics and the approach of Virtue Ethics is found in Michael 
Stocker, ―The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,‖ in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael A. 
Slote (Oxford: Oxord University Press, 2001), 66-78. Furthermore we have to refer to Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) and Alasdair 
MacIntyre, ―Das Wesen der Tugenden,‖ in Tugendethik, ed. Klaus P. Rippe and Peter Schaber (Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1998), 93-113. The author develops in these works his concern of After Virtue in more detail (the 
first of both books contains an explicit appreciation of the importance of St. Thomas for the history of Western 
moral thought.). 
For a general outline of all major themes of the Virtue Ethics we can defer to Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) (it is written as textbook of Virtue Ethics and avoids therefore 
special issues). Interesting is also Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). Swanton asserts that virtue is not to be understood exclusively in relation to the 
perfection of the agent (agent flourishing), but is always correlative to the demands of environment of the agent 
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According to S. van Hooft the purpose of the virtue ethics is ―to describe what human 
flourishing consists in and how the virtues help us achieve it.‖16 Such an approach avoids the 
reduction of the moral ought to mere obedience of norms or laws. Likewise, the goodness of 
an action does not depend only on the judgment of the expected positive consequence, 
whereby it remained unclear why one should obey the moral law or why the happiness of the 
majority should become our private concern. For the virtue ethics, however, the moral ought 
grounds itself in the natural or acquired inclinations of the agent himself. ―Virtue ethics 
conceives of the virtuous agent as wanting to do what morality requires.―17 For R. J. Devettere 
the natural inclinations of man are the proper foundation of ethics.
18
 Virtue ethics tries to 
articulate this good which man strives for by nature. ―Virtue ethics thus arises from the 
natural inclinations embedded in human nature. It is rooted in our natural desires for what is 
pleasurable and good. . . . Virtue ethics is about desire and not duty, about what we want to do 
and not what we ought to do.―19 And P. Geach annotates in this famous book The Virtues: ―A 
moral code ‗freely adopted‘ that ignores the built-in teleologies of human nature can only lead 
to disaster.‖20 
In this introduction, it is neither possible nor necessary to portray (or also to criticize) the 
approach of virtue ethics in more detail. On that score we can defer to a large corpus of 
secondary literature.
21
  
                                                                                                                                                        
(demands of the world; ibid., 68-76). She claims consequently a pluralistic virtue ethic. (―I prefer to understand 
the rationale of virtue not primarily through the idea of the perfection of our nature, but through the idea of the 
multifaceted, pluralistically understood demands of the world, ‗naturalized‘ via the constraint of Virtue.‖ Ibid., 
94-95). That such a context-depending Virtue Ethics does not lead necessarily to subjective arbitrariness is 
shown by Ludwig Siep, ―Virtues, Values, and Moral Objectivity,‖ in Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity. Issues in 
Ancient and Modern Ethics, ed. Christopher Gill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 83-98. Th. Hurka criticizes 
different aspects of Virtue Ethics, but shows in which way even a consequentialistic approach could profit from 
some of its elements (see Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford - New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001)). 
16
 Stan van Hooft, Understanding Virtue Ethics (Chesham, NH: Acumen, 2006), 10. 
17
 Ibid., 17. The goodness of man – so Hooft further on – consists ―in doing well what is in us as human beings 
to do. A good individual is one who is good as a human being.‖ (Ibid., 15). 
18
 See the chapter The Origin of Ethics in Raymond J. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the 
Ancient Greeks (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 13-39. 
19
 Ibid., 20. And subsequently he explains: ―The origin of virtue ethics lies in the instincts, desires, and impulses 
of human nature. . . . What gets ethics going is our natural instincts, desires, and impulses for something good 
that we need and do not have.‖ (Ibid., 37). 
20
 Peter Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), vii. Elsewhere he explains more 
detailed: ―Of course a man is free . . . to lay down his own standards, regardless of his inbuilt teleologies. The 
trouble is that it will not work out.‖ (Ibid., 19). 
21
 One of the usual points of criticism against a Virtue Ethics is the observation that every moral theory requires 
in a certain way the concept of a moral obligation. Does not also the Virtue Ethics imply an ought since man 
should act according virtues? See the critique in Robert B. Louden, ―Einige Laster der Tugendethik,‖ in 
Tugendethik, ed. Klaus P. Rippe and Peter Schaber (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1998), 185-212, esp. 187-191. 
Schockenhoff argues that the approach of deontology as well as of Virtue Ethics can become one-sided if ought 
and virtue taken as ultimate terms (whereas for Schockenhoff the idea of the good is the proper foundation of 
ethics which grounds ought as well as virtue). See. Eberhard Schockenhoff, Grundlegung der Ethik: Ein 
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0.1.2 A Reborn Interest in St. Thomas’s Virtue Theory:  
Aristotelian Virtues Crowned by Faith, Hope and Charity? 
 
On the basis of the foregoing outline, it is not surprising that the reappraisal of virtue ethics 
has led to an increasing interest in ancient ethical theories, first of all in Aristotle who was the 
first to develop a systematic moral theory.
22
 
In a similar way (but as we will see with important modifications) the topic of virtues takes an 
important place in Aquinas‘s account of ethics. In the Prima secundae of the Summa 
theologiae, which discusses the general principles of moral theology, the treatise on virtues 
appears long before the discussion of law. Virtues are portrayed as internal principles of 
human actions, whereas laws determine practical matters only from the outside.
23
 In the 
Secunda secundae (which examines moral issues in particular) the situation is even clearer. In 
the prologue to the Secunda secundae, Aquinas notes that moral study has to include the 
various virtues as well as their corresponding precepts and opposite vices, but as standard for 
structuring the whole discussion he prefers the particular virtues since all the other issues 
relate to virtues either as support (i.e. precepts) or as contrary (i.e. vices). Thus, ―the whole 
matter of morals can be traced back to the consideration of virtues.‖24 
                                                                                                                                                        
theologischer Entwurf (Freiburg: Herder, 2007), 48-54. Also M. Rhonheimer describes both systems as 
complementary approaches. (Martin Rhonheimer, Die Perspektive der Moral. Philosophische Grundlagen der 
Tugendethik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 18-30). Similarly Josef Schuster, Moralisches Können: Studien 
zur Tugendethik, 2 ed. (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1997) and Dietmar Mieth, Die neuen Tugenden: Ein ethischer 
Entwurf (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1984). Hursthouse mentions several times that even a Virtue Ethics is 
necessarily an some ways normative. (Rosalind Hursthouse, ―Normative Virtue Ethics,‖ in How Should One Live? 
Essays on the Virtues, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 19-36; Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 
43-62). On the other side, M. Honecker notes that the correct concern of the Virtue Ethics to take into account 
the human affects and desires, runs sometimes into danger to underestimate the role of reason (Honecker, 
―Schwierigkeiten mit dem Begriff Tugend,‖ 180-183). An interesting collection of various critical essays about 
Virtue Ethics presents Daniel Statman, Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1997). 
22
 See for example J.O. Urmson, Aristotle's Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Julia Annas, The Morality of 
Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); J.L. Ackrill, ―Aristotle on 'Eudaimonia',‖ in Aristotle's 
Ethics. Critical Essays, ed. Nancy Sherman (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 57-78; 
David Bostock, Aristotle's Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For a historical overview of the 
beginnings of a scientific ethics before Aristotle, see Olof Gigon, ―Einleitung,‖ in Die Nikomachische Ethik 
(München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1972), 8-23. 
23
 See ST I-II 49 prologus: ―Post actus et passiones [ST I-II 6-48], considerandum est de principiis humanorum 
actuum. Et primo, de principiis intrinsecis; secundo, de principiis extrinsecis [i.e. de legibus; q. 90]. Principium 
autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de potentiis in prima parte dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus 
considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, 
qui sunt humanorum actuum principia.‖ 
24
 ST II-II prologus: ―Tota materia morali ad considerationem virtutum reducta.‖ As M.D. Jordan has shown 
Aquinas was original in using the different virtues for structuring the various issues of moral theology (Marc D. 
Jordan, ―Ideals of ‗Scientia moralis‘ and the Invention of the ‗Summa theologiae‘,‖ in Aquinas’s Moral Theory: 
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St. Thomas is of special interest for theologians since his enumeration of virtues doesn‘t 
contain only the ―pagan‖ perfections treated by Aristotle, but also specific Christian elements. 
He continues in the prologue to the Secunda secundae: ―All virtues can be traced back to 
seven which are the three theological [virtues] which are treated first, and the others are the 
four cardinal [virtues] which are treated afterwards.‖25  
Based on this statement and the resulting structure of the Secunda secundae, many scholars 
have interpreted and continue to interpret Aquinas‘s virtue theory as a mixture of two 
substantially different types of virtue. On the one side, there are the ordinary virtues of the 
common human life, exemplified by the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, 
and temperance. There, according to a common opinion, Aquinas does nothing more than 
repeat Aristotle. On the other side, there are specific Christian virtues that are directly given 
by grace, namely faith, hope and charity. The former constitute the natural basis of ethics, 
valid and attainable for everybody, while the latter add a specific Christian character to the 
moral life of the faithful by subjoining some supplementary perfections which are, admittedly, 
essential for the Christian life but nevertheless leave untouched their more common natural 
basis.  
 
Some Examples of this Interpretation 
The proponents of such a view are legion. In their popular handbook on Christian ethics, W. 
Beach and H. R. Niebuhr hold the position that beside the addition of the theological virtues 
Aquinas did little more than reproduce Aristotle: 
 
In man to man relationships, the life of a good man will be characterized by the practice of the 
four classical virtues: temperance, courage (or fortitude), justice, and above all wisdom or 
prudence, that refined ability to judge correctly what is right to know and do. This much can 
be developed by natural and reasonable man, quite apart from revelation and faith. In all this 
Thomas does little more than reproduce Aristotle. God endows man, through Christian 
                                                                                                                                                        
Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 91-95). 
Already in the first half of the 20
th
 century some moral theology textbooks have observed this peculiar structure 
of the Summa Theologiae and began to reorganize the special moral theology on the basis of the virtues rather 
than the Decalogue (as had been done since centuries). So for example Dominicus M. Prümmer, Manuale 
theologiae moralis: Secundum principia S. Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 1-3 (Freiburg: Herder, 1961) and Jean-Benoît 
Vittrant, Théologie morale: Bref exposé à l’usage des membres du clergé et spécialement des confesseurs (Paris: 
Beauchesne, 1953). However, in those cases the virtutes served yet only to classify the list of obligations and 
prohibitions in a new way, whereas the focus was still obligation, not virtue itself. Nevertheless, those authors 
drew already attention to the limitation of a moral theory based exclusively on commandments. 
25
 ST II-II prologus: ―Omnes virtutes sunt ulterius reducendae ad septem, quarum tres sunt theologicae, de 
quibus primo est agendum; aliae vero quatuor sunt cardinales, de quibus posterius agetur.‖ 
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revelation and the Church with its sacraments, with the added gift of the three theological 
virtues, faith, hope and love, which direct man to God Himself, and which therefore crown the 
four natural virtues. These seven cardinal virtues are the internal habits of the good life.
26
 
 
In the same way, A. Fagothey argues in his widespread book Right and Reason: ―St. Thomas 
follows Aristotle, omitting some points, developing others more thoroughly, and adding the 
theological virtues.‖27 In her article ―Virtues and Vices,‖ Philippa Foot describes Aquinas as a 
faithful disciple of Aristotle who just added some theological issues: ―By and large Aquinas 
followed Aristotle – sometimes even heroically – where Aristotle gave an opinion, and where 
St. Thomas is on his own, as in developing the doctrine of the theological virtues of faith, 
hope and charity, . . . he still uses an Aristotelian framework.‖28 
From a different viewpoint, J. F. Keenan suggested a similar account. In his book Goodness 
and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s ‘Summa theologiae,’ he describes the cardinal virtues as 
providing right actions and making the agent right, whereas it is due to theological virtues to 
make the agent good. The former are an independent set of habits of the latter, and vice versa. 
Prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance are the key-virtues for human perfection, 
realizable even apart from specifically Christian qualities. And conversely, the infused virtues 
of faith, hope and charity can be possessed besides the cardinal virtues.  
 
Can we imagine a person with the four cardinal virtues but without charity? Again, I think we 
can. If someone has the virtues but lacks charity, then he or she is a rightly ordered person 
without goodness. Similarly, we can consider the person who has charity but lacks the four 
virtues. This person wants to be temperate, brave, just, and prudent but has not yet attained, 
and may never attain, such integration. Many people may have the virtue of charity, who are 
not temperate, brave, just, or prudent.
29
 
 
                                                 
26
 Waldo Beach and Helmut R. Niebuhr, Christian Ethics: Sources of the Living Tradition, 2 ed. (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1973), 205-206. 
27
 Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice, 6 ed. (Saint Louis, MO: The C.V. Mosby 
Company, 1976), 180. 
28
 Philippa Foot, ―Virtues and Vices,‖ in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote (Oxford: Oxord 
University Press, 2001), 164.  
29
 James F. Keenan, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s ‘Summa Theologiae’ (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1992), 11; developed in more detail in 92-105. The author proposed this position 
also in several other publications, e.g. James F. Keenan, ―Die erworbene Tugend als richtige (nicht gute) 
Lebensführung: Ein genauerer Ausdruck ethischer Beschreibung,‖ in Ethische Theorie praktisch: Der 
fundamental-moraltheologische Ansatz in sozialethischer Entfaltung, ed. Franz Furger (Münster: 
Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1991), 19-35, esp. 29-33; James F. Keenan, ―Proposing Cardinal 
Virtues,‖ Theological Studies 56 (1995): 709-729, esp. 716-717; James F. Keenan, ―How Catholic Are the 
Virtues?,‖ America 176/20 (1997): 16-22. 
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The list of supporters of such an interpretation of Aquinas could be continued almost 
endlessly.
30
 
 
 
0.1.3 The Neglect of Infused Moral Virtues and Their Recent Rediscovery 
 
The above described interpretation of St. Thomas‘s moral theory entails, however, two serious 
problems: a conflict between so-called ―pagan‖ and ―monkish‖ virtues, and a general 
disregard for the infused cardinal virtues. 
 
(a) The Conflict between “Pagan” and “Monkish” Virtues 
It remains unarguable that Aquinas integrated many Aristotelian elements into his moral 
theory. Nonetheless, it is impossible to read it as a simple reproduction of Aristotle crowned 
by some theological add-ons. Aquinas‘s theory contains not only the theological virtues as 
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 We want to advert to some further scholars who claimed a similar view: For example, E. Stump explains in 
her recent book about Aquinas: ―The four cardinal virtues can be understood as habits of this sort [i.e. as 
acquired habits]. Reason‘s habit of good governance generally is prudence; reason‘s restraint which wards off 
self-serving concupiscence is temperance; reason's persevering rather than giving in to self-serving irascible 
passions such as fear is courage; reason's governance of one's relations with others is justice. Aquinas‘s 
normative ethics is based on virtues; it is concerned with dispositions and then with actions stemming from those 
dispositions. In addition to the moral virtues in all their various manifestations, . . . the supreme theological 
virtues of faith, hope and charity cannot be acquired but must be directly infused by God.‖ (Eleonore Stump, 
Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 25).  
For another instance we can refer to Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). The author describes in a separate chapter first the function of moral virtue according to an 
Aristotelian pattern (―How to be happy,‖ 227-249) which is followed by two chapters about grace and the 
specific Christian virtues faith hope and charity (―How to be holy‖ and ―The heart of grace,‖ 250-296).  
Similar Copleston who explains Aquinas‘s moral theory as composed of an Aristotelian humanistic foundation 
which is crowned by the theological virtues: ―While building, therefore, on a largely Aristotelian foundation, 
which represents what we may call the ‗humanistic‘ element in his ideal for man, Aquinas proceeds to discuss 
the theological virtues which, are not acquired in the same way as the natural virtues.‖ (Frederick C. Copleston, 
Aquinas (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961), 209). 
Interesting is the account of V.J. Bourke (Vernon J. Bourke, ―Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?,‖ The 
Monist 58 (1974): 52-63). The scholar is well aware that for Aquinas good and evil are not only measured by the 
standard of the natural law (as natural reason) but also by the divinely revealed law. However, he reduces the 
purpose of that divine law to confirm natural reason as determining principle of moral judgments (ibid., 61-66). 
Likewise D. Mieth mentions the difference between the ―ordinary‖ cardinal virtues and the theological virtues as 
specific Christian ingredient. He suggests a ―Christian integration of the cardinal virtues by the so-called 
theological virtues‖, (Mieth, Die neuen Tugenden, 43) which implies at the end that the theological virtues are 
read as specific Christian moral virtues (see the chapter The virtues of faith: the art of hoping and loving, ibid., 
170-189). 
Other authors who read the thomistic moral theory as composed of the four cardinal virtues and Christian charity 
(including faith and hope) are Geach, The Virtues and Paul J. Wadell, Friends of God: Virtues and Gifts in 
Aquinas (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 103-109; Paul J. Wadell, The Primacy of Love: An Introduction to the 
Ethics of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), 126-136. 
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completely new perfections in addition to the ―classical‖ moral virtues, but also the content of 
these ordinary human virtues is fundamentally transformed. Whilst the ancient thinkers have 
praised personal greatness and pride as man‘s ultimum posse, St. Thomas, faithful to the 
Christian tradition, recommends the opposite as human virtuousness: obedience, humility and 
self-denial.
31
 Thus it shall be hard to describe the combination of these two heritages simply 
by terms of addition. Their amalgamation raises many more questions than is usually 
mentioned – if reconciliation is possible at all.  
J. Casey brings the mutual contrariety to the point by saying:  
 
We do value greatness of achievement as well as pure intentions; we respect proper pride in 
others, and need to have it in ourselves; we do understand the virtues as somehow fulfilled in a 
public sphere; we admire and love people more for the active virtues of courage and practical 
wisdom than for what Hume called the ‗monkish virtues‘ of humility and self-denial. Yet at 
the same time it would be absurd to deny that we are all inescapably influenced by another 
tradition, one which teaches that he who would save his life must lose it; that the poor in spirit 
shall inherit the earth; that unless we become as little children we shall not enter the kingdom 
of heaven . . . On the face of it, these different traditions cannot be reconciled. It is true that 
Aquinas made an heroic attempt to reconcile the ethics of Aristotle with the teachings of 
Christ, and that many men of the Renaissance were quite unembarrassed by the conflict – just 
as they were happy to mingle Christian and pagan mythology in their art and literature.
32
 
 
The quotation makes very clear that a reading of St. Thomas as a simple repetition of Aristotle 
plus some new habits completely misunderstands his moral theory. Rather one might 
seriously doubt whether it is possible at all to find a common basis for the ancient ideal and 
the Christian ―monkish virtues.‖33 
 
(b) The Disregard of the Explicit References to Infused Cardinal Virtues 
Beyond that, the outlined conception ignores an integral part of Aquinas‘s moral theory, 
namely his doctrine of the infused moral virtues. According to St. Thomas, the act of divine 
justification bestows on the faithful faith, hope and charity. But not enough, in addition to that 
he claims the infusion of a specific set of supernatural cardinal virtues. In fact, he knows on 
the one hand acquired cardinal virtues as described by Aristotle (Aquinas even refers to these 
                                                 
31
 E.g. ST II-II 104 and 161. 
32
 John Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 211. 
33
 Also A. MacIntyre portrayed very well the tension between Aristotle and the Christian tradition (represented 
by St. Augustine‘s theology) and argued for a successful reconciliation of both heritages (MacIntyre, Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, 164-182). However, he fails to address the tension between both conceptions of 
virtue. 
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virtues sometimes as ―as those about which the philosophers have spoken‖34), on the other 
hand, he mentions a parallel set the infused cardinal virtues which are bestowed by God 
(given at once). Hence, a Thomistic moral account which refers only to cardinal virtues 
according to their Greek understanding ignores a substantial part of the source text.  
Aquinas speaks about these infused cardinal virtues on many occasions. Thus, it is hard to 
believe that his interpreters could oversee the doctrine by accident. Rather it seems that they 
consciously omit mentioning of these virtues as an act of ―mercy‖ regarding the doctor 
communis, considering the infused cardinal virtues as a superfluous attachment. G.J. Hughes 
called it a ―rather bizarre duplication of all the natural moral virtues by parallel supernatural 
virtues.―35 Such a position suggests that St. Thomas treated infused cardinal virtues either 
because of reverence of a previous tradition or for ―esthetic‖ reasons, as a second batch of 
Christian perfections, construed in a strict parallelism to their pagan counterparts, as a product 
of the scholastic preference for putting systematic structures which are, however, in this case 
just a needless complication.
36
 
The opinion that infused cardinal virtues are redundant is not new. It was already held in the 
middle Ages by Duns Scotus.
37
 But the denial by the Franciscan was rooted in a general 
rejection of the entire Thomistic anthropological framework,
38
 whereas many contemporary 
accounts consider the doctrine of infused moral virtues as dispensable even within Aquinas‘s 
own schema. 
                                                 
34
 De virt. card. 4: ―de quibus locuti sunt philosophi.‖ Similar in ad 3 or also ST I-II 61.5 ad 4. 
35
 Gerard J. Hughes, ―Does Aquinas Have a Moral Philosophy?,‖ Heythrop Journal 38 (1998): 318. 
36
 That‘s the suspicion of Paul de Vooght, ―Y a-t-il des vertus morales infuses?,‖ Ephemerides Theologicae 
Lovanienses 10 (1933): 240-241: ―La mentalité métaphysique scolastique est la cause de celle-ci.― More refined 
is the critique of O. Lottin who repeated many times his critical position: Odon Lottin, ―A propos des vertus 
morales infuses,‖ in Principes de morale. Compléments de doctrine et d'histoire, vol. 2, ed. Ders. (Louvain: 
Éditions de L'Abbaye du Mont César, 1947), 220-225; Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XII
e
 et XIII
e
 
siècles. Problèmes de morale, vol. 4 (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1954), 804-807; Odon Lottin, Morale 
fondamentale, vol. 1 (Tournai: Desclée & Cie, 1954), 408-414; Odon Lottin, ―Vertus morales acquises et vertus 
morales infuses chez Thomas d'Aquin,‖ in Études de morale histoire et doctrine, ed. Odon Lottin (Gembloux: J. 
Duculot, 1961), 140-149; Odon Lottin, Principes de morale: Exposé systématique, vol. 1 (Louvain: Éditions de 
L'Abbaye du Mont César, 1947), 272-275. Worth to note that Lottin does not negate the reality of supernatural 
moral virtues but holds the position that it is possible for a justified person to acquire supernatural moral virtues 
by means of commands of the theological virtues. More thereto in ch. 2.1. 
An interesting attempt of a unifying ―reinterpretation‖ of Lottin and Aquinas undertakes Amatus de Sutter, ―De 
virtutum moralium infusarum existentia controversia recentior,‖ Ephemerides Carmeliticae 14 (1963): 413-431.  
37
 For an overview of the doctrine on infused moral virtues at the beginning of the 14
th
 century, see Lottin, 
Psychologie et morale, vol. 4, 737-807. 
38
 In chapter 1 we will see that for Aquinas infused virtues (the theological as well as the infused moral ones) are 
necessary since the gift of grace elevates and divinizes man‘s whole nature. Scotus, however, seems to identify 
grace simply with charity as a habit of the will, without raising man‘s nature to a new and higher level. (―Scotus 
believes that sanctifying grace and the theological virtue of charity are one and the same.‖ (Richard Cross, Duns 
Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 107-111, here 108). 
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In recent times however a certain rediscovery of the doctrine of infused moral virtues has 
taken place. It is impossible to mention in an introduction all the scholarly articles which have 
touched upon the issue in some way. We will therefore restrict ourselves to a few authors who 
have contributed important support for a new appraisal of the Thomistic doctrine of infused 
moral virtues. 
 
(1) Servais Pinckaers: The Scriptural Foundation of the Doctrine of Infused Virtues 
First of all, we have to mention the inspiring studies of S. Pinckaers. The famous Dominican 
of Fribourg affirmed repeatedly the importance of infused cardinal virtues for the moral life in 
Aquinas‘s thought. And this as a result of its grounding upon the sources of divine revelation. 
―Some such theory [of infused moral virtues] seems necessary if we are to explain what the 
Scriptures teach concerning the way to life as followers of Christ.‖ 39  Already a cursory 
overview of the relevant texts in the New Testament which touch the issue of moral virtues 
suggests a divine infusion. For example, according to the letter to the Ephesians, God has 
bestowed upon us grace that grants us ―all wisdom and prudence []‖ (Eph 1.8). 2 
Timothy 1.7 tells us that ―God did not give us a spirit of cowardice but rather of power, love 
and temperance [].‖ Further, the New Testament takes ―power‖ () as 
one of the equivalents for the Greek virtue of fortitude.
40
 Regarding justice () the 
hagiographers affirm that Christ is our justice (1 Cor 1.30) and in Christ we become justice of 
God (2 Cor 5.21). Thus, the New Testament portrays prudence, justice, fortitude and 
temperance as given to us by God. Pinckaers has shown in several books how the Thomistic 
account of morality (and especially the doctrine of infused virtues) is nothing else than a 
consequent advancement of the most fundamental sources of Christian faith.
41
 
                                                 
39
 Servais Pinckaers, Morality: The Catholic View (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine‘s Press, 2001), 72. Admittedly, 
Scripture does not know an explicit doctrine of infused virtues. But as O.H. Pesch has mentioned, from the basis 
of divine revelation they can be considered as valid ―postulate‖ or ―explanatory model.‖(Otto H. Pesch, ―Die 
bleibende Bedeutung der thomanischen Tugendlehre,‖ Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 21 
(1974): 375). 
40
 Also Eph 6.10 notes that strength (kratos) for resisting the devil comes from God. 
41
 Servais Pinckaers, Das geistliche Leben des Christen. Theologie und Spritualität nach Paulus und Thomas von 
Aquin (Paderborn: Bonifatius, 1995); Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, esp. 104-167; Servais 
Pinckaers, ―The Sources of the Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas,‖ in The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomistic 
Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig St. Titus (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2005), 3-25; Servais Pinckaers, ―Scripture and the Renewal in Moral Theology,‖ in The Pinckaers Reader: 
Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig St. Titus (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2005), 46-63; for a general presentation of (thomistic) morality on the basis of 
Scriptural texts, see Servais Pinckaers, La justice évangélique (Paris: Téqui, 1986); Servais Pinckaers, The 
Pursuit of Happiness - God’s Way: Living the Beatitudes (New York: Alba House, 1998). 
Recently, W.C. Mattison proposed an intresting application of Pinckers‘s claim. He relates the three theological 
and the four cardinal virtues to the seven petitions of the Prayer the Lord. Further, he notes that there is no 
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(2) Jean Porter: The Subversion of the Aristotelian Account by Infused Virtues 
In 1992, J. Porter published the stimulating article ―The Subversion of Virtue,‖ which 
investigates how Aquinas uses the Aristotelian account of virtues for his theological purposes. 
Porter succeeded to show that Aquinas had built the Christian moral synthesis upon the 
―pagan‖ understanding of virtue but simultaneously had transformed this original account by 
introducing the idea of infused habits. 
 
The infused virtues function in a way that is significantly different from the way in which the 
acquired virtues function, so much so that they can be described as virtues only in a carefully 
qualified sense. And yet, without some reference to the acquired virtues as traditionally 
understood, Aquinas‘s account of the infused virtues would loose its meaning and point. His 
theological treatment of the virtues builds upon the tradition of the ‗pagan virtues‘ even as it 
subverts that tradition.
42
 
 
Though such a short article leaves many questions unanswered (for example the mutual 
cooperation of ―pagan‖ and infused virtues), it designates an important step for recovering the 
doctrine of infused virtues by giving evidence for the concordance as well as difference 
between Aristotle and Aquinas.
43
 
 
(3) Renée Mirkes and Gabriel Baumann: The Cooperation of Acquired and Infused 
Virtue 
Almost at the same time R. Mirkes prepared her dissertation about the relation of acquired 
and infused virtues. At the moment one receives the grace of divine justification, a 
supernatural set of cardinal virtues is also infused to the faithful. However, what does this 
imply for previously acquired ―pagan‖ virtues? Are the infused virtues incomplete if the agent 
                                                                                                                                                        
rupture within the listing of the seven petitions. But the theological virtues are infused. Thus, he concludes that 
―the very format of the Lord‘s Prayer is both an ‗argument‘ for the existence of the infused cardinal (or moral) 
virtues, and indeed the primacy of the infused (rather than acquired) cardinal virtues.‖ (William C. Mattison, 
―The Lord's Prayer and an Ethics of Virtue,‖ The Thomist 73 (2009): 310). 
42
 Jean Porter, ―The Subversion of Virtue. Acquired and Infused Virtues in the ‗Summa theologiae‘,‖ The Annual 
of the Society of Christian Ethics 12 (1992): 19-41, here 20. 
43
 The issue of infused virtues is treated also in Jean Porter, ―‗De ordine caritatis:‘ Charity, Friendship, and 
Justice in Thomas Aquinas‘ Summa Theologiae,‖ The Thomist 53 (1998): 197-214 and shortly at the end of Jean 
Porter, ―The Virtue of Justice (IIa IIae, qq. 58-122),‖ in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 282-284. 
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lacks such natural perfections? Mirkes argues in her extensive study that infused virtues are 
perfect moral virtues only in connection with acquired virtues.
44
 
Most recently G. Baumann published a thesis on the ontological rooting of infused virtues 
into the graced agent. The research treats at great length a possible clarification of the 
cooperation of both sets of virtue.
45
  
It is not possible to appreciate both studies in this introduction (we will refer to them several 
times later on, esp. in chapter 3), but they are certainly to be considered as important steps for 
a recovery of the doctrine of the infused moral virtues.  
 
(4) Angela McKay: Infused Moral Virtues as Primary Concern of Aquinas’s Moral 
Theory 
Last but not least we have to mention the seminal dissertation The Infused and Acquired 
Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy of A. McKay,46 who has contributed to the current 
discussion in two ways:  
The first part of her thesis shows how the set of infused virtues ―differs drastically‖47 from its 
acquired counterpart (regarding their right mean, their origin, their development, etc.). Further, 
she illustrates that even infused virtues alone are perfect virtues which confer by themselves 
to the agent a specific kind of facility (and not only by their combination with acquired 
virtues).  
In the second (and even more challenging) part of her book she tries to demonstrate a highly 
controversial claim, which simply follows from consequent reasoning. If infused moral 
virtues are really the primary concern of Aquinas, then this position should have some effects 
on his portrayal of the particular virtues. More precisely stated, the detailed discussions of the 
four cardinal virtues in the Secunda secundae of the Summa theologiae should not describe 
                                                 
44
 Renée Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue and its Significance of the Nature-Grace 
Question,‖ (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1995. The most principal points of her thesis are summarized in 
Renée Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine of Moral Virtue and its Significance for Theories of Facility,‖ The Thomist 
61 (1997): 189-218 and Renée Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1998): 589-605. 
45
 Gabriel Baumann, ―La surnaturalisation des actes humains par la grâce: L‘enracinement ontologique des 
vertus morales infuses chez S. Thomas,‖ (S.T.D. diss., University of Fribourg, 2008, 
http://ethesis.unifr.ch/theses/downloads.php?file=BaumannG.pdf (accessed February 4, 2010)). 
46
 Angela M. McKay, ―The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas‘ Moral Philosophy,‖ (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Notre Dame, 2004, http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-04152004-
125337/unrestricted/McKayAM052004.pdf (accessed February 4, 2010)). Nota bene: Recent articles of McKay 
are published under the name of ―Angela McKay Knobel‖ (since 2010). Both names refer to the same author. 
47
 Ibid., 4. 
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pagan virtues, but infused cardinal virtues. McKay offers therefore in the second part of her 
dissertation a subtle investigation of the treatises on prudence and fortitude in the ST II-II
48
 
and demonstrates that reading these texts as concerning infused virtues is not only possible 
but is perhaps more suitable.  
This leads us straightaway to the topic of our own thesis. 
 
 
0.2 Our Thesis: Justice as an Infused Virtue in the Summa Theologiae 
 
0.2.1 Reading the Secunda secundae as about Infused Moral Virtues 
 
According to McKay‘s thesis infused moral virtue is the primary concern of the extensive 
section about the cardinal virtues in ST II-II. It is hard to find scholars who agree with McKay 
in this interpretation. Even among Thomists who acknowledge explicitly the importance of 
infused moral virtues and recognizes them as essential part of Aquinas‘s moral theory (few 
enough), the Secunda secundae is read as concerning acquired cardinal virtues.  
One such writer is R. Mirkes, who of course is well aware of the two sets of moral virtues and 
who certainly does not undervalue the issue of infused virtues explains regarding ST II-II:  
 
While insisting on the two species of moral virtue, acquired and infused, Aquinas devotes the 
greatest proportion of the Secunda secundae of the Summa theologiae to the analysis of the 
acquired moral virtues and neglects a correspondingly full exposition of their infused 
counterparts.
49
 
 
In the same way T.H. Irwin explains that the Secunda secundae is concerned about the three 
theological virtues and ―the four cardinal virtues, as the basis of the acquired virtues.‖50 
Likewise G. Baumann, who writes at the end of his dissertation:  
 
                                                 
48
 The treatise on prudence (incl. all of its parts) comprises ST II-II 47-56, the treatise on fortitude qq. 123-140.  
49
 Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 190; the same position is repeated in Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect 
Moral Virtue,‖ 589. 
50
 Terence H. Irwin, ―Do Virtue Conflict? Aquinas‘ Answer,‖ in Virtue Ethics, Old and New, ed. Stephen M. 
Gardiner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 60. 
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When St. Thomas gives the definition of the cardinal virtues in this part of the Summa 
theologiae [sc. in the Secunda secundae] he never gives a definition whose object is 
supernatural. . . . ‗Natural reason‘ is the measure of the acquired virtues which reserved to 
pagans from a supernatural optic. . . . Hence, the cardinal virtues there are treated as natural 
ones.
51
 
 
M. Labourdette, who gave an excellent account of the general character of infused moral 
virtues in his commentary on the questions on virtue in the Prima secundae,
52
 can certainly be 
considered a specialist on the matter. Nonetheless, he argues the following about the Secunda 
secundae:  
 
The first part of the Secunda Secundae . . . was dedicated to these supernatural powers of the 
divine participated life which are the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit 
attached to them. Starting from question 47 we have entered another domain, namely that of 
the virtues of the human life as such, i.e. those perfections of the moral order which the human 
nature by itself demands to achieve, in whatever state it is.
53
 
 
Noteworthy is also the assertion of the Dutch Thomist L. Elders. Though a philosopher, 
Elders recognizes the important function of the infused moral virtues in Aquinas‘s thought. 
Nevertheless, he argues that the Secunda secundae is to be read as concerning acquired 
virtues, which argument then serves as justification for his own philosophical investigation of 
the texts. 
 
In the second volume of Part II of the Summa theologiae St. Thomas studies the infused 
supernatural virtues, as appears from the context of this treatise and its location after the 
discussion of the three theological virtues, faith, hope and love.. [sic] He does not explain the 
difference between the virtues we acquired in a natural way and the infused virtues, but his 
analyses and arguments concerning the nature and division of the virtues are at the level of 
natural reason. This means that Aquinas sees an analogy and coherence between the natural 
and the infused moral virtues. The nature and operation of the infused virtues must apparently 
be studied in the light of the acquired virtues. The acquired virtues, in fact, are taken up into 
the supernatural virtues. Their practice helps Christians on their way to their supernatural 
end. . . . This justifies presenting the insights of St. Thomas about the cardinal virtues in a 
study of philosophical ethics.
54
 
                                                 
51
 Baumann, ―La surnaturalisation,‖ 265. The conclusion does not contradict the fact that for Aquinas the infused 
moral virtues are of higher importance since according to Baumann every act of infused virtue implies a 
simultaneous exercise of the corresponding natural virtue. Thus, the Secunda secundae describes just this 
subordinate habit (see the more detailed outline on that in ch. 3). 
52
 See M.-Michel Labourdette, Cours de théologie morale: Les principes des actes humains (Ia-IIae, Qu. 49-70) 
(Toulouse, 1963). 
53
 M.-Michel Labourdette, Cours de théologie morale: La justice (IIa-IIae, 57-79), vol. 1 (Toulouse, 1960), 1. 
54
 Léon J. Elders, The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Happiness, Natural Law and the Virtues (Frankfurt (Main): 
Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2005), 229. 
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Consequently, Elders never mentions the issue of infused virtue in the subsequent portrayal of 
justice in the Secunda secundae.
55
 
Moreover, scholars such as M.D. Jordan, S.J. Pope and C. Steel, who explicitly researched the 
structure of the Secunda secundae, describe the four sections on prudence, justice, fortitude 
and temperance unanimously as about acquired virtues.
56
 
 
The Challenge of McKay’s Thesis 
Against this background the challenging originality of McKay‘s thesis is apparent. 57  As 
already mentioned, the second part of her work contains a detailed reading of the treatise on 
prudence and fortitude to give evidence for her claim. For her purposes she focuses especially 
                                                 
55
 Ibid., 239-270. 
56
 See Jordan, ―Ideals of ‗Scientia moralis‘ and the Invention of the ‗Summa theologiae‘,‖ 91-95; Stephen J. 
Pope, ―Overview of Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,‖ in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 30-53; Carlos Steel, ―Thomas‘ Lehre von den Kardinaltugenden (S.th. 
II-II, qq. 47-170),‖ in Thomas von Aquin: Die ‘Summa theologiae’. Werkinterpretationen, ed. Andreas Speer 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 322-342. 
Other authors remain unclear about this point. For example, R.J. Regan explains regarding the structure of the 
Secunda secundae: ―After treating of the theological virtues, Aquinas considers the cardinal virtues: prudence, 
justice, fortitude, and temperance. These are natural virtues, to which charity adds supernatural prudence and 
supernatural moral virtues.‖ (Richard J. Regan, ―Introduction,‖ in The Cardinal Virtues. Prudence, Justice, 
Fortitude, and Temperance, (contains the text of Thomas Aquinas) (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2005), xvii). Although the assertion itself is unclear, his subsequent argument shows that he reads the 
discussion of the cardinal virtues in the ST II-II as about acquired virtues. 
57
 There are few scholars who indicate gingerly that St. Thomas‘s first concern in the Summa Theologiae is (or 
has to be) infused moral virtues – however without drawing explicit conclusions for the reading of the Secunda 
secundae. For example R. Garrigou-Lagrange: ―While reading the part of St. Thomas‘ Summa dealing with these 
Christian moral virtues, especially prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, many think these are only the 
natural virtues described by Aristotle and that they are clothed with a simple adventitious supernatural modality, 
springing from the influence of charity, which should direct all our acts to God. Some theologians have not gone 
beyond this conception. The thought of St. Thomas is far loftier. According to his teaching, the Christian moral 
virtues are infused and, because of their formal object, essentially distinct from the highest acquired moral 
virtues described by the greatest philosophers.‖ (Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian Perfection and 
Contemplation According to St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book, 
1937), 61). Similar E. Gilson who notes: ―As to what moral virtues St. Thomas is actually speaking about in the 
Summa, the answer in principle is simple. He is speaking of the infused supernatural moral virtues and not the 
acquired natural moral virtues. However, we must not forget that philosophy is never absent from this synthesis 
of the revealed and the revealable. It is present in the moral parts as well as elsewhere. Perhaps it is especially 
present in the moral parts because here it represents that nature which is presupposed by grace in order to perfect 
it and bring it to its end.‖ (Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 333-350, here 338-339). More recently Bonnie Kent, ―The Moral Life,‖ 
in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. Arthur S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 248: ―A close reading of the Summa theologiae reveals that these naturally acquired 
virtues play a far more modest role than one might expect.‖ And elsewhere: ―A few of the moral virtues 
described in the Secunda Secundae are supernatural.― (Bonnie Kent, ―Moral Provincialism,‖ Religious Studies 
30 (1994): 282). These short notices, however, fail to give any explicit reason or indication which would 
substantiate the assertion for the Secunda secundae. 
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on articles which define the particular moral virtue in connection with grace and charity, or 
which assert a necessary relation to a corresponding gift of the Holy Spirit or to the divine law. 
It is impossible to summarize her complete argumentation in few lines. But it will be very 
helpful for the understanding of our own thesis to outline briefly at least some of its central 
points. 
 
ST II-II 47-56: Prudence as Infused Virtue 
McKay proves her contention about infused prudence in three steps:  
First, she points to the fact that the general question on prudence (q. 47) describes grace as 
prerequisite for ―prudence simply speaking‖ (prudentia simpliciter). Without grace somebody 
might have prudence in regard to particular issues, but not in regard to his final end, i.e. 
prudence in its proper form. Consequently, prudentia simpliciter is more than just ―pagan‖ 
phronesis.
58
  
Secondly, q. 52 suggests a cooperation of prudence as cardinal virtue with counsel as a gift 
the Holy Spirit. The former has to be perfected by the latter. Thus, we have to conclude that 
Aquinas here describes prudence as virtue in the order of grace.
59
  
And thirdly, the discussion of contrary vices describes repeatedly imprudent acts not only as 
contrary to prudence, but also as destructive to grace, i.e. as sins – another strong indication 
for McKay‘s thesis that the prudence discussed perfects man in regard to his supernatural 
final end.
60
 
 
ST II-II 124-140: Fortitude as Infused Virtue 
McKay develops her argument for infused fortitude in the following steps:  
First, Aquinas‘s discussion ends with a special question about the precepts of fortitude. 
Accordingly, he quotes some commands of divine law saying that they ―are given with regard 
to what is convenient for the ordination of the mind towards God.―61  Consequently, the 
purpose of the described fortitude is not an earthly good but the attainment of God.
62
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 ST II-II 47.13 and 14; see McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 102-110. 
59
 Ibid., 110-114. 
60
 ST II-II 53, esp. article 1 and 2; Ibid., 114-117. 
61
 ST II-II 140.1: ―Praecepta legis divinae, tam de fortitudine quam de aliis virtutibus, dantur secundum quod 
convenit ordinationi mentis in deum.‖ Even more explicit in ad 1. 
62
 McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 133-137. 
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Furthermore, in another question he combines (similar to the case of prudence) fortitude as 
virtue with a particular gift of the Holy Spirit, both as perfecting the agent regarding his 
attainment of eternal life. Thus, fortitude is treated as belonging to the order of grace.
63
 
Secondly, Aquinas discusses magnanimity, patience, perseverance and magnificence as 
principal parts of fortitude.
64
 In regard to each particular virtue, McKay points to some 
significant indications for an infused habit. According to q. 129, magnanimity does not 
consist in the realization of one‘s own greatness but in the actual primacy of the divine good 
participated by man. Obviously Aquinas does not simply repeat an Aristotelian account of 
magnanimity.
65
 Subsequently, he notes an internal connection between magnanimity and 
humility. But the latter is clearly described elsewhere as an infused virtue.
66
 In addition, 
Aquinas claims in the discussion of patience that there is no patience as virtue apart from 
charity. Only by charity one gives preference to grace over any kind of distress – which is the 
proper notion of patience. Hence, patience is understood as infused virtue.
67
 Further, in q. 137 
Aquinas asserts that perseverance ―needs the gift of habitual grace as also the other infused 
virtues.‖68 And last but not least, in a sed contra of q. 134 he describes the magnificence 
possessed by man as ―a certain participation in divine virtue.‖69  
Thirdly, the first question of the whole treaties on fortitude in general is followed by a 
discussion about martyrdom as principal part of fortitude, defined in its perfect notion as 
suffering death for Christ. Clearly even this ordering suggests the concern about supernatural 
fortitude.
70
 
Admittedly, such a sketchy abstract of McKay‘s thesis may be too fragmented. But it should 
indicate at least the general method by which she proceeds to prove her controversial thesis – 
i.e. the general concern of the discussion of the cardinal virtues in the Secunda secundae is 
not acquired but infused virtue. However, she only covers the treatise on prudence and 
fortitude (with a few references to the discussion on temperance). She had to leave untouched 
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 ST II-II 139; Ibid., 137-140. 
64
 Cf. ST II-II 129 prologus.  
65
 ST II-II 129.3 ad 4: ―Magnanimitas igitur facit quod homo se magnis dignificet secundum considerationem 
donorum quae possidet ex deo.‖ 
66
 ST II-III 161.1 ad 5; see thereto McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 142-166. 
67
 ST II-II 136.3: ―Quod autem aliquis praeferat bonum gratiae omnibus naturalibus bonis ex quorum amissione 
potest dolor causari, pertinet ad caritatem, quae diligit deum super omnia. Unde manifestum est quod patientia, 
secundum quod est virtus, a caritate causatur.‖ The reply to the second objection even distinguishes explicitly 
between this kind of virtue from political virtue. See Ibid., 166-179. 
68
 ST II-II 137.4: ―Hoc modo indiget dono habitualis gratiae, sicut et ceterae virtutes infusae.‖ Commented by 
Ibid., 179-182. 
69
 ST II-II 134.1 sed contra: ―Virtus humana est participatio quaedam virtutis divinae. Sed magnificentia pertinet 
ad virtutem divinam . . . Ergo magnificentia est virtus.‖ See Ibid., 182. 
70
 ST II-II 124; Ibid., 182-86. 
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– for reasons of her dissertation‘s length – the extensive part about justice in ST II-II. But if 
her thesis is principally right with regard to prudence and fortitude, then it also has to be 
possible to read the treatise on justice as about an infused cardinal virtue.  
 
ST II-II 57-122 as about Infused Justice? 
The case of the treatise on justice raises several important questions: The long treatise keeps – 
seemingly – complete silence about infused justice. Though the discussion is by far the 
longest part in the Summa theologiae dedicated to one special virtue (qq. 57-122), it is hard to 
find any references to the general topic of infused virtues, and Aquinas never mentions the 
term ―iustitia infusa.‖ Thus, even McKay admits at the end of her dissertation that a reading 
of the treatise on justice as about infused virtue raises many and serious difficulties: 
 
The treatises on temperance and justice pose more problems than the treatises on prudence and 
fortitude did. First, the treatises on prudence and fortitude both contain articles which clearly 
concern infused, and only infused, virtue – namely articles which ask whether a certain virtue 
can be possessed without grace. These articles provided us with a ‗way in,‘ as it were, to the 
treatise as a whole. Because the treatises on temperance and justice do not contain such 
articles, they are that much more difficult to navigate. A second, even more complicated 
problem lies in the fact that the treatises on temperance and justice both contain discussions of 
virtues (fasting and religion) which one might intuitively think of as infused virtues, but which 
Aquinas clearly locates as natural, rather than supernatural, virtues. Although neither of these 
difficulties are insurmountable, they do render the treatises more problematic. While I do 
believe a reading similar to those given of prudence and fortitude can be given of temperance 
and justice, I also believe that a careful and detailed analysis of those treatises must precede 
any such reading.
71
 
 
Therefore, after this long introduction, we reach finally our own thesis. Where the dissertation 
of McKay ends our work begins. We want to accomplish this ―careful and detailed analysis‖ 
about the treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae which is necessary to demonstrate that 
not only can it be read as about infused justice, but that doing so makes even more sense than 
reading it as about an acquired cardinal virtue.  
 
 
                                                 
71
 Ibid., 188.  
A rare exception between scholars is Aumann who argues: ―As an infused virtue justice is a supernatural habit 
that inclines the will constantly and perpetually to render each one that which is due strictly.‖ And in a footnote 
he refers to ST II-II 58, the introductory question about justice (see Jordan Aumann, Spiritual Theology (London: 
Sheed & Ward, 1980), 281). However, he fails to give any evidence for this claim.  
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0.2.2 ST II-II as about Infused Justice: The Structure of Our Argument 
 
Our argument is constructed in three sections, organized in seven chapters.  
In the first section (chapter 1-3), we clarify general issues of acquired and infused virtues. 
Based on these results, the second section (chapter 4-6) reconstructs justice as an infused 
virtue. Since St. Thomas does not treat infused justice ex professo, it is necessary to deduce its 
exact meaning by reference to his general descriptions of infused virtues.  
The third section (chapter 7) offers a reading through the treatise on justice in the Secunda 
secundae and tries to verify our proposed reconstruction of infused justice by referring to the 
text in the Summa itself.  
In particular, our thesis proceeds in the following steps: 
 
Chapter 1 outlines ―The General Framework of Infused Moral Virtues: Their Perfection and 
Limitation.‖ In the first part, we portray Aquinas‘s theory of acquired and infused virtues as 
two sets of moral virtues which are structured in a strict and parallel way (section 1.1). He 
describes infused virtues as perfect virtues, but everyday experience reveals many of the 
faithful as quite imperfect (though they should have – according to St. Thomas – infused 
virtues), so we have to determine carefully the function and limit of infused virtues (section 
1.2). Moreover, Aquinas asserts an internal connection and cooperation of these virtues with 
the gifts of the Holy Spirit, so we shall have to discuss this relationship as well (section 1.3). 
 
Chapter 2 adds further specifications of the ―Differences between Acquired and Infused 
Virtues.‖ We develop our argument by reference to the four Aristotelian causes.  
First, the efficient cause of infused virtues is – by definition – God himself. But why should it 
be impossible to acquire moral virtues which can cooperate with (infused) charity by one‘s 
own repeated acts? Why does St. Thomas hold the position that acquired virtues cannot be 
guided by the theological virtues (section 2.1)?  
Secondly, the formal determination of acquired virtues stems from human reason; the formal 
ratio of infused virtues is the divine law.
72
 But how are the two interrelated? In which way 
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 Cf. ST I-II 63.4. 
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does the divine law inform infused virtues, and how is reason involved in their actions 
(section 2.2)? 
Thirdly, the human city on earth is the final cause of acquired virtues; the community of 
saints, i.e. the Church, is the end of infused virtues.
73
 More difficult than the second assertion 
is the first one: what is meant by acquired virtues as perfections regarding human things? Do 
they imply man‘s complete perfection on a natural level? Regarding all practical matters? As 
perfect natural virtues? Or does St. Thomas use the concept only for the ability to lead a 
peaceful and harmonious life in a human city, i.e. as political virtue? On that score, a heated 
controversy arose recently between McKay and Osborne. We shall suggest a solution which 
takes account of both positions and deepens the understanding of infused virtues as ―political 
virtues‖ of the heavenly community (section 2.3). 
Fourth, the material cause. As Aquinas notes somewhere, actions and passions are the matter 
for virtues. The issue is clear. However, we want to use this occasion for the investigation 
whether one virtue can be taken as ―matter‖ of another virtue, for example temperance as 
matter of prudence. Beyond that, some scholars take the matter-form-analogy for 
exemplifying the relation of acquired and infused virtues. In section 2.4 we shall explore the 
possibility (and the limit) of this analogy.  
 
Chapter 3 is concerned about ―Different Theories about the Cooperation of Acquired and 
Infused Virtues Developed by the Commentators.‖ Having outlined the specific difference 
between acquired and infused virtues, we have still to determine the possible interaction of the 
two kinds of virtue. How do acquired virtues affect the infused ones? Do infused virtues 
imply likewise acquired virtues? There are many concrete and tricky questions, many of 
which Aquinas had not addressed. As a result, the commentators were free to create numerous 
hypotheses. We want to give an overview about these theories and propose our own solution. 
The results of this third chapter are highly important for our further argument, since in the 
following chapters we apply these general principles to the special case of justice.
74
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 See again ST I-II 63.4.  
74
 Thus, if somebody disagrees with our results of chapter 3, he will probably regard also the line of argument of 
chapter 4 to 7 as less convincing. 
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Chapter 4, the first chapter of the second section (about the reconstruction of justice as 
infused virtue), describes ―The General Structure of Justice According to St. Thomas.‖ Before 
we reconstruct justice as an infused virtue, we have to clarify the meaning of justice as such.  
First, we discuss the special character of the object of justice, i.e. the ius (section 4.1), then the 
different kinds of iusta, namely natural and positive rights (section 4.2), and finally the 
foundation which grounds the obligation to render everyone his right (section 4.3). Based on 
these results, we shall be ready to grasp Aquinas‘s definition of the virtue justice as an interior 
inclination of the will to give each his due (section 4.4). Moreover, Aquinas uses the concept 
of justice in several analogous ways, e.g., as a particular virtue, as a general virtue, as a mode 
of all virtues, as metaphorical justice, etc. In section 4.5 we present a short summary of these 
different meanings justice can carry in the Summa. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between ―Charity and Justice.‖ The issue is important. 
Both virtues reside in the will, and both intend the good of the other. Nonetheless, both 
remain specifically different. Justice grants to the other what is due to him, i.e. what belongs 
to him in the proper sense, or what is his. Justice strives for compensation. Charity (or more 
common: friendship) bestows upon the other free gifts; it gives gratuitously from one‘s own, 
from what is mine (section 5.1). Further, Aquinas does not only distinguish between charity 
and justice, but he knows even different kinds of friendship. As a result, there must exist 
various kinds of justice. Although he does not assert explicitly such a parallel structure, we 
can reconstruct such an understanding from various remarks he makes (section 5.2). Based on 
these findings, it becomes possible to delimit more exactly the particular character of infused 
justice in contrast to the other infused moral virtues (section 5.3) and the special cooperation 
of infused justice and charity (section 5.4).  
At the end of this chapter however a new and serious difficulty presents itself. Reconstructing 
infused justice as rendering to another person what is due to him because of the divine law 
allows for a twofold interpretation. On one side, it seems to be a general virtue which might 
commands all virtuous acts (a kind of divine justice). On the other side, if we limit the task of 
infused justice to the ordinary matter of justice (i.e. external actions regarding fellow-citizens), 
it seems to be almost equal to its natural counterpart which strives for the wellbeing of the 
human society on earth (section 5.5). 
Thus, a further chapter becomes necessary to clarify the exact meaning of infused justice 
according to the general features of infused moral virtues.  
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Chapter 6 undertakes ―The Reconstruction of Justice as Infused Virtue,‖ not by referring to 
an explicit text of Aquinas (there are none), but by applying the general principles of acquired 
and infused virtues to the particular case of justice. The foundation for our argument in this 
section is laid down in the first part of our thesis, especially in the third chapter. (Needless to 
say that the cogency of your reconstruction depends largely on the validity of our results in 
chapter 3.) 
We proceed in three steps: First, we give an account of infused metaphorical justice. On 
several occasions Aquinas describes the graced status of the justified faithful by the term 
―justice‖ – not as moral virtue but as a state of rectitude. That status, obviously has to be 
infused (section 6.1). 
Further, we reconstruct infused justice as observing the whole divine law, rendering to God 
what is due to him. The result is an infused divine legal justice which corresponds to the first 
option of our dilemma at the end of the previous chapter (section 6.2). 
More complicated is the account of infused justice as cardinal virtue in the proper sense 
(second option), as virtue by which we pay back what is due to the other insofar he is our 
fellow-citizen, but by reference to the divine law (section 6.3). The Old Law knew many 
determinations regarding these matters, i.e. the judicial precepts. In the New Law, however, 
Christ abandoned all these precepts and gave freedom to believers. Only the natural law, i.e. 
the moral precepts, remained obligatory, as well as the positive laws of the civil authority (if 
they are just) and – this is important – the ecclesiastical canons insofar they concern the civil 
life. These results allow the reconstruction of various kinds of justice: infused commutative 
justice, infused distributive justice, infused legal justice. It likewise makes clear that the 
external object of infused justice and of its acquired counterpart differs only in certain areas, 
whereas both coincide in many respects. 
This will be of special importance for the next (and final) section. 
 
Chapter 7, which comprises the third section of this dissertation, is titled ―Justice as Infused 
Virtue in the Treatise on Justice in ST II-II.‖ After having shown what infused justice has to 
be like according to the general principles of infused moral virtues, we verify in a final step 
our reconstruction by reference to the treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae.  
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We examine first the order of the various questions in the treatise. Against a superficial 
similarity, the structure of the discussion of justice in the Secunda secundae differs in 
important respects from Aristotle‘s account: the whole treatise follows consequently the 
structure of the divine law as formulated by the Ten Commandments (section 7.1). In the next 
subchapters, we concentrate on the section about justice in its proper sense (qq. 58-79, section 
7.2-5). After an initial reading of these questions, one may surmise that there is not the 
faintest mention of an infused virtue, whereas the second large part of the treatise contains 
some more apparent indications. Thus, if we succeed to demonstrate our thesis in this first 
part, it will be well positioned for the questions that arise in the second. In section 7.2 we 
investigate various indications for infused virtue as references to the divine law, to 
ecclesiastical determinations, to charity as the foundation of justice, to merit, to mortal sin as 
contrary, etc. Section 7.3 raises (and answers) some objections. Section 7.4 and 7.5 discuss 
the different kinds of justice (e.g., commutative and distributive justice, legal justice, etc.) as 
infused virtues, always by reference to the text itself. In section 7.6 we list briefly some 
arguments for infused virtues in the second part of the treatise, which discusses the potential 
parts of justice (qq. 80-119), as for example religion and piety. To conclude, we investigate q. 
121 about piety as gift of the Holy Spirit. We will see that this question at the end of the 
whole discussion fits perfectly to a reading of the whole treatise as about infused justice 
(section 7.8). 
We argue in the forgoing manner that it is possible to give evidence that the treatise on justice 
in ST II-II speaks indeed of an infused virtue. 
 
 
0.3 Some Preliminary Remarks  
 
First, regarding the method of our argument, the concern of our thesis is Aquinas‘s doctrine as 
such rather than the progression of his teaching. Therefore, we will largely ignore questions of 
development across texts, and focus instead on showing that it is possible to prove our claim 
by reference to Aquinas‘s corpus as a whole.  
Moreover, some technical notes need to be made. 
If a citation in this work contains an emphasis (italic, bold, or underlined formation), the 
highlighting is taken over from the original. Emphasis added to a quotation is always 
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mentioned explicitly. The only exceptions to this rule are quotations from the texts of St. 
Thomas. Due to the fact that there is no high-lighting in the original text, any emphasis in 
such quotations is ours, even if it is not marked as such. Further, we decided to use for all 
Latin citation a consistent style – what means for example the general renunciation of the 
usage of the letter ―j‖ and its substitution by the classical ―i‖ – even if the cited source makes 
a distinction. (The various volumes of the Busa-edition of Aquinas differ in this regard.) 
Quotations of St. Thomas and of others authors in foreign languages are translated into 
English. All translations are mine. For cited texts of Aquinas, we give the original Latin text 
in footnotes. In the other cases, we quote only the most important terms in the original 
language. If we cite a text in foreign language only in an explicatory footnote, we dispense 
with an English translation. 
If we refer in a footnote by a cross-reference to another footnote, the number relates to the 
footnote-numbering of the same chapter. Otherwise we give a special notation. 
The abbreviations of Aquinas‘s works are registered in a special table (see page viii), which is 
followed by a list of other abbreviations used in this dissertation. 
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FIRST PART: Acquired and Infused Virtues in Aquinas  
 
1. The General Framework of Infused Moral Virtues: Their Perfection and 
Limitation 
 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is quite humble. It wants to clarify the most general 
features of the Thomistic account of infused moral virtues and ward off some seemingly 
obvious objections against that doctrine which might make it appear as unreasonable 
―scholastic sophistry.‖ In this first chapter our argument proceeds in three steps: 
First, infused virtues are called ―infused‖ since they are immediately bestowed by God upon 
each human agent who receives sanctifying grace. This divine infusion is, however, not 
limited to the Christian ―chief-virtues‖ faith, hope and charity which thereafter command (or 
cooperate with) the ordinary acquired moral virtues (as some scholars have read Aquinas; see 
the Introduction, section 0.2). Grace implies a parallel counterpart to each natural moral virtue. 
Thus, the structure of this ―second set‖ of moral virtues imitates exactly its acquired 
complement. We shall outline this strict parallel construction in subchapter 1.1.  
Second, having clarified the general features of infused moral virtue, we turn to the most 
common objections against this doctrine, namely those drawn from everyday experience: 
Does every graced agent really become simultaneously equipped with true moral virtues? 
Does our experience not show that after the sudden conversion of an obstinate sinner it takes 
years until he attains a certain ease and facility in performing good actions? Thus, how is it 
possible to argue for an immediate infusion of moral virtues together with sanctifying grace? 
Moreover, many Christians who take their faith seriously and live in the state of grace (insofar 
as faith is ratable from external signs) remain nevertheless quite imperfect in many important 
practical matters. Obviously they possess grace without some moral virtues. 
We shall see that even for St. Thomas infused moral virtues do not make the faithful a kind of 
―superman.‖ The graced agent might remain quite unskillful in many respects. However, this 
does not undermine Aquinas‘s theory about infused virtues. It becomes necessary to 
determine the exact scope of those perfections – including their limitations. 
Third, these limitations of infused moral virtues, however, seem to cut across the claimed 
parallel structure between both kinds of virtue. Ordinary acquired moral virtues imply a 
certain greatness and autonomy of the agent (not for nothing are self-confidence, pride, etc., 
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counted as signs of excellence in Aristotelian terms), however the Christian virtues consist 
somehow in the opposite: in the admission of one‘s own imperfection, in submission, 
obedience, humility, self-denial, etc. Hence, how is it possible to maintain the analogue 
architecture of acquired and infused virtues? Section 1.3 shows that Aquinas can argue for 
such a structure by combining the idea of infused virtues with the doctrine of the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit, by which gifts the graced agent participates in the divine nature and becomes 
acquainted to following the divine instigations. Of course, there remains an important 
difference between acquired and infused virtues;
1
 but nevertheless a basic parallel structure is 
preserved. 
 
 
1.1 The Parallel Structure of Acquired and Infused Virtues 
 
Aquinas distinguishes repeatedly a twofold frame of reference for human activity: the order of 
nature and the order of grace.
2
 Although in concreto mankind lives only for one final end, 
namely the end of the ordo supernaturalis,
3
 the natural order is not suppressed, and both 
orders remain structured in a parallel fashion.
4
 For this reason Aquinas usually takes the 
                                                 
1
 Porter speaks rightly of a ―subversion‖ of the Aristotelian understanding of virtue (Porter, ―The Subversion of 
Virtue,‖ 19-41). 
2
 This is the continuous teaching of Aquinas throughout his career: ―Finis . . . communis et ultimus . . . est 
duplex.‖ (In sent. II 41.1). ―Est autem duplex hominis ultimum bonum.‖ (De veritate 14.2). ―Ultima autem 
perfectio rationalis seu intellectualis naturae est duplex.‖ (ST I-II 62.1). ―Considerandum est autem, quod est 
duplex hominis bonum; unum quidem quod est proportionatum suae naturae; aliud autem quod suae naturae 
facultatem excedit.‖ (De virt. in com. 10). However, this might not be interpreted as two distinct ends of man – 
as for example Mondin who speaks of ―due fini ultimi distinti‖ (Battista Mondin, ―Il fine naturale della vita 
umana, quale fondamento ultimo della morale, nel commento alle sentenze di San Tommaso d'Aquino,‖ 
Sapienza 28 (1975): 385). As Stanley notes, ―Thomas does not argue that man has two ends, the one natural and 
the other supernatural. Rather, he speaks of a single end which is twofold, which is realized at both a natural and 
supernatural level.‖ (Kevin M. Staley, ―Happiness: The Natural End of Man?,‖ The Thomist 53 (1989): 215-234, 
here 227).  
3
 A short remark concerning the terminology of a supernatural order: To the best of our knowledge Aquinas 
does not use the term ordo supernaturalis but speaks usually of ordo gratiae (e.g. ST I 112.2). However, he uses 
more than 300 times the term supernaturalis (according the Index thomisticus at 314 places – including 
supernaturaliter). Often he asserts that virtues ordinantur in finem supernaturalem or in beatitudinem 
supernaturalem. One time he mentions things ―quae a supernaturali dei ordinatione dependent.‖ (ST I 58.5). 
Another time he asserts that natural reason and will ―deficient ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis.‖ (ST I-II 
62.3). Hence, those texts show that the terminology of a supernatural order certainly corresponds to Aquinas 
general idea. Thereto also Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira, ―‗Ordo rationis, ordo amoris:‘ La notion d‘ordre au 
centre de l‘univers étique de S.Thomas,‖ in ‘Ordo sapientiae et amoris:’ Image et message de Saint Thomas 
d’Aquin à travers les récentes études historiques, herméneutiques et doctrinales, ed. Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de 
Oliveira (Fribourg: Èditions Universitaires, 1993): 291, note 12. 
4
 For an outline of this parallelism, see: Lottin, Morale fondamentale, 370-414. Lottin disagreed with Aquinas in 
important issues – as we will see later, but he summarized faithfully that parallel treatment of both orders several 
times. For a more recent treatment: Romanus Cessario, Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (London: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 94-125. 
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natural order as ―starting-point‖ for his investigation of moral issues, and he transfers these 
findings to the order of grace based on this general principle: 
 
Because of our deficiency, divine and necessary things which are most knowable by nature, 
are not apparent to us. Hence, we are not adapted their insight from an apt principle, and 
therefore we have to attain what is more knowable and prior by nature beginning with what is 
less knowable and posterior by nature.
5
 
 
Following this principle St. Thomas distinguishes two different sets of virtues as man‘s 
practical perfections in regard to both orders, namely acquired and infused virtues. An inquiry 
into the former will shed light on the understanding of the latter.  
 
The Moral Order on a Natural Level 
Aquinas‘s teaching on virtues is based on the fact that the rational soul, though the immediate 
principle of man‘s being, is not the immediate principle of his actions. Otherwise man would 
remain permanently in action. Therefore, he claims the existence of intermediate potencies 
between the human soul and man‘s actions.6 Furthermore, for a constant, easy and prompt 
achievement of good actions, the potencies require habits which dispose the natural powers 
toward the right acting in respect to the human good, namely by acting in accordance with the 
order of reason. These habits are called virtue.
7
  
Since virtues are additional determinants of the human powers (acquirable by the repeated 
acts of the same powers) they are potentially already contained in the human faculties. 
Aquinas substantiates his teaching as follows: The power of reason is equipped with a natural 
habit which provides the immediate understanding of its first principles, i.e. the intellectus 
principiorum which is the basis of all further intellectual knowledge. Analogously the 
appetitive powers bear a natural inclination towards universal goodness. These natural 
potencies are the basis of the acquisition of any virtue – Aquinas speaks of the ―seeds of 
                                                 
5
 Super de trin. 3.1: ―Ex defectu vero nostro sunt non apparentia res divinae et necessariae, quae sunt secundum 
naturam maxime notae. Unde ad harum inspectionem non sumus statim a principio idonei, cum oporteat nos ex 
minus notis et posterioribus secundum naturam in magis nota et priora naturaliter pervenire.‖ 
6
 See ST I 77.1. 
7
 See for the definition of virtue by Aquinas in ST I-II 55. 
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virtues‖8 – since man can only on the basis of those natural faculties perform good acts whose 
repetition will generate acquired virtues.
9
 
This is the most general function of the moral life according to natural standards. In 
comparison, the organism of supernatural life corresponds to the structure of the natural order 
piece by piece but on a higher level.  
 
The Order of Grace 
As all human acts presuppose the rational soul as their underlying principle,
10
 likewise 
supernatural acts require habitual grace (gratia gratum faciens) as a kind of ―supernatural 
nature,‖ although grace is, of course, not a substance but an accidental determination, a 
habitual entity in the essence of the soul which elevates its natural being. Further, the essence 
of the soul does not act except through mediation of different potencies (intellect, will, 
sensitive appetite, etc.) and their corresponding virtues, analogously habitual grace confers 
immediately a supernatural life but requires additionally further determinations which dispose 
the agent for supernatural actions.
11
 Natural powers and acquired virtues are the proximate 
principles of the moral good operation. Likewise, some additional supernatural principles are 
required on the supernatural level.  
But principles of which kind? Aquinas explains:  
 
It is necessary, that some principles are divinely given to man, whereby he is directed to 
supernatural beatitude in the same way, as he is directed to his connatural end by the natural 
principles . . . And such principles are called theological virtues: first, because their object is 
God, insofar as they direct us rightly to God; secondly, because they are infused in us by God 
alone; thirdly, because these virtues are made known to us only by divine revelation, in holy 
scripture.
12
 
                                                 
8
 ST I-II 51.1; ST I-II 63.1; De virt. in com. 8. 
9
 For the augmentation of acquired virtue by repeated actions, see ST I-II 51.2 and 3, and further the question 52. 
A good account of how the development of virtue grounds on such natural seeds offers Angela M. McKay, 
―Synderesis, Law, and Virtue,‖ in The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human 
Flourishing, ed. Mark J. Cherry (Austin, TX: Springer, 2009), 33-44. 
10
 In de anima I 1.7: ―Ipsa anima est fons et principium omnis motus in rebus animatis.‖  
11
 See De veritate 17.5 ad 17: ―Sicut essentia animae immediate est essendi principium, operationis vero 
principium est mediantibus potentiis, ita immediatus effectus gratiae est conferre esse spirituale, quod pertinet ad 
informationem subiecti, sive ad iustificationem impii, quae est effectus gratiae operantis. Sed effectus gratiae 
mediantibus virtutibus et donis est elicere actus meritorios, quod pertinet ad gratiam cooperantem.― For a 
detailed exposition see Jacques Maritain, An Essay on Christian Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1955), 61-108. 
12
 ST I-II 62.1: ―Oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad 
beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem . . . Et huiusmodi 
principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia habent deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in 
deum; tum quia a solo deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra scriptura, huiusmodi 
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Thus, the purpose of the theological virtues is to direct man toward his supernatural final end 
(sc. divine beatitude). And since the beatific vision exceeds man‘s natural destiny infinitly, he 
must be directed by divine intervention towards his new ultimate end. This ―reorientation‖ is 
due to faith, hope and charity.
13
  
However, this is not enough. In addition to the three theological virtues, Aquinas demands 
parallel to each acquired virtue a special corresponding infused virtue: infused prudence to 
acquired prudence, infused justice to acquired justice, and infused fortitude to acquired 
fortitude etc.
14
 His argument is as follows: If grace directs man to a higher final end, then also 
actions about earthly affairs have to be measured regarding to this new standard, for things 
sufficient for the natural final end might be deficient for the supernatural end.
15
 The order of 
grace requires, therefore, not only the theological virtues in regard to the new final end, but 
also infused moral virtues in regard to earthly things but in reference to the final end.
16
 
Aquinas clearly constructs his theological moral theory to parallel his account of natural 
ethics. In the order of nature, the natural habit of first intellectual principles and the natural 
inclination toward the good of reason are the sources and ―seeds‖ of acquired moral virtues. 
                                                                                                                                                        
virtutes traduntur.‖ Short in ST I-II 62.3: ―Virtutes theologicae hoc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem 
supernaturalem, sicut per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem.‖ Likewise ST II-II 
2.3 ad 2.  
Since the proper object of the theological virtues is God himself, Aquinas calls only those virtues ―superhumanae 
vel divinae‖ virtues (ST I-II 61.1 ad 2), but not the infused moral virtues. 
13
 ―Finis autem ad quem divina largitas hominem ordinavit vel praedestinavit, scilicet fruitio sui ipsius, est 
omnino supra facultatem naturae creatae elevatus . . . Ideo oportet quod superaddatur homini aliquid per quod 
habeat inclinationem in finem illum, sicut per naturalia habet inclinationem in finem sibi connaturalem: et ista 
superaddita dicuntur virtutes theologicae.‖ (In sent. III 23.1.4C). 
14
 ―Virtus infusa est simul cum virtute acquisita.‖ (In sent. III 33.1.2C sed contra 2).  
15
 In sent. III 33.1.2D ad 2. 
16
 ―Rectitudo actus est ex proportione ad finem; ad diversos autem fines diversimode accipitur actus proportio: 
unde aliquis actus est rectus proportionatus bono civili, qui non est rectus proportionatus gloriae aeternae: unde 
oportet quod sint aliae virtutes infusae, quae faciant actus rectos ex proportione ad finem.‖ (In sent. III 33.1.2C 
ad 2; see also 2D).  
A good survey of the practical implications of grace gives D. Westberg: ―Regarding God as final end, new 
actions will be undertaken in the life of grace, specifically related to growing in love for God. Though varying in 
time and place, they will involve prayer, worship, and new ways of showing love to other people. The activities 
characteristic of ordinary human life will not change per se, because they have their own goodness and finality in 
the natural order, but they will change in relation to a firm held conviction of God as the true final end of living. 
The importance of eating, friendship, acquiring knowledge, and so on will be retained, but will be seen from a 
different perspective. There may be a change in the time or attention given, but primarily there will be a 
difference in the attitude and the quality of intention brought to bear. This relation of activities to God may in 
many cases result in an enrichment rather than a diminution of enjoyment. Eating and friendship, for example, 
when seen in relation to the love of God, take on a new purpose, a new awareness of God‘s presence and 
providence, and therefore a greater source of joy than when pursued as primary goods in themselves. It is in this 
way that Thomistic prudence, rather than being a narrower version of Aristotle‘s phronesis, is actually 
broadened.‖ (Daniel Westberg, Right Practical Reason. Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 256). 
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Analogously, the theological virtues are the foundation and ―seeds‖ for the supernatural order 
inclusive of the infused moral virtues.
17
 
Theological and infused moral virtues differ from each other. The former give the general 
orientation towards God as supernatural final end, the latter perfect the human faculties 
regarding their own proper objects, i.e. created things in proportion to God as object of 
supernatural beatitude. The infused moral virtues are – to quote an expression of O. H. Pesch 
– the ―spreading of ‘infused’ grace into the powers of the soul.‖18 
Aquinas summarizes the relationship of the various virtues of both orders in the following 
way: 
 
Effects have to be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and 
moral, which are acquired by our actions, proceed from certain natural principles pre-existing 
in us . . . In place of these natural principles God bestows on us the theological virtues, 
whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated above [ST I-II 63.1]. Therefore we 
need to receive from God other habits corresponding in due proportion to the theological 
virtues, which relate to the theological virtues as the moral and intellectual virtues relate to the 
natural principles of virtues.
19
 
 
The relation is illustrated by the following schema:  
 
natural seeds of virtues    theological virtues 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––    =   ––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
               acquired virtues                infused virtues 
Figure 1 
                                                 
17
 For example ST II-II 4.7. 
18
 Otto H. Pesch, ―Die Theologie der Tugend und die theologischen Tugenden,‖ Concilium 23 (1987): 240 
(emphasis in the original).  
19
 ST I-II 63.3: ―Oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam 
intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis 
in nobis praeexistentibus . . . Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur nobis a deo virtutes theologicae, 
quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus 
theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes 
theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum.‖ See also ad 2, ad 3; 
likewise De virt. in com. 10. Pesch notes rightly that the function of infused moral virtues can be only 
understood on the basis of their dependence on the theological virtues (Otto H. Pesch, Thomas von Aquin: 
Grenze und Größe mittelalterlicher Theologie; Eine Einführung, 3 ed. (Mainz: Matthias-Gründewald-Verlag, 
1995), 111). 
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Some Remarks Regarding the Used Terminology 
(1) As we have seen, the concept of infused virtues can signify either the theological virtues 
or the corresponding supernatural moral virtues; both kinds have to be immediately infused 
by God since they belong to the order of grace. Here we use the name of virtus infusa 
exclusively as technical term for the supernatural moral virtues. Even Aquinas himself 
regularly compares in this sense acquired and infused virtues as corresponding counterparts.
20
 
Infused virtues are limited in that qualified meaning to virtues concerning created things (thus, 
moral virtues), but in respect of the final end of the order of grace. Hence, they do not include 
the theological virtues although even these are infused. As a collective term for infused moral 
virtues as well as the theological virtues we will use the term of the supernatural virtues. 
(2) The use of the concept of natural virtues has to be clarified as well. For Aquinas the 
virtutes naturales do not denote moral virtues according to the order of nature, but simply the 
natural inclinations of the human powers which allow the generation of acquired moral 
virtues.
21
 This can be understood in a twofold way. On the one hand, from the part of man‘s 
rational soul, the natural virtue of the intellect consists in the immediate knowledge of first 
principles,
22
 and analogously for the will it consists in the natural inclination toward the 
reasonable good. We referred to these natural virtues in the foregoing paragraph as ―seeds of 
virtue.‖ On the other hand, there can be natural virtues rooted in man‘s bodily constitution, 
which depend on the fact of man‘s physicality. The one is more inclined to intellectual work, 
the other is more apt to perform courageous deeds, and the third has a temperate mind.
23
 But 
none of these natural virtues is moral virtue in the proper sense.
24
 They are rather natural 
dispositions for the acquisition of moral virtues.
25
  
Hence, originally the term of virtutes naturales is not used as counterpart of the virtutes 
supernaturales.
26
 Nevertheless they correspond to something analogous in the supernatural 
                                                 
20
 See e.g. In sent. III 33.1.2D; ST I-II 63.4; In virt. in com. 10. 
21
 See ST I-II 51.1; 63.1; De virt. in com. 8. 
22
 For example in ST I-II 62.3 arg. 1 Aquinas designates the intellectus principiorum as virtus naturalis. 
23
 This second point Aquinas overtook faithfully from Aristotle‘s teaching on natural virtues (cf. Stephen A. 
White, ―Natural Virtue and Perfect Virtue in Aristotle,‖ Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient 
Philosophy 8 (1992): 135-169, esp. 152-160). 
24
 Aquinas describes those dispositions also as ―virtutes imperfectae‖ (ST I-II 65.1; De virt. card. 2).  
25
 See for the question of natural virtue: Luke J. Lindon, ―The Significance of the Term ‗Virtus Naturalis‘ in the 
Moral Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,‖ Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 31 
(1957): 97-104. ―Natural virtue is the natural inclination to the good of virtues as yet unpossessed. It is the 
human will's natural desire for virtue's good, or the lower powers considered as being subject to and able to 
move under the guidance of reason. . . . Briefly, man is not the agent or the producer or the cause of natural 
virtue: it is discovered in him as the seed of the acquired perfections which may accrue to him. These latter 
originate in the former, but are brought to fruition only through exercise.‖ (Ibid., 102). 
26
 See the annotations in Richard J. Westley, ―Commentary,‖ Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 31 (1957): 104-106. 
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order. For example, theological virtues provide the fundamental orientation of man toward his 
supernatural end and provide the foundation for infused moral virtues, and likewise the 
natural virtues (at least as they are rooted in the soul) supply the necessary foundation for 
moral virtues, namely the natural inclination toward the reasonable good.
27
 
To avoid any equivocation, however, we will conform in this paper to the linguistic usage of 
today and use the concept ―natural virtue‖ synonymously to ―acquired virtue,‖ i.e. as 
counterpart of supernatural virtues (including infused and theological virtues).  
 
 
1.2 The Substantial Limitation of the Scope of Infused Virtues 
 
In the act of justification God bestows at once, together with sanctifying grace, all moral 
virtues to the believer, to every believer, without exception. So goes the Thomistic doctrine. 
Therefore, it has to be true that in the state of grace no believer lacks any moral virtue. This 
conclusion, however, seems to be easily refuted. A lifelong alcoholic or an aged criminal who 
suddenly converts, who goes to confession and receives – according to the Catholic faith – 
sanctifying grace as well as – according to the doctrine at issue – simultaneously all moral 
virtues. But such a convert will nevertheless remain (at least normally) a quite ―unvirtuous‖ 
believer, i.e. he remains – grace aside – still pitifully inclined toward his old lifestyle. 
Admittedly, he might succeed to abstain from evil deeds, but his former vicious inclinations 
will at least impede the realization of his new ideal. And not unless he has practiced the 
Christian way for many years and by great endeavors will he easily achieve good deeds. How 
does this experience not reduce the doctrine of infused virtue to absurdity? 
Moreover, even from the opposite viewpoint the doctrine seems to be inconsistent. Everybody 
knows some faithful who lead serious religious lives, individuals who are ready to spend all 
their energy for the salvation of their neighbors. These believers obviously possess charity in 
a very high (and even heroic) degree, but many of them lack nonetheless some quite basic 
perfections in regard to their quotidian duties. For example, they may be unable to prepare 
realistic budgets their households, or the smallest things may make them anxious and timid, or 
they may fail to take sufficient care of their health, etc.  
                                                 
27
 See Hayden Ramsay, ―Natural Virtue,‖ Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie 37 (1998): 341-360. 
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Both cases seem to contradict the idea of infused moral virtues and to support the position that 
divine justification includes just the infusion of charity, by means of which a believer might 
subsequently acquire moral virtues – step by step – by living a stable Christian life. He might 
do so, of course, or he might lack these perfections for years despite acting out of a high 
degree of charity.  
In the following subchapter we want to address these two ―experimental‖ objections of which 
St. Thomas was well aware and still claimed the existence of infused moral virtues.
28
 
 
 
1.2.1 The Compatibility of Infused Virtues and Vicious Inclinations 
 
As the first suggestive argument against the theory of infused moral virtue, we want to 
address their ―obvious‖ absence in the recently converted sinner. In a more subtle way the 
same argument can made from the observations of many Christians who obviously do not 
perform their good actions from virtue, since ―virtue‖ implies – as Aquinas notes – the doing 
of these actions with ease, promptness and joy.
29
 To them it actually appears that they could 
live a contrary lifestyle much more easily, promptly and with pleasure. Even though the 
converted (and a fortiori the ―ordinary‖ believer) abstains from evil acts, how we can describe 
his conduct as virtuous? Or to put it another way, if Christians do what the divine law requires 
but apparently do so without any psychological inclination to do it, how can these actions be 
said to spring from virtues?  
For these reasons some scholars – e.g. Schockenhoff, Günthör, Mirkes, and Harvey – have 
argued that infused virtue as such is not yet perfect virtue.
30
 It is an ―incomplete virtue‖31 
which does not correspond to ―the concept of ‗virtue‘ in its full notion.‖32 Rather it implies a 
―transitional stage‖33 which requires for further perfection.34 
                                                 
28
 For the following, see the helpful article of Michael S. Sherwin, ―Infused Virtues and the Effects of Acquired 
Vice: A Test Case for the Thomistic Theory of Infused Cardinal Virtues,‖ The Thomist 73 (2009): 29-52. 
29
 Cf. De virt. in com. 1. 
30
 Eberhard Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum hominis:’ Die anthropologischen und theologischen Grundlagen der 
Tugendethik des Thomas von Aquin (Mainz: Matthias-Gründewald-Verlag, 1987), 311-317. According to Mirkes 
moral virtue is perfect and complete only if consists in a conjunction of infused and acquired virtue; e.g. Mirkes, 
―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 125-231. Likewise John F. Harvey, ―The Nature of the Infused 
Moral Virtues,‖ Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 10 (1955): 215: ―Neither the 
acquired nor the infused virtues are complete in themselves; each needs the other to attain perfection.‖ 
31
 Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum hominis’, 315. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid., 317. 
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Aquinas was well aware of the problems that seem to disqualify his doctrine of infused virtues. 
He himself formulates the same observation as an objection against his teaching: 
 
Those who have a habit of virtue perform easily the acts of that virtue, and they are pleasing to 
them for their own sake . . . but many who have charity and are free from mortal sin, 
nonetheless have difficulty performing acts of virtue; nor do they find these acts pleasing for 
their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without having 
other virtues.
35
 
 
In his response he draws an example from the speculative virtues, that a person who 
habitually knows some scientific truth and can therefore usually engage in acts of knowing 
that truth easily and with pleasure, may experience nonetheless difficulty in performing a 
concrete act of knowing because of accidental impediments, for example sickness or 
drowsiness, which impede his ability to exercise his intellectual virtue. Although he possesses 
virtue, he fails to experience the pleasure which he should feel by using the habit. This 
discomfort, however, is not due to a defect of the intellectual virtue but is caused by extrinsic 
impediments.  
In an analogous way each faithful man or woman in the state of grace truly possesses infused 
virtues, but the ease and pleasure of engaging in related acts may be impeded by extrinsic 
impediments, namely by residual effects of previous acquired vices or bodily dispositions. 
―One may experience difficulty in performing the actions proper to the habit of infused moral 
virtues because of certain contrary dispositions surviving from previous acts.‖36  
                                                                                                                                                        
34
 A good English summary of Schockenhoffs view on that score gives William McDonough, ―Caritas as the 
Prae-Ambulum of All Virtue: Eberhard Schockenhoff on the Theological-Anthropological Significance and the 
Contemporary Interreligious Relevance of Thomas Aquinas‘s Teaching of the Virtues Morales Infusae,‖ Journal 
of the Society of Christian Ethics 27 (2007): 97-126, esp. 103-109. 
In a similar way A. Günther explains: ―Zur vollen Ausgestaltung des gnadenhaft mit der übernatürlichen Tugend 
ausgestatteten Menschen gehören die natürlichen.‖ (Anselm Günthör, Anruf und Antwort: Handbuch der 
katholischen Moraltheologie; Der Christ - gerufen zum Leben, vol. 1 (Allgemeine Moraltheologie) (Vallendar-
Schönstatt: Patris Verlag, 1993), 476). 
35
 ST I-II 65.3 arg. 2: ―Qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt virtutis, et ei secundum se 
placent . . . Sed multi habent caritatem, absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen difficultatem in operibus 
virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad caritatem. Ergo 
multi habent caritatem, qui non habent alias virtutes.‖ See also In Sent IV 14.2.2 arg. 4: ―Habitus virtutis non 
manet cum habitu vitii; quia contraria non sunt simul in eodem. Sed post contritionem adhuc manet habitus vitii, 
quod patet ex inclinatione ad pristinos actus. Ergo poenitentia non statim omnes virtutes restituit.‖ 
36
 ST I-II 65.3 ad 2. The whole reply: ―Quandoque contingit quod aliquis habens habitum, patitur difficultatem in 
operando, et per consequens non sentit delectationem et complacentiam in actu, propter aliquod impedimentum 
extrinsecus superveniens, sicut ille qui habet habitum scientiae, patitur difficultatem in intelligendo, propter 
somnolentiam vel aliquam infirmitatem. Et similiter habitus moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum 
difficultatem in operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex praecedentibus actibus relictas. Quae 
quidem difficultas non ita accidit in virtutibus moralibus acquisitis, quia per exercitium actuum, quo acquiruntur, 
tolluntur etiam contrariae dispositiones.‖ The same argument is made in De virt. card. 2 ad 2. 
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Aquinas‘s solution for this runs as follows. Even if some Christians in the state of grace fail to 
perform acts of moral virtue with ease, pleasure, and delight, this does not undermine the 
existence of infused virtues, for the experience of weakness is not due to an imperfection of 
the infused virtues but is rather a consequence of some lingering contrary habits. 
 
Let us add three further obersations regarding this issue. 
First, Aquinas refuses to portray such remaining dispositions as vices in the strict sense 
because they are no longer principles of our actions. Divine grace has destroyed intemperance 
as vice in an intemperate person who has converted and received infused temperance. What 
remains is just a contrary disposition to the inclination of the infused virtue – but as habit 
already ―on the way of corruption.‖ 37  Nevertheless, those remnants can still impede our 
facility to act from the new infused principle. For exemple, the drunkenness of the recently 
converted alcoholic is really overcome, for his addiction has lost its ability to influence his 
actual behavior, even if a lingering inclination remains for the moment. 
From this observation follows a second point. Since grace ―destroys‖ previous vices so that 
they are no longer a principle of action, the graced agent, equipped by the contrary infused 
virtue, shall be able in all occasions to act according to the new habit, even if he might feel 
discomfort. In other words, infused virtues make it so that ―those passions – though felt – in 
no way dominate. Infused virtue makes it that no one obeys in any manner the concupiscence 
of sin; and as long as [the infused virtue] remains, it does this infallibly.‖38  
Thirdly, Aquinas argues that the delightful exercise of infused virtue is due not only to the 
absence of contrary habits but also to the virtue‘s own qualities. He distinguishes therefore a 
two-fold kind of joy and ease: ―The facility in the achievement of virtuous deeds can have 
two origins, namely from a previous customization, and this facility is not given by infused 
virtue in its beginning; and from a strong adhesion to the object of virtue, and this can be 
found in infused virtue immediately from the beginning.‖ 39  In the case of the recently 
                                                 
37
 ―Licet per actum unum simplicem non corrumpatur habitus acquisitus, tamen actus contritionis habet quod 
corrumpat habitum vitii generatum ex virtute gratiae; unde in eo qui habuit habitum intemperantiae, cum 
conteritur, non remanet cum virtute temperantiae infusa habitus intemperantiae in ratione habitus, sed in via 
corruptionis, quasi dispositio quaedam.‖ (De virt. in com. 10 ad 16). 
38
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 14: ―Praevalet virtus infusa [super virtutem acquisitam] quantum ad hoc quod facit quod 
huiusmodi passiones etsi sentiantur, nullo tamen modo dominentur. Virtus enim infusa facit quod nullo modo 
obediatur concupiscentiis peccati; et facit hoc infallibiliter ipsa manente.‖ See thereto Bonnie Kent, ―Transitory 
Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence,‖ Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (1989): 199-223 and Angela 
M. McKay, ―Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue,‖ The Thomist 69 (2005): 79-80. 
39
 In sent. IV 14.2.2 ad 5: ―Facilitas operandi opera virtutum potest esse ex duobus; scilicet ex consuetudine 
praecedente; et hanc facilitatem non tribuit virtus infusa statim in sui principio: et iterum ex forti inhaesione ad 
obiectum virtutis; et hanc est invenire in virtute infusa statim in sui principio.‖ 
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converted, the ease of ―strong inhesion‖ might still be impeded by some lingering contrary 
inclinations, but nevertheless it allows acting ―without difficulty.‖40 Thus, even if contrary 
depressive passions (caused from former vices) are psychologically felt, infused virtues 
provide supernatural motivation for acting easily against those passions.
41
 St. Thomas refers 
to the Aristotelian example of the annoyances of warfare which might hinder the soldier‘s 
experience of full pleasure in achieving courageous deeds. Despite these annoyances, 
fortitude should provide the perfection required to accomplish the necessary acts without 
sadness. Analogously for infused virtue, ―it is sufficient to act without sadness.‖42 (We will 
discuss the two types of facility – i.e. because of infused virtues themselves, or because of 
freedom from contrary vices – in a more detailed manner in section 3.2). 
 
 
1.2.2 The Compatibility of Infused Virtues with Serious Flaws 
 
A second objection against infused virtues is based on the observation of believers who 
certainly have charity, but nonetheless remain very imperfect in practical matters, even in 
quite important ones. If, however, grace and charity are infused in combination with all other 
moral virtues, then it seems that an agent in the state of grace should be able to achieve the 
good in all important practical fields.  
For resolving the issue we have to investigate the exact scope of infused moral virtues, and in 
so doing highlight their substantial limitations. To introduce this investigation, we will 
examine several historical examples of saints who possessed the infused virtues to a 
tremendous degree, but suffered at the same time a serious lack of ―ordinary‖ human 
                                                 
40
 See ST III 89.1 ad 3: ―Quantum est ex ipsa inclinatione caritatis et aliarum virtutum, poenitens opera virtutum 
delectabiliter et sine difficultate operatur.‖ 
41
 Hence, obviously B. Kent misreads Aquinas by arguing: ―Acquired moral virtues make related actions easier; 
infused moral virtues do not.‖ (Kent, ―The Moral Life,‖ 248). A similar (and simultaneously) inconsistent 
position is held by Coerver: On the one hand he claims ―that per se the infused moral virtues do confer a certain 
measure of intrinsic facility inasmuch as they tend to strengthen the will and incline it intrinsically to acts of 
virtue.‖ (Robert F. Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America, 1946), 115). But then he continues to argue the contrary: ―However, this facility of itself 
does not moderate the passions, . . . nor render the practice of virtue easy and effortless.‖ (Ibid., 116). Obviously 
Coerver holds the option that infused virtues reside only in the will but do not perfect likewise man‘s sensitive 
appetite – an understanding which is certainly not that of St. Thomas (more thereto in section 2.1). 
A good and correct description of the intrinsic facility provided by infused virtues is given in Baumann, ―La 
surnaturalisation,‖ 108-114.  
42
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 15: ―Quia a principio virtus infusa non semper ita tollit sensum passionum sicut virtus 
acquisita, propter hoc a principio non ita delectabiliter operatur. Non tamen hoc est contra rationem virtutis, quia 
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perfections and virtues. Afterwards we will outline Aquinas‘s systematic explanation of this 
phenomenon.  
 
 
a) Historical Examples of “Imperfect Saints” Who Are Canonized 
 
St. Felicity: Infused Fortitude without Acquired Fortitude 
The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity tells the story of the martyrdom of two ancient saints.
43
 
Perpetua was a young, well born and liberally educated woman. She lived in North Africa and, 
with her pregnant slave Felicity, was arrested for being a Christian. Some days before their 
scheduled execution Felicity gave birth to her child. The document reports: 
 
Immediately after their prayer, her labor pains arrived. While she was in labor she was in great 
pain due to the natural difficulty of a birth in the eighth month. One of the prison guards said 
to her, ―You‘re crying now. What will you do when you are thrown to the beasts, whom you 
scorned when you didn‘t want to sacrifice?‖ She responded, ―What I suffer now, I suffer, but 
there will be someone within me who will suffer for me because I will be suffering for him.‖ 
She gave birth to a girl and one of the sisters brought her up as her own daughter.
44
 
 
Indeed, shortly afterwards both women witnessed courageously to the faith by dying in the 
arena while singing psalms and encouraging each other (+202 at Carthage).  
Whether the legend is true or not, it renders an ostensive example of what infused fortitude 
implies, as well as what it does not. Divinely infused courage enabled St. Felicity to sustain 
the most terrible sufferings while ―chanting and singing psalms‖ (cf. Eph 5.19). She 
maintained her fidelity to Christ whom she loved by charity, in a grave situation in which 
divine friendship was at stake. However, this infused virtue didn‘t simply change her ordinary 
affective constitution in regard to any matter whatsoever. To be sure, it didn‘t provide 
fortitude and endurance in all situations. The Christian martyr might still shake with fear in 
considerably less dangerous situations than martyrdom. Infused fortitude, therefore, does not 
                                                                                                                                                        
quandoque ad virtutem sufficit sine tristitia operari; nec requiritur quod delectabiliter operetur propter molestias 
quae sentiuntur; sicut philosophus dicit III ethic., quod forti sufficit sine tristitia operari.‖ See also ST I-II 59.3. 
43
 Cf. Johannes Quasten, Patrology, vol. 1 (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1960), 181. 
44
 The Passion of Saints Perpetua and Felicity, XV.4-7, cited in Richard Valantasis, Late Antiquity in Practice 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 394. 
Chapter 1. The General Framework of Infused Moral Virtues 
 41 
necessarily confer courage or the qualities of a heroic soldier to aid a believer in his purely 
private affairs.
45
 
 
St. John Vianney and Charles de Foucault: Infused Temperance without Acquired 
Temperance 
Something similar can be shown for infused temperance for example in the life of St. John 
Mary Vianney, the Curé of Ars, who was famous for his rigorous fasting and other 
austerities.
46
 For reasons of vicarious penitence for sinners, the Curé lived for several years on 
practically nothing but a small portion of potatoes that he prepared once a week. This is an 
extraordinary example of tempering one‘s inclination to enjoy food for reasons of divine 
charity. As he confessed toward the end of his life, however, he lacked the right measure of 
fasting in relation to preserving the health of his body, i.e. acquired temperance. 
Another example illustrating our point regarding infused temperance is the conversion of 
blessed Charles de Foucault. Having received the sacrament of confession, he changed his 
sensual lifestyle overnight (he was famous for his excessive revelries) and began to live a 
completely abstinent life. However, as he declared later on, he ruined his health in these first 
years after his conversion by failing to achieve the right mean mean of austerity.  
In short, though the divine gift of infused temperance enables the believer, moved for reasons 
of divine charity, to abstain in a heroic way from sense pleasures, it does not provide the 
capability to achieve the temperate mean in every respect. 
 
St. Louis: The Imperfection of Infused Prudence
47
 
St. Louis IX, King of France, was already recognized as a man of great personal sanctity by 
his contemporaries. By all accounts, he was an exemplary Christian who certainly possessed 
the infused virtues to a high degree. Nevertheless, one can blame him for seriously unwise 
decisions regarding the governance of his reign, for example his endeavors on behalf of the 
seventh crusade (which ended in disastrous failure). At the least, the crusade distracted him 
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 Aquinas distinguishes (and compares) various kinds of fortitude: For a juxtaposition of infused fortitude and 
civic fortitude, see for example ST II-II 124.2 ad 1. In De virt. in com. 10 ad 4 he opposes fortitude of the 
individual and of the good citizen. More thereto in section 2.3. 
46
 See Herbert Thurston and Donald Attwater, Butler's Lives of the Saints. Complete Edition, vol. 3, 1995), 280-
287. 
47
 I owe the following reference to St. Louis as an example of the limited perfection of infused prudence to 
Sherwin, ―Infused Virtues,‖ 41-42. 
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from attending to the internal affairs of his country.
48
 This is just one example in which St. 
Louis failed to choose and achieve always just and prudent actions.  
Are these examples from the lives of the saints arguments against the doctrine of infused 
virtue? Not really. Infused virtues are given for the maintenance of the order of charity, or to 
remain faithful to divine friendship. They do not provide perfection in regard to all human 
matters. 
 
 
b) The Twofold Limitation of Infused Virtues 
 
For a theoretical account of what the three examples above demonstrate we can refer to ST II-
II 47.14 ad 1, where Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of prudence. The first kind is sufficient 
for things which are necessary for salvation (de necessitate salutis), and this prudence is 
possessed by all who have grace. The other kind of prudence, however, ―is more perfect 
[plenior], since through it a man is able to provide both for himself and for others not only in 
things which are necessary for salvation, but also in all things pertaining to human life; and 
such industry is not in all who have grace.‖49  
The assertion shows clearly a limit to the infused virtues. They perfect an agent only in 
respect to his final end in the order of grace, and consequently they do not include 
virtuousness in regard to all earthly affairs. They provide the capacity for one to preserve his 
orientation towards God as final end in all mundane affairs, but they do not make the agent a 
perfect manager of routine business. Elsewhere Aquinas notes that a graced agent may know 
how to use his reason for choosing right action in the sight of God while at the same time he 
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 See Ibid., 394-398. ―Though the two crusades in which he was engaged were failures, he is certainly to be 
ranked among the most valiant of princes, and a perfect example of the good and great medieval nobleman.‖ 
(Ibid., 394). 
49
 ST II-II 47.13 ad 1: ―Duplex est industria. Una quidem quae est sufficiens ad ea quae sunt de necessitate 
salutis. Et talis industria datur omnibus habentibus gratiam, quos unctio docet de omnibus, ut dicitur I Ioan. II. 
Est autem alia industria plenior, per quam aliquis sibi et aliis potest providere, non solum de his quae sunt 
necessaria ad salutem sed etiam de quibuscumque pertinentibus ad humanam vitam. Et talis industria non est in 
omnibus habentibus gratiam.‖ Aquinas uses sometimes the concept industria instead of prudentia for 
distinguishing true and perfect prudence (ad totius vitae finem) from false or imperfect prudence in respect to 
apparent or particular goods (cf. ST II-II 47.13 ad 3). For a good explanation of that prudence which is ―plenior‖ 
than mere infused prudence, see Josef Pieper, ―Traktat über die Klugheit,‖ in Werke in acht Bänden: Schriften 
zur Philosophischen Anthropologie und Ethik: Das Menschenbild der Tugendlehre, vol. 4, ed. Berthold Wald 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996), 12. 
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may lack ―worldly cleverness.‖50 St. Louis obviously had infused prudence, but he lacked 
such mundana astutia. His infused virtues didn‘t save him from serious misjudgments 
regarding his political affairs. Virtuousness in such domains, explains St. Thomas, is not 
given by infusion but requires natural talents and permanent training.
51
 In a similar way we 
have to understand the case of the Curé of Ars. Obviously he failed (by a lack of acquired 
temperance and prudence) to choose the right means regarding the care of this bodily health. 
Infused temperance led by infused prudence provided only the right use of food in regard to a 
perfect submission of his body to the soul, nothing else. 
This assertion should be taken in the most strict sense. It does not deny that infused virtues are 
concerned about the things of the earthly life. To be sure, their proper matter is human life. 
But infused virtues exclusively enable man to use those things of life in regard to his final end, 
i.e. to dwell in earthly affairs without loosing divine friendship. In the case of St. Louis this 
implies a life as king without loosing his personal orientation towards the final end. This is the 
proper task of infused virtues, and not providing perfection with regard to right action in 
concrete political issues (except cases in which his own salvation would be at stake, for 
example by establishing unjust laws).  
This first observation implies ipso facto another limitation: infused virtues are not only 
limited in regard to many desirable goods, they might even fail to judge by one‘s own 
consideration the necessary means regarding one‘s supernatural end. Virtue in the ordinary 
sense disposes an agent to self-reliant operation. According to the description of infused 
virtues, however, the virtuous agent might be dependent and reliant upon good counsel of 
others. The only indispensable characteristic which Aquinas identifies in the infused virtues is 
that ―those who require to be guided by other‘s counsel, are – if they have grace – at least able 
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 See ST I-II 58.4 arg. 2 (affirmative): ―Quandoque contingit quod aliqui in quibus non multum viget usus 
rationis, sunt virtuosi et deo accepti.‖ And he replies: ―In virtuoso non oportet quod vigeat usus rationis quantum 
ad omnia, sed solum quantum ad ea quae sunt agenda secundum virtutem. Et sic usus rationis viget in omnibus 
virtuosis. Unde etiam qui videntur simplices, eo quod carent mundana astutia, possunt esse prudentes; secundum 
illud Matth. X, estote prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae.‖ (ST I-II 58.4 ad 2). Cf. ST II-II 
52.1 ad 1 where Aquinas describes the graced man as prudent ―in his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem.‖ 
51
 As Aquinas explicitly mentions in ST II-II 47.13 ad 3, in matters, which are not necessary for salvation, human 
endeavor and repeated actions are required for attaining the proper perfection: ―In his autem qui iam habent 
usum rationis est etiam secundum actum quantum ad ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis, sed per exercitium 
meretur augmentum quousque perficiatur, sicut et ceterae virtutes.‖ It is worth to note that Aquinas simply 
argues at this point that the repeated action merit the augmentation of virtue; it remains, however, unclear, in 
which way we have to think this acquisition. Is it merited in the sense as natural consequence? Or as divine 
infusion? More on that in chapter 3. 
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to take counsel for themselves in this point, that they require the counsel of others and can 
discern good counsel from evil one.‖52 
These considerations reveal a substantial limitation of the scope of infused virtues. They do 
not create a kind of ―superman,‖ but contrarily enable a very restrained kind of perfection. 
One might even doubt whether these infused habits should be called ―virtues‖ at all except in 
a highly qualified sense. One might also doubt whether it is reasonable to compare them with 
the ordinary concept of moral virtues, understood as perfections which enable a man to 
achieve good deeds by himself, on his own account, and by his own resources.  
This will be the issue of the next subchapter. How does Aquinas succeed to claim, on the one 
hand, a parallel structure of acquired and infused virtue (cf. section 1.1), and to limit on the 
other the scope of the infused virtues in such a drastic manner (cf. section 1.2)? 
 
 
1.3 The Relevance of the Gifts for the Understanding of Infused Virtues 
 
Aquinas succeeds in maintaining the parallel structure of both sets of virtues by combining 
the doctrine of infused moral virtues with the ancient idea of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 
Admittedly, we will see that the ordinary understanding of moral virtues becomes thereby 
reversed. Nonetheless, it allows a parallel portrayal of both types of virtue despite their 
important differences. What does this mean? 
J. Porter mentioned the common opinion that the gifts ―may seem at first to be a marginal 
component of his [Aquinas‘s] moral theory.‖53 Normally scholars focus exclusively on St. 
Thomas‘s teaching on the virtues and consider the gifts as a redundant appendix. Nevertheless, 
the gifts reappear again and again throughout his whole work with important consequences 
for his doctrine on virtue. 
Aquinas is used to portraying the order of nature and the order of grace in a parallel fashion 
(cf. section 1.1). The gifts, however, introduce a fundamental difference between the two 
orders. As was already shown, the natural moral virtues ground in the natural capacity of 
human powers (the ―natural seeds‖ of acquired virtues), whereas the infused moral virtues are 
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 ST II-II 47.13 ad 2: ―Illi qui indigent regi consilio alieno saltem in hoc sibi ipsis consulere sciunt, si gratiam 
habent, ut aliorum requirant consilia, et discernant consilia bona a malis.‖ 
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 Porter, ―The Subversion of Virtue,‖ 35. 
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rooted in the theological virtues.
54
 The two kinds of perfection differ in an important respect: 
―Although this second perfection is greater than the first, the former is possessed by man in a 
more perfect way than the latter, because man has the former in his full possession, whereas 
he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly.‖55 Faith, hope 
and charity are ―superhuman‖ virtues 56  and their resulting acts are supernatural actions. 
Therefore, man cannot use these virtues (and consequently even the infused moral virtues) 
completely by his own, but rather he has to be moved by a higher agent who is in full disposal 
of those actions, namely by God Himself who dwells by grace in the agent‘s heart and moves 
him from within.
57
 The gifts of the Holy Spirit dispose man to respond to this higher motion 
man. ―In order to the supernatural final end, to which reason moves somehow and imperfectly 
informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in 
addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Spirit. . . . Therefore, in order to accomplish this 
end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Spirit.‖58 Thus, the gifts are habitual 
dispositions of the soul which make man amenable to the immediate motion of the Holy Spirit.  
From that perspective one might be inclined to read the function of the gifts and the infused 
virtues as two separate modes of acting (and this is indeed the common interpretation of 
Thomists
59
): on the one hand, actions moved directly by the Holy Spirit through the gifts, and 
on the other, as the more ordinary way, by human powers perfected through infused virtues. 
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 ST I-II 68.2: ―Ratio autem hominis est perfecta dupliciter a deo, primo quidem, naturali perfectione, scilicet 
secundum lumen naturale rationis; alio modo, quadam supernaturali perfectione, per virtutes theologicas.‖ 
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 ST I-II 68.2: ―Quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit maior quam prima, tamen prima perfectiori modo habetur ab 
homine quam secunda, nam prima habetur ab homine quasi plena possessio, secunda autem habetur quasi 
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 See quotation in footnote 11. 
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 ST I-II 68.2: ―Id quod imperfecte habet naturam aliquam vel formam aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, 
nisi ab altero moveatur. Sicut sol, quia est perfecte lucidus, per seipsum potest illuminare, luna autem, in qua est 
imperfecte natura lucis, non illuminat nisi illuminata.‖ 
58
 ST I-II 68.2: ―In ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet secundum quod est aliqualiter 
et imperfecte formata per virtutes theologicas; non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et 
motio spiritus sancti . . . Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum, necessarium est homini habere donum spiritus 
sancti.‖ 
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 See for example A. Gardeil who describes the difference of infused virtues and gifts as grounding two 
different modes of action: ―La raison unique de leur distinction est dans la différence de leur mode intérieur 
d‘opérer: ici mode humain, là mode divin; ici action surnaturalisée, mais réglée par la raison, là activité d‘abord 
purement réceptrice, puis agissante, mais uniquement sous l‘inspiration du Saint-Esprit, règle divine, supérieure 
à la raison, même surnaturalisée, étant la Raison divine elle-même.‖ (A Gardeil, ―Dons du Saint-Esprit,‖ in 
Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and É. Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et 
Ané, 1939), 1728-1781, here 1739). Similar Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian Perfection, 272-277 and Romanus 
Cessario, Introduction to Moral Theology (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 
205-212 (also in Romanus Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2002), 13-18). 
Recently in Ulrich Horst, Die Gaben des Heiligen Geistes nach Thomas von Aquin (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
2001), 79-92. According to Lottin, Thomas supported the doctrine of the gifts only because he was dependent on 
his time without fully believing in it (Lottin, Morale fondamentale, 427-434. A good overview of the doctrine of 
the gifts in times after Aquinas is given in Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. 4, 667-736). 
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According to that view an understanding of the gifts is actually dispensable for a theory of 
infused virtue.  
However, some scholars have recently argued for a more intimate connection between the 
gifts and the infused virtues. Also, the structure of the Secunda secundae itself, in which 
Aquinas treats the gifts in connection with the particular cardinal virtues, suggests such an 
interpretation. We have to be content here simply to refer to these discussions and to 
summarize shortly their principle arguments insofar as they are relevant to our thesis:
60
 
St. Thomas mentions several times that an operation instigated by the Holy Spirit, which is 
mediated by the gifts, remains nevertheless a human act that involves human reason as well as 
his will. ―Man is so acted upon [agitur] by the Holy Spirit, that he also acts himself [agit], in 
so far as he has a free-will.‖61 Hence, we can conclude a necessary cooperation of the gifts 
with the infused moral virtues. The gifts dispose man to be amenable to divine motion, but 
since divine motion results in human acting, the relative virtues are likewise and necessarily 
involved. The issue is maybe less clear in ST I-II 68, the general question about the gifts. An 
assertion Aquinas makes in the Commentary on the Letter to the Romans is more explicit: 
 
The spiritual man is inclined to do something not principally by the motion of his own 
will but by the instinct of the Holy Spirit. . . . Thereby, however, it is not excluded that 
spiritual men operate by will and free decision, since the Holy Spirit causes in them 
the motion of the will and free decision, as it is said in Phil II 13: It is God who works 
in us the willing and achieving.
62
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 See Porter, ―The Subversion of Virtue,‖ 33-37. Likewise Servais Pinckaers, ―Morality and the Movement of 
the Holy Spirit: Aquinas‘s Doctrine of ‗Instinctus‘,‖ in The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomistic Moral 
Theology (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 385-395, esp. 390-392. A quite 
detailed portrayal of the cooperation of gifts and infused moral virtues is given by McKay, ―Infused and 
Acquired Virtues,‖ 33-57. McKay summarizes her thesis on that score as following: ―My interpretation requires 
that (1) every act of infused virtue involves the simultaneous operation of the corresponding gift and (2) that the 
motion of the holy spirit is operative in every act of infused virtue.‖ (Ibid., 39, footnote 57). She points out also 
some problems of the ―two-mode‖ action-theory. More recently she repeated her view in Angela M. McKay, 
―Ethique et vertus morales infuses,‖ in Renouveler toutes choses en Christ: Vers un renouveau thomiste de la 
théologie morale, ed. Michael S. Sherwin and Craig St. Titus (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2009), 122-
139, esp. 134-135. 
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 ST I-II 68.3 ad 2: ―[Homo] sic agitur a spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi arbitrii.‖ And in 
the Secunda secundae he explains: ―Mens humana ex hoc ipso quod dirigitur a spiritu sancto, fit potens dirigere 
se et alios.‖ (ST II-II 52.2 ad 3). 
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 Super Rom. VIII 3: ―Homo spiritualis non quasi ex motu propriae voluntatis principaliter sed ex instinctu 
spiritus sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum. . . . Non tamen per hoc excluditur quin viri spirituales per 
voluntatem et liberum arbitrium operentur, quia ipsum motum voluntatis et liberi arbitrii spiritus sanctus in eis 
causat, secundum illud Phil. II, 13: deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere.‖ This quotation makes very 
clear that the account of Horst is incorrect who charactersise virtues as active principles, while ―wir uns 
gegenüber den Gaben des Hl. Geistes eher abwartend, patientes, verhalten, also ‗getrieben‘ werden und nicht 
selbst ‗treiben‘.‖ Horst, Die Gaben des Heiligen Geistes nach Thomas von Aquin, 83). 
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This quotation makes clear that for Aquinas the doctrine of the gifts does not imply a second 
kind of action that is optional for the graced agent. Rather, it relates to two different aspects of 
each human act in the state of grace, for each act depends on an instigation by the Holy Spirit 
(as first cause), but implies likewise a partnership and cooperation of the human powers that 
are ordinarily involved in human actions (but now as second causes) and are perfected by 
virtue. Therefore, the gifts as well as the infused virtues are necessary in graced human 
activity. In one respect the actions of the graced agent are divine since they are moved by the 
Spirit as first cause through the gifts, and in another respect they are human since they are 
determined by reason as second cause through the infused virtues (which are, admittedly, 
moved beforehand by the Spirit). Both causes belong essentially and inseparably to the 
supernatural action.
63
 
Aquinas thematizes the issue ex professo in his Commentary on the Sentences where he 
distinguishes three meanings of human operation. First, it belongs to an actus humanus to 
originate from human reason;
64
 secondly, to consist in operations and passions, the proper 
matter of human actions;
65
 and thirdly, to be performed in a human mode, i.e. by the ordinary 
powers of man. ―Thirdly, [an action] is called human because of its mode, namely if in a 
human operation of the first or second kind is also a human mode preserved.‖66 Subsequently, 
he contrasts that human mode with a divine mode of acting: ―If, however, somebody executes 
things which belong to man in a supra-human mode, the operation is not simply human, but in 
a certain way divine.‖67 Thus, the text makes clear that that divine mode of some human 
actions does not suppress the two prior meanings. Even operationes divino modo (which 
means: originated by a divine instigation) remain human actions in the first and second sense, 
i.e. actions and passions originated from reason.  
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 See ST I 23.5: ―Nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda, et causa prima.‖ And even more explicit in ScG 
III 70.7: ―Non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae virtuti attribuitur quasi partim a deo, et partim a 
naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium modum: sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur 
instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus.‖ 
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 ―Operatio autem hominis potest dici tripliciter. Primo ex potentia eliciente vel imperante operationem; sicut 
operatio rationis vel alicuius potentiae quae obedit rationi, quia a ratione habet homo quod sit homo; nutriri 
autem et videre non sunt operationes hominis inquantum est homo, sed inquantum est vivum vel animal; et 
secundum hoc omnes habitus perficientes ad operationes aliquas in quibus non communicat homo cum brutis, 
possunt dici virtutes humanae.‖ (In sent. III 34.1.1). 
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 ―Secundo dicitur operatio humana ex materia, sive obiecto, sicut illae quae habent pro materia passiones, sive 
operationes humanas: sic enim virtutes morales proprie virtutes humanae dicuntur. Unde dicit philosophus 10 
ethicor., quod opus speculativae virtutis est magis divinum quam humanum: quia habet necessaria et aeterna pro 
materia, non autem humana.‖ (In sent. III 34.1.1). 
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 In sent. III 34.1.1: ―Tertio dicitur humana ex modo, quia scilicet in operationibus humanis vel primo vel 
secundo modo, etiam modus humanus servatur.‖ 
67
 In sent. III 34.1.1: ―Si autem ea quae hominis sunt, supra humanum modum quis exequatur, erit operatio non 
humana simpliciter, sed quodammodo divina.‖ 
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For an example we can refer to the gift of counsel, described as corresponding and perfecting 
the gift of (infused) prudence.
68
 St. Thomas emphasizes that the divine instigation received 
through the gift of counsel does not dispense with the need for prudence, which is about 
practical ambiguities and doubts. He even mentions that ―doubts belong to counsel [as a 
gift],‖69 since it is due to prudence to inquire into the various possibilities by which an end 
may be attained.
70
  
This shows how the gifts and the infused virtues require each other. The gifts dispose man to 
be moved by the Holy Spirit, and the virtues perfect the human faculties to achieve the human 
act readily under the influence of the divine motion. According to that view graced actions do 
not only presuppose infused virtues but they also arise (since they are likewise superhuman 
actions) necessarily from a motion of the Holy Spirit. As a result, every act of infused virtue 
involves the corresponding cooperation of a gift. As Pinckaers explains, such a conception of 
the gifts illustrates ―the unity of action between the superior principle, which is God‘s Spirit, 
and the interior principles which are the virtues, at the level of our free and reasonable will, at 
the source of our actions.‖71  
What‘s the gain for a parallel understanding of acquired and infused virtues? The foregoing 
chapter has shown that acquired virtues grant to the agent a certain autonomy; he is able to 
decide and achieve the good on his own resources, whereas infused virtues do not provide a 
self-sufficiency of the graced agent. The reason for this is now clear. Infused virtue does not 
imply a ―full perfection‖ in the sense of autonomy and independency, since it is a 
participation in the divine perfection. In this way (as Pinckaers explains elsewhere) ―the first 
source of moral excellence is no longer located in the human person, but in God.‖72 The 
divine perfection, however, cannot be possessed in the same complete way as natural virtues. 
It is a participated perfection. The parallel to acquired virtues remains only possible if one 
takes into account their essential connection with the divine mover by means of the gifts of 
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 ST II-II 52.2: ―Prudentia, quae importat rectitudinem rationis, maxime perficitur et iuvatur secundum quod 
regulatur et movetur a spiritu sancto. Quod pertinet ad donum consilii.‖ 
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 ST II-II 52.3 ad 2: ―Dubitatio pertinet ad consilium [ut donum] secundum statum vitae praesentis.‖ See also 
the argument in the body of the article: ―Mens viatorum movetur a deo in agendis per hoc quod sedatur anxietas 
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 The general cooperation of the virtue of prudence and the gift of counsel is described as following: ―Dona 
spiritus sancti, ut supra dictum est [ST I-II 68.1], sunt quaedam dispositiones quibus anima redditur bene mobilis 
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 Pinckaers, ―Morality and the Movement,‖ 389. 
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 Pinckaers, Morality: The Catholic View, 71. 
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the Holy Spirit. Thus, the gifts are essential for an adequate understanding of infused moral 
virtues as true virtues.  
Nonetheless, a study about infused virtue should not focus permanently on this fact. Since 
graced actions, achieved according to a divine mode, are likewise human acts, the essential 
structure of human acting is preserved (which means their determination by reason, operations 
and passions as objects). Since those powers are perfected by infused virtues, research about 
infused justice might dispense with an explicit focus on the gifts – though it should be aware 
of their internal connection. 
This introductory outline provided a first approach to the Thomistic doctrine of infused 
virtues with the intention to depict the general framework in which the doctrine is developed 
and to remove some of the usual reservations against it. Of course, there remain many 
unanswered issues. In chapter 2 we will address a number of more specific questions 
regarding the difference of acquired and infused virtues. Afterwards, chapter 3 shall treat the 
interaction of both types of virtues.  
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2. Differences between Acquired and Infused Virtues: Four Clarifications 
 
The aim of this second chapter is to provide a more detailed clarification of the differences 
between acquired and infused virtues. As a starting point of our research we take ST I-II 63.4, 
which investigates whether acquired virtues belong to the same species as infused virtues. In a 
certain way the whole of chapter 2 will be nothing else than a commentary on this article. 
Therefore, we begin by quoting the text of the article‘s corpus in full: 
 
On the contrary, any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a 
difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, which God works 
in us without us, as stated above [q. 55.4]. Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words 
cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue. 
 
I answer that, there is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above, is 
taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a 
good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in 
respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this 
object is from reason which institutes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material 
element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is 
appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a 
different aspect than the mean which is imposed according to divine rule. For instance, in the 
consumption of food, the mean stated by human reason, is that food should not harm the 
health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas according to the divine rule it 
requires that man chastises his body, and brings it into subjection (1 Cor. 9.27), by abstinence 
in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ 
in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.  
 
The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: 
for a man's health and a horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference 
between the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the 
Philosopher says in Polit. III 3, that the virtues of citizens are different by which they are well 
directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, 
whereby men behave well in respect of their being fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the 
household of God (Eph. 2.19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in 
respect of human things.
1
 
                                                 
1
 ST I-II 63.4: ―Sed contra, quaelibet differentia in definitione posita, mutata diversificat speciem. Sed in 
definitione virtutis infusae ponitur, quam deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus 
acquisita, cui hoc non convenit, non est eiusdem speciei cum infusa.  
Respondeo dicendum quod dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo, sicut praedictum est, secundum 
speciales et formales rationes obiectorum. Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum consideratum in materia 
propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti 
formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte 
concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem quod alterius rationis est modus qui imponitur in huiusmodi 
concupiscentiis secundum regulam rationis humanae, et secundum regulam divinam. Puta in sumptione ciborum, 
ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini corporis, nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem 
regulam legis divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, et in servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi 
et potus, et aliorum huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita differunt specie, et 
eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus. Alio modo habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur, non 
enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit 
philosophus, in III polit., quod diversae sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se habent ad diversas politias. 
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The body of the article distinguishes acquired and infused virtues by means of their formal 
and final causes, while the sed contra invokes God as the efficient cause of infused virtues.
2
 
Furthermore, there is even a reference to the material cause: the pleasures of the 
concupiscence of touch are described as the matter of temperance. We will therefore use the 
four Aristotelian causes as a framework for a more detailed investigation of the acquired and 
infused virtues.
3
 Each of the following four subchapters contains the clarification of a 
problematic issue which is either controversial among scholars or simply not mentioned by 
them. 
Section 2.1 is concerned with the efficient cause and returns to the question why the infused 
moral virtues are necessary at all (see section 1.1). In particular we deal with the more subtle 
issue of whether infused prudence in cooperation with acquired moral virtues may be enough 
for graced actions according to the supernatural rule. 
Section 2.2 deals with the two different formal rules: reason as the measure of acquired 
virtues, and the divine rule as measure of the infused ones. But how does the divine law 
intervene in the reasonable human act? Or put another way, what is the precise function of the 
rule of reason in the act of infused virtues?  
Section 2.3 is concerned with the different final causes. Whereas Aquinas‘s statement 
regarding the purpose of infused virtues is quite clear (man‘s membership in the Church), the 
exact purpose of acquired virtue remains controversial. What does Aquinas mean by good 
behavior in respect to human things? Are acquired virtues identical with pagan political 
virtues, or do they require man‘s total order in all practical matters on a natural sphere? 
Finally, we treat the material cause of the virtues, which are usually identified as man‘s 
actions and passions. Section 2.4, however, poses the question in a much more specific way: 
can a virtue be considered as matter of another virtue? Aquinas often speaks of charity and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad 
hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici dei; et aliae virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet 
in ordine ad res humanas.‖ 
2
 Scholars often distinguish acquired and infused virtues based on these three causes (e.g. Cessario, Introduction 
to Moral Theology, 201). An exception is Aubert who determines the differences between the natural and 
supernatural order in reference to all four causes (cf. Jean-Marie Aubert, ―La spécificité de la morale chrétienne 
selon Saint Thomas,‖ Le Supplément 92 (1970): 69-73).  
3
 For a general outline of habits by the four aristotelian causes, see Jacobus M. Ramirez, De habitibus in 
communi. In I-II Summae Theologiae divini Thomae expositio (QQ. XLIX-LIV), vol. 2 (Madrid: Instituto de 
Filosofia ‗Luis Vives‘, 1973), 234-237. Interesting on that score is also William C. III Mattison, ―Thomas‘s 
Categorizations of Virtue: Historical Background and Contemporary Significance,‖ The Thomist 74 (2010): 189-
235. Mattison shows in which way Aquinas brought more clarity into the common distinction of acquired and 
infused virtues by a precise determination of their efficient and final cause and their respective objects. 
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prudence as forms of all virtues. But then it should be possible to understand some virtues as 
the matter of other ―formatting‖ virtues. 
Through the investigation of these four issues, which resembles a ―commentary‖ on ST I-II 
63.4, we prepare the way for an investigation of the interaction of acquired and infused virtues 
in chapter 3. 
 
 
2.1 The Efficient Cause: The Absolute Need for Infused Moral Virtues 
 
In this first subchapter we investigate Aquinas‘s assertion that God himself is – and has to be 
– the efficient cause of moral virtues with regard to man‘s supernatural end, whereas acquired 
virtues may be generated and developed by the repeated operations of the agent himself. We 
can skip an outline of Aquinas‘s understanding of the ordinary acquisition of natural moral 
virtues because it is an uncontroversial theme.
4
 The moral virtues of the order of grace, 
however, are given by divine infusion, which – according the famous definition of Peter 
Lombardus – ―God works in us without us.‖5  
In the introduction we already mentioned the old and often repeated objection of Duns Scotus 
who argued for a cooperation of infused theological virtues and ―ordinary‖ acquired moral 
virtues. According to the Franciscan scholar, the doctrine of infused moral virtues was 
redundant.
6
 But as shown in section 1.1, the theological virtues perfect the graced agent only 
                                                 
4
 The acquisition of a natural virtue is explained in In sent. II 44.2.1 ad 6; III 33.1.2B; ST I-II 63.2; De virt. in 
com. 9; for a description of the acquisition of habits in general: ST I-II 51.2 and 3. A helpful exposition of 
Aquinas‘s doctrine on the development of acquired virtue provides Hilary Carpenter, ―The Natural Virtues,‖ in 
Moral Principles and Practice. Papers Read at the Summer School of Catholic Studies Held at Cambridge, 1932, 
ed. G.J. MacGillivray (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne LTD., 1938), 106-125. Very detailed is Ramirez, 
De habitibus. For the development of affective virtues see Peter Nickel, Ordnung der Gefühle: Studien zum 
Begriff des ‘habitus’ (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001). 
5
 Quoted in e.g. ST I-II 55.4: ―deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.‖ The expression ―sine nobis‖ might be 
misleading. Aquinas certainly does not hold a quasi mechanic, external infusion of virtues, independent of man‘s 
own attitude. The consent of man remains necessary also for an infusion sine nobis; in this way man is involved 
even in the process of the infusion of virtues. In contrast, the acquisition of virtues acts vice versa: The natural 
virtues are caused by man‘s own operation, but even here the motion arises, of course, from God as first cause; it 
is an acquisition which achieves God in us with us, i.e. though our actions. ―Virtus infusa causatur in nobis a deo 
sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam deus in 
nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim 
operatur in omni voluntate et natura.‖ (ST I-II 55.4 ad 6). 
6
 According to Duns Scotus the command of supernatural charity suffices to move the human potencies to act, if 
they are prepared by natural virtues to follow a superior command. ―Si virtutes morales sufficienter inclinant in 
fines suos et humanos (quod est idem), et prudentia dirigit circa media in acquirendo illos fines, et caritas ultima 
ad ultimum finem, igitur - secundum hoc - homo potest simpliciter esse perfectus sine moralibus infusis. Et sic 
non necesse est ponere infusas propter medium, quia ad hoc valet prudentia, - nec propter finem ultimum, quia 
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with regard to God as final end.
7
 Virtuous acts regarding temporal things, however, require a 
special set of additional moral virtues measured by a divine standard.
8
 
Against this need for infused moral virtues, however, one could make another more 
sophisticated objection. Wouldn‘t it be sufficient to argue for the theological virtues in 
combination with infused prudence? Faith, hope, and charity provide man‘s direction towards 
the final end, and infused prudence chooses the right means with regard to this end, i.e. 
according to a supernatural measure. Subsequently, it commands the act of man‘s appetitive 
powers (i.e. the will, the irascible and concupiscible appetitive), which are disposed to follow 
the command of (infused) prudence by the acquired moral virtues, namely justice, fortitude, 
and temperance. Thus, are not at least the infused moral virtues of the appetitive powers 
redundant? 
This will be the first issue which is clarified in this section. For its solution we have to attain a 
more exact understanding of the function of moral virtues. In fact, Aquinas insistence on the 
need for a necessary divine causa efficiens for supernatural moral virtues will remain strange 
if we understand moral virtue as mere neutral readiness of the appetitive powers to obey the 
command of a superior power. 
In a second subchapter we shall inquire as to the manner in which (or whether at all) God as 
efficient cause of infused virtues can serve as a distinctive principle in regard to acquired 
virtues. The secondary literature barely mentions this question.
9
 However, Aquinas just states 
this claim in the sed contra of ST II-II 63.4.
10
 In which sense does he make this assertion? 
                                                                                                                                                        
ad hoc sufficit caritas: nec enim temperantia infusa, si poneretur, alium finem acquireret.‖ (Joannes Duns Scotus, 
Lectura in librum tertium sententiarum, vol. 21 (Rome: Typis vaticanis, 2004), dist. 36, qu. unica, no. 122). 
7
 Namely in regard to God as first truth in respect to faith, as final end in respect to hope and charity. 
8
 See ST I-II 63.3 and 65.3, corp. art. and ad 1. 
9
 An exception is Jeffrey Hause, ―Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue,‖ American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 81 (2007): 15-18 and Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1993), 214; however, the latter, as we shall see, in a somehow problematic way. J. Inglis mentions the 
distinction between acquired and infused virtus by their different efficient causes (John Inglis, ―Aquinas‘s 
Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: Rethinking of Standard Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue 
in Aquinas,‖ Journal of Religious Ethics 27 (1999): 21), but subsequently his argument slides to acquired and 
infused virtues as two efficient causes of one common moral act (what is a quite different thing). 
10
 See footnote 1. 
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2.1.1 The Necessary Infusion of Special Virtues in the Appetitive Powers 
 
Why does St. Thomas consider the cooperation of acquired moral virtues and infused 
prudence insufficient for the perfect life of the graced agent? The answer depends on the 
general interpretation of the function of the human appetites and their virtues. Usually moral 
virtues are understood as habits of the appetitive human powers that provide a ―neutral‖ 
readiness to obey the command of a superior power.
11
 If this were already the full description 
of a moral virtue, then indeed the Scotist objection against supernatural moral virtues could be 
hardly refuted. If an appetitive power were already disposed by an acquired virtue to obey the 
command of reason, then why couldn‘t it likewise obey the guidance of infused prudence? 
This, however, is not at all Aquinas‘s view of moral virtues. In a recently published article, J. 
Hause has shown for the case of justice that it cannot be reduced to a mere readiness of its 
underlying power (the will) to follow the command of reason. Rather justice consists in an 
additional ―strong direction‖ to some ends which implies an additional specification of the 
natural appetite.
12
 The readiness of the will to be subject to reason pertains already to its 
nature.
13
 Consequently, it does not require an additional habit. But to render everybody his 
due (the proper task of justice) demands a new perfection, a special inclination.
14
 Nevertheless, 
Hause doubts whether Aquinas would assert such a ―strong direction‖ generally for all moral 
virtue or whether a ―weak direction‖ understood as mere readiness to obey a superior virtue 
wouldn‘t be sufficient for most virtues.15 
In the following paragraphs we hope to show that actually every moral virtue implies more 
than a neutral disposition, that the power itself receives a new inclination, and that every 
moral virtue consists – according to the terminology of Hause – in a strong direction.  
We will first test our thesis by applying it to acquired temperance, and then we will apply the 
results generally to all the infused moral virtues. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 E.g. ST I-II 58.3. 
12
 Hause, ―Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue,‖ 1-12; about the ―strong directive function‖ see esp. 7-10. 
13
 Since the bonum intellectum is the proper object of the will. 
14
 See ST I-II 56.6.  
15
 Hause, ―Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue,‖ 10. 
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a) Acquired Temperance as Reasonable Inclination of the Sensitive 
Appetite 
 
Temperance: Just a Question of “Obedient” Passions?  
It is not by chance that the function of temperance is often reduced to a passive readiness of 
the sensitive appetite to follow the command of reason. In fact, there is something true about 
it. Passions are principles of action. Their natural motions are determined by the sensible good, 
which is their proper object. On that level the sensitive appetite is not yet a subject of moral 
virtue since it lacks a relation to the reasonable good. ―The irascible and concupiscible powers 
can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the sensitive 
appetite. And in this way they are not the subject of virtue.‖16 However, since the will is able 
to move the other human powers (in cooperation with the practical intellect), it might move 
even the sensible appetite. And thereby the latter participates in the order of reason. Passions 
are in this way, as Aquinas says, ―subjectable‖ to the order of reason and become thereby 
morally relevant.
17
  
 
Secondly, they can be considered as participating in reason, since they have the natural 
capacity to obey reason. And in this way the irascible or concupiscible power can be the 
subject of human virtue; since something is a principle of a human act insofar it participates in 
reason. And to these powers it is necessary to put virtues.
18
  
 
However, the sensible appetite does not follow ―automatically‖ the command of reason but 
may resist guidance. For example, the intellect commands us to renounce a further glass of 
wine, but our passions push us to continue drinking. Maybe the intellect wins the internal 
struggle. But as long as the appetite is inclined to follow its own law the commanded act 
remains a source of certain sadness, since it is moved violently by the higher appetite. 
                                                 
16
 ST I-II 56.4: ―Irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo secundum se, inquantum 
sunt partes appetitus sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competit eis quod sint subiectum virtutis.‖ 
17
 ―Naturale est quod vires inferiores sint subiicibiles rationi.‖ (De virt. in com. 8 ad 17). In sent. III 33.1.2A 
explains that the appetitives powers ―naturaliter sunt obaudibiles rationi: unde naturaliter sunt susceptivae 
virtutis.‖ And consequently: ―In irascibili et concupiscibili . . . sit aliquid rationis participative, inquantum rationi 
obedire possunt.‖ (In sent. III 33.2.4B). 
18
 ST I-II 56.4: ―Alio modo possunt considerari inquantum participant rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi 
obedire. Et sic irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis humanae, sic enim est principium 
humani actus, inquantum participat rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes.‖ Similar in In sent. 
III 33.2.4B ad 4: ―Sensibilis appetitus, secundum quod in natura sua consideratur, dicitur sensualitas, et sic est 
perpetuae corruptionis; et secundum ipsum non differt homo a brutis, nec potest esse subiectum virtutis, non 
autem secundum quod est participans aliqualiter ratione; et ideo nihil prohibet sic in eo esse virtutem sicut in 
proximo subiecto.‖ It should be noted that because of this potential reasonability man‘s passions are from the 
very beginning essentially different from the sensitive appetite of non-rational animals. (Cf. the analysis of 
Chapter 2. Differences of Acquired and Infused Virtues: Four Clarifications 
 56 
Therefore, the virtuous functioning of the sensible appetite presupposes the absence of 
unregulated passion and the disposition of easy submission.
19
  
 
Temperance as Reasonable Inclination of the Sensitive Appetite  
So far, so good. However, although the passive disposition of the sensitive appetite for being 
moved by the higher power is important, it is neither the complete character of temperance 
nor the most important one. Accordingly, St. Thomas: ―No act is perfectly produced by an 
active power, unless it is connatural to that power by some form, which is the principle of that 
action.‖20 Hence, neither the absence of unregulated passions, nor the passive readiness to 
obey a potential command, but the actual conformity of the sensitive appetite according to the 
order reason is the specific character of affective virtue. ―Since the good disposition of the 
power which moves by being moved, depends on its conformity with the moving power, 
therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible power is nothing else but a 
certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason.‖21 The mere fact that the sensible 
appetite can follow the command of reason (or even that it follows a concrete command) is 
not the proper purpose of an affective virtue. Rather, it implies – so to speak – the realization 
of the order of reason in the sensible appetite. ―Moral virtue . . . is not only according to right 
reason [secundum rationem rectam], . . . but it is also with right reason [cum ratione 
recta].‖22 Only because of this participation of the sensible appetite in the order of reason is 
                                                                                                                                                        
human passions according to Aquinas in Lee H. Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and 
Conceptions of Courage (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), 72-112). 
19
 ―Quando igitur oportet operationem hominis esse circa ea quae sunt obiecta sensibilis appetitus, requiritur ad 
bonitatem operationis quod sit in appetitu sensibili aliqua dispositio, vel perfectio, per quam appetitus praedictus 
de facili obediat rationi; et hanc virtutem vocamus.‖ (De virt. in com. 4). 
20
 ST II-II 23.2: ―Nullus autem actus perfecte producitur ab aliqua potentia activa nisi sit ei connaturalis per 
aliquam formam quae sit principium actionis.‖ G. Abbà mentioned a development regarding the function of 
moral matters in Aquinas‘s thought. Whereas in his earlier works moral virtue is yet described as mere readiness 
to follow the judgment of reason, in his later works (esp. the second part of the Summa theologiae) moral virtue 
implies itself an inclination to the good act. See the summary of his research: Giuseppe Abbà, ‘Lex et virtus:’ 
Studi sull'evoluzione della dottrina morale di san Tommaso d’Aqino (Rome: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 1983), 
265-271; for an outline of Aquinas‘s developed position in the Summa theologiae, see ibid., 174-224. 
21
 ST I-II 56.4: ―Quia bona dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum conformitatem ad 
potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quaedam habitualis 
conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem.― Also ad 2: ―Irascibilis et concupiscibilis ex se quidem non habent 
bonum virtutis. . . . Inquantum vero conformantur rationi, sic in eis adgeneratur bonum virtutis moralis.― In fact, 
it is due to moral virtue to incline the underlying power itself to the good of the reasonable order, to provide a 
―convenire rationi‖ of the passions (ST I-II 59.1). Or elsewhere: ―Habitui vero proprium est ut inclinet potentiam 
ad agendum quod convenit habitui inquantum facit id videri bonum quod ei convenit, malum autem quod ei 
repugnat.‖ (ST II-II 24.11). Consequently, in ST I-II 58.5 Aquinas defines virtues of the sensitive appetite as 
dispositions ―quae vim appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi.‖ Porter rightly emphasis that the 
affective virtues are more than a mere ―self-control‖ of passions (Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The 
Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1990), 110-123). 
22
 ST I-II 58.4 ad 3: ―Virtus moralis non . . . solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id quod 
est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut 
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temperance a virtue at all. Temperance as a neutral disposition without own ―reasonable 
tendency‖ would collapse, since it is the intrinsic reasonableness which constitutes the 
specific character of virtue.
23
 Therefore, we can assert that temperance is the imprint of the 
ordo rationis in the sensible appetite.
24
 Wadell describes virtuous affections even as ―spirited 
emotions,―25 as affects that answer a sensible good as proximate object but in a reasonable 
way. Thus, referring again to our example, the concupiscible appetite of a temperate person 
would refuse a fifth glass of wine not only because it is trained to be obedient to a command 
of reason but also because it inclines itself according to the order of reason. 
According to the weak-direction-theory of Hause, one could imagine a hypothetical situation 
where a man loses reason but his sensible appetite remains perfected by temperance (at least 
for some time) since his passions do not incline him immediately to intemperate things. Not 
so for Aquinas. Admittedly, a certain habit might remain in the appetitive power even without 
prudence. That remaining habit, however, is not a moral virtue in its proper sense because the 
habit does not participate in the reasonable order. The ratio virtutis of temperance is not 
specified by the calmness of passions but by the imprint of the order of reason in the 
appetitive power itself.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Aristoteles dicit, in VI ethic.‖ Similar in De virt. in com. 12 ad 16: ―Virtus moralis nihil aliud est quam 
participatio quaedam rationis rectae in parte appetitiva.‖  
23
 Temperance and fortitude never can be addressed without implicit reference to reason. ―Habitus qui est in 
irascibili, non habet rationem virtutis . . . nisi inquantum intellectum et discretionem recipit a ratione, quam 
perficit prudentia.‖ (In sent. III 27.2.4C). Hence, it is would be inadequate to ascribe a temperate action 
exclusively to the appetitive power: always the formal part of the act pertains to reason. ―Sicut iam dictum est, 
actus virtutis non potest esse irascibilis vel concupiscibilis tantum, sine ratione. Id tamen quod est in actu virtutis, 
principalius est rationis, scilicet electio; sicut et in qualibet operatione principalior est agentis actio quam passio 
patientis. Ratio enim imperat irascibili et concupiscibili. Non ergo pro tanto dicitur esse virtus in irascibili vel 
concupiscibili, quasi per eas totus actus virtutis vel principalior pars expleatur; sed in quantum, per virtutis 
habitum, ultimum complementum bonitatis actui virtutis confertur: in hoc scilicet quod irascibilis et 
concupiscibilis absque difficultate sequantur ordinem rationis.― (De virt. in com. 5 ad 2). What is true for 
temperance and fortitude, is likewise valid for all virtues of appetitive powers: ―Habitus moralis habet rationem 
virtutis humanae, inquantum rationi conformatur.‖ (ST I-II 58.3). ―Sicut virtutis moralis subiectum est aliquid 
participans ratione, ita virtus moralis habet rationem virtutis inquantum participat virtutem intellectualem.‖ (ST 
II-II 47.5 ad 3). 
24
 Cf. In sent. III 27.2.4C ad 5. Affective virtues rule the sensible appetite in such a way that they conform 
themselves to the true good. ―Elles gouvernent les passions de sorte que l‘on désire ce qui est vraiment conforme 
au bien.― (Jean Porter, ―Vertus,‖ in Dictionnaire Critique de Théologieed., ed by Jean-Yves Lacoste, Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, 1219). 
However, it should be noted that the affective powers – despite the rational inclination – do not produce human 
acts apart of a precedent act of reason and will. Every human act originates from man‘s intellectual faculties. 
―Actus virtutis non potest esse irascibilis vel concupiscibilis tantum, sine ratione. Id tamen quod est in actu 
virtutis, principalius est rationis, scilicet electio; sicut et in qualibet operatione principalior est agentis actio quam 
passio patientis. Ratio enim imperat irascibili et concupiscibili. Non ergo pro tanto dicitur esse virtus in irascibili 
vel concupiscibili, quasi per eas totus actus virtutis vel principalior pars expleatur; sed in quantum, per virtutis 
habitum, ultimum complementum bonitatis actui virtutis confertur: in hoc scilicet quod irascibilis et 
concupiscibilis absque difficultate sequantur ordinem rationis.‖ (De virt. in com. 4 ad 2). 
25
 Cf. Wadell, The Primacy of Love, 98-103. 
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Conclusion: Temperance as Directing Prudence 
Up to now we have spoken of the ―order of reason‖ while avoiding any reference to prudence. 
As the virtue of the practical intellect prudence is defined as recta ratio agibilium, as a virtue 
of the intellect which inquires, judges and commands the right mean in practical matters.
26
 
The foregoing findings might suggest the idea that temperance simply consists in the 
participation of the sensible appetite in prudence. Is prudence therefore the superior virtue 
which determines the order of temperance? 
Aquinas addresses the general relation between prudence and moral virtues on several 
occasions, asking whether the moral virtues can exist without prudence and vice versa.
27
 He 
argues for a somehow circular schema: the moral virtues require prudence and prudence 
requires the moral virtues. The latter require prudence since by themselves they imply just the 
inclination towards the right end. On their own they fail to choose and command the right 
means for attaining these right ends. Therefore, they need the guidance of prudence which 
determines ea quae sunt ad finem.
28
 Conversely, prudence can only choose the right means if 
the human appetite is already ordered towards its right end. In other words, the right appetite 
towards the end is the measure of the practical intellect for the right means.
29
 Thus, prudence 
presupposes the moral virtues, which direct the human appetites to the right ends – in a way 
―before‖ the proper activity of prudence.30 
 
This assertion requires a twofold explanation. 
First, moral virtues are not blind inclinations, although their end is not determined by 
prudence. St. Thomas denies that the ends of moral virtues are the result of a proceeding 
inquiry by prudence. Nonetheless, they are known by reason, namely immediately and 
naturally as first principles of the practical intellect, such as the preservation of one‘s life. ―In 
practical reason some principles preexist naturally known, and those are the ends of moral 
                                                 
26
 ST I-II 57.4-6; ST II-II 47.1-5. 
27
 See e.g. ST I-II 58.4 and 5; 66.3 ad 3; ST II-II 47.6 and 7; De virt. card. 2; Quodl. XII 15.1 etc. 
28
 ST I-II 58.4; ST II-II 47.7. 
29
 Very illuminative is the following explanation in In ethic. VI 2.8: ―Appetitus est finis et eorum quae sunt ad 
finem: finis autem determinatus est homini a natura, ut supra in III habitum est. Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, 
non sunt nobis determinata a natura, sed per rationem investigantur; sic ergo manifestum est quod rectitudo 
appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura veritatis in ratione practica. Et secundum hoc determinatur veritas 
rationis practicae secundum concordiam ad appetitum rectum. Ipsa autem veritas rationis practicae est regula 
rectitudinis appetitus, circa ea quae sunt ad finem.‖ 
30
 Thus, it is clear that prudence does not choose the end of moral virtues; see ST I-II 58.5; ST II-II 47.6. 
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virtues.‖31 And further: ―The end of moral virtues is determined by natural reason which is 
called synderesis.‖ 32  Only subsequently to this principal orientation of the moral virtues 
towards immediately known practical ends does the virtue of prudence inquire, judge and 
command the apt means for attaining the end.  
Secondly, though prudence does not choose the end of the moral virtues, Aquinas sometimes 
says that it might dictate their ends. ―Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in choosing 
the right means, but also in prescribing the end.‖33 Such an assertion is based on the fact that 
the ends which are (already) determined by nature and known by the practical intellect have 
yet to be decreed to the appetitive powers. As seen above, the appetitive powers have to be 
determined according to the order of reason.
34
 And in this qualified sense prudence even 
prescribes their end. However, this does not imply a potential choice regarding the end.
35
 
Let us apply this view to the concrete example of temperance. By his practical intellect man 
immediately acknowledges health as a good. Temperance thus inclines the concupiscible 
appetite towards health – according to the order of reason, but not as chosen by prudence. 
Only subsequently does prudence join the process of action. It chooses the right means for 
attaining the already determined end, and it commands particular acts from temperance to 
achieve the end, i.e. in virtue of its inclination towards the end.  
This outline should provide us enough to show that prudence cannot be portrayed simply as 
the guiding virtue of moral virtues. On the contrary, prudence is, in a certain sense, even 
subordinate to the moral virtues.  
 
 
b) Infused Prudence and Its Cooperation with Infused Moral Virtues 
 
The insufficiency of mere infused prudence without infused moral virtues should now be 
evident. Moral virtues do not only dispose their underlying powers to follow a superior 
                                                 
31
 ST II-II 47.4: ―In ratione practica praeexistunt quaedam ut principia naturaliter nota, et huiusmodi sunt fines 
virtutum moralium.‖ 
32
 ST II-II 47.6 ad 1: ―Virtutibus moralibus praestituit finem ratio naturalis quae dicitur syneresis.‖ In ST I-II 58.4 
Aquinas attributes the knowledge of the end to the intellectual virtue of intellectus (which is discussed in ST II-II 
57.2). 
33
 ST I-II 66.3 ad 3: ―Prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in 
praestituendo finem.‖ Similar also in ST II-II 47.2 ad 1: ―In genere autem humanorum actuum causa altissima est 
finis communis toti vitae humanae. Et hunc finem intendit prudentia.‖ 
34
 ST I-II 60.1: ―In moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens.‖ 
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command; they also imply in themselves an inclination to right ends on the natural level 
according to the immediate insights of synderesis. Analogously, the infused moral virtues 
have to consist in the participation of the appetitive powers in a certain order, namely the 
order of grace. Or to put it another way, by the infused moral virtues the appetitive powers 
incline to certain ends according to the first principles of the supernatural life, principles 
which we identified in section 1.1 as the theological virtues. 
This point is highly important. If we reconstruct the account of infused moral virtues in a 
parallel fashion to their acquired counterparts, then their ends are not chosen by infused 
prudence which inquires, elects, and commands ea quae sunt ad finem. On the contrary, it is 
due to the light of divine faith that the graced agent acknowledges immediately and quasi-
naturally some supernatural truth which exceeds mere human reason. This divine knowledge 
of faith includes not only speculative but also practical truth about some goods unknowable 
by mere natural synderesis. And these revealed goods constitute the ends of infused moral 
virtues.
36
 
Our interpretation is confirmed by Aquinas‘s discussion of understanding and knowledge as 
gifts of the Holy Spirit to support divine faith.
37
 Through the influence of those gifts man 
knows truths above his reason,
38
 not only theoretical but also practical ones. Those insights – 
exceeding the synderesis but made possible by the gift of intellect and the virtue of faith – 
become the first principles of the moral life of the graced agent. St. Thomas explains: ―The 
rule of human actions is human reason and the eternal law, as stated above. Now the eternal 
law exceeds human reason. And therefore the knowledge of human actions as ruled by the 
eternal law, exceeds natural reason, and requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy 
Spirit.‖ 39  And from those first principles man can draw further practical conclusions, 
supported by the gift of knowledge. ―By [the gift of] knowledge of the things of faith, and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
35
 On the contrary: Aquinas notes that prudence is moved by the natural knowledge the practical principles. 
―Synderesis movet prudentiam, sicut intellectus principiorum scientiam.‖ (ST II-II 47.6 ad 3). 
36
 ST II-II 4.2 ad 4: ―Fides est in intellectu speculativo sicut in subiecto, ut manifeste patet ex fidei obiecto. Sed 
quia veritas prima, quae est fidei obiectum, est finis omnium desideriorum et actionum nostrarum, ut patet per 
Augustinum, in I de Trin.; inde est quod per dilectionem operatur. Sicut etiam intellectus speculativus extensione 
fit practicus.‖ See thereto also Christopher J. Thompson, ―The Spirit and the Limits of Prudential Reasoning,‖ 
The Thomist 63 (1999): 433-434. 
37
 Discussed in ST II-II 8 and 9. 
38
 ST II-II 8.1. 
39
 ST II-II 8.3 ad 3: ―Regula humanorum actuum est et ratio humana et lex aeterna, ut supra dictum est. Lex 
autem aeterna excedit naturalem rationem. Et ideo cognitio humanorum actuum secundum quod regulantur a 
lege aeterna, excedit rationem naturalem, et indiget supernaturali lumine doni spiritus sancti.‖ Similar in the corp. 
art.: ―Donum intellectus etiam ad quaedam operabilia se extendit . . . inquantum in agendis regulamur rationibus 
aeternis, quibus conspiciendis et consulendis, secundum Augustinum, XII de Trin., inhaeret superior ratio, quae 
dono intellectus perficitur.‖ 
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conclusions drawn from those things of faith, we are directed in our actions.‖40 This shows 
that the ends of supernatural moral virtue are not inquired and chosen by prudence, but 
already predetermined. 
However, the mere intellectual knowledge of these supernatural goods is not enough, since 
moral virtues consist in the right inclination of the appetitive powers themselves. A theory of 
infused moral virtue becomes therefore necessary. Acquired temperance is the inclination of 
the sensible appetite according to the order of reason. Analogously, infused temperance is the 
inclination to the right ends in respect to the supernatural order. Only on this basis – 
subsequently – prudence becomes relevant, namely as inquiring, choosing, and commanding 
the right means, but always in regard to an already determined end.  
Let us assume per impossible the hypothetical case that an irrational animal becomes 
equipped with by rational powers. Thus, reason would direct the animal to a new (and higher) 
end. But such a divine infusion of reason would not imply automatically a potential 
virtuousness of the sensitive appetite. Even a command or approval of some passions by 
reason wouldn‘t already be temperate. Unless the sensitive appetite of the animal is not 
fundamentally transformed – namely if it does not become itself reasonable by participation in 
the intellect – then the miraculous animal couldn‘t act temperately in the proper sense. 
Analogously, the infusion of theological virtues together with infused prudence would be 
insufficient to transform the human moral life unless a new set of moral virtues are equally 
infused.
41
 
                                                 
40
 ST II-II 9.3: ―Per scientiam credibilium, et eorum quae ad credibilia consequuntur, dirigimur in agendis.‖ 
41
 For the same reasons the suggestion that those supernatural habits could be generated by repeated actions is 
impossible. Without infused moral virtues the human faculties lack the adequacy in regard to the divine good 
and hence they are simply disproportioned to follow a supernatural command; see ST I-II 63.3 corp. and ad 1; 
the ―proportionaliter― obviously does not imply a neutral readiness regarding theological virtues. 
This sheds light also on Lottin‘s position who didn‘t negate the specific difference between natural and 
supernatural acts, but he held that under the influence of theological virtues the acquired virtues become able to 
bring forth supernatural actions. ―A baptême, nous recevons la grâce sanctifiante et les trios vertus théologales, 
habitus surnaturels qui contiennent virtuellement tout ce qui surnaturalisera les actes humains . . . Quand se 
posera devant la conscience un acte à poser qui relève d‘une vertu morale, la foi et la charité interviendront, 
l‘une pour conférer à cet acte un objet formel surnaturel, l‘autre pour l‘orienter vers la fin dernière. Il est don 
inutile de recourir à d‘autres habitus infus.‖ (Lottin, Morale fondamentale, 412). In this way he even conceded 
the existence of infused virtues, although the meaning of the concept has fundamentally changed: ―Les vertus 
morales dites infuses ne sont pas un vain mot; elles sont des réalités, des habitus, des vertus, non toutefois des 
vertus qui nous seraient infuses au baptême, mais des vertus acquises par l‘exercice des vertus théologales.‖ 
(Lottin, ―Vertus morales acquises,‖ 140-141, footnote 3). In a similar (though slightly different) way Beraza 
defended the necessity of infused moral virtues because of the supernatural final end (Blasio Beraza, Tractatus 
de virtutibus infusis (Bilbao: El Mensajero del Corazón de Jesús, 1929), 646), but reduced the need to the 
perfection of the will. ―Virtutes morales per se infusas esse tantum in voluntate.‖ (Ibid., 646-647). Those authors 
obviously ignore the fact that all human faculties from the very beginning of their supernatural acting need a 
proper inclination in accordance to the order of grace. 
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This principle, which clearly holds for temperance, is universally valid for all moral virtues as 
perfections of human appetitive powers, i.e. for fortitude, justice, and their annexed virtues. 
God himself must be the efficient cause of a new set of moral virtues, since they consist in a 
specific inclination of the particular human powers themselves, an inclination to use the 
created things in regard to new supernatural ends. The moral virtues in themselves have to 
contain a divine measure and consequently they can only be caused directly by God himself.
42
 
Thus, for St. Thomas the divine gift of charity has to be completed by the infusion of 
supernatural moral virtues: 
 
In order that the act of a lower power is perfect, not only there has to be a perfection in the 
higher power, but also in the lower: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect 
action does not follow, as long as the instrument also is not well disposed. Thus, in order that 
man work well in things pertaining to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to 
the end, but also virtues which dispose him well to the things referred to the end: for the virtue 
which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are 
referred to the end. And therefore it is necessary to have together with charity other [infused] 
moral virtues.
43
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 J. Hause describes the character of the infused moral virtues as a ―strong direction‖ toward the right mean 
according to a divine measure which lies per se beyond the human moral knowledge which we can attain 
through our own nature. Thus, God has to infuse those virtues. ―When we acquire virtue, we do it on the basis of 
our experience and on the basis of moral principles available to us. But both our knowledge and our experience 
are necessarily limited; and so if our virtues provide us with strong direction, that direction will be limited by the 
constraints on our own knowledge and experience. When God infuses virtues in us, Aquinas might say, he can 
overcome these limitations. The resulting strong direction makes up for what we cannot know and cannot 
experience. . . . The difference in efficient causes explains why the infused virtues have different formal objects 
and ends than the acquired virtues.‖ (Hause, ―Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue,‖ 17-18).  
43
 ST I-II 65.3 ad 1: ―Ad hoc quod actus inferioris potentiae sit perfectus, requiritur quod non solum adsit 
perfectio in superiori potentia, sed etiam in inferiori, si enim principale agens debito modo se haberet, non 
sequeretur actio perfecta, si instrumentum non esset bene dispositum. Unde oportet ad hoc quod homo bene 
operetur in his quae sunt ad finem, quod non solum habeat virtutem qua bene se habeat circa finem, sed etiam 
virtutes quibus bene se habeat circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nam virtus quae est circa finem, se habet ut 
principalis et motiva respectu earum quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo cum caritate necesse est etiam habere alias 
virtutes morales.‖ See also De virt. in com. 10: ―Infunditur igitur divinitus homini ad peragendas actiones 
ordinatas in finem vitae aeternae primo quidem gratia, per quam habet anima quoddam spirituale esse, et deinde 
fides, spes et caritas; ut per fidem intellectus illuminetur de aliquibus supernaturalibus cognoscendis, quae se 
habent in isto ordine sicut principia naturaliter cognita in ordine connaturalium operationum; per spem autem et 
caritatem acquirit voluntas quamdam inclinationem in illud bonum supernaturale ad quod voluntas humana per 
naturalem inclinationem non sufficienter ordinatur. Et sicut praeter ista principia naturalia requiruntur habitus 
virtutum ad perfectionem hominis secundum modum sibi connaturalem, ut supra dictum est; ita ex divina 
influentia consequitur homo, praeter praemissa supernaturalia principia, aliquas virtutes infusas, quibus perficitur 
ad operationes ordinandas in finem vitae aeternae.‖ See also ad 5. 
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2.1.2 The Efficient Cause of Infused Virtues as Criterion of Discernment  
 
The second question regarding the efficient cause of infused virtue was whether the mere fact 
of a divine infusion implies necessarily a different species of virtue. Aquinas claims in the sed 
contra of ST I-II 63.4 that there is a specific difference between acquired and infused virtues 
because of the divine infusion of the latter.
44
 P. Ramsey has argued on the basis of this 
argument that both kinds of virtue ―differ mainly in that their source is different.‖45 But St. 
Thomas himself acknowledges that a man who is immediately created by God does not differ 
specifically from a man born by nature – as the eyesight of a healthy man is of the same 
species as that of man who was born blind and healed miraculously by Jesus (Jn 9).  
Both examples are conceded.
46
 This is not the point in question, however. There is no doubt 
that God could infuse the habit of acquired natural virtue immediately through a miracle.
47
 
Therefore, it has to be conceded that the formal difference between natural and supernatural 
moral virtues cannot be determined by the mere fact of God‘s immediate infusion. But 
Aquinas‘s assertion is more moderate. He does not claim that the efficient cause provides a 
formal criterion of discernment for infused virtues. Rather, it is their necessary infusion which 
demonstrates sufficiently a principal difference to the species of acquired virtues. In the 
aforementioned quotation he refers to the statement ―which God works in us without us‖ as 
the general difference of the supernatural moral virtue in relation to acquired virtues. The 
former can only be generated by infusion, whereas their natural counterparts might be 
accidentally infused. Hence, not only the fact of a divine infusion determines the species of 
infused virtues, but their necessary infusion.  
 
In conclusion, as some scholars have rightly noted, the efficient cause does not provide a 
formal definition of infused virtue, for this remains only an extrinsic element.
48
 Nevertheless, 
the fact that those moral virtues can be possessed only by and through divine infusion can be 
                                                 
44
 See the quotation corresponding to footnote 1. 
45
 Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, 214. See the whole statement: ―There is a table of infused moral virtues 
exactly identical with St. Thomas‘s table of acquired moral virtue, each bearing the same name and referring to 
almost the same essential quality of character. Theses duplicate sets of virtues differ mainly in that their source is 
different.‖ 
46
 Cf. ST I-II 63.4 arg. 3; De virt. in com. 10 arg. 7. 
47
 ―Omnem formam quam operatur natura, potest etiam eamdem specie deus operari per seipsum sine operatione 
naturae: et secundum hoc, sanitas quae a deo miraculose perficitur, est eiusdem speciei cum sanitate quam facit 
natura. Unde non sequitur quod omnem formam quam deus potest facere, possit etiam natura perficere.‖ (De virt. 
in com. 10 ad 7). 
48
 See e.g. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XII
e
 et XIII
e
 siècles: Problèmes de morale, vol. 3 (Louvain: 
Abbaye du Mont César, 1949), 461.  
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taken as evidence that even the content of those virtues must differ from their acquired 
counterparts. 
 
 
2.2 The Formal Cause: The Asymmetric Relation of Acquired and Infused 
Virtues 
 
According to ST I-II 63.4, the set of acquired virtues is characterized by the rule of reason as 
its formal measure (secundum regulam rationis humanae), and the set of infused virtues is 
directed by the divine rule (secundum regulam divinam). At first glance, the distinction seems 
completely clear. The actual text, however, is more sophisticated. St. Thomas does not simply 
speak of various measures, but of two rationes formales obiectorum virtutum. What does he 
mean by this? Reason is described as formal measure of the objects of acquired virtue, the 
divine rule in regard to the objects of infused virtues. But what function does reason assume 
in the case of infused virtues? At the end of the Prima secundae we read: ―As the acquired 
virtues perfect a man to walk in accordance with the natural light of reason, likewise the 
infused virtues perfect a man to walk in accordance with the light of grace.‖49 Hence, does the 
divine law work as a formal notion besides reason? Or is there even in the case of infused 
virtues an essential involvement of reason? This will be the issue of the next section (2.2.1). 
Moreover, ST I-II 63.4 remains silent about the reciprocal relationship of both rules. For a 
solution to these questions we will turn to the section on law at the end of the Prima 
secunda,
50
 where the law is defined as rule of human actions,
51
 and where natural law and 
divine law are distinguished. We hope to show that it is possible to draw from these articles 
certain conclusions regarding the relationship between the formal rules of both sets of virtues. 
                                                 
49
 ST I-II 110.3 – ―Sicut enim virtutes acquisitae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini naturali 
rationis; ita virtutes infusae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini gratiae.‖ For literature about 
that twofold rule, we refer to Michael Schmaus, ―Das natürliche Sittengesetz und das Gesetz des Evangeliums,‖ 
in San Tommaso e la filosofia del diritto oggi, ed. Giovanni Ambrosetti (Rome: Città nuova editrice, 1975), 222-
238. 
50
 See ST I-II 90-108. 
51
 ST I-II 90.1: ―Lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel 
ab agendo retrahitur, dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum.‖ 
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2.2.1 What is Not Meant by the Different Formal Notion 
 
Aquinas invokes the rule of reason as the formal measure of acquired virtue, contrasting it 
with the divine rule as the measure of infused virtue. What is the exact meaning of this 
assertion? Or better, what is not meant thereby? 
A careful reading of ST I-II 63.4 shows that St. Thomas does not directly portray reason as the 
rule of acquired virtues and divine rule as the measure of infused virtues.
52
 In particular, he 
refers to the two rules as ―special and formal notions of [their] objects.‖53 The object of any 
virtue is defined as the good considered in its relative matter. Thomas takes as his example the 
virtue of temperance, whose matter is sensible pleasure. Consequently, the object of 
temperance (the good of sensible concupiscence) is determined either according to the 
measure of reason or according to divine law. Or to put it another way, the end of acquired 
temperance (since the good is the end) is determined by reason, whereas the end of infused 
temperance is specified by the divine law. 
At this point we can apply the results of the previous section. The good of acquired 
temperance – St. Thomas refers to bodily health as an example – is known by reason (by 
synderesis, as natural knowledge). On the other hand, the good of infused temperance – the 
ready submission of the body to the spirit – is revealed by Sacred Scripture and commanded 
by divine law. The two resulting species of temperance are just different inclinations of the 
sensible appetite towards their specific object as measured by two standards. And 
subsequently it is due to prudence (either acquired or infused) to choose and command the 
right means for attaining the relative end which is already determined either by the rule of 
reason or by the divine rule. 
From this perspective it should be clear what the different formal notions of acquired and 
infused virtue do not mean. They do not imply that reason possesses only a decisive function 
in the acts of the acquired virtues, whereas the acts of the infused virtues are specified 
somehow directly from the divine law. Of course, the divine rule determines the ―objects‖ of 
infused virtues, i.e. their ends. This determination, however, does not take place without an 
involvement of man‘s own reason, but of course through perfected reason. The divine law is 
revealed to man‘s mind by divine faith (in cooperation with the gifts) as new practical 
principles which determine the end of infused moral virtues. But these divinely given 
                                                 
52
 One time he speaks also of the divine law. 
53
 ―Speciales et formales rationes obiectorum‖ (ST I-II 63.4). Similar some lines later: ―. . . cuius quidem obiecti 
formalis ratio est a ratione.‖ 
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principles are known only by man‘s reason, which subsequently chooses and commands 
particular human acts. Admittedly, we are dealing here not with mere natural reason, but with 
a reason that presupposes a divine enlightening (with an involvement of a corresponding gift, 
presupposing a motion of the Holy Spirit). However, it is still true human reason.  
In the disputed question De malo, St. Thomas speaks of ratio informata lege divina as the 
formal principle for morally good and evil actions: ―Good and evil in human acts is 
considered insofar the act concords to reason informed by the divine law.‖ 54  And some 
articles later he adds: ―It belongs to reason to rule the appetite, especially insofar it is 
informed by the law of God.‖55 In a similar way ST I-II 19.4 describes reason as regula 
proxima of the human act, whereas the eternal law is the remote rule. And the third reply 
mentions the possibility that the latter is made known to human reason either by natural 
knowledge of reason or by divine revelation, which is nothing else than the divine law.
56
 But 
in both cases the human power of reason remains the proximate rule of the moral act, though 
in the latter case it is reason elevated and illuminated by the revealed divine law. 
We have to learn from these quotations that Aquinas‘s description of the divine rule as formal 
notion of the infused virtues depicts the principle which determines the end of those virtues. 
But it does not deny reason‘s essential function for the acts of such virtues. Reason remains 
the regula proxima even for the graced human acts which are therefore in a certain way 
formally determined by reason, though reason itself is informed by a higher principle. (The 
result fits again to our outline of the function of the gifts where we saw that the instigation of 
the Holy Spirit does not supercede the act of reason but moves it.
57
) Hence, Aquinas can write 
without hesitation: ―Virtue entails ruling by reason internal affections as well as the use of 
corporal things. This, namely, is constituted by the divine law.‖58 Thus, Aquinas‘s assertion 
should not mislead us to undervalue the ordinary structure of the human act (as ruled by 
reason) even in the case of infused virtues. 
                                                 
54
 De malo 2.4: ―Bonum et malum in actibus humanis consideratur secundum quod actus concordat rationi 
informatae lege divina.‖ 
55
 De malo 8.2: ―Ad rationem pertinet dirigere appetitum, et praecipue secundum quod est lege dei informata.‖ 
See for this: van C.A.J. Ouwerkerk, ‘Caritas et Ratio:’ Étude sur le double principe de la vie morale chrétienne 
d’après s. Thomas d’Aquin (Nijmegen: Drukkerij Gebr. Janssen, 1956), 59-64. In the Summa theologiae we do 
not find the explicit expression of reason informed by the divine law, but there are some indirect hints, so for 
example ST I-II 74.7: ―Actus humani regulari possunt ex regula rationis humanae, quae sumitur ex rebus creatis, 
quas naturaliter homo cognoscit; et ulterius ex regula legis divinae.‖ 
56
 ―Licet lex aeterna sit nobis ignota secundum quod est in mente divina; innotescit tamen nobis aliqualiter vel 
per rationem naturalem, quae ab ea derivatur ut propria eius imago; vel per aliqualem revelationem 
superadditam.‖ (ST I-II 19.4 ad 3). 
57
 Even if ST I-II 68.2 demands ―non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus 
Sancti‖, the motion of the Holy Spirit does not make redundant the act of reason. 
Chapter 2. Differences of Acquired and Infused Virtues: Four Clarifications 
 67 
This finding becomes very important for the remaining parts of this work, since we now have 
to expect that Aquinas might refer to reason in a more general way as the measure for the 
infused virtues, even without an explicit indication of whether reason is informed by the 
divine law.
59
  
 
 
2.2.2 The Mutual Relationship between Rule of Reason and Divine Rule 
 
Subsequent to the previous section we need to investigate the mutual relationship between the 
rule of reason and the divine rule. Aquinas describes this relationship in the treatise on law in 
the Summa theologiae. According to ST I-II 63.4, the two rules lead to different kinds of 
virtue. As was seen in the previous chapter, however, reason, which is the measure of the one, 
is also essentially involved in the action of the other. Hence, how does Aquinas describe the 
interaction of both measures?
60
 The ordering of our actions by the rule of reason corresponds 
to the natural law (lex naturalis), while the ordering by the divine rule depends on the divine 
law. Thus, the natural law is determinative for acquired virtues, the divine law for infused 
virtues. Therefore, we will investigate first the content of these two laws, and then we draw 
some conclusions regarding the relation between the formal rules of both kinds of virtue. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
58
 ScG III 121.3: ―Virtus autem in hoc consistit, quod tam interiores affectiones, quam corporalium rerum usus, 
ratione regulentur. Est igitur hoc lege divina statuendum.‖ 
59
 As example we can refer to In sent. III 36.1.2C ad 3, where he describes infused affective virtues as 
participating in reason: ―Virtutes infusae et acquisitae non sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili nisi secundum quod 
participant aliqualiter rationem.‖ In ST II-II 161.5 even the theological virtues are described as realizing the 
order of reason: ―Bonum humanae virtutis in ordine rationis consistit. Qui quidem principaliter attenditur 
respectu finis. Unde virtutes theologicae, quae habent ultimum finem pro obiecto, sunt potissimae.‖ Thus, Pieper 
argues for such a wider use of the term ratio in the work of Aquinas: ―Vernunft ist . . . nicht notwendig 
eingeschränkt zu denken auf den Bereich des natürlicherweise Erkennbaren; oft genug . . . erscheint die ratio als 
Partnerin des Glaubens oder auch als seine Voraussetzung, aber ebensooft ist damit einfachhin die Kraft gemeint, 
Wahrheit zu fassen, die gewusste wie die geglaubte.‖ (Pieper, ―Über den Begriff der Sünde,‖ 240). 
60
 See for he following Ouwerkerk, ‘Caritas et Ratio’, 59-64; 92-101. 
Important to notice: At the present stage we are not yet concerned about the interaction of both virtues; this will 
be the issue of chapter 3. 
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a) The Natural Law as Formal Rule of the Objects of Acquired Virtues  
 
A first exposition of St. Thomas‘s doctrine on natural law is given in ST I-II 91.2. It is treated 
in more detail later in q. 94. The doctrine of the lex naturalis as the foundation of morality has 
become in past decades a topic of controvery.
61
 It is neither possible nor necessary to dwell on 
these issues in our research. In a few lines, we will only recount the most basic (and 
undisputed) aspects of Aquinas‘s doctrine. 
The starting point for his outline of the natural law is the assertion that every operation of a 
creature arises from a natural inclination, i.e. from a natural striving for certain predetermined 
ends, which consist in nothing else than the perfection of the agent according to his own 
nature, or its proper good. In this way creatures participate in the divine governance of the 
universe, which Aquinas identifies with the eternal law.
62
 Through the natural inclinations of 
creatures God himself guides all things according to his wisdom (i.e. the eternal law).
63
  
What is valid for all created things is valid for man in a special way. Rational creatures 
surpass other beings since their natural inclinations do not push them in a passive way, but 
rather they apprehend (by reason) certain objects immediately (naturaliter) as good and 
appetibile. They thereby participate in an active and reasonable way in the governance of the 
universe. Thus, St. Thomas defines the natural law for man‘s acting: ―The natural law . . . is 
the light of the intellect as implanted to us by God, by which we recognize what to do and 
what to avoid.‖64 
Thus, though it is finally the eternal law which constitutes the order of goodness, man‘s 
reason constitutes analogously an order of goodness – not autonomously but simply through 
participating in the eternal law. Aquinas describes this participation in terms of the first 
principle of the practical intellect, divinely impressed and therefore immediately known, and 
by which man is inclined in accordance to the eternal law – naturally and reasonably at 
once.
65
 Thus, man‘s natural inclinations are not understood as a blind, irrational instinct, but 
                                                 
61
 For a detailed overview of the whole problematic see Martin Rhonheimer, Praktische Vernunft und 
Vernünftigkeit der Praxis. Handlungstheorie bei Thomas von Aquin in ihrer Entstehung aus dem Problemkontext 
der aristotelischen Ethik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994). 
62
 For the eternal law, cf. ST I-II 91.1 and more extensive q. 92. In ST I-II 71.6 Aquinas refers to the lex aeterna 
parallel to human reason as ―quasi ratio die.‖ 
63
 ―Omnia participant aliqualiter legem aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent inclinationes in 
proprios actus et fines.‖ (ST I-II 91.2). 
64
 De duo. prae., prologus: ―Lex naturae . . . est . . . lumen intellectus insitum nobis a deo, per quod cognoscimus 
quid agendum et quid vitandum.― 
65
 For Aquinas nature and reason are not yet contraries (see Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 400-405). 
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as an intelligible tending towards the specific human good.
66
 This intuitive practical 
knowledge is expressed in the most basic axiom: ―Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is 
to be avoided.‖67 This is the first precept of the natural law. Though it is the expression of a 
natural inclination, it is nevertheless a law in the proper sense, sc. ―a certain ordinance of 
reason,‖68 since it is based on the natural judgment of the practical intellect.  
There are, of course, further precepts which the human agent comprehends immediately as 
conclusions of the first natural precept.
69
 Aquinas presents a short overview about the 
principal natural precepts in three levels: first, in common with every other substance, man 
inclines to preserve his own being according to his nature; secondly, as all animals, he 
inclines to the procreative union of male and female, including the education of the offspring, 
etc.; thirdly, as a specific characteristic of mankind, man enjoys life in community and strives 
for the knowledge of the truth about God.
70
 
Already this sketchy outline of Aquinas‘s doctrine of natural law shows what is meant by the 
description of reason as ―ratio formalis obiectorum‖ for acquired virtues. For example the 
sound care for bodily health belongs to the human good not because of the mere fact of an 
instinctive striving for survival, but because practical reason perceives its own substantial 
being as appetibile. And consequently, acquired virtues consist in habitual inclinations 
regarding objects (as their ends) which are immediately known by reason as good.
71
 
 
 
                                                 
66
 ―Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae subiacet, inquantum et 
ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam 
habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura 
lex naturalis dicitur.‖ (ST I-II 91.2). 
67
 ST I-II 94.2: ―Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.‖ 
68
 ST I-II 90.4: ―quaedam ordinatio rationis.‖ 
69
 In the famous article 94.2 of ST I-II Aquinas draws a parallel between practical and speculative intellect: The 
speculative intellect contains some first principles, which are naturally known and which provide the necessary 
basis of any further knowledge of truth. Likewise the practical intellect contains some first practical principles, 
known not by discursive reasoning, but by immediate understanding. 
70
 ―Inest enim primo inclinatio homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum omnibus 
substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appetit conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et 
secundum hanc inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium 
impeditur. Secundo inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua communicat cum 
ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur ea esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est 
coniunctio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia. Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum 
secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi propria, sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod 
veritatem cognoscat de deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat.― (ST I-II 94.2).  
71
 For further discussion of the relationship of moral virtue and lex naturalis see for example Schuster, 
Moralisches Können, 43-52. 
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b) The Divine Law as Formal Notion of the Objects of Infused Virtues 
 
What about the divine law? The infused moral virtues are specifically different from their 
acquired counterparts because of their specification by the divine law. The concept of the lex 
divina must not be confused with the lex aeterna.
72
 The latter means, as seen above, divine 
providence itself, i.e. the divine governance of the universe (―ratio gubernationis rerum in 
deo‖73). On the contrary, the term of the divine law is based on the fact that God has ordered 
man as rational creature towards supernatural friendship with himself. The divine law consists 
of precepts revealed by God (directly or mediated by man or angels
74
) for ordering man 
towards that new supernatural end.
75
 Whereas the natural law is accessible to human reason 
since it corresponds to his natural inclinations, the attaining of supernatural beatitude exceeds 
human natural powers. Hence man‘s destiny to such a higher end has to be revealed and the 
necessary principles of action have to be given in addition to his natural powers. 
Consequently, a corresponding law also became necessary – the divine law. Aquinas explains: 
―Since man is ordained to the end of eternal beatitude which exceeds the proportions of the 
natural human faculty, . . . therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human 
law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.‖76 Both the natural and the 
divine law are specifically different, not only because of the different kinds of promulgation, 
but first and foremost by their different ends. Consequently, virtues which imply a direction to 
objects measured by those different rules are also formally distinct. Acquired virtues on the 
one hand, infused virtues on the other hand.  
Aquinas devotes a long exposition to the topic of divine law. It is divided in internally 
connected two parts: an extended discussion of the Old Law (ST I-II 98-105), and a shorter 
section on the New Law (qq. 106-108). Although we live in the time of the New Law, the 
                                                 
72
 For a good overview of the different kinds of law in Aquinas, see Thomas Gilby, ―Appendix 2: The 
Theological Classification of Law (1a2ae. 91,1-3),‖ in Summa Theologiae: Law and Political Theory, vol. 28 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 162-164. 
73
 ST I-II 91.1; cf. ST I-II 93. 
74
 Cf. ST I-II 98.2 and 3. 
75
 In a certain way the eternal law is combines both the natural and divine law: ―Per naturalem legem participatur 
lex aeterna secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae. Sed oportet ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in 
ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et ideo superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna participatur altiori 
modo.‖ (ST I-II 91.4 ad 1; cf. also ad 2 and ST II-II 22.1 ad 1). 
76
 ST I-II 91.4: ―Quia homo ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem naturalis 
facultatis humanae, . . . ideo necessarium fuit ut supra legem naturalem et humanam, dirigeretur etiam ad suum 
finem lege divinitus data.‖ Aquinas mentions here three further reasons for the necessity of a divinely revealed 
law, although these arguments would not require necessarily a revelation: a) the fallibility of human knowledge 
of the moral precepts; b) the impossibility of human law to judge internal actions; c) the human law cannot 
prohibit all evil actions. 
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treatise on the Old Law is of great interest, at least because Aquinas makes some key 
distinctions solely in this prior part 
 
 
i) The Divine Law of the Old Testament 
 
For Aquinas the lex vetus is not a totally different law from the lex nova. Both are given for 
the same end, namely man‘s direction to supernatural beatitude.77 But the Old Law differs 
from the New Law as something imperfect in relation to its perfect state.
78
 Nevertheless, both 
truly belong to the divine law. Also, the Old Law cannot be reduced to the natural law that 
directs man to his natural perfection, but it is given as imperfect preparation for his 
supernatural end.
79
 
In this context Aquinas explicitly asserts that the Old Law as part of divine law does not 
contradict the natural law but rather concords with right reason. ―The Old Law was in 
accordance with reason.‖80 This consonatia of the natural and divine laws is highly important 
for the relation between the rule of reason and the divine rule. It is impossible to interpret the 
consonance as a simple the identity of both laws. In ST I-II 98.5 St. Thomas asks the question 
whether all men are obligated to observe the Old Law. In his answer he distinguishes some 
precepts which belong to the natural law per se but are ―additionally‖ revealed by divine law, 
the so called praecepta moralia, and these precepts are obligatory also for pagans since they 
can be known by mere reason.
81
 Those precepts are revealed only because of the weakness 
and uncertainty of man‘s natural knowledge.82 But there are other precepts which were given 
to the Jews beyond the natural law as additional principles in regard to the final end, and for 
these precepts there is no universal obligation. Aquinas summarizes the point as follows: ―The 
Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its 
own.‖83  
                                                 
77
 Cf. ST I-II 91.5 and 107.1. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Cf. ST I-II 98.1. 
80
 ST I-II 98.1: ―Lex autem vetus rationi consonabat.‖ 
81
 ―Praecepta moralia ex ipso dictamine naturalis rationis efficaciam habent, etiam si nunquam in lege 
statuantur.‖ (ST I-II 100.11). Smith speaks of the moral precepts of the Old Law as the ―written articulation of 
the natural law.‖ Cf. Randall Smith, ―What the Old Law Reveals About the Natural Law According to Thomas 
Aquinas,‖ The Thomist 75 (2011): 105-108. 
82
 Cf. ST I-II 91.4.  
83
 ST I-II 98.5. The whole context: ―Lex vetus manifestabat praecepta legis naturae, et superaddebat quaedam 
propria praecepta. Quantum igitur ad illa quae lex vetus continebat de lege naturae, omnefs tenebantur ad 
Chapter 2. Differences of Acquired and Infused Virtues: Four Clarifications 
 72 
It is especially through theses additional precepts that man is directed positively to his 
supernatural end. These precepts regulate man‘s actions in a twofold respect: they determine 
his relation toward God as well as toward his neighbors. In both cases they do so with regard 
to the attainment of his supernatural end. In the Old Law the former are the praecepta 
caeremonialia, the latter the praecepta iudicialia. But even these additional precepts never 
contradict the precepts of natural law. Why? The fact that man is well ordered in regard to 
both God and his neighbors already belongs to the common dictate of reason (i.e. to the 
natural law).
84
 The divine law of ceremonial and judicial precepts provides only a further 
determination of these two relations.
85
  
The exact meaning of such a determination is discussed in the context of human law in ST I-II 
95.2. The lawgiver is entitled to determine in greater detail what is already just by nature. For 
example, the natural law itself demands generally the punishment of a delinquent, but the civil 
authority has to determine the measure of the penalty.
86
 Those determinations exceed the 
natural law, but they may not contradict it. Analogously, the ceremonial and judicial precepts 
of the divine law never contradict the natural law. Rather, they are further determinations of 
the natural law based on the natural law itself. However, the binding force of these divine 
determinations completely depends on divine revelation and promulgation. 
Thus, the Old Law contains three different kinds of precepts: ―We must therefore distinguish 
three kinds of precept in the Old Law; namely moral precepts, which are dictated by the 
natural law; ceremonial precepts, which are determinations of the divine cultus; and judicial 
precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men.‖87 
                                                                                                                                                        
observantiam veteris legis, non quia erant de veteri lege, sed quia erant de lege naturae. Sed quantum ad illa quae 
lex vetus superaddebat, non tenebantur aliqui ad observantiam veteris legis nisi solus populus Iudaeorum.‖ And 
in ST I-II 99.2 ad 1: 99.2 ad 1: ―Lex vetus distinguitur a lege naturae non tanquam ab ea omnino aliena, sed 
tanquam aliquid ei superaddens. Sicut enim gratia praesupponit naturam, ita oportet quod lex divina 
praesupponat legem naturalem.‖ 
84
 The natural precept to love God and one‘s neighbor belongs to the most obvious natural laws. As a result they 
are omitted in the Decalogue (ST I-II 100.11). Nevertheless both relations are further specified by the divine law. 
85
 ―Ad legem divinam pertinet ut ordinet homines ad invicem et ad deum. Utrumque autem horum in communi 
quidem pertinet ad dictamen legis naturae, ad quod referuntur moralia praecepta, sed oportet quod determinetur 
utrumque per legem divinam vel humanam, quia principia naturaliter nota sunt communia tam in speculativis 
quam in activis. Sicut igitur determinatio communis praecepti de cultu divino fit per praecepta caeremonialia, sic 
et determinatio communis praecepti de iustitia observanda inter homines, determinatur per praecepta iudicialia.‖ 
(ST I-II 99.4). And ad 2: ―Praecepta iudicialia communicant in aliquo cum moralibus, inquantum scilicet a 
ratione derivantur.‖ 
86
 ―Derivantur ergo quaedam [sc. leges] a principiis communibus legis naturae . . . per modum determinationis, 
sicut lex naturae habet quod ille qui peccat, puniatur; sed quod tali poena puniatur, hoc est quaedam determinatio 
legis naturae.‖ (ST I-II 95.2). 
87
 ST I-II 99.4: ―Oportet tria praecepta legis veteris ponere; scilicet moralia, quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae; 
caeremonialia, quae sunt determinationes cultus divini; et iudicialia, quae sunt determinationes iustitiae inter 
homines observandae.‖ Consequently: ―Praecepta caeremonialia et iudicialia sunt determinativa praeceptorum 
Decalogi ex vi institutionis, non autem ex vi naturalis instinctus.‖ (ST I-II 100.11 ad 2). Hence, even ceremonial 
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This reveals two important points. First, natural law and divine law are not only in harmony, 
but the supernatural law even includes the natural law. The precepts of the natural law remain 
valid as an integral part of the divine law.
88
 Second, in this way the natural law is already a 
certain preparation for the divine law.
89
 And although the divine law requires much more by 
adding some additional precepts, sc. the ceremonial and judicial precepts, it always consists in 
a determination of the natural law. 
 
 
ii) The Divine Law of the New Testament 
 
The same fact becomes apparent from a different viewpoint, that is in the context of the New 
Covenant. For Aquinas, the New Law is only secondarily a list of written precepts contained 
in Holy Scripture. First and foremost, the lex nova is grace. ―Principally the New Law is the 
grace itself of the Holy Spirit.‖90 Thus, unlike the Old Law, the New Law does not consist in 
precepts imposed on man from the outside. Rather the Holy Spirit, dwelling in the hearts of 
the justified, moves them from within towards the supernatural final end and works thereby as 
                                                                                                                                                        
and judicial precepts are based on the natural law, but in different ways. Thus P.M. Hall explains: ―All the 
precepts of the Old Law thus belong, diversely, to the natural law by way of clarification or further specification 
of it.‖ (Pamela M. Hall, ―The Old Law and the New Law (Ia IIae, qq. 98-108),‖ in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. 
Stephen J. Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 197). 
A very helpful overview of these three kinds of divine laws in the Old Testament (incl. examples) is given in 
Quodl. II 4.3: ―In veteri autem testamento triplex genus praeceptorum erat. Quaedam enim erant praecepta 
moralia, quaedam iudicialia, quaedam caeremonialia. Praecepta moralia sunt indita naturali rationi, ad quae 
homines omni tempore obligantur, ut honora patre et matrem, non moechaberis, non furtum facies, et similia. 
Praecepta autem iudicialia sunt per quae iudicia exercebantur; puta, si quis furaretur unam ovem, redderet 
quatuor. Et huiusmodi praecepta non sunt indita rationi naturali. Non enim ratio naturalis habet quod ille qui 
furatur ovem, magis reddat quatuor quam tres vel unam. Sed tamen per huiusmodi praecepta determinatur 
morale praeceptum. Habet enim ratio naturalis quod ille qui furatur, debeat puniri; sed quod tali poena puniatur, 
hoc determinatur per praeceptum iudiciale. Praecepta autem caeremonialia veteris legis sunt quae pertinent ad 
observantiam divini cultus, et sunt ordinata ad figurandum aliquod futurum, sicut immolatio agni paschalis 
figurabat occisionem christi.‖ 
88
 Aubert made an interesting comment from the viewpoint of the actual coextension of salvific history and 
world history: In the time before the revelation of the divine law mankind was ruled only the by the natural law; 
nonetheless it was ordered (implicitly) towards the supernatural end; thus, the New Law cannot stand in 
contradiction to the natural law (cf. Jean-Marie Aubert, ―Nature de la relation entre ‗lex nova‘ et ‗lex naturalis‘ 
chez Saint Thomas d‘Aquin,‖ in Atti dell’VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale VI. Morale e Diritto nella 
prospettiva tomistica, ed. Pontificia accademia di S. Tommaso e di religione cattolica (Vatican City: Libreria 
Editrice Vaticano, 1982):). 
89
 Aquinas even says: ―Gratia et virtus imitantur naturae ordinem.‖ (ST II-II 31.3). Dewan explains thereto: 
―Both [orders] are from God, and one prepares for the other: the natural prepares for the supernatural.‖ 
(Lawrence Dewan, ―Wisdom and Human Life: the Natural and the Supernatural,‖ in Wisdom, Law, and Virtue. 
Essays in Thomistic Ethics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 8). And further: ―Not only does grace 
presuppose nature, but its role is to elevate nature in a direction already pointed to by nature.‖ (Ibid., 9). 
90
 ST I-II 106.1: ―Principaliter lex nova est ipsa gratia Spiritus Sancti.‖ For a good commentary, see Edward 
Kaczynski, ―‗Lex nova‘ in San Tommaso: Le tendenze spiritualistiche e legalistiche nella teologia morale,‖ in 
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a ―personal lawgiver.‖91 (Again, the conception fits perfectly to our outline about the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit in section 1.3). For this reason, the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Old 
Law, which were merely preparations for the New Covenant, are abrogated, not because their 
end has changed but because the perfect state surpasses the imperfect state. As St. Paul 
explains it, the full statue of man supersedes every childish behavior.
92
  
But what about the relationship between the New Law and the rule of reason? The moral 
precepts, which are just formulations of natural law, remain valid also for the state of grace. 
―The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the New Law, because they are of 
themselves essential to virtue.‖93 The supernatural order does not suppress the order of nature; 
what is recognized as good by reason remains good even for man in the state of grace. 
Therefore, we have to conclude that the graced agent belongs at the same time to two orders. 
―There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being part of 
his nature, and thus the natural law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man 
as something added to his nature by a gift of grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into 
man.‖94  
Thus, as in times of the Old Law the lex divina of the New Covenant corresponds to but 
exceeds the rule of reason. 
 
 
c) Consistency and Disparity of the Double Formal Notion 
 
This inquiry into Aquinas‘s account of natural law and divine law allows now a more precise 
specification of the objects of acquired and infused virtues. We can draw two conclusions.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Atti dell'VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale VI. Morale e Diritto nella prospettiva tomistica, ed. Pontificia 
accademia di S. Tommaso e di religione cattolica (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticano, 1982), 26-31. 
91
 Baumann, ―La surnaturalisation,‖ 13: ―législateur personnel.‖ 
92
 See 1 Cor 13.11: ―When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but 
when I became a man, I put away childish things.― 
93
 ST I-II 108.3 ad 3: ―Praecepta moralia omnino in nova lege remanere debebant, quia secundum se pertinent ad 
rationem virtutis.‖ See also 108.2 ad 1. 
94
 ST I-II 106.1 ad 2: ―Dupliciter est aliquid inditum homini. Uno modo, pertinens ad naturam humanam, et sic 
lex naturalis est lex indita homini. Alio modo est aliquid inditum homini quasi naturae superadditum per gratiae 
donum. Et hoc modo lex nova est indita homini.‖ 
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i) The Asymmetric Consistency of Both Rules 
 
In ST I-II 63.4, the article with which we started, Aquinas points the rule of reason and the 
rule of divine law as formally distinguishing the objects of the acquired virtues and infused 
virtues. In the treatise on law, however, it becomes clear that the order of grace does not only 
not contradict the order of nature, but that there exists an internal though asymmetric relation. 
The Old Law contains natural laws (praecepta moralia) as well as additional divine laws, 
likewise the New Law preserves all natural precepts, but beyond them it demands even more. 
The rule of divine law includes the rule of reason, but not vice versa. ―The divine law is the 
higher rule; therefore, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason is 
also ruled by divine law, but not vice versa.‖95 It is the divine law which determines the 
unique ultimate end of human actions, and therefore it is the higher rule, but always in accord 
with the rule of reason.
96
 Thus, good actions according to the divine rule accord (and have to 
accord) simultaneously with the rule of reason.
97
  
The opposite is quite different. The natural order does not include the revealed supernatural 
rule per se (otherwise it wouldn‘t be truly super-natural). Thus, although there is an important 
parallel between both orders, there is at the same time an asymmetry. The supernatural end is 
beyond nature and reasonable; it contains both orders.
98
 The order of nature, however, is 
―only‖ reasonable but does not extend to the end of the order of grace. It is limited to the 
order of nature.
99
 
                                                 
95
 ST I-II 63.2: ―Lex divina est superior regula, ideo ad plura se extendit, ita quod quidquid regulatur ratione 
humana, regulatur etiam lege divina, sed non convertitur.‖ 
96
 That‘s nothing else as the common principle that grace does not destroy but perfect nature. ―Cum enim gratia 
non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei; sicut et naturalis inclinatio 
voluntatis obsequitur caritati.‖ (ST I 1.8 ad 2). According to St. Thomas even in heavenly beatitude the natural 
acts continue: ―Oportet quod natura salvetur in beatitudine. Et similiter oportet quod in actu beatitudinis salvetur 
actus naturae.‖ (ST I 62.7). 
97
 One example therefore is given in De malo 1.3: ―Delectatio et quodlibet aliud in rebus humanis est 
mensurandum et regulandum secundum regulam rationis et legis divinae.‖ Likewise in De malo 2.2 and ST II-II 
141.2 ad 1 the good act is defined by reference to the rule of reason as well as the divine rule. 
98
 Although the supernatural order contains the natural order, both orders are directed toward the supernatural 
end in different ways. As Cajetan notes, virtues of the supernatural order are directed to the final end per se; the 
natural virtues ab alio – namely by the higher order. ―Bonum secundum regulam divinam, quod est proprius finis 
moralis infusae, et bonum secundum humanam regulam, quod est proximus finis acquisitae, ita se habent, quod 
hoc est humani, illud divini ordinis: et consequenter hoc ex alio tantum, illud etiam ex se habet, quod ad deum 
supernaturalem finem ordinetur.‖ (Cajetanus, ―Commentarium,‖ in Summa Theologiae (Rome: S.C. de 
Propaganda Fide, 1891):, In I-II Summae Theologiae, I-II 63.3). 
99
 See also De virt. in com. 9 and 10. We should note that a twofold rule of human actions does not imply 
necessarily a double end of man‘s life (cf. Brian J. Shanley, ―Aquinas on Pagan Virtue,‖ The Thomist 63 (1999): 
555). Carpenter has expressed it pointedly: ―The natural end of man now is a supernatural end.― (Hilary 
Carpenter, ―The Supernatural Virtues,‖ in Moral Principles and Practice. Papers Read at the Summer School of 
Catholic Studies Held at Cambridge, 1932, ed. G.J. MacGillivray (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1938), 
130). 
Chapter 2. Differences of Acquired and Infused Virtues: Four Clarifications 
 76 
ii) All Acts of Acquired and Infused Virtues Are Specifically Different 
 
The fact that the divine rule does not contradict but instead reaffirms and extends the rule of 
reason may mislead us to the faulty conclusion that some acts of infused virtues might be 
identical with the acts of their acquired counterparts. An example: the rule of reason as well as 
the divine law demand love of God, but the natural virtuous act of love is essentially different 
from supernatural charity. ―Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature 
does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as he is the principle and the end of 
natural good, whereas charity loves him as the object of beatitude and inasmuch as man has a 
spiritual fellowship with God.‖100 Indeed, in both ways man loves God above all things, even 
more than himself; by both he is united to God. Charity does not contradict natural law,
101
 but 
nevertheless both ways of loving God are essentially different. Aquinas speaks even of a 
―double union with God‖102 – either by natural love or by charity. In both types of union God 
is loved as ―highest good‖,103 but each time under a different aspect. Consequently, though the 
natural law does not contradict the supernatural law, the acts of natural love and supernatural 
love are always specifically different.  
The same is valid for any moral act in the state of grace. Even if an act of infused virtue does 
not contradict the rule of reason by following the divine law, even if its external appearance is 
similar to an act of acquired virtue, nonetheless it is not just a natural act but specifically 
different. For example, in particular cases infused temperance might respond to the pleasure 
of savoring an excellent wine with the same concrete passions as acquired temperance. 
However, if the affective response arises from infused virtue, it arises first of all by an 
                                                 
100
 ST I-II 109.3 ad 1: ―Caritas diligit deum super omnia eminentius quam natura. Natura enim diligit deum super 
omnia, prout est principium et finis naturalis boni, caritas autem secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis, et 
secundum quod homo habet quandam societatem spiritualem cum deo.‖ And Aquinas continues: ―Addit etiam 
caritas super dilectionem naturalem dei promptitudinem quandam et delectationem, sicut et quilibet habitus 
virtutis addit supra actum bonum qui fit ex sola naturali ratione hominis virtutis habitum non habentis.‖ For the 
twofold direction of man towards God by natural and supernatural love, see also In sent. III 23.1.4C ad 1, In sent. 
II 28.3 ad 2; De caritate 2 ad 16; De spe 1 ad 9; ST I 61.5 ad 4; Super II Cor. XIII 4; furthermore: Shanley, 
―Aquinas on Pagan Virtue,‖ 569-570. 
101
 ―Si naturaliter plus seipsum diligeret quam deum, sequeretur quod naturalis dilectio esset perversa; et quod 
non perficeretur per caritatem, sed destrueretur.‖ (ST I 60.5). Similar in Quodl. 4.8.4. 
102
 Super II Cor. XIII 4: ―Nos autem habemus duplicem coniunctionem cum deo. Una est quantum ad bona 
naturae, quae hic participamus ab ipso; alia quantum ad beatitudinem, inquantum nos hic sumus participes per 
gratiam supernae felicitatis, secundum quod hic est possibile, speramus etiam ad perfectam consecutionem illius 
aeternae beatitudinis pervenire et fieri cives caelestis ierusalem. Et secundum primam communicationem ad 
deum, est amicitia naturalis secundum quam unumquodque, secundum quod est, deum ut causam primam et 
summum bonum appetit et desiderat, ut finem suum. Secundum vero communicationem secundam est amor 
charitatis, qua solum creatura intellectualis deum diligit.‖ 
103
 De caritate 1.2 ad 16: ―Amor summi boni, prout est principium esse naturalis, inest nobis a natura; sed prout 
est obiectum illius beatitudinis quae totam capacitatem naturae creatae excedit, non inest nobis a natura, sed est 
supra naturam.‖ 
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instigation of the Holy Spirit, following a divine measure, and therefore the whole act would 
be different in its kind. Why? Since the divine rule, while not contradicting the rule of reason, 
determines formally the object of the infused virtue. W. C. Mattison explains it very well: 
―Even when the one with infused cardinal virtue performs acts that appear the same to the 
external observer as the ones performed by someone with acquired cardinal virtues, those acts 
nonetheless possess a different overall meaning due to their relation to the supernatural 
destiny of the person.‖104 
 
 
2.3 The Final Cause: The Different Purpose of Acquired and Infused Virtues 
 
ST I-II 63.4 describes the end of acquired virtues as man‘s right order ―in regard to human 
things‖ (ad res humanas). At first glance the description seems simple and clear. However, it 
allows for two quite different interpretations, and it has in fact been interpreted in quite 
different ways. The right order in respect to human things can be understood either as man‘s 
perfection regarding every practical matter on the level of nature, or – since Aquinas is 
speaking here in the context of perfections regarding different politiae – as man‘s perfection 
as a good member of the human community on earth. In the second case acquired virtues 
would be identical with political virtues, ―by which man is rectified in civic operation.‖105 
The important difference between both accounts should be obvious. In the first case acquired 
virtue implies man‘s complete natural perfection; in the second it perfects the agent only in 
regard to the public order, including first of all the observance of human law. Hence, what 
does Aquinas have in mind exactly by referring to acquired virtues as virtues of the citizen 
―whereby man behaves well in respect to human things‖? 
The clarification is not only important for the understanding of the acquired virtues, but also 
for that of the infused virtues, since Aquinas describes the two in a parallel fashion. A certain 
interpretation of the acquired virtues necessarily has certain ramifications for one‘s notion of 
the infused virtues. 
Our argument proceeds in the following manner.  
                                                 
104
 William C. Mattison, Introducing Moral Theology: True Happines and the Virtues (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Brazos Press, 2008), 328. 
105
 This definition of virtutes politicae is given in In sent. III 33.1.4 ad 2: ―Homo per eas in civilibus operibus 
rectificatur.‖ 
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The next section gives a short summary of the status quaestionis, i.e. whether acquired virtues 
in Aquinas are to be read as perfections of the good pagan citizen, or as man‘s ultimate 
perfection on a mere natural level (section 2.3.1). In the subsequent subchapter (section 2.3.2) 
we investigate the textual basis for the two contrary positions in the works of St. Thomas. On 
this basis we will suggest an interpretation which allows an understanding of acquired virtues 
as perfection in regard of particular matters (i.e. the human city) which is nevertheless faithful 
to Aquinas‘s doctrine of the necessary connection of all virtues (section 2.3.3). Thereby it will 
become clear in which way the two rival interpretations refer to something correct. 
In section 2.3.4 we apply these results to our understanding of the infused moral virtues, 
namely as heavenly political virtues. This application of the understanding of (pagan) political 
virtues to the infused virtues sheds a surprising (and for our research important) light on the 
relationship of divine law and human law with regard to the two kinds of virtue (section 2.3.5). 
 
 
2.3.1. A Recent Controversy: Political Virtue or Perfect Acquired Virtue? 
 
The issue of the meaning of acquired virtues was recently part of the debate about the role of 
Augustinianism in Aquinas‘s moral theology, i.e. whether Aquinas‘s understanding of virtue 
is more in debt to St. Augustine or to Aristotle. The former position was defended, for 
example, by A. MacIntyre‘s arguing that there is no genuine virtue that is not shaped by 
divine infusion.
106
 The latter position was defended by B. Kent who argued for the possibility 
of moral virtue even apart from grace.
107
 B. Shanley suggested in his article ―Aquinas on 
Pagan Virtue‖ something of a middle course by arguing that St. Thomas‘s understanding of 
virtue combines Augustinian insights as well as Aristotelian ones: ―Aquinas admits 
                                                 
106
 MacIntyre‘s post-After Virtue narratives deal explicitly with the thomistic doctrine. Regarding the virtue of 
justice he claims: ―Justice cannot flourish, cannot indeed, so it turns out, even exist as a natural virtue, unless and 
insofar as it is informed by the supernatural virtue of caritas.‖ (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 
here 205; see also Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 1990)). 
Of course, the idea is not an invention of MacIntery. Yet Maritain held a similar position (Jacques Maritain, 
Science and Wisdom (London: The Centenary Press, 1944), 145-154; 180-183). Quite bold also Carpenter: 
―Since the supernatural end is the only true ultimate end, not only for those who have actually received 
sanctifying grace, but for all mankind, it follows that merely natural habits cannot be true virtues, even though 
for the sake of convenience the courtesy title is left to them.‖ (Carpenter, ―The Supernatural Virtues,‖ 134). 
107
 Kent, ―Moral Provincialism,‖ 269-285, referring to MacIntyre on pages 274-277. She repeats her critique in 
Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, DC: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 19-34.  
Chapter 2. Differences of Acquired and Infused Virtues: Four Clarifications 
 79 
Aristotelian virtue, but within Augustinian limitations.‖108 Only supernaturally infused virtues 
enable man to achieve meritorious actions which serve for the attainment of his supernatural 
end. Here Aquinas remains a faithful adherent to St. Augustine‘s doctrine. At the same time, 
acquired virtues are true perfections with regard to the temporal city. These are understood by 
St. Thomas as pagan civil virtues, as true though limited perfections, as dispositions which 
enable man to preserve the good of the earthly city, independent of his overall moral 
perfection on a natural level, and a fortiori apart from grace.  
A sharp controversy arose in the wake of Shanley‘s seminal article. Th. Osborne objected and 
argued that according to Aquinas man in his fallen state is unable to acquire true virtues as 
stable habits even on a mere natural level without the help of grace. He might acquire 
dispositions for some good work, but perfect acquired virtue can develop only under the 
influence of supernatural aid – even on a natural level. In defense of Shanley‘s account, A. 
McKay replied to Osborne that in the writings of St. Thomas acquired virtues denote 
explicitly human perfections disregarding the help of grace, sc. they are true virtues with 
regard to specific practical areas.
109
 
 
 
a) Shanley and McKay: Acquired Virtue as Pagan Political Virtue 
 
At the beginning of his article Shanley summarizes his principal thesis as follows: ―Acquired 
moral virtue . . . is essentially political virtue, the virtue of man as a social being ordered to 
the common good . . . Aquinas believed that such virtue had been not only articulated by 
pagans, but also actually achieved.‖110 Hence, according to Shanley, Aquinas‘s concept of 
acquired virtue is not to be understood ―as the achievement of man‘s natural end, but rather as 
the optimal good achievable by human beings apart from grace.‖111 Certainly, the Dominican 
scholar is aware that pagan civil virtues do not make man simply good, i.e. he does not 
become perfect in respect to all practical matters. Shanley explicitly negates the identification 
                                                 
108
 Shanley, ―Aquinas on Pagan Virtue,‖ 554. 
109
 McKay, ―Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue,‖ 535-555, especially 552-555; even in her dissertation she 
defends this position (McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 85-124). Similar Mirkes who argues that 
acquired virtues are concerned only with particular goods: Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral 
Virtue,‖ 596; Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 195. 
110
 Shanley, ―Aquinas on Pagan Virtue,‖ 554-555. 
111
 Ibid., 555. 
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of political virtues with ―complete moral virtue.‖112 He distinguishes carefully between the 
pagan virtues and the achievement of the complete good, proportionate to human nature. 
 
The key distinction in this discussion is that before the Fall man could achieve the complete 
good proportionate to his nature without the aid of grace, while after the Fall man is unable to 
achieve that complete good. Aquinas leaves the door open to the achievement of a genuine but 
incomplete human good.
113
 
 
According to this interpretation, right order towards God remains impossible even for an 
agent who possesses acquired virtues, that is his relation towards supernatural beatitude as 
well as his natural relation to God as creator of every being. Due to his weakened nature, 
injured by the Fall, man is unable to fulfill all natural obligations unless he receives gratuitous 
support from God.
114
 As a result, acquired virtues understood as pagan virtues are in principle 
compatible with repeated acts of certain mortal sins.
115
  
Shanley however puts an emphasis on the fact that though pagan political virtues achieve only 
a particular human good, nevertheless they build a unified whole. It is the common good of 
the city which rules those virtues as a connecting final end and therefore provides an internal 
unity. ―A necessary condition for the achievement of the acquired moral virtues is the 
overarching rectification of a person‘s will with respect to the bonum civile or bonum 
commune.‖116 
Especially the latter point is further developed by McKay in her defense of Shanley‘s position. 
Her principal concern: ―Aquinas clearly indicates that acquired moral virtues, connected by 
prudence, can exist apart from grace.‖117 In a detailed analysis of various texts of Aquinas she 
tries to demonstrate that charity and grace are only necessary prerequisites for infused moral 
                                                 
112
 See Ibid., 567. Rather, pagan virtue achieve only an incomplete human good (see ibid., 572). 
113
 Ibid., 569. 
114
 ―We cannot autonomously achieve a natural love of God qua metaphysical source of being and goodness; . . . 
This means that even if a person were to recognize the moral obligation to practice the virtue of religion, he 
could not effectively do so apart from grace.‖ (Ibid., 571). 
115
 ―Aquinas thinks that it is possible to live the life of acquired moral virtue even though one performs actions 
that can be categorized theologically as mortal sins.‖ (Ibid., 557). 
116
 Ibid., 561. 
117
 McKay, ―Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue,‖ 555; likewise at many other places, e.g. 536. The position is 
certainly not novel; e.g. Gardeil argues: ―Chez celui qui ne vit pas de la charité, il peut y avoir d‘excellentes 
dispositions et habitudes vertueuses et, par suite, des actions vertueuses proprement dites, encore qu‘il manque à 
celles-ci, pour être parfaitement vertueuses, d‘être ordonnée à Dieu.― (H.-D. Gardeil, ―Appendice,‖ in Somme 
théologique: La charité; Tome premier 2
a
-2
ae
, questions 23-26 (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1967), 268). 
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virtues, whereas St. Thomas never refers to a perfect natural virtue which the human agent 
would cultivate in the state of grace.
118
 
 
 
b) Osborne: The Argument for Perfect Acquired Virtue 
 
Precisely this last assertion provoked Osborne‘s critique in his response to Shanley as well as 
to McKay.
119
 Principally, he defends the following two propositions: ―(1) that humans 
without grace are unable to fulfill even their natural obligations, and (2) that someone without 
grace cannot possess the same type of perfect acquired moral virtue that can be possessed by 
someone with grace.‖120 It is noteworthy that the first point may be conceded by all Thomists, 
inclusive Shanley and McKay.
121
 The second assertion, however, seems to be controversial. 
Osborne argues: ―Although pagan virtue differs from vice, it is not the same as the acquired 
virtue of a good Christian.‖122 Shanley had generally identified acquired virtue as pagan 
political virtue.  
Osborne argues the following to support his view of two different kinds of acquired virtue: 
 
In the state of fallen nature there can be no ordering to the natural end without an ordering to 
the supernatural end. Consequently, although acquired and infused prudence are distinct, there 
cannot even be perfect acquired prudence in an individual who does not have the infused 
virtues and whose actions are not ordered to his supernatural end. Moreover, without perfect 
acquired prudence it is impossible fully to possess the other acquired moral virtues. Therefore, 
without charity there is no prudence and the moral virtues are not connected.
123
 
 
                                                 
118
 This is her final conclusion (McKay, ―Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue,‖ 555). 
119
 For his response to Shanley, see Thomas M. Osborne, ―The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas‘s Moral 
Theory,‖ The Thomist 67 (2003); for his reply to McKay, see Thomas M. Osborne, ―Perfect and Imperfect 
Virtues in Aquinas,‖ The Thomist 71 (2007). Indirectly he touches the issue also in Thomas M. Osborne, 
―Thomas and Scotus on Prudence Without All the Major Virtues: Imperfect or Merely Partial?,‖ The Thomist 74 
(2010): 165-188. 
120
 Osborne, ―The Augustinianism,‖ 280. 
121
 For example Shanley, ―Aquinas on Pagan Virtue,‖ 568: ―In his fallen condition, however, man is unable to 
achieve the complete good proportioned to his nature.‖ And McKay, ―Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue,‖ 
541; 546. 
122
 Osborne, ―The Augustinianism,‖ 289. 
123
 Ibid., 292. Or the other way around: ―According to my interpretation, no agent can be ordered to the natural 
end without at the same time being ordered to the supernatural end through charity. Moreover, this ordering to 
the natural end is a necessary condition for acquired prudence and the unity of the acquired moral virtues. 
Consequently, if a pagan possesses acquired moral virtues that are connected with each other through prudence, 
it follows that he must be ordered to even the supernatural last end, which requires charity.‖ (Ibid., 300). 
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It is the famous teaching of the unity of virtues which compels Osborne (who presents in this 
point the position of many Thomists
124
) to argue for the distinction between two kinds of 
acquired virtue, or to speak more cautiously, between two different grades of those virtues,
125
 
namely an imperfect and a perfect state of acquired virtue.
126
 He does not want to deny the 
existence of true civil pagan virtues, attainable even for non-Christians, independent of the 
help of grace. But since those acquired virtues are possessed by an agent who remains 
disordered in some practical matters, meaning he acts imprudently regarding certain issues – 
e.g. in relation towards God, the area of religion,
127
 ‒ his acquired good habits regarding the 
common good of the earthly city would also stay in permanent danger of becoming 
occasionally overwhelmed by still disordered desires. They would suffer an essential 
instability since the remaining disorder could compromise the already acquired good habits at 
any time. According to Osborne, acquired virtues as pagan political virtues might therefore be 
described as good habits with regard to some particular good, but as long as prudence has not 
been perfected to extend to all practical matters, the moral virtues remain disconnected and 
are characterized by an intrinsic imperfection and instability.
128
 
Quite a different person emerges in the state of grace. Through infused virtues an agent is 
ordered to the right (supernatural) final end. Certainly, acquired virtues remain essentially 
different to infused virtues, since their rule is not divine law but human reason. However, 
through infused habits the agent is ―already‖ ordered as a whole toward the right final end. 
And under such conditions even the natural virtues, which are per se too weak to achieve 
man‘s overall perfection, can be fully developed, so to speak under the protection of the 
                                                 
124
 Osborn refers to authors as the Carmelites of Salamanca, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Billuart etc. (Osborne, 
―Perfect and Imperfect Virtues,‖ 43; 50-51). The same position is developed in greater detail by Garrigou-
Lagrange (esp. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, ―L‘instabilité dans l‘état de péché mortel des vertus acquises,‖ 
Revue Thomiste 43 (1937): 258-262). Likewise by Parent who explains: ―L‘homme ne saurait être bon, au sens 
plein du mot, s'il n'est ordonné à la fin ultime; et depuis le péché, il ne peut être ordonné à cette fin (même 
naturelle) sans la grâce.‖ (Joseph-Marie Parent, ―Les vertus morales infuses dans la vie chrétienne,‖ in Théologie. 
Cahiers II - III. Études et recherches IV - V, ed. Collège Dominicain d‘Ottawa (Ottawa: Les Èditions du Lévrier, 
1944), 219). 
125
 ―The imperfect/perfect distinction within acquired virtue need not be between distinct kinds of virtue but 
rather is in the way in which the virtue is possessed.‖ (Osborne, ―Perfect and Imperfect Virtues,‖ 57). 
126
 For this, see especially Ibid., 52-57. 
127
 That‘s not only a question of supernatural divine friendship. As Osborne rightly mentions that man‘s 
obligation to be thankful toward God for the received gifts does not dependent on a divine precept but is a result 
of natural reasoning; see Osborne, ―The Augustinianism,‖ 287. 
128
 For the same argument see Parent, ―Les vertus morales infuses dans la vie chrétienne,‖ 214- 219: ―La 
prudence acquise ne saurait être parfaite sans la rectification de la volonté vis-à-vis de la fin naturelle. Or, il se 
trouve que le péché mortel ou l‘état de péché - incompatible avec la grâce et la charité - non seulement détourne 
l‘homme de sa fin dernière surnaturelle, mais détruit également son ordination à la fin ultime naturelle, parce 
qu‘il n‘est pas moins contraire à la loi naturelle et à la raison qu‘à la loi divine. On ne peut pas dire du pécheur 
qu‘il reste bien disposé à l‘égard de la fin ultime naturelle; même s‘il garde l‘amour du bien rationnel en tel ou 
tel domaine, cet attachement n‘a pas la fermeté ni l‘universalité requises pour le bon fonctionnement de la 
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infused virtues. Osborne describes such virtues as perfect acquired virtues, or man‘s 
reasonable order ―concerning every moral matter,‖ 129  in regard to his ―natural ultimate 
end.‖130 He therefore concludes: ―Perfect acquired virtue is impossible in someone who lacks 
grace.‖131 And to put a fine point on his conclusion: ―Acquired virtue depends on grace for its 
full development.‖132 
We can summarize the distinction Osborne makes between the two grades of acquired virtues 
as follows. Imperfect acquired virtues well-dispose man in regard to some particular good; 
they are guided by an imperfect kind of prudence which may choose the right means in some 
practical areas but likewise fail in other concerns. Therefore, those virtues are only 
unconnected and scattered good dispositions. On the other hand, perfect acquired virtues 
provide man‘s perfection in all moral matters according to the rule of reason, including his 
relationship to God. But since man can relate to God rightly only by grace, perfect acquired 
virtues are attainable only under the influence of grace, although by themselves they remain 
only natural habits.
133
 
At this stage we can see that Osborne‘s thesis does not necessarily contradict Shanley‘s or 
McKay‘s principal position. In the first part of his article Shanley describes political virtues as 
―the optimal good achievable by human beings apart from grace.‖134 This accords fully with 
Osborne‘s imperfect acquired virtues. In the second part of his essay, subtitled ―The 
Impossibility of a Right Order to God Without Grace,‖ Shanley himself negates the 
possibility of a perfect moral virtue on a natural level apart from grace. Osborne holds the 
same view for perfect acquired virtues. Substantially, there is no disagreement between the 
two authors.
135
 
                                                                                                                                                        
prudence. Celle-ci, en effet, est totale ou elle n‘est pas; le défaut de prudence sur un point rejaillit sur les 
autres.― (Ibid., 16-217). 
129
 Osborne, ―Perfect and Imperfect Virtues,‖ 58. 
130
 Ibid., 56. 
131
 Ibid., 51. And further: ―For there to be perfect acquired virtue without grace, an agent would have to be fully 
virtuous on a natural level and yet be turned away from the supernatural ultimate end.‖ (Ibid., 55). 
132
 Ibid., 40. Garrigou-Lagrange has shown in which way mortal sin – as act against charity – implies ipso facto 
an act against the order or reason; cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, ―L‘instabilité,‖ 255 -262. 
133
 Perfect acquired virtues are connected by a perfect natural prudence which regards all moral matters. The way, 
how imperfect and perfect acquired virtues depend on imperfect and perfect acquired prudence as connecting 
principle, is explained most clearly in Osborne, ―Perfect and Imperfect Virtues,‖ 57-62; Osborne reads ST II-II 
47.13 as distinction between different grades of acquired prudence.  
134
 Shanley, ―Aquinas on Pagan Virtue,‖ 555. 
135
 Or more exact: Shanley argues by a negative statement, namely that perfect acquired virtue is impossible to 
attain for man in the present state apart from grace; Osborne suggests a positive thesis, sc. that perfect acquired 
virtue develops under the protection of infused virtues. Concerning imperfect acquired virtue (in Osborne‘s terms) 
both scholars agree. Shanley certainly would consent with Osborne‘s assertion (understood as critique at 
Shanley): ―Someone without charity can consistently perform good actions and it is in this sense that he can be 
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However, it remains unclear in which sense Aquinas himself uses the term virtus acquisita: as 
pagan virtue alone or also as perfect acquired virtue? This is, in a certain sense, a question of 
interpretation. Is there textual support for Osborne‘s assertion? He concedes that the 
distinction cannot be found verbatim in Aquinas, but he holds that it is implicitly present and 
presupposed in various texts. To give an example for imperfect acquired virtues as 
unconnected good dispositions (i.e. the pagan civil virtues), Osborne refers to ST I-II 49.2 ad 
3, where Aquinas describes dispositions for good deeds which remain essentially instable 
because of their mutual disconnection (dispositio instabilis). He calls them ―true but 
imperfect‖ virtues;136  true since they are true perfections in regard to certain goods, but 
imperfect since not yet connected by prudence. Likewise in ST I-II 65.2 Aquinas talks about a 
kind of acquired virtue which is found ―in many pagans‖ apart of grace.137 In contrast, when 
Aquinas speaks about moral virtues ruled by prudence, then – according to Osborne‘s 
interpretation – perfect acquired virtues are at stake, since true prudence requires a unity of all 
moral virtues.
138
 Of course, since they do not enable man to attain his supernatural end, these 
perfect virtues are only ―aliqualiter perfecta‖, i.e. perfect on a natural level but not according 
to the divine law, even if they flourish only under the protection of charity.  
Osborne‘s argumentation is impressive. However, there are other texts of Aquinas which 
contradict his interpretation. In the Commentary on the Sentences, for example, Aquinas 
devotes two special articles to the question of the connection of virtues, in particular of 
infused virtues,
139
 but also of political virtues.
140
 Even more problematic, the article about 
political virtues as acquired virtues refers to the very same distinction between connected and 
disconnected virtues as ST I-II 65.1 and De virt. card. 2, the two articles which Osborne 
invokes for his thesis of perfect acquired virtues. But the article in In sent. presents explicitly 
political virtues as connected virtues. ―In a different way virtue is considered as something 
perfect because of customization; and in this it takes the name of a political virtue; and in this 
way it is necessary that there are all virtues at once.‖141 
This quotation demonstrates the need to refer to St. Thomas himself as the primary source for 
a well founded interpretation of what Aquinas has in mind when describing acquired virtues 
                                                                                                                                                        
said to have true virtue. Nevertheless, this true virtue will be very imperfect even on only a natural level.‖ 
(Osborne, ―The Augustinianism,‖ 299). 
136
 ST I-II 49.2 ad 3: ―vera sed imperfecta.‖ 
137
 ST I-II 65.2: ―in multis gentilibus.‖ 
138
 E.g. De virt. card. 2; ST I-II 65.2. Osborne reads ST I-II 65.2 as description of infused and perfect acquired 
virtue.  
139
 ―Utrum virtutes gratuitae sint connexae.‖ (In sent. III 36.1.2). 
140
 ―Utrum virtutes politicae sint connexae.― (In sent. III 36.1.1). 
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as ―circa res humanas.‖ We return to our original question: are the acquired virtues political 
virtues only, or do they contribute to man‘s total perfection according to the rule of natural 
reason?  
 
 
2.3.2 The Textual Basis for the Meaning of Acquired Virtues 
 
In the following subchapter we will investigate the textual basis for both interpretations. Does 
Aquinas describe acquired virtues explicitly as man‘s limited perfection in regard to the 
political common good? Or does he use the concept for man‘s overall perfection according 
the rule of reason? Or does he use the term according to both meanings? 
 
 
a) Textual Evidence for Acquired Virtue as Political Virtue 
 
Aquinas identifies repeatedly acquired virtues with political virtues. We present a short 
overview of this equation found in the Commentary on the Sentences, the disputed questions 
De virt. in com. and De virt. car., up to the Summa theologiae.  
Comparing infused and acquired virtues, Aquinas describes the latter in the Commentary on 
the Sentences again and again as political virtues. ―Infused virtue is not more deficient in 
meritorious operations than acquired virtue in political operations. But acquired virtue guides 
man sufficiently in all civic operations.‖142 And again: ―Through charity the soul does not 
have less goodness in the life of grace [in esse gratiae] than through acquired virtue in the 
political life [in esse politico].‖143 Acquired virtues perfect the agent in respect to life in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
141
 In sent. III 36.1.1: ―Alio modo consideratur virtus secundum esse perfectum quod ex assuefactione recipit; et 
sic accipit nomen politicae virtutis; et hoc modo oportet virtutes omnes esse simul.‖ 
142
 In sent. I 14.2.1A arg. 4 (affirmative): ―Virtus infusa non est deficientior in operibus meritoriis, quam virtus 
acquisita in operibus politicis. Sed virtus acquisita sufficienter dirigit hominem in omnibus civilibus.‖ 
143
 In sent. I 17.1: ―Per caritatem anima non habet minus de bonitate in esse gratiae, quam per virtutem 
acquisitam in esse politico.‖ Likewise in In sent. III 26.2.1 arg. 2: ―Virtutes infusae ordinantur ad aliquod 
arduum, quod est vita aeterna; ita et virtutes acquisitae ad aliquod arduum, quod est felicitas civilis.‖ And the 
reply to the objection: ―Illud arduum in quod ordinant virtutes acquisitae, est finis proportionatus facultati 
naturae; et ideo natura per seipsam determinata est ad sperandum illum finem; unde non indiget aliquo habitu 
superaddito, per quem determinetur in illud.‖ (ad 2). Further in In sent. III 33.1.2C arg. 2: ―Ad faciendum actum 
rectum sufficit virtus acquisita, ad faciendum autem meritorium sufficit caritas. Ergo non indigemus virtutibus 
moralibus infusis.‖ And Aquinas answers: ―Aliquis actus est rectus proportionatus bono civili, qui non est rectus 
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political community: ―[Virtues] perfect man in regard to different lives; acquired ones in 
regard to the civil life, infused ones in regard to the spiritual life.‖144 The good achieved by 
acquired virtues is therefore the good of the community. ―Acquired [virtues] guide in regard 
to the civil life; thus, they have the civil good as end.‖145 He limits explicitly the range of 
these virtues to regulations of interhuman relations; their goal is the welfare of the earthly city, 
and consequently man‘s relationship to angels (as other created persons) does not belong to 
the task of acquired virtues.
146
 Moreover, Aquinas identifies these political virtues clearly 
with the moral virtues. ―Something is called political because it relates to the civil life, and in 
this sense all moral virtues are sometimes called political.‖147 
The identification of acquired virtues with political virtues is not limited to Aquinas‘s earliest 
work. We find the same conception in his later writings. In De virt. in com. he argues that 
although man cannot attain heavenly beatitude by acquired virtues, they allow him to achieve 
a ―certain beatitude . . . in this life about which Aristotle has written in Metaphysics X,‖ i.e. 
the beatitude of a happy life in the earthly city.
148
 He is even more explicit in De virt. in com. 
9 ad 18: all objections in this article deal with the question of whether some virtues can be 
acquired by repeated actions. The eighteenth objection asserts that virtues depend on grace, 
but not on actions. Aquinas responds: ―Grace is said to be the form of infused virtue, not in 
the sense that it gives virtue its specific being, but insofar as by grace the act of virtue is 
somehow informed. Hence it is not necessary that political virtue results from the infusion of 
grace.‖149 Although the reply does not mention the concept of acquired virtue, it is clear that it 
presupposes the identification of the political and acquired virtues.  
In De virt. card. St. Thomas again describes acquired virtues as political virtues. The text is of 
special interest since it repeatedly refers to acquired virtues ―as those about which the 
                                                                                                                                                        
proportionatus gloriae aeternae: unde oportet quod sint aliae virtutes infusae, quae faciant actus rectos ex 
proportione ad finem.‖ (ad 2).  
144
 In sent. III 33.1.2D: ―In alia vita [virtutes] hominem perficiunt, acquisitae quidem in vita civili, infusae in vita 
spirituali.‖ Also In sent. III 36.1: ―Consideratur virtus secundum esse perfectum quod ex assuefactione recipit; et 
sic accipit nomen politicae virtutis.‖ 
145
 In sent. III 33.1.4: ―[Virtutes] acquisitae dirigunt in vita civili; unde habent bonum civile pro fine.‖ See also 
In sent. III 33.1.2D ad 2: ―Per virtutem acquisitam collimitantur circumstantiae secundum proportionem ad 
bonum civile.‖ Further clear indications: In sent. II 44.2.1 ad 6. 
146
 In sent. III 33.1.4 ad 5: ―Philosophus loquitur de virtutibus acquisitis, quae perficiunt hominem in vita 
civitatis terrenae, in qua vita non habemus cum Angelis aliquam communicationem.‖ 
147
 In sent. III 33.3.4E ad 3: ―Politicum . . . dicitur . . . secundum quod respicit civilem vitam; et sic omnes 
virtutes morales quandoque dicuntur politicae.‖ 
148
 De virt. in com. 9 ad 6: ―Per virtutes acquisitas non pervenitur ad felicitatem caelestem, sed ad quamdam 
felicitatem quam homo natus est acquirere per propria naturalia in hac vita secundum actum perfectae virtutis, de 
qua Aristoteles tractat in X Metaph.‖ Similar in De virt. in com. 10 ad 8 where acquired virtues are described as 
―ad bonum praesentis vitae.‖ Cf. also In sent. III 27.2.2. 
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philosophers have spoken,‖150  a notable indication that acquired virtues do not comprise 
man‘s perfection according to reason in all practical matters (which would presuppose grace 
and therefore was certainly not discussed by the philosophers). ―The acquired virtues, which 
were discussed by the philosophers, are ordered only for perfecting men in regard to the civic 
life.‖151 
In the Summa theologiae the concept of acquired virtue is introduced surprisingly late. The 
section on virtues begins with ST I-II 55. But topics such as the general character of (moral) 
virtues, and their distinction from intellectual virtues and arts, their cooperation with prudence, 
their residing in the various powers of man, etc., are discussed almost without any reference 
to the term of virtus acquisita. Finally in ST I-II 61.5, in the context of discussing four 
traditional species of virtue (by Macrobius), Aquinas introduces the concept of political 
virtues by differentiating them from the virtutes exemplares in God, the virtutes purgati 
animae of the blessed in heaven, and the virtues purgatoriae of the saints on earth.
152
 The 
political virtues are described as following: 
 
Since man by his nature is a political animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him 
according to the condition of his nature, are called political; since it is by reason of these 
virtues that man behaves rightly in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we 
have been speaking of these virtues until now.
153 
 
Though Aquinas does not refer to the concept of acquired virtue, his description ―prout 
scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis‖ corresponds 
plainly to the quotation of ST I-II 63.4, where acquired virtues are defined as perfections ―in 
                                                                                                                                                        
149
 De virt. in com. 9 ad 18: ―Gratia dicitur esse forma virtutis infusae; non tamen ita quod ei det esse specificum; 
sed in quantum per eam informatur aliqualiter actus eius. Unde non oportet quod virtus politica sit per 
infusionem gratiae.‖ 
150
 De virt. card. 4 corp. art. and ad 3. 
151
 De virt. card. 4: ―Virtutes acquisitae, de quibus locuti sunt philosophi, ordinantur tantum ad perficiendum 
homines in vita civili.‖ Similar in the reply to objection 3: ―Bonum civile non est finis ultimus virtutum 
cardinalium infusarum, de quibus loquimur, sed virtutum acquisitarum de quibus philosophi sunt locuti.‖ 
(Already in the objection he writes – affirmatively: ―Virtutes cardinales ordinantur ad bonum civile.‖) And ad 7: 
―Virtutes politicae de quibus ipse loquitur, ordinantur tantum ad bonum civile praesentis vitae.‖ Already in 
article 2 ad 9 of De virt. card. Aquinas describes the virtues acquisitae as virtues ―quae ordinant hominem in his 
quae occurrunt in vita humana.‖ 
152
 Aquinas‘s interpretation of theses classic division is maybe most clear in Princ. bibl. 3: ―In primo gradu, 
secundum eum, sunt virtutes politicae, quibus homo moderate rebus mundi utitur et inter homines 
conversatur; . . . In secundo gradu sunt virtutes purgatoriae, quibus homo se a rebus mundi exuit per 
contemptum; . . . In tertio gradu sunt virtutes purgati animi, quibus homo, saeculi curis penitus calcatis, in sola 
sapientiae contemplatione delectatur.‖ 
153
 ST I-II 61.5: ―Quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine 
existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte 
se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus locuti sumus.‖ 
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res humanas.‖ In ST I-II 63.2 Aquinas finally discusses the question of acquiring virtue by 
repeated action and introduces thereby the relating concept, though he does not mention the 
term ―political virtue‖ there. In an indirect way, however, the reply to the second objection is 
instructive. The answer explains that acquired virtues are not lost by contrary actions. In fact, 
they are compatible with repeated evil deeds, theologically categorized as mortal sins. ―Virtue 
which is acquired in a human mode is compatible with the act of sin, even if mortal.‖154 
Obviously, acquired virtue is not understood as man‘s overall-perfection on a natural level. 
Hence, although in the ST there is no direct description of acquired virtues as political virtues, 
this understanding is implicitly presupposed.
155
 
 
 
b) Textual Indications for Perfect Acquired Virtue  
 
Osborne‘s principle argument in defending a perfect acquired virtue is Aquinas‘s teaching 
that a moral virtue as a stable and perfect habit has to be connected with all moral virtues. As 
long as an agent lacks a virtue in one practical area, his perfection in other practical matters 
remains imperfect.
156
 An agent possesses either all virtues or none. ―In order to have one 
virtue, somebody has to be well disposed about all things which are useful in life.‖157 In the 
                                                 
154
 ST 63.2 ad 2. The complete text: ―Virtus humanitus acquisita potest secum compati aliquem actum peccati, 
etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae voluntati subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per 
unum actum peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis acquisitae; habitui enim non contrariatur directe actus, sed 
habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia homo non possit peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet mortaliter; 
non tamen impeditur quin possit habitum virtutis acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et 
praecipue ab his quae sunt valde rationi contraria.‖ Later on this argument is repeated several times, for example 
in ST I-II 71.4: ―Peccatum mortale non potest simul esse cum virtutibus infusis, potest tamen simul esse cum 
virtutibus acquisitis.‖ Or ST I-II 73.1 ad 4 ―unus actus peccati etiam mortalis, non tollit habitum virtutis 
acquisitae.‖ 
155
 For a good argumentation thereto (including an interpretation of political virtues in ST I-II 61.5) see: Mary M. 
Keys, Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
130-140. 
156
 Utz summarizes well the equivalence of perfect moral virtue and prudence: ―Es ist ein und dasselbe, ob man 
sagt, die vollkommenen Tugenden seien wesentlich verknüpft oder die Tugenden seien in der Klugheit verknüpft, 
denn vollkommen ist eine sittliche Tugend entsprechend ihrer Unterordnung unter die Klugheit.‖ (A.F. Utz, 
―Kommentar,‖ in Die deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe: Summa Theologica; Grundlagen der menschlichen Handlung, 
2 ed., vol. 11 (Salzburg: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1940), 615). 
157
 In sent. III 36.1.1 ad 1: ―Oportet ad hoc quod una virtus habeatur, quod bene se habeat quis circa omnia quae 
in usum vitae veniunt.‖ Aquinas discusses the issue several times. Cf. In sent. III 36.1-2; IV 33.3.2 ad 6; Quodl. 
XII 15; In NE VI 11; ST I-II 65; De virt. card. 2. About the history of this question from St. Thomas to Duns 
Scotus, cf. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. 4, 551-663; a scholarly discussions of Aquinas‘s doctrin provides 
Fridolino M. Utz, De connexione virtutum moralium inter se secundum doctrinam St. Thomae Aquinais 
(Oldenburg: Albertus-Magnus-Verlag, 1937), 97-126; more recently: Bonnie Kent, ―Habits and Virtues (Ia IIae, 
qq. 49-70),‖ in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2002), 122-124. 
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famous article ST I-II 65.1 – utrum virtutes morales sint ad invicem connexae – St. Thomas 
suggests the following argument: 
 
It is necessary that man works simultaneously in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he 
exercises by good deeds in all matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if 
he acts by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by 
behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence, he will acquire a 
certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, because of 
the defect of prudence, which is corrupted in matters of concupiscence.
158
 
 
Even from a different viewpoint one can show the necessary connection of all moral virtues 
on a natural level. As seen in section 2.2, natural reason is the formal cause of acquired virtue. 
Consequently, it seems that every action and every passion which can be judged by reason 
must be ruled by acquired prudence. Otherwise, the agent would behave in certain things 
unreasonably, i.e. unvirtuously. Hence, moral virtue on a natural level (i.e. ruled by natural 
reason) has to be concerned circa omnia. Aquinas explains: ―Moral virtue perfects the 
appetitive part of the soul by directing it to the good of reason. Now the good of reason is that 
which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently, there are moral virtues about all 
matters that are subject to reason‘s direction and moderation.‖159  
There is a third continuously repeated argument brought forward in defense of perfect 
acquired virtues. Prudence as right reason in practical matters may perfect the agent in regard 
to particular ends. Aquinas, however, puts emphasis on the fact that this kind of practical 
knowledge is only prudentia secundum quid. The simply prudent knows to judge and 
command the right means for the good life as a whole. ―Just as he who reasons well for a 
                                                                                                                                                        
The doctrine of the connection virtues down to the present day a controversial issue. For authors who negate the 
connection, see e.g. Geach, The Virtues, 160-168; James D. Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1978), 121-127. The doctrine is defended by Casey, Pagan Virtue, 70-78; Jean Porter, ―The 
Unity of the Virtues and the Ambiguity of Goodness: A Reappraisal of Aquinas‘ Theory of the Virtues,‖ Journal 
of Religious Ethics 21 (1993): 145-160; again in Jean Porter, ―Virtue and Sin: The Connection of the Virtues and 
the Case of the Flawed Saint,‖ Journal of Religion 75 (1995): 523-528. For a non-thomistic defense of the unity 
of virtue: Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 78-82. 
158
 ST I-II 65.1 ad 1: ―Oportet quod homo simul exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si 
quidem circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquiret habitus omnium virtutum moralium. Si autem 
exercitetur bene operando circa unam materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, non 
autem circa concupiscentias; acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit 
rationem virtutis, propter defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur.‖ Aquinas distinguishes 
in the article (and at many other places) two different meanings of the connexio virtutum, on the one hand as 
general mode of every virtue (i.e. every virtue must be applied prudently, justly, bravely and modestly), on the 
other hand as perfection of all relevant human powers in regard of a specific good. For our present issue only the 
second meaning of connection is important. 
159
 ST I-II 59.4: ―Virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est 
autem rationis bonum id quod est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum. Unde circa omne id quod 
contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem.‖ 
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particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, 
namely warfare, so he who reasons well with regard to right life as a whole, is said to be 
prudent absolutely.‖160 
Therefore, though we have seen in the forgoing passage that Aquinas clearly identifies 
acquired and political virtues, the doctrine of the connection of virtues seems to demand 
necessarily moral virtue as man‘s overall perfection in regard to all practical matters, even on 
a natural level. In short, the doctrine demands perfect acquired virtue. 
 
 
2.3.3 St. Thomas’s Analog Understanding of the connexio virtutum  
 
The foregoing overview of the textual basis might give the impression that Aquinas holds at 
the same time two contrary positions. He identifies acquired virtues with political virtues, but 
he argues likewise for a necessary connection of virtues, i.e. for their completeness in regard 
to all practical matters. In this subchapter we want to suggest an interpretation by which both 
(seemingly contradictory) assertions can be simultaneously accepted. Our argument proceeds 
in three steps. 
 
(a) Aquinas defends clearly the connection of all moral virtues by prudence. We want to argue 
that we should read this principle in an analogous way. The principle can mean man‘s 
ordering in respect to all practical matters, in respect to himself as well as to his neighbors as 
well as to God. However, this is not the only possible interpretation of the unifying function 
of prudence. In several places St. Thomas distinguishes between various perspectives of 
man‘s perfection: man perfected as single individual (ut homo), or perfected as member of a 
community (ut civis). The latter option is again subdivided, sc. man either as part of the human 
society or united with God in divine friendship. According to the explicit affirmation of 
Aquinas there are specific virtues for each of these aspects. As we shall argue, they are true 
and connected virtues. The concept ―connected‖ attains here an analogous meaning. The 
various virtues are truly connected, namely in respect to their relative good – the good of the 
individual, the public good, and the divine good. Hence, the human agent can have connected 
                                                 
160
 ST II-II 47.2 ad 1: ―Sicut ille qui ratiocinatur bene ad aliquem finem particularem, puta ad victoriam, dicitur 
esse prudens non simpliciter, sed in hoc genere, scilicet in rebus bellicis; ita ille qui bene ratiocinatur ad totum 
bene vivere dicitur prudens simpliciter.‖ 
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virtues in respect to this proper perfection (connected since he chooses all necessary things for 
his private good), whereas he remains disordered in relation to the common good. Of course, 
such virtues for the own good are less perfect than virtues which perfect man for the good life 
in human society or for divine friendship. Nevertheless – so we argue – they are true and 
connected virtues.  
In summary, prudence works as a unifying virtue not only in respect to the final end of the 
whole human existence, but also because it belongs to the very essence of prudence to direct 
an agent to a specific end in a certain genus. Thereby it connects all relating virtues.
161
 
We will check our interpretation againt Aquinas‘s own statements. 
 
(b) As the second step of our argument we want to argue against an ―over-interpretation‖ of 
some general assertions in St. Thomas concerning moral virtues. On many occasions (maybe 
in most cases) Aquinas talks about moral virtue in a very general way, in describing generally 
man‘s perfection as a reasonable agent, or in explaining the common relation between 
intellectual and moral virtues, etc., without intending any prediction concerning the exact 
extent of the practical area or the question of acquiring those virtues, often even without 
distinguishing the natural and supernatural level. He describes moral virtues just as 
dispositions which provide man‘s right order towards the bonum rationis.162 But do these 
texts imply a perfect acquired virtue in the sense Osborne describes? Does the connection of 
the virtues by prudence necessarily include all practical matters? We do not think so. Aquinas 
says what he says, nothing more and nothing less. Moral virtues provide man‘s right ordering 
toward his final end on the level of natural reason, but it remains undetermined whether 
Aquinas intends man‘s good as individual, as member of the human society, or as regarding 
God. Certainly, these assertions can be taken as the starting point of an argument that the 
whole order of reason would require virtues regarding all practical matters, and this would 
result on a natural basis in perfect acquired virtues, which in the present state (after the Fall) 
nobody can acquire without the help of grace etc. All these conclusions are totally right and 
coherent to the thought of Aquinas. But they are interpretations of his thought. If Aquinas 
were asked about the possibility of perfect natural moral virtues, then he may give such an 
answer. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge St. Thomas himself never identifies the 
―virtutes acquisitae‖ as man‘s overall perfection according to the rule of reason.  
                                                 
161
 As example we can refer to B. Kent who argues for the existence of connected virtues apart from charity 
(Kent, ―Habits and Virtues,‖ 123); however her short outline does not clarify how this is to be understood.  
162
 ST I-II 59.4: ―Virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis.‖ 
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a) Connected Virtues in Regard to Different Aspects of Man 
 
The guiding principle of our argument is Aquinas‘s assertion that the consideration of man 
from different aspects lead to one to consider his different goods, and consequently his 
different virtues. Of course, this does not imply several ―complete‖ or ―perfect‖ goods for 
man. Since every creature is directed to one final end, consequently there is only one perfect 
good, namely the attainment of his ultimate end. Nevertheless, St. Thomas distinguishes 
several true human goods which result from considerationing man from various points of 
view (secundum diversas considerationes hominis).  
The idea is clearly outlined in De virt. in com. 9. Starting from the observation that different 
things are characterized by different ends and therefore are perfected by different goods, he 
applies this general principle to man as considered from different viewpoints, either as 
individual man (ut homo) or as member of a community (ut civis). 
 
The proper good of one thing is not the same as the good of other things, since to diverse 
perfectible things belong diverse perfections. Thus, the good of man is different from the good 
of a horse or a stone. Even for man himself there are diverse kinds of goods according to 
diverse considerations. For the good of man as man is not the same as his good as citizen. 
Since the good of man as man is that his reason be perfected by knowledge of truth and that 
his inferior appetites be subjected to the rule of reason, for man is human precisely because he 
is rational. However, the good of man as citizen is that he is ordered to all things according to 
society. Hence the Philosopher explains, in the Politics III, that a man‘s virtues are not the 
same insofar he is a good [man] and insofar he is a good citizen.
163
 
 
We should note that the expression ut homo connotes in this context an agent as individual, 
contrasted to his membership in a greater whole (ut civis). Hence, the ut homo here is not 
identical with the frequently used distinction of man ut animal and man ut homo, as a 
                                                 
163
 De virt. in com. 9: ―Bonum autem proprium uniuscuiusque rei est aliud ab eo quod est proprium alterius: 
diversorum enim perfectibilium sunt diversae perfectiones; unde et bonum hominis est aliud a bono equi et a 
bono lapidis. Ipsius etiam hominis secundum diversas sui considerationes accipitur diversimode bonum. Non 
enim idem est bonum hominis in quantum est homo, et in quantum est civis. Nam bonum hominis in quantum est 
homo, est ut ratio sit perfecta in cognitione veritatis, et inferiores appetitus regulentur secundum regulam rationis: 
nam homo habet quod sit homo per hoc quod sit rationalis. Bonum autem hominis in quantum est civis, est ut 
ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes: et propter hoc philosophus dicit, III politic., quod non est 
eadem virtus hominis in quantum est bonus et hominis in quantum est bonus civis.‖  
A similar argument can be found in De caritate 2. Aquinas distinguishes there even more aspects, sc. ut homo, ut 
artifex, ut civis. ―Manifestum est quod secundum propriam virtutem homo ordinatur ad proprium bonum. 
Proprium autem bonum hominis oportet diversimode accipi, secundum quod homo diversimode accipitur. Nam 
proprium bonum hominis in quantum homo, est bonum rationis, eo quod homini esse est rationale esse. Bonum 
autem hominis secundum quod est artifex, est bonum artis; et sic etiam secundum quod est politicus, est bonum 
eius bonum commune civitatis.‖ 
Chapter 2. Differences of Acquired and Infused Virtues: Four Clarifications 
 93 
sensitive living being or reasonable agent.
164
 On the contrary, in De virt. in com. 9 and 10 
(and likewise in other texts
165
) the distinction ut homo – ut civis refers to two different aspects 
of man as reasonable animal. For reasons of greater clarity we will translate ut homo in the 
subsequent text as individual and contrast it with man as citizen.
166
 
These two different ways to look at man (ut homo – ut civis) lead to identifying two different 
goods, or more exactly to two different ―genus‖ of the human good. Furthermore, 
corresponding to these two aspects, Aquinas demands respectively two different sets of virtue 
which perfect man, either inquantum est homo or inquantum est civis.
167
 His good as single 
man consists in the perfection of those powers which relate immediately to his wellbeing as 
an individual. Thomas mentions knowledge of truth and obedient submission of the passions 
under the guidance of reason. As citizen, man‘s good consists in his right relationship to the 
other members of the community and to the common good. (Aquinas subsequently 
distinguishes man‘s citizenship in the human society and in the heavenly society, the Church. 
We will return to this further distinction at the end of this chapter). 
So far, Aquinas‘s assertions are explicit. In the following paragraphs, we shall argue that the 
two different aspects of man lead to two different sets of connected virtues, though none of 
them can be identified with perfect acquired virtues. Admittedly, St. Thomas does not 
mention in this context the issue of connected virtues. Our thesis seeks to develop this point 
further by offering a reconstruction of Aquinas‘s thoughts rather than a simple summary of 
                                                 
164
 Usually the formal aspect ut homo intends man‘s specific character as animal rationale. The distinction 
between man ut animal and ut homo can be found throughout the work of Aquinas. Some examples: In sent. III 
17.1.1B: ―Sicut autem de perfectione humanae naturae, inquantum homo est homo, est rationis voluntas; ita de 
perfectione hominis, inquantum animal, est appetitus sensibilis.‖ De veritate 5.9 ad 5: ―Animal non ratiocinatur 
inquantum est animal, sed inquantum est homo.‖ ST I 76.1: ―Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius operatione 
ostenditur. Propria autem operatio hominis, inquantum est homo, est intelligere, per hanc enim omnia animalia 
transcendit.‖ Of special interest is ST I-II 21.2 ad 2, where St. Thomas connects the consideration ut homo with 
the moral order. ―In moralibus, ubi attenditur ordo rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae, semper 
peccatum et malum attenditur per deviationem ab ordine rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae. Et ideo 
culpatur ex tali peccato homo et inquantum est homo, et inquantum est moralis.‖ 
165
 Aquinas refers several times to the comparison of the good man and the good citizen. De virt. in com. 10; De 
caritate 2; In politic. III 3; indirect the dissection is presupposed in ST I-II 56.6; De virt. in com. 5. 
166
 Since the twofold meaning of ut homo is fundamental for the right understanding of the present issue we want 
to clarify the distinction by a graphic:  
man 
ut homo (as reasonable animal) 
ut homo (as individual) 
ut civis (as member) 
ut animal 
 
 
 
167
 In De virt. in com. 10 the argument is reassumed and the difference of both kinds of virtue even more 
emphasized: ―Secundum igitur quod bonum diversificatur in homine, oportet etiam quod et virtus diversificetur; 
sicut patet quod aliud est bonum hominis in quantum et homo, et aliud in quantum civis. Et manifestum est quod 
aliquae operationes possent esse convenientes homini in quantum est homo, quae non essent convenientes ei 
secundum quod est civis.‖ 
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his texts. Nonetheless, we think there is sufficient evidence that our view is what St. Thomas 
would have said.  
First, we shall clarify the distinction by concrete examples.  
 
Man as Individual 
The good individual is characterized by the ability to achieve his private good. Thus, the 
relative virtues help him to work for goods that promote his wellbeing as an individual, e.g. 
wealth and health. Interestingly, Aquinas mentions here only the intellectual and affective 
virtues: prudence perfects practical reason for choosing and commanding the right human acts; 
and temperance and fortitude perfect the sensitive appetite, since uncontrolled passions would 
hinder the execution of the actus humanus. But what about the will? Article 5 of De virt. in 
com. raises the question whether there is any virtue at all in the will.
168
 Aquinas answers: 
―Each appetite tends to the proper good of the appetizing [agent].‖169 But the will is the 
natural inclination of man.
170
 Consequently, the will is inclined by nature towards the proper 
good of man. Only its outreach to things beyond the proper good of man (―some good might 
exceed the proportion of the will‖171) requires an additional virtue. Accordingly, St. Thomas 
mentions caritas as regarding the divine good, and iustitia in relation to the good of the other, 
since the good of the other ―transcends the limits of the human nature.‖172  
Therefore, justice does not belong for Aquinas to the virtues of man as individual. To 
consider the agent ut homo abstracts from his membership in a community and the resulting 
relations to others. A man might be avaricious against others, and this defect would violate 
the good of others. It would also constrain the common good. Ultimately, it would harm even 
the agent himself. But the agent‘s avarice would harm him only in his relationship to others, 
as a member of a community, or ut civis. Avarice implies a lack of a civil virtue; it 
compromises man as citizen but not as individual. Aquinas repeats Aristotle saying that there 
are men who provide virtuously for their proper good but fail to seek the common good. Such 
                                                 
168
 As parallel article in the Summa theologiae, cf. ST I-II 56.6.  
169
 De virt. in com. 5: ―Uniuscuiusque appetitus tendat in proprium bonum appetentis.‖ 
170
 Cf. De veritate 22.5 ad 3: ―Intellectus enim etsi habeat inclinationem in aliquid, non tamen nominat ipsam 
inclinationem hominis, sed voluntas ipsam inclinationem hominis nominat.‖  
171
 De virt. in com. 5: ―Aliquod bonum potest excedere voluntatis proportionem.‖ 
172
 ST I-II 56.6: ―transcendit limites humanae naturae.‖ Cf. also ad 3. Even more developed is the argument in In 
sent. III 33.2.4C: ―In voluntate enim, secundum quod est finis, non potest esse aliqua virtus moralis, quia ad 
bonum civile et naturale hominis, voluntas naturalem inclinationem habet sicut in proprium subiectum; sed 
secundum quod voluntas est eorum quae sunt ordinata ad finem, sic in voluntate potest esse moralis virtus, 
scilicet iustitia.‖ 
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men are perfect as individuals but wicked as citizens. ―Many are able to use virtue in proper 
things, but in things regarding others, they cannot.‖173 
Thus, for St. Thomas there could exist an agent who possesses in a certain way connected 
virtues but simultaneously lacks in regard to other aspects some important virtues. An agent 
who is perfect as individual requires affective virtues (temperance in the concupiscent 
appetite, fortitude in the irascible appetite), since only a virtuous sensitive appetite does not 
disturb voluntary actions (as seen, the will tends naturally towards his own good).
174
 Imagine 
a fraudulent merchant. He certainly lacks justice. Nevertheless, he might be well-prepared to 
care for his health and wealth, i.e. for his private good. As individual he acts virtuously. And 
these virtues can be understood as connected virtues, since all human powers are perfected in 
respect to his private good. To achieve his own prosperity the wicked merchant needs 
fortitude (to sustain himself against the dangers of a mercantile expedition), temperance (to 
control his desire to drink and to stay sober in the market), and prudence (to choose the right 
means for attaining his end). All three virtues are mutually dependent.
175
  
Moreover, the good man as individual may not only lack the virtue of justice, but even his 
affective virtues have not to be perfect in respect to all matters. It would be sufficient if his 
passions were controlled in things pertaining to him alone. Maybe he becomes quickly angry 
in conversation. As long as this does not infect his own good, it wouldn‘t contradict his 
virtues as good individual. Admittedly, those virtues might be quite poor perfections.
176
 But 
                                                 
173
 De virt. in com. 5: ―Multi in propriis quidem virtute uti possunt, in his autem quae sunt ad alterum, non 
possunt.‖ See also De virt. card. 1; ST II-II 58.6 sed contra; In ethic. V 2.9. 
At this point one could object that the perfection of the single man contains necessarily his right order toward the 
other. The part of a whole is only perfect if it is in right relation to the whole (ST I-II 21.3; II-II 47.10 ad 2). The 
argument is certainly right. But by considering the good of the agent ut homo Aquinas explicitly abstracts from 
man‘s relation to the common good. This shall become clearer if we discuss prudence regarding the proper good 
and the common good (ST II-II 47.11). 
Pinckaers comments on that: ―Love for self comes first and is the source of friendship with others, because each 
of us is a substantial unity and there is inevitably a certain distance between us and others, even in the heart of 
our communion. Given this distance to be bridged, which is most apparent when external action according to an 
objective standard, such as justice, is involved, one's natural love for others needs to be strengthened, perfected 
by a virtue. This is not to say that natural love is limited to self-love, but that it does need to go beyond itself 
towards others in order to develop its natural inclination. This does not happen, actually, without a progressive 
adjustment between one's self and the other, which calls for and forms a virtue, the steady, strong will to give the 
other his due.‖ (Servais Pinckaers, ―Christ, Moral Absolutes, and the Good: Recent Moral Theology,‖ The 
Thomist 55 (1991): 139-140). 
174
 Cf. ST I-II 56.6 ad 1: Aquinas confirms here that temperance and fortitude works ―ad bonum proprium ipsius 
volentis.‖ See also ST II-II 47.10 arg. 3 (affirmative). 
175
 Aquinas himself shows by an example how temperance and fortitude are mutually dependent: ―Si autem 
exercitetur bene operando circa unam materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, non 
autem circa concupiscentias; acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit 
rationem virtutis.‖ (ST I-II 65.1 ad 1). 
176
 In his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics he explicitly evaluates the civil virtue (as legal justice) as 
perfect virtue in comparison to the virtue ad bonum proprium. ―Iustitia legalis est perfecta virtus, quia ille qui 
habet hanc virtutem, potest uti virtute ad alterum, et non solum ad seipsum; quod quidem non contingit omnibus 
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nonetheless they could be described as connected virtues, connected in respect to the private 
good of the agent. 
 
Man as Citizen 
Something analogous is true for man‘s perfection ut civis. The virtues of the good citizen 
dispose man such ―that he is ordered to all things according to the society.‖177 We know from 
the foregoing quotation of De virt. in com. 5 that inter-personal relations are perfected by 
justice,
178
 which is used in a general sense as collective term for one‘s disposition to live in 
accordance with his fellow citizens.
179
 
Analogously to the previous paragraph, we can describe the virtues of the good citizen as 
connected virtues, connected since they include all perfections necessary for the achievement 
of the society‘s common good. It wouldn‘t be enough if a citizen had justice only in a partial 
area, if he respected the bodily integrity of his fellow-citizen but betrayed his trade partners or 
to told lies. In the good citizen, all the subspecies of justice have to be connected. Moreover, 
justice alone would be insufficient. Being a good citizen also presupposes the affective virtues, 
since their right functioning requires an ordered sensitive appetite. Otherwise, disordered 
passions would regularly disturb man in his civil actions.
180
 Hence, the good citizen is 
characterized by justice combined with temperance and fortitude, which were originally 
portrayed as virtues of the good man (including, of course, prudence). Aquinas therefore 
claims the following connection to obtain. It belongs to justice, he argues, ―to establish the 
order of reason in all human things, whereas the other virtues conserve this good, inasmuch as 
they moderate the passions, for not leading man away from reason‘s good.‖181 
                                                                                                                                                        
virtuosis; multi enim possunt uti virtute in propriis, qui non possunt ea uti in his quae sunt ad alterum.‖ (In ethic. 
V 2.9). 
177
 De virt. in com. 9: ―Ut ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes.‖ 
178
 See footnote 173. As mentioned above, for the moment we disregard Aquinas‘s consideration of man‘s 
citizenship in the Church and concentrate exclusively to his membership in the earthly community. 
179
 Cf. In ethic. V 2.10: ―Sola iustitia inter virtutes videtur esse alienum bonum, quia est ad alterum in quantum 
intendit operari ea quae sunt utilia alteri, scilicet vel ipsi communitati vel principi communitatis; aliae vero 
virtutes intendunt operari bonum proprium, puta temperantia intendit quietare animum a turpibus concupiscentiis. 
Et idem est in aliis virtutibus.‖ We shall investigate the proper structure of justice later on in more detail (chapter 
4); for the moment it is enough to understand justice as general virtue which perfects the human will in regard to 
the good of the other and the common good. 
180
 ScG III 121.4: ―Homo legem non sequeretur nisi alia omnia quae pertinent ad hominem, rationi subderentur.‖ 
181
 ST II-II 123.12: ―Ad ipsam [sc. iustitiam] pertinet ordinem rationis ponere in omnibus rebus humanis. Aliae 
autem virtutes sunt conservativae huius boni, inquantum scilicet moderantur passiones, ne abducant hominem a 
bono rationis.‖ Similar in ST II-II 123.1. For Aquinas‘s differentiation between the affective virtues and justice, 
see Bonnie Kent, ―Justice, Passion, and Another‘s Good: Aristotle Among the Theologians,‖ in Nach der 
Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. 
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The issue, however, suffers further complication. For Aquinas, the kind of temperance and 
fortitude which characterize the good individual is insufficient to support justice for the good 
citizen. The good citizen therefore needs a different – a ―higher‖ – species of affective virtue. 
 
A virtue ordered to an inferior end does not produce an act ordered to a superior end, except by 
means of superior virtue; as the fortitude which is man‘s virtue as individual [qua homo] does not 
order its act to the common good except by means of fortitude which is a man‘s virtue as citizen 
[inquantum est cives].
182
 
 
Although the fortitude of the good individual is a true virtue and connected with the other 
virtues, it does not enable the agent to perform courageous deeds (fortia) in every respect. A 
man who is brave regarding his personal good needs a more perfect species of fortitude in 
order to be able to defend courageously the political good. Hence, it wouldn‘t be enough if 
justice commands the fortitude of the good individual. Rather, there must be a proper species 
of political fortitude which is commanded by justice in regard to the common good. Right 
here we reach the proper meaning of political virtue. A virtue becomes ―political‖ when is 
employed by justice (political virtues are ―embodied in justice‖183) and work thereby for the 
sake of the common good.
184
 
Quite similar is the case of temperance: As a virtue of the good individual, temperance 
enables the agent to use sensible pleasures in order to provide for his bodily health. As a 
political virtue, however, temperance is measured ―not only according to the convenience of 
the body, but also according to the convenience of external things, such as wealth and charges, 
and especially according to the convenience of honesty.‖ 185  Elsewhere Aquinas says: ―It 
                                                                                                                                                        
Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, and Andreas Speer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
2001), 706-710.  
182
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 4: ―Virtus ordinata in finem inferiorem non facit actus ordinatum ad finem superiorem, 
nisi mediante virtute superiori; sicut fortitudo, quae est virtus hominis qua homo, non ordinat actum suum ad 
bonum politicum, nisi mediante fortitudine quae est virtus hominis in quantum est civis.‖ 
183
 Harry V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the 
Nicomachean Ethics (Westport, CT: Greenword Press, 1979), 31. The whole text: ―If all moral virtues are 
embodied in justice, and justice is essentially political; and if, further, practical wisdom, which supplies the rule 
and measure of moral virtue, is in substance the same virtue as political wisdom, as Aristotle also says, then it is 
clear that there is no moral virtue which is not essentially a part of (or derivative form) the political relationship.‖ 
(Ibid., 31-32). 
184
 As Aquinas explains in ST I 60.5, political virtues enable man to favor the common good to the private good. 
185
 ST II-II 141.6 ad 3: ―Temperantia respicit necessitatem quantum ad convenientiam vitae. Quae quidem 
attenditur non solum secundum convenientiam corporis, sed etiam secundum convenientiam exteriorum rerum, 
puta divitiarum et officiorum; et multo magis secundum convenientiam honestatis.‖ 
Though Aquinas does not use the concept of ―political temperance‖ at this place, it is clear that he describes here 
temperance as political virtue. 
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belongs to the rule of reason that man takes food insofar it is convenient to the sustenance of 
[his] nature, and to the good habitude of man, and the conversation of his fellow-citizen.‖186 
Thus, the right mean of temperance in the case of the good citizen is not only determined by 
his private good, but it has to take into account man‘s relation to his neighbor, i.e. it aims for 
the common good . . . and for nothing beyond. The good citizen possesses all virtues (as 
connected virtues) which are necessary for achieving the common good of the city. Anything 
more, however, is not required. Even on this level it is not necessary that the sensitive appetite 
is ordered in any possible respect. To assent sometimes knowingly and willingly to 
intemperate passions would not immediately hinder the act of justice. The right order towards 
God is likewise not a conditio sine qua non for those political virtues. Imagine an atheist who 
refuses impenitently to render honor to God, but who pays back everybody his due, who is 
honest in business, who respects human laws, etc. Such a person could be, according to 
Aquinas, a good citizen who possesses connected political virtues, though he lacks the 
important virtue of religion.
187
 
This restriction of political virtue to the achievement of the common good of the city may 
seem too narrow for earning the name of moral virtues, but this is explicitly the position 
Aquinas takes. ―The whole of moral philosophy seems to be ordered to the civic good.‖188 
Moral virtues perfect man ―in things which pertain to the communitarian life.‖189 Justice is 
therefore ―all virtue.‖190 
 
Several Species of Prudence, Several Kinds of Connected Virtues 
Up to now our inquiry of the virtues of the good citizen has focused on justice, fortitude and 
temperance. By themselves the latter two are virtues of man as individual, but as virtues 
                                                 
186
 De malo 14.1 ad 1: ―Regula rationis haec est, ut homo sumat cibum secundum quod convenit sustentationi 
naturae, et bonae habitudini hominis, et conversationi eorum cum quibus vivit.‖ Similar in In ethic. III 21.5 
where St. Thomas describes temperance as directed ―ad sanitatem et bonam habitudinem corporis et ad decentem 
conversationem cum aliis.‖ 
187
 On this regard, Finis notes rightly about the common good of the city: ―The specifically political common 
good does not, as such, include certain important human goods which essentially pertain to individuals in 
themselves, such as the good of religious faith and worship.‖ (John Finnis, ―Public Good: The Specifically 
Political Common Good in Aquinas,‖ in Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in 
the Work of Germain Grisez, ed. Robert P. George (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 178). 
188
 In ethic. VIII 1.5: ―Tota moralis philosophia videtur ordinari ad bonum civile.‖ Thus, Kluxen notes rightly: 
―‘Moralis‘ und ‗moralis scientia‘ werden fast immer in diesem Sinn verwendet [sc. for man‘s perfection 
regarding the common life]; nur in der Einteilung der Ethik erscheint ‗monastica‘, wie In Eth. I, 1 n. 6.‖ 
(Wolfgang Kluxen, Philosophische Ethik bei Thomas von Aquin, 3 ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998), 
90, footnote 20). 
189
 ST I-II 66.3 ad 1: ―Virtutes morales sunt magis permanentes quam intellectuales, propter exercitium earum in 
his quae pertinent ad vitam communem.‖ 
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which support and preserve justice they also pertain to political virtues. But what about 
prudence? If our interpretation is right, Aquinas should distinguish also two kinds of prudence 
– one for the good individual, another for the good citizen. And indeed, in a clear parallel to 
the connected virtues of the good individual and the good citizen, Aquinas recognizes 
different species of prudence which guide the agent either in achieving his own good or the 
good of the city. We refer to ST II-II 47.11, which asks whether prudence regarding one‘s 
proper good is of the same species as prudence which extends to the common good. The 
article shows that even prudence is not a univocal concept. Different kinds of prudence work 
for different ends and connect different sets of moral virtues.
191
 Following Aristotle, Aquinas 
distinguishes three species of prudence: monastica as prudence in regard to the private good, 
oeconomica regarding the good of the household, and politica concerning the common good 
of society. His argument is as follows. Prudence chooses and commands the right means for 
attaining the right end. But the private good, the good of the household, and the common 
good are different ends, which require different species of prudence. Hence, the practical 
intellect has to be perfected in regard to those different goods by different species of prudence.  
 
The species of habits differ by their relation to different ends. But the individual good, the 
good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Hence, there have 
to be different species of prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is 
prudence simply so called, which is directed to one‘s own good; another, domestic prudence 
[oeconomica] which is directed to the common good of the house or the family; and a third, 
political prudence [politica] which is directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.
192
 
 
This shows that the differentiation between moral virtues specifying man as individual and 
other virtues required for man as citizen is not an isolated assertion of De virt. in com. 9 and 
10. This differentiation is confirmed also in Aquinas‘s discussion of prudence. Prudence 
simplicter dicta rules the virtues in respect to the good as individual (in the sed contra 
Aquinas refers to this species of prudence as monastica).
193
 All virtues of the good individual 
                                                                                                                                                        
190
 De virt. card. 3 ad 8: ―tota virtus.― Similar in In ethic. V 2.7 and 13. 
191
 Osborne would probably remark at this point that he never negated the existence of prudence in regard to 
particular ends, rather he distinguished between imperfect prudence (in regard to particular goods) and perfect 
acquired prudence (in regard to all moral matters, according to the reasonable rule); both as two different 
―grades‖ of recta ratio agibilium. However, this statement does not correspond exactly to Aquinas. Virtues ut 
homo do not refer to man‘s complete reasonable order, but his perfection in regard to the good as individual. 
192
 ST II-II 47.11. For a more extended discussion of the various species of prudence see ST II-II 50 De partibus 
subiectivis prudentiae. In ST II-II 50.4 even the art of military command (directed to the conservation of the 
common good) is described as prudence. 
193
 ST II-II 47.11: ―Necesse est quod ex relatione ad diversos fines diversificentur species habitus. Diversi autem 
fines sunt bonum proprium unius, et bonum familiae, et bonum civitatis et regni. Unde necesse est quod et 
prudentiae differant specie secundum differentiam horum finium, ut scilicet una sit prudentia simpliciter dicta, 
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are combined by this special kind of prudence, namely in respect to the achievement of the 
proper good. Similarly prudence in respect to the good of the household and the common 
good; prudence as oeconomia and as politia rule all virtues of the good member of the 
household and the citizen. Hence the domestic virtues as well as the political ones can be 
understood as connected virtues, connected by a proper species of prudence.  
This view clarifies again that the concept of ―connected moral virtues‖ is an analogous term. 
As Aquinas notes, every species of prudence results in a different set of virtues in the 
appetitive powers: ―Prudence is not only in the reason but has something in the appetite. 
Therefore, everything mentioned here is a species of prudence [sc. monastica, oeconomica, 
politica] to the extent that it does not reside only in reason but has something in the 
appetite.‖194  
Concerning the mutual relationship of the various kinds of prudence Aquinas makes another 
interesting argument: though monastica and politica are different because of their proper end 
(bonum proprium – bonum commune), nevertheless politica is only perfect if it is 
accompanied by prudence regarding the proper good. As long as politica lacks the more basic 
prudence, it remains imperfect. ―Civic and domestic prudence are not sufficient without 
prudence in the own things. Even if the city and the household are properly arranged, it is still 
not evident how one‘s own affairs have to be disposed.‖195 Politica is therefore the more 
perfect species of prudence; it is prudentia completa, since it includes prudence regarding 
                                                                                                                                                        
quae ordinatur ad bonum proprium; alia autem oeconomica, quae ordinatur ad bonum commune domus vel 
familiae; et tertia politica, quae ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis vel regni.‖ Aquinas‘s diction is here 
somehow ambiguous: The concept prudentia simpliciter dicta might be read as prudence for the final end of all 
human life. In that way ST I-II 47.2 is to be read about the agent who is simply prudent (prudens simpliciter) 
since he acts rightly for the final end. Thus, prudence simplicter dicta seems to be rather perfect acquired (or 
even infused) prudence than prudence only for the good of the individual – disregarding the community and God. 
However, the sed contra identifies prudentia simpliciter dicta clearly with monastica, i.e. prudence in own 
things. Moreover, Aquinas inherited the diction virtus simpliciter dicta from Aristotle who made use of it in right 
the same context: An act of any virtue commanded by justice adopts the notion of justice, but stems likewise 
from the ―simple virtue‖ (―‖ NE V 3 1130a11); St. Thomas comments: ―Actus enim idem subiecto 
producitur a iustitia legali et a virtute simpliciter dicta.‖ (In ethic. V 2.13). This shows that the diction prudentia 
simpliciter dicta does not imply the right final end but rather the basic meaning of prudence. Likewise in In ethic. 
VI 7.5: ―Quamvis politica tam legis positiva quam executiva sit prudentia, tamen maxime videtur esse prudentia 
quae est circa unum tantum, scilicet circa seipsum. Et talis ratio suiipsius gubernativa retinet sibi commune 
nomen prudentiae; quia aliae partes prudentiae habent propria nomina, quibus nominantur; earum enim quaedam 
quidem dicitur oeconomia, id est prudentia dispensativa domus; quaedam vero dicitur legis positio, idest 
prudentia ponendi leges; quaedam vero est politica, idest prudentia exequendi leges.‖ See thereto also Thomas 
Gilby, Principality and Polity: Aquinas and the Rise of State Theory in the West (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co, 1958), 227. 
194
 In ethic. VI 7.6: ―Prudentia non est in ratione solum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu. Omnia ergo de quibus hic 
fit mentio [sc. monastica, oeconomia, politia], in tantum sunt species prudentiae, inquantum non in ratione sola 
consistunt, sed habent aliquid in appetitu.‖ 
195
 In ethic. VI 7.13: ―Nec tamen sufficit politica et oeconomica sine prudentia propriorum. Quia recte disposita 
civitate et domo, adhuc est immanifestum qualiter oportet disponere ea quae ad seipsum pertinent.‖ 
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one‘s own good (monastica).196 Or more exactly, political prudence makes use of the other 
kinds of prudence regarding the common good; it commands the less perfect virtue regarding 
one‘s proper good and thereby redirects it toward its own higher end.197  
The foregoing shows that moral virtues, understood as political virtues, contain two aspects: 
they perfect man as individual and as member of a human community. More, however, is not 
required of them.
198
 
 
Summa: Connected Virtues ad finem in aliquo genere 
Following up on the results of the preceding section we can conclude that the doctrine of the 
connexio virtutum is for Aquinas not a technical term having a simple univocal sense, such 
that (as Osborne has argued) only the agent who works for the ultimate end of the human life 
can possess truly connected virtues, combined by prudence. Rather virtues are called 
―connected‖ whenever they are ordered by a particular species of prudence in relation to a 
certain final end. But these final ends do not necessarily have to be the final end of man‘s 
whole life. On the contrary, the good of the individual (warranted by fortitude and 
temperance), the good of the household (guaranteed by the virtues of family life
199
), and the 
common good (achieve by general justice), each functions as a unifying principal for 
connected virtues – the connected virtues of a good individual, of a good member of the 
household, and of a good citizen.  
Aquinas mentions such a possible partial limitation of the moral virtues explicitly in texts 
discussing the unity of virtues. De virt. card. 2 describes acquired virtues not as virtues 
regarding the end of the whole life (on a natural level) but explicitly as ―right reason in 
                                                 
196
 ―Politica est prudentia quaedam, qua homo dirigitur in his quae ad alium spectant; unde nominat prudentiam 
completam. Et quia non omnis prudentia habet istam completionem; ideo ponitur pars eius. Tamen in eo in quo 
completum habet esse, prudentia non differt secundum substantiam habitus prudentiae et politicae, sed ratione 
tantum.‖ (In sent. III 33.3.1D ad 3). Gilby describes very well, in which way complete prudence includes 
monastica, oeconomia and politia; Gilby, Principality and Polity, 227-228. 
197
 In ST I-II 47.11 ad 3 Aquinas describes how a superior virtue commands inferior habits (―imperet aliis 
habitibus‖). In the same way politia, which is about the common good, commands monastica which is about the 
proper good. From this point Aquinas can identify both species secundum substantiam, whereas they differ in 
relation. ―Politica et prudentia sunt idem habitus secundum substantiam, quia utraque est recta ratio rerum 
agibilium circa humana bona vel mala; sed differunt secundum rationem. Nam prudentia est recta ratio agibilium 
circa unius hominis bona vel mala, idest suiipsius. Politica autem circa bona vel mala totius multitudinis civilis. 
Ex quo patet quod ita se habet politica ad prudentiam, sicut iustitia legalis ad virtutem.‖ (In ethic. VI 7.2; cf. ST 
II-II 47.10 ad 1). 
198
 In ethic. I 1.6 is very clear on that reagard: ―Moralis philosophia in tres partes dividitur. Quarum prima 
considerat operationes unius hominis ordinatas ad finem, quae vocatur monastica. Secunda autem considerat 
operationes multitudinis domesticae, quae vocatur oeconomica. Tertia autem considerat operationes multitudinis 
civilis, quae vocatur politica.‖ 
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respect to any genus‖, and later on, ―in respect to a human good.‖200 Furthermore, ST I-II 65.2 
distinguishes the connection of acquired virtues by prudence and of infused virtues by charity. 
Although the acquired virtues fail to direct man toward his supernatural final end, 
nevertheless ―they direct man well in respect to the ultimate end in some particular genus, but 
not in respect of the final end simply.‖ 201  Hence, the most important articles about the 
connections among virtues describe acquired virtues (as connected) not in regard to a 
hypothetical natural final end, but in regard to a final end in any genus.
202
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
199
 In fact, Aquinas knows also a special set of virtues for the family-life; cf. e.g. ST II-II 47.11 ad 2; implicit also 
in ST II-II 57.4. 
200
 De virt. card. 2: ―Rectam rationem in quolibet genere . . . respectu boni humani.‖ Interesting to note: In 
various replies of the article Aquinas describes these virtues in quolibet genere as connected by prudence (see ad 
4, ad 9, ad 10, ad 13 and ad 14). Hence, Osborne is wrong to read these descriptions as perfect acquired virtue 
(cf. Osborne, ―The Augustinianism,‖ 297-298). 
201
 ST I-II 65.2. The whole text: ―Solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene 
ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt secundum quid 
virtutes, non autem simpliciter, ordinant enim hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem 
respectu finis ultimi simpliciter.‖ There are even more hints that Aquinas speaks in 65.2 about acquired virtue 
not in the sense of ―perfect acquired virtue.‖ For example he replies to the first objection: ―Virtutes ibi 
accipiuntur secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis. Alioquin, si virtus moralis secundum perfectam rationem 
virtutis accipiatur, bonum facit habentem; et per consequens in malis esse non potest.‖ Hence, the imperfect 
virtue here is not identical with connected acquired virtue; otherwise it would make man itself good. 
Further, at the very beginning of the corpus articuli he defines acquired virtues as ―in ordine ad finem qui non 
excedit facultatem naturalem hominis‖, which ―possunt per opera humana acquiri.‖ Is this to be understood as an 
abstract assertion about human nature as such (in its unfallen state) or about man in his concrete historical state? 
If (a) would be true, the imperfect virtue in 65.2 could be perfect moral virtue; if (b) would be the case, imperfect 
virtue implies just a perfection in certain matter, since after the fall man cannot achieve his natural good as a 
whole, as it is clear from ST I-II 109.2. But by his reference to the pagans Aquinas clearly determines his 
assertion in respect to the real state of man. Hence, imperfect virtue here has to be understood as particular 
perfections. 
Even the last sentence of the body of the article does not allow a different understanding. Aquinas quotes 
Augustine for rendering more precisely the meaning of imperfect virtue in this context: ―Ubi deest agnitio 
veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in bonis moribus.‖ Admittedly, the quotation is harsh for describing political 
virtue (Gilson calls it ―an extreme expression‖ Gilson, The Christian Philosophy, 498). It is, however, entirely 
impossible to read it as a description of perfect acquired virtue. 
Worth to note that Osborne who refers to ST I-II 65.2 as affirmation for this own thesis about perfect acquired 
virtue embezzles Aquinas‘s accessory sentence that the virtues connected by prudence are ―respectu finis ultimi 
in aliquo genere.‖ (See the discussion in Osborne, ―Perfect and Imperfect Virtues,‖ 54-55). 
202
 Cf. also De virt. in com. 6. The function of acquired prudence is not the installation of an overall order, but 
the rule the agent towards the end of the particular moral virtues. ―Prudentia . . . est perfectiva omnium virtutum 
moralium quae sunt in parte appetitiva, quarum unaquaeque facit inclinationem appetitus in aliquod genus 
humani boni: sicut iustitia facit inclinationem in bonum quod est aequalitas pertinentium ad communicationem 
vitae; temperantia in bonum quod est refrenari a concupiscentiis; et sic de singulis virtutibus.‖ And ST I-II 58.4 
ad 3 describes the purpose of prudence as ―recta electio eorum quae conveniunt ad debitum finem‖ – and leaves 
the issue open whether the due end is the final end of the whole life. 
Of special interest is ST II-II 23.7, where St. Thomas distinguishes on the one hand charity and its connected 
virtues in regard to the supernatural end, and on the other hand virtues in regard to some particular end, ―puta 
conservatio civitatis vel aliquid huiusmodi.‖ The statement of ST II-II 23.7 fits perfectly to ST I-II 65.2; it is even 
more precise, insofar it describes those virtues as true virtues (since connected), but imperfect virtues (since not 
directed to the supernatural final end). See thereto also Odon Lottin, ―Les vertus morales acquises: sont-elles des 
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b) Reinterpretation of Some General Assertions of Aquinas 
 
We have shown how Aquinas recognizes connected virtues in regard to particular matters. 
Consequently, his frequent reference to the connection of all virtues (by prudence) does not 
necessarily indicate ―perfect acquired virtues.‖ Nonetheless, there are some difficult texts 
which require a special explanation if we want to demonstrate that Aquinas uses the term 
―virtus acquisita‖ generally in the sense of political virtue. 
As we have seen in the textual overview, Aquinas sees only that prudence which rules life as 
a whole as prudentia simplex.
203
 The ability to choose the right means in regard to particular 
ends – as for example the virtues of an artist or the good soldier – are qualified as prudence 
secundum quid. We quoted already the text of ST II-II 47.2.
204
 Similarly in a later question 
Aquinas states: ―Somebody is called prudent in two ways: First, simpliciter, i.e. in relation to 
the end of the whole life. Secondly, secundum quid, i.e. in relation to some particular end, for 
example if somebody is said to be prudent in business or something else.‖205 So what does 
Aquinas intend by prudence simpliciter in this context? 
Osborne reads such passages as descriptions of perfect acquired prudence, i.e. man‘s 
complete order on a natural level. In contrast, scholars like McKay argue that it has to be 
infused prudence because only infused virtues provide man‘s orientation toward the final end 
of his whole life. The point at issue here is explained in ST II-II 47.13, where Aquinas 
explicitly affirms that a sinner cannot possess perfect prudence. Aquinas distinguishes 
between true but imperfect prudence, i.e. the knowledge to attain particular ends, and true and 
perfect prudence, i.e. ―ad totam vitam.‖ The former kind might be possessed even by sinners. 
Thus, it is apparently an imperfect kind of prudence, whereas the latter (since implying the 
right order to the ultimate end of the whole life) is possessed only by justified persons. This is 
described as perfect prudence. McKay concludes that perfect prudence (and likewise 
prudentia simplex in regard to the end of the whole life) must be identified with infused 
prudence. Osborne, however, reads the same article as a statement about perfect acquired 
virtue which is only attainable by a justified person but remains specifically different from 
                                                                                                                                                        
vraies virtus? La réponse des théologiens de saint Thomas à Pierre Auriol,‖ Recherches de théologie ancienne et 
médievale 21 (1954): 102-103. 
203
 Worth to note: Aquinas uses the diction of prudentia simplex, not, however, prudentia simpliciter dicta which 
is used in the sense of monastica. See footnote 193. 
204
 See footnote 33 and 160. 
205
 ST II-II 55.2: ―Prudens dicitur aliquis dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter, scilicet in ordine ad finem totius vitae; 
alio modo, secundum quid, scilicet in ordine ad finem aliquem particularem, puta sicut dicitur aliquis prudens in 
negotiatione vel in aliquo huiusmodi.‖ 
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infused prudence. His argument seems persuasive since Aquinas does not mention infused 
virtues in ST II-II 47.13.
206
 Furthermore, Aquinas applies the distinction between simple 
prudence ad finem totae vitae and prudence secundum quid regarding particular ends quite 
often in passages and contexts where the issue of infused virtues is obviously absent. An 
example for this can be found in ST I-II 57.4 ad 3, long before the issue of infused moral 
virtues is even introduced into the discussion:
207
 ―Prudence consists in good counsel about 
things which pertain to man‘s entire life, and the ultimate end of human life.‖208 Can one 
argue that Aquinas makes at this place a statement about infused prudence without 
mentioning it? Or rather does he speak here of perfect acquired prudence? 
Further, in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Aquinas describes prudence in the 
same way, i.e. as perfection of the practical intellect ―in regard to the whole moral matter‖209 
and ―in regard to the whole life.‖210 But it seems unlikely that Aquinas refers to divinely 
infused virtues in a commentary on the pagan philosopher. Similarly, it cannot be a political 
virtue he refers to, since those provide only man‘s order toward the common good and fail to 
rule man‘s relation to God.211 So are these texts not obvious cases of perfect acquired virtue?  
Although the conclusion seems obvious, it does not follow necessarily. Admittedly, Aquinas 
does not use the term of virtutes infusae in those texts, but likewise he does not refer to 
virtutes acquisitae.
212
 He just describes the function of moral virtues under the guidance of 
                                                 
206
 Admittedly, in the following article (47.14) he refers explicitly to infused virtues. 
207
 The first explicit consideration of infused virtues takes place not before ST I-II 63.3. 
208
 ST I-II 57.4 ad 3: ―Prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum 
finem vitae humanae. Sed in artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines proprios illarum 
artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes duces vel 
gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter, sed illi solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad 
totam vitam.‖ 
209
 See In ethic. VI 11.14. ―Si essent diversae prudentiae circa materias diversarum virtutum moralium, sicut sunt 
diversa artificiorum genera, nihil prohiberet unam virtutem moralem esse sine alia, unaquaque earum habente 
prudentiam sibi correspondentem. Sed hoc non potest esse; quia eadem sunt principia prudentiae ad totam 
materiam moralem, ut scilicet omnia redigantur ad regulam rationis. Et ideo propter prudentiae unitatem omnes 
virtutes morales sunt sibi connexae.‖ 
210
 In ethic. VI 4.3: ―Si ergo ille qui est bene consiliativus ad aliquid particulare est prudens particulariter in 
aliquo negotio; consequens est, quod ille sit totaliter et simpliciter prudens qui est bene consiliativus de his quae 
pertinent ad totam vitam.‖ Similar in In ethic. VI 4.2. 
211
 But reason constitutes a relation between man and God which has to be rectified; cf. ST I-II 62.1 ad 3. 
212
 To the best of our knowledge, the only exception to our general observation that Aquinas never refers to the 
term of ―acquired virtue‖ in his descriptions of prudence as determined by the final end of the whole life, is 
found in the treatise on grace in the ST I-II. In this context Aquinas uses the term of acquired virtue two times in 
a way which could be interpreted as description of man‘s overall perfection according to a natural level. ―In statu 
naturae integrae, quantum ad sufficientiam operativae virtutis, poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et operari 
bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisitae, non autem bonum superexcedens, quale 
est bonum virtutis infusae. Sed in statu naturae corruptae etiam deficit homo ab hoc quod secundum suam 
naturam potest, ut non possit totum huiusmodi bonum implere per sua naturalia.‖ (ST I-II 109.2). Similar in ST I-
II 110.3: ―Sicut enim virtutes acquisitae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini naturali rationis; 
ita virtutes infusae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini gratiae.‖ Hence, do those texts show 
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prudence. The question whether the virtues are directed to a supernatural or a natural end is 
simply absent. Likewise absent is the question whether the agent possesses those virtues by 
infusion or by proper acquisition. These texts are concerned only with the general structure of 
moral virtues, their cooperation, and their guidance by prudence as an intellectual virtue.
213
 
Hence, it would be inadequate to force on such texts an interpretative decision between either 
infused virtues or perfect acquired virtues. This description of virtue comes ―before‖ the 
question is raised whether there is only a natural order of virtue or also a supernatural one. 
Theoretically the particular texts can apply to both levels. Starting from these texts, therefore, 
one could continue to argue that a historical concrete human being has de facto only a 
supernatural final end, and consequently only infused prudence is prudentia simplex. McKay 
then appears to be completely right. Likewise, one can argue that Aquinas speaks only about 
right reason in respect to the whole life, and this suggests man‘s order to God on a natural 
level which, however, can be developed fully only under the reign of grace. Osborne then 
appears to be right as well. These two conclusions lead in two contrary directions, but both 
can be validly made. Aquinas, however, draws none of these further conclusions explicitly. 
He gives just a description of the function of moral virtue. 
Aquinas‘s general description of moral virtue as regarding man‘s final end of the whole life is 
therefore neither an argument for perfect acquired virtues nor for infused virtues. As a result, 
                                                                                                                                                        
that Aquinas uses the term of ―acquired virtues‖ as perfections in regard to man‘s natural final end? I.e. as 
perfect acquired virtues?  
We want to argue that there are two reasonable ways to explain this seemingly exception: First, in the treatise on 
grace Aquinas applies regularly the distinction between man in statu naturae integrae and in statu naturae 
corruptae; even in the conflicting article (109.2) he refers to these two aspects. But the un-fallen man certainly 
would have been able to achieve completely his natural good by his own resources. Hence, in statu naturae 
integrae man could have been acquired perfect natural virtues, i.e. perfect acquired virtues. According to this 
interpretation it is the special context of the question which allows using the term ―virtus acquisita‖ in respect to 
the complete moral perfection on a natural level. A second possible explanation relies on another assertion which 
St. Thomas makes in the same context. In ST I-II 110.3 he contrasts the end of acquired and infused virtues 
describing the former in relation to the nature of man, the latter in relation to the divine nature. ―Virtutes 
acquisitae per actus humanos, de quibus supra dictum est, sunt dispositiones quibus homo convenienter 
disponitur in ordine ad naturam qua homo est. Virtutes autem infusae disponunt hominem altiori modo, et ad 
altiorem finem, unde etiam oportet quod in ordine ad aliquam altiorem naturam. Hoc autem est in ordine ad 
naturam divinam participatam.‖ Hence, it seems natural that even in this context Aquinas limits the scope of 
acquired virtues to the regulation of interhuman relationships, i.e. the common good of the earthly city, 
disregarding man‘s direction toward God himself.  
In any case, it would be somehow daring to ground on two quotations the argument that Aquinas intends by the 
term ―virtus acquisita‖ man‘s perfect order toward a natural final end. 
213
 As a further urgent indication for our thesis we can invoke Aquinas‘s structure of his discussion of moral 
virtue in the Prima secundae as well as in De virt. in com. Both writings begin with a long description of moral 
and intellectual virtues in general, their inhering in the human powers and their interaction. In both cases 
distinction of natural and supernatural, acquired and infused is introduced afterwards, sc. in the Summa for the 
first time in ST I-II 61.5, in De virt. in com. in article 8. The prior discussion focus on morality in a more general 
way; hence, it would be anachronistic to try to interpret those texts as perfect acquired or infused virtue. 
Something analog could be said about the whole text of In ethics. 
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his discussion here cannot be taken either as an argument against the identification of 
acquired virtues with political virtues. 
 
 
c) The Essential Imperfection and Limitation of Acquired Virtues 
 
To conclude the present section we intend to show not only that Aquinas does not use the 
term of acquired virtues as perfect natural virtues in the sense of Osborn, but also, and to the 
contrary, that the notions of imperfection, instability, and limitation belong essentially to these 
virtues. Of course, acquired virtues are imperfect in comparison with infused virtues since 
they are ruled by mere reason and fall short of directing an agent to his supernatural end. This 
kind of imperfection, however, would be true also for perfect acquired virtue. But the 
imperfection which Aquinas combines with acquired virtue goes much further and is again an 
argument for the identification of acquired virtue with political virtue. 
 
i) Acquired Virtues: Working “ut in pluribus” 
 
Aquinas several times discusses the mode of action of acquired virtues, i.e. their reliability 
and infallibility (or fallibility) to accomplish constantly and firmly good deeds. According to 
Osborne‘s view, Aquinas speaks of perfect acquired virtues as stable (since connected) habits 
by which the agent is able to achieve the good on any occasion and at any time. Hence, if 
Aquinas in fact speaks of perfect acquired virtue which (of course assisted by grace) can 
provide for man‘s overall perfection, he would have to mention it in just this context.  
In a stark contrast, however, Aquinas always emphasizes the weakness and instability of 
acquired virtues. His teaching is unequivocal: a subject equipped with acquired virtues can 
never abstain from all evil actions, but avoids bad works only ut in pluribus. ―Acquired virtue 
does not make the agent to decline always from sin, but only in many cases, since also things 
which happens naturally, take place in many cases‖214 In another place the teaching is even 
                                                 
214
 De virt. in com. 9 ad 5: ―Virtus acquisita facit declinare a peccato non semper, sed ut in pluribus: quia et ea 
quae naturaliter accidunt, ut in pluribus eveniunt.‖ The same assertion in ST I-II 63.2 ad 2: ―Virtus humanitus 
acquisita potest secum compati aliquem actum peccati, etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae 
voluntati subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per unum actum peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis 
acquisitae; habitui enim non contrariatur directe actus, sed habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia homo non possit 
peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet mortaliter; non tamen impeditur quin possit habitum virtutis 
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stronger. The promptness and ―infallibility‖ which is due to acquired virtues consists in their 
functioning in pluribus: ―It is the effect of [acquired] virtue that man attains the good 
promptly and infallibly in most of the cases.‖215 Obviously it belongs to the very essence of 
acquired virtue to fail sometimes. Their infallibility consists in performing good works most 
of the time.
216
 
One could argue that St. Thomas speaks here about acquired virtue apart from grace, i.e. as 
imperfect virtue, and that in the graced person acquired virtues attain a stability and force by 
which the agent could achieve his proper work reliably and at any time. Going in this 
direction, however, is also blocked. In De virt. in com. 10 ad 14 Aquinas compares directly 
the modus actionis of acquired and infused virtues: ―Infused virtue works such that man in no 
way obeys the concupiscence of sin, and it does so infallibly as long as it remains. Acquired 
virtue, however, falls short in this respect, although only in a small number of instances.‖217 If 
Aquinas used the term of virtutes acquisitae in the sense of perfect acquired virtues which 
ignores every failure, he would have to mention it in this context. But he affirms just the 
opposite.  
Moreover, if we interpret acquired virtue as political virtue, its limited power (as working ut 
in pluribus) loses its pejorative meaning. The end of civil virtues is the preservation of the 
common good. Not every evil deed, however, threatens men‘s peaceful living together, 
otherwise, the earthly city would be an absurd project from the very beginning. This allows St. 
Thomas to argue that acquired virtues achieve their proper end prompte et infallibiliter by 
working ut in pluribus. The ultimate reason why he can use this seemingly contradictory 
expression is the fact that the common good of the human society is already infallibly 
achieved if the citizens act virtuously ―most of the time,‖ especially in things ―which are very 
                                                                                                                                                        
acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et praecipue ab his quae sunt valde rationi 
contraria.‖ 
215
 De virt. in com. 8. ad 6: ―Est effectus virtutis [acquisitae], quod homo prompte et infallibiliter ut in pluribus 
bonum attingat.‖ Note that Aquinas does not refer in the reply verbatim to ―acquired virtues.‖ However, the 
context of the whole article is plainly about the issue of these virtues.  
216
 Likewise in In sent. I 39.2.2 ad 4: ―Tunc est agens perfectum quantum ad omnes suas operationes, quando 
iam perfecta est perfectionibus secundis, quae sunt virtutes; et ideo quando determinatur per perfectionem 
secundam vel infusam vel acquisitam, tunc determinatur ad unum, vel ad quod tendat ut in maiori parte, sicut in 
statu viae, vel ut semper, sicut in statu patriae.‖ 
217
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 14: ―Virtus enim infusa facit quod nullo modo obediatur concupiscentiis peccati; et 
facit hoc infallibiliter ipsa manente. Sed virtus acquisita deficit in hoc, licet in paucioribus.‖ That is not to say 
that a person with infused virtues cannot sin; but if one sins, it is because he is not using infused virtutes. If one 
is using it, one cannot fail. In contrast, it is essential for acquired virtues to provide the good acting ut in pluribus 
but not always. See also De virt. in com. 9 ad 5. About the infallibility of infused virtues, see Nickel, Ordnung 
der Gefühle, 45-51. 
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contrary to reason.‖218 More is not required.219 To be sure, more is not even possible apart 
from grace. But this fact does not undermine the meaning of acquired virtues as connected 
political virtues.  
 
 
ii) Acquired Virtues: Disregarding Man’s Relation Towards God 
 
Political virtues perfect man in respect to the earthly city according to the rule of reason; but 
they leave man‘s relation to God untouched. Man relates to God not only by grace, however, 
but also on a pure natural level. ―Reason and will are naturally directed to God, insofar as he 
is the principle and end of nature, but in proportion to nature.‖220 Again, Aquinas says: ―It 
belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something for divine reverence.‖221 
Does this not lead to the necessary conclusion that acquired virtues (as virtues ruled by reason) 
have to include also man‘s relation to God? That they cannot be limited to the human city? 
It is certainly true that man relates to God not only by divine faith but also by natural 
reason.
222
 Aquinas nevertheless limits the range of acquired virtues constantly to human life 
on earth; they direct man ―ad bonum praesentis vitae,‖223 ―bonum humanum‖224 or ―bonum in 
rebus humanis gerendis.‖225 Theoretically, of course, those terms could also include man‘s 
natural relation to God since he relates to God even by reason. However, if for St. Thomas 
this relationship were ruled by acquired virtues, then he would not oppose acquired virtues as 
directed to the bonum humanum against infused virtues as directed to the divine good.
226
 
Similarly the expression ―bonum praesentis vitae‖ could include man‘s relation to God. But at 
                                                 
218
 ST I-II 63.2 ad 2: ―per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et praecipue ab his quae sunt valde 
rationi contraria.‖ 
219
 Quite different in the case of infused virtues: The nature of these virtues (and the character of their 
supernatural end) demands an acting ut in omnibus, since already one failure (i.e. mortal sin) would destroy 
grace and all infused habits. 
220
 ST I-II 62.1 ad 3: ―Ad deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout est naturae principium et finis, 
secundum tamen proportionem naturae.‖ 
221
 ST II-II 81.2 ad 3: ―De dictamine rationis naturalis est quod homo aliqua faciat ad reverentiam divinam.‖ 
Similar in ST II-II 83.16; 85.1; 87.1; cf. also ST I-II 99.3 ad 2; 99.4; 104.1 ad 3. 
222
 This is well shown by David Gallagher, ―The Role of God in the Philosophical Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,‖ 
in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie 
der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, ed. Jan A. 
Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 1024-1033 and MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions 
of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition, 141-142. 
223
 Cf. De virt. in com. 10 ad 8. For a good discussion, see Gallagher, ―The Role of God,‖ 1024-1033. 
224
 Cf. De virt. in com. 9 ad 7. 
225
 Cf. ST I-II 61.5; II-II 129.1. 
226
 ―Virtus acquisita non est maximum bonum simpliciter, sed maximum in genere humanorum bonorum; virtus 
autem infusa est maximum bonum simpliciter, in quantum per eam homo ad summum bonum ordinatur, quod est 
deus.‖ (De virt. in com. 9 ad 7). 
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other places the good of the present life is clearly rooted in the earthly city.
227
 Moreover, 
Aquinas describes acquired virtue as ―perfect‖ if it disposes man ―for a certain happiness that 
man can acquire through his own natural powers in this life by an act of perfect virtue, of 
which Aristotle treats in Book X of the Metaphysics.‖228 But the moral virtues of the Greek 
philosopher are constantly determined as political virtues,
229
 a clear indication that acquired 
virtues disregard man‘s relation to God.  
Later on in the ST II-II Aquinas again limits the human virtues to mere interhuman actions. 
He gives the following exhaustive list of moral virtues:  
 
It belongs to human virtue to make man good and to make his work accord with reason. This 
happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual 
virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human things, and this belongs to 
justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human 
things. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. 
First, if [the will] is drawn by some object of pleasure to something other than what the 
rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance. 
Secondly, if the will is disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on 
account of some difficulty that presents itself. And this obstacle is removed by the virtue of 
fortitude.
230
 
 
This whole outline of human virtues disregards man‘s relationship towards God. 
A final objection presents itself. The negation of any relevance of political virtue for man‘s 
relation to God seems to imply an irreligious state, a politia which is neutral towards matters 
of religion. This modern view is certainly alien to Aquinas, who demands even the 
acknowledgment of God‘s supremacy by the state as integral part of the earthly common good. 
―The purpose of human life and society is God.‖231 This observation, however, does not 
                                                 
227
 So for example in In ethic. III 14.9; 18.6.  
228
 De virt. in com. 9 ad 6: ―Per virtutes acquisitas non pervenitur ad felicitatem caelestem, sed ad quamdam 
felicitatem quam homo natus est acquirere per propria naturalia in hac vita secundum actum perfectae virtutis, de 
qua Aristoteles tractat in X metaph.‖ 
229
 E.g. De virt. card. 4 corpus articuli, also ad 3. 
230
 ST II-II 123.1: ―Ad virtutem humanam pertinet ut faciat hominem et opus eius secundum rationem esse. Quod 
quidem tripliciter contingit. Uno modo, secundum quod ipsa ratio rectificatur, quod fit per virtutes intellectuales. 
Alio modo, secundum quod ipsa rectitudo rationis in rebus humanis instituitur, quod pertinet ad iustitiam. Tertio, 
secundum quod tolluntur impedimenta huius rectitudinis in rebus humanis ponendae. Dupliciter autem impeditur 
voluntas humana ne rectitudinem rationis sequatur. Uno modo, per hoc quod attrahitur ab aliquo delectabili ad 
aliud quam rectitudo rationis requirat, et hoc impedimentum tollit virtus temperantiae. Alio modo, per hoc quod 
voluntatem repellit ab eo quod est secundum rationem, propter aliquid difficile quod incumbit. Et ad hoc 
impedimentum tollendum requiritur fortitudo.‖ Similar in ST II-II 123.12. 
231
 ST I-II 100.6: ―Finis autem humanae vitae et societatis est deus.‖ See also ST I-II 100.8; ST II-II 25.1 ad 2; 
26.3; 26.4 ad 3. Consequently, Dewan and Pakaluk have argued that the common good of the society demands 
for man‘s right order even towards to God; see Lawrence Dewan, ―St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political 
Good,‖ The Thomist 64 (2000): 337-374; Michael Pakaluk, ―Is the Common Good of Political Society Limited 
and Instrumental?,‖ Review of Metaphysics 55 (2001): 57-94. 
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undermine our thesis that political virtues do not perfect man‘s internal relation to God. 
Admittedly, it is true that Aquinas explains: ―Since politica prescribes all things which belong 
to the city, consequently it prescribes also things which pertain to the divine cultus.‖232 This, 
however, rather proves our position. The state commands certain acts which pertain to the 
divine cult, but only insofar as the proper end of those acts is the common good of the state. 
Of course, in itself the divine cult stands above the earthly common good, and in themselves 
those commanded acts aim for man‘s right relation to God. Nevertheless, the immediate 
finality of those ―religious‖ human laws remains the good of the human city. St. Thomas 
states about the human laws of the Jews: ―The human laws have not concerned themselves 
with the institution of anything relating to divine worship except as affecting the common 
good of men, and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating to divine 
matters, since it seemed expedient for the formation of human morals, as it might be seen in 
the rites of the gentiles.‖233 Elsewhere, St. Thomas clarifies the issue through a comparison. 
The acts of wisdom are in themselves more perfect than decisions of prudence, but the latter 
have to command the necessary circumstances for attaining wisdom, although prudence 
cannot determine wisdom itself. In an analog way, the political virtues relate to religion which 
is in itself of a higher order, but nevertheless the performance of external acts of the divine 
cultus belongs likewise to political virtues, commanded by human laws, which provide the 
necessary space for the true virtue of religion, which belongs to a higher order (as wisdom).
234
 
Even if the human city commands external acts of religious devotions, it does not follow that 
political virtues necessarily touch man‘s internal relation to God.235 
 
 
                                                 
232
 In ethic. VI 11.17: ―Cum politica praecipiat de omnibus quae sunt in civitate, consequens est, quod praecipiat 
de his quae pertinent ad cultum divinum.‖ 
233
 ST I-II 99.3: ―Leges humanae non curaverunt aliquid instituere de cultu divino nisi in ordine ad bonum 
commune hominum, et propter hoc etiam multa confinxerunt circa res divinas, secundum quod videbatur eis 
expediens ad informandos mores hominum; sicut patet in ritu gentilium.‖ See likewise ad 2.  
234
 ―Prudentia, etiam politica, non utitur sapientia praecipiens illi qualiter debeat iudicare circa res divinas, sed 
praecipit propter illam, ordinans scilicet qualiter homines possint ad sapientiam pervenire.‖ (In ethic. VI 11.16). 
235
 Helpful is also ScG III 80.14-16 where Aquinas clearly distinguishes the common good of the city from the 
good of religion: ―In rebus humanis est aliquod bonum commune, quod quidem est bonum civitatis vel gentis. . . . 
Est etiam aliquod humanum bonum quod non in communitate consistit, sed ad unum aliquem pertinet secundum 
seipsum, non tamen uni soli utile, sed multis. Sicut quae sunt ab omnibus et singulis credenda et observanda, 
sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et cultus divinus, et alia huiusmodi.‖ 
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iii) The Civil Good as bonum humanum 
 
We can reach the same conclusion from exactly the opposite perspective. Thomas does not 
only describe man‘s perfection ―in rebus humanis‖ independent of his relation to God, he 
even distinguishes it from actions which injure only man‘s own good. The proper ―bonum 
humanum‖ consists in this membership in the earthly city.236 Actions against one‘s own good 
are not against the human good as long as they do not hinder the achievement of the common 
good. In this sense not every inordinate act is called ―evil.‖  
 
The philosopher does not call each inordinate act evil, but only an act which is injuring in 
regard to the other; therefore he says in Ethics IV, that the prodigal who because of the waste 
of his goods in an inordinate way, is not evil but vane; and in a similar way he speaks of many 
other vices.
237
 
 
Only the act which is harmful to the other is qualified as harmful to the human good. 
Admittedly, justice requires temperate passions for its own function, but not every single 
willing assent to blameful concupiscence is ―evil‖ in comparison to the bonum humanum, 
although it is evil according to the divine measure. Aquinas notes, therefore, in the subsequent 
text that the philosopher ―uses evil in a stricter sense than we do since for us all inordinate 
acts are evil‖,238 and accordingly for St. Thomas every inordinate act is at least against the 
divine good. However, the quotation provides sufficient indication that the term of ―human 
things‖ does not include all relationships, but refer only to those things of the human city. 
Another confirming statement is found in Aquinas‘s Commentary on the Metaphysics. 
Someone may perform evil actions because he lacks virtue, but such action that are negligible 
regarding one‘s neighbor are not to be categorized as evil. ―If somebody lacks virtue in regard 
to an action which is very small and quasi indifferent for life, then it is not called evil; but 
only if he lacks virtue in regard to acts which are important and necessary for life.‖239 Again, 
                                                 
236
 In ethic. I 2.13: ―Sciendum est autem, quod politicam dicit esse principalissimam, non simpliciter, sed in 
genere activarum scientiarum, quae sunt circa res humanas, quarum ultimum finem politica considerat. . . . Dicit 
autem ad politicam pertinere considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae.‖ See also ST II-II 136.3 ad 2: ―Bonum 
politicae virtutis est commensuratum naturae humanae.‖  
237
 In sent. II 40.1.5 ad 1: ―Philosophus appellat malum non omnem actum inordinatum, sed solum illum qui 
nocivus est respectu alterius; unde dicit in 4 ethic., quod prodigus, quia causa iactantiae sua inordinate expendit, 
non est malus sed vanus; et similiter de multis aliis vitiis dicit.‖  
238
 In sent. II 40.1.5 ad 1: ―Et sic patet quod ipse strictius accipit malum quam nos dicentes omnem actum 
inordinatum esse malum.‖ 
239
 In metaph. X 6.21: ―Si aliquis virtute careat quantum ad aliquos actus minimos et quasi indifferentes ad vitam, 
non dicitur malus; sed solum si careat virtute quantum ad actus principales et necessarios ad vitam.‖ Interesting 
also In sent. II 40.1.5 ad 1: ―Sicut ait Commentator, in 10 metaph., quod dicitur homo neque bonus neque malus, 
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the virtuousness becomes defined by reference of man‘s relation to the other, to the earthly 
society, as political virtue. Relations beyond this area are irrelevant for the bonum 
humanum.
240
 
 
 
2.3.4. Infused Virtue as “Political Virtue:” Aquinas’s Inventive Use of  
Aristotle  
 
From various perspectives we have seen Aquinas‘s use of the term of acquired virtue as a 
synonym for political virtue. The foregoing long analysis was necessary to determine the 
exact significance of that technical term in St. Thomas‘s writings. The understanding of 
acquired virtue as political virtue has, of course, some important consequences for the general 
juxtaposition of acquired and infused virtues. The commentators are used to reducing both 
kinds to their two different formal aspects, that is the rule of reason and the divine rule 
(understood as divinely enlightened reason; see section 2.1.3). From this they conclude that 
acquired virtues imply man‘s complete perfection according to the measure of reason (at least 
perfect acquired virtues), and infused virtues man‘s complete perfection according to the 
divine law. Both imply an overall perfection of the agent, though by different standards. One 
of the main reasons against understanding acquired virtues as political virtues is certainly the 
apparent incongruence between political virtues and their infused counterparts. The former 
demand only a partial realization of their formal principle (since the good citizen of the 
earthly city can act further on unreasonably in regard of his final end as human being), the 
latter require man‘s universal order according to the divine law.  
Hence, the issue at question is the following: does the interpretation of acquired virtues as 
political virtues really hinder a parallel juxtaposition of acquired and infused virtues? We will 
show that the contrary is the case. Aquinas employs the general understanding of political 
                                                                                                                                                        
qui non est susceptibilis bonitatis vel malitiae civilis; sicut agrestis, qui extra civilem vitam est, et per 
consequens actiones eius neque bonae neque malae sunt civiliter, inquantum non sunt ordinatae ad civile 
bonum.‖ 
240
 The same teaching in In ethic. IV 4.4 ―Prodigus non videtur esse pravus secundum id quod pertinet proprie ad 
virtutem moralem, quae respicit directe appetitivam potentiam. Non enim pertinet ad malum sive corruptum 
appetitum, neque ad defectum virilis animi, quod aliquis superabundet in dando et in non accipiendo, sed hoc 
videtur pertinere ad insipientiam quamdam. Et sic videtur, quod prodigalitas non tam pertineat ad malitiam 
moralem, quae respicit pronitatem appetitus ad malum, quam secundum rationis defectum.‖ See also In ethic. IV 
4.5. It should be noted that in the Summa theologiae Aquinas presents a somewhat different view. In ST II-II 
119.2 the habit of prodigalitas is described as (at least venial) sin. However, this difference makes perfect sense 
if we are right that the primarily concern of the Secunda secundae is not acquired but infused virtue. 
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virtue to introduce divinely infused habits in his system of moral virtues, namely as political 
virtues of a higher form of city. Consequently, the interpretation of acquired virtue as political 
virtues does not only not hinder their comparison with the infused virtues, but rather this 
interpretation confirms such a comparison.  
 
 
a) Various Regimes, Various Political Virtues  
 
As seen in section 2.3.3a, Aquinas adopts the Aristotelian claim that the good citizen 
surpasses the good individual since he does not work only for his private good but also for the 
common good.
241
 However, in addition to these univocal assertions, Aristotle argues 
sometimes for the opposite, and Aquinas adopts this assertion as well: ―It happens that 
somebody is a good citizen, but lacks the virtue of the good man.‖242 Do Aristotle and St. 
Thomas contradict themselves here? 
It would seem not, although Aquinas uses the statement in a way which goes far beyond the 
assertion of Aristotle.
243
 According to a general view, the good citizen has to possess also the 
virtues of the good man. (―Neither politica nor oeconomica is enough without prudence in the 
own things.‖244) However, without denying those premises, Aristotle distinguishes in his 
Politics (and subsequently Aquinas in his commentary) different forms of government of the 
human city, as e.g. monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, etc. But political 
virtues perfect the citizen in reference to the particular conditions of a city, so each of these 
different regimes requires special kinds of political virtues: 
 
It is clear that the virtue of the citizen as citizen is considered in relation to the regime, so that 
the good citizen is the man who works well to preserve the regime. Now there are several 
species of regimes . . . and men are well ordered to different regimes by means of different 
virtues. Since a democracy is preserved in one way, and an oligarchy or a tyranny in another. 
Hence it is evident that there is not one perfect virtue according to which a citizen [sc. as 
citizen] can be called simply good.
245
 
                                                 
241
 E.g. ST II-II 58.6 sed contra; De virt. card. 1; In ethic. V 2.9. 
242
 In politic. III 3.2: ―Contingit igitur aliquem esse bonum civem, qui tamen non habet virtutem secundum quam 
aliquis est bonus vir.‖ 
243
 See for the following: Gilson, The Christian Philosophy, 308. 
244
 In ethic. VI 7.13: ―Nec tamen sufficit politica et oeconomica sine prudentia propriorum.‖ 
245
 In politic. III 3.2: ―Patet, quod virtus civis inquantum est civis, consideretur in ordine ad politiam; ut scilicet 
ille sit bonus civis, qui bene operatur ad conservationem politiae. Sunt autem plures species politiae . . . ad 
diversas autem politias ordinantur homines bene, secundum diversas virtutes. Alio enim modo conservatur 
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The good citizen of a tyranny has to know how to become a friend of the tyrant and to be 
ready to accomplish every command without reservation, while the good citizen of the 
democracy has to know how to convince this fellow-citizen and to submit himself to the 
decision of the majority, etc. In both cases a man is a good citizen if he respects the laws of 
his city and is successful according to the standards of each form of government, though he 
does not necessarily possess virtues as man in the above discussed sense. He might be judged 
as virtuous only in comparison to the laws of his relative politia, e.g. the tyranny.  
Aristotle introduces therefore a distinction between imperfect and perfect forms of 
government. In the former it is possible to have political virtues independent of man‘s 
virtuousness as man, but which are certainly true and efficient political virtues according to 
the laws of a specific city.
246
 Only in the politia optima (identified as aristocracy
247
) the good 
citizen and good man are identical since rights, duties and positions in the city are assigned 
according to virtue.
248
 ―In a certain city, sc. the aristocracy, the good man and the good citizen 
are identical, since the ruling offices are granted according to the virtue which is that of the 
good man. In other [forms of governments], however, the good citizen is not the same as the 
good man, sc. in the corrupt regimes, in which ruling offices are not distributed according to 
virtue.‖249  
Thus, it becomes necessary to assert different kinds of civil virtues which do not imply the 
same degrees of personal virtue. Each kind is perfect in terms of civil virtue itself, but only 
one of them presupposes the good man in the proper sense. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
democratia, et alio modo oligarchia, aut tyrannis. Unde manifestum est quod non est una virtus perfecta 
secundum quam civis possit simpliciter dici bonus.‖ For good outline of the issue in Aristotle, see Günther Bien, 
―Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles (V),‖ in Aristoteles: Die Nikomachische Ethik, ed. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1995), 143. 
246
 Cf. In ST I-II 92.1. 
247
 Cf. ST I-II 105.1. 
248
 Aristotle and Aquinas distinguish further on between the good citizen as ruler and as inferior, e.g. ST I-II 
92.1 ad 3; II-II 47.12, In politic. III 3.2-13. For our present concern, however, we can let aside this difference. 
249
 In politic. III 4.7: ―In aliqua civitate, scilicet aristocratica, idem est bonus vir et bonus civis, quia scilicet 
principatus dantur secundum virtutem quae est boni viri. In aliquibus autem alius est bonus vir et alius bonus 
civis, scilicet in corruptis politiis in quibus principatus dantur non secundum virtutem.‖ Similar in the already 
earlier quoted text: ―Contingit igitur aliquem esse bonum civem, qui tamen non habet virtutem secundum quam 
aliquis est bonus vir; et hoc in politiis, quae sunt praeter optimam politiam.‖ (In politic. III 3.2). 
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b) Infused Virtues as Political Virtues of the Citizen in the Church 
 
Such is the Aristotelian doctrine. Aquinas does not only repeat this Aristotelian distinction of 
various politiae and further several species of political virtues, he also makes use of the idea 
to integrate infused virtues into his moral-system. He distinguishes not only different regimes 
of the earthly city but he interprets the order of grace as a special politia, as the most perfect 
city. Consequently, infused virtues are understood as political virtues of that special ―city.‖ 
We recall ST I-II 63.4: infused virtues are habits ―whereby men behave well in respect of their 
being fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God.‖ 250  Already in his 
Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas identified the community of Saints and God‘s 
household with the Church: ―Acquired virtues perfect man in regard to the civic life, the 
infused ones in regard to the spiritual life which is from grace, according to which the 
virtuous man is a member of the Church.‖251 The infused virtues dispose men not for actions 
―proportioned towards the civic good‖ but ―proportioned towards eternal glory.‖252 As man is 
inclined by nature towards the life in a human city and is disposed for that life by political 
virtues, the graced agent is inclined by charity towards divine friendship and beatitude and is 
disposed by infused virtues for the corresponding life, as ―quasi citizen and companion of that 
blessed society.‖253 
St. Thomas gains a double advantage by interpreting man‘s friendship with God in terms of a 
specific political regime. 
First, acquired virtues (as political virtues) and infused virtues turn out to be two sets of virtue 
that are truly comparable. Both sets perfect man completely in regard to a specific end: 
acquired virtues in regard to the civil good, infused virtues towards the good of the Church. 
From this viewpoint it becomes useless to criticize the alleged inconsistency in a comparison 
between political virtues as focusing on a limited perfection on the natural level and infused 
                                                 
250
 ST I-II 63.4: ―per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici dei.‖ 
251
 In sent. III 33.1.2D: ―In alia vita hominem perficiunt, acquisitae quidem in vita civili, infusae in vita spirituali, 
quae est ex gratia, secundum quam homo virtuosus est membrum ecclesiae.‖ 
252
 In sent. III 33.1.2C ad 2: ―Rectitudo actus est ex proportione ad finem; ad diversos autem fines diversimode 
accipitur actus proportio: unde aliquis actus est rectus proportionatus bono civili, qui non est rectus 
proportionatus gloriae aeternae: unde oportet quod sint aliae virtutes infusae, quae faciant actus rectos ex 
proportione ad finem.‖ 
253
 De caritate 2: ―Si autem homo, in quantum admittitur ad participandum bonum alicuius civitatis, et efficitur 
civis illius civitatis; competunt ei virtutes quaedam ad operandum ea quae sunt civium, et ad amandum bonum 
civitatis; ita cum homo per divinam gratiam admittatur in participationem caelestis beatitudinis, quae in visione 
et fruitione dei consistit, fit quasi civis et socius illius beatae societatis, quae vocatur caelestis ierusalem 
secundum illud, Ephes. II, 19: estis cives sanctorum et domestici dei. Unde homini sic ad caelestia adscripto 
competunt quaedam virtutes gratuitae, quae sunt virtutes infusae; ad quarum debitam operationem praeexigitur 
amor boni communis toti societati, quod est bonum divinum, prout est beatitudinis obiectum.‖ 
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virtue as implying man‘s supernatural perfection in regard to all matters. Interpreting both as 
political virtues in regard to different cities, each one implies man‘s full perfection in regard 
to a certain city.
254
 Admittedly, man‘s citizenship of the heavenly city belongs to a higher 
order than membership in any earthly community, but nevertheless the benchmark of the 
relative virtues is the same ‒ man‘s perfection as member of a certain community.  
Secondly, Aristotle distinguishes between virtues of the politia optima and the politiae 
corruptae. Though only the former includes also the virtue of the good individual, 
nevertheless all kinds are true virtues in respect to their relative politia. This distinction 
allows Aquinas not only to interpret acquired and infused virtues under the same aspect (as 
political virtues), but simultaneously to maintain the radical difference between both, sc. the 
essential superiority of infused virtues. For St. Thomas, the heavenly city becomes the 
politica optima, and consequently only in this case the good man is identical with the good 
citizen.  
 
 
2.3.5 The Parallel Function of Human and Divine Laws and the 
Consequences for Acquired and Infused Virtues 
 
The parallel understanding of acquired and infused virtues as different kinds of political virtue 
gets unexpected support from the structure of the treatise on law in the Prima secundae of the 
Summa theologiae.
255
 A reading of the whole treatise shows that Aquinas compares 
repeatedly two kinds of community, namely the human city, ruled by human law, and man‘s 
supernatural community with God (described as divine friendship), which is ruled by divine 
precepts. ―The divine law is instituted principally for ordering men to God, while the human 
                                                 
254
 Aquinas emphasizes that rectitude of the act of acquired virtues is measured by his adequacy ad bonum civile. 
Hence, actions which are against the order of reason, but does not harm the civil order, lies beyond the range of 
acquired virtues. ―Rectitudo actus est ex proportione ad finem; ad diversos autem fines diversimode accipitur 
actus proportio: unde aliquis actus est rectus proportionatus bono civili, qui non est rectus proportionatus gloriae 
aeternae: unde oportet quod sint aliae virtutes infusae, quae faciant actus rectos ex proportione ad finem.‖ (In 
sent. III 33.1.2C ad 2). Therefore, as seen above (section 2.3.3c-i), for acquired virtues an acting ut in pluribus is 
enough. 
255
 After the introductory question about law in general (q. 90) Aquinas presents in q. 91 the different kinds of 
law which he discusses later on in more detail: the eternal law (q. 93), the natural law (q. 94), the human law (q. 
95-97), and the divine law (q. 98-108). Though the eternal law is the ultimate reason of every law, only the latter 
three have an immediate relevance for man‘s action. (The eternal law, identified as divine providence, becomes 
relevant for man through the natural, the human and the divine law.) 
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law is instituted principally for ordering men in relation to one another.‖256  ―Just as the 
principal intention of human law is to create friendship between man and man; so the 
intention of divine law is principally to establish the friendship of man to God.‖257 St. Thomas 
returns to this distinction again and again.
258
 At the same time, we note not a single time a 
similar comparison between the different ends of the natural law and the divine law.  
This observation appears even more surprising if we consider that human and divine laws are, 
in a certain way, two incomparable categories. The human law is confined to ruling only 
external relations between single men and leaves untouched their internal motives. In other 
words, it includes only a part of man‘s practical action.259 On the contrary, the divine law 
rules external as well internal actions in regard to man‘s ultimate end. Although both kinds of 
law work for a certain politia, namely the earthly city and the community of saints (or 
friendship with God), their ―matter‖ does not coincide.  
 
It should be known that the end of human law is different from the end of divine law. For the 
end of human law is the temporal tranquility of the city, which end law attains by restraining 
external actions, insofar as those evils might disturb the peaceful condition of the city. But the 
end of the divine law is to bring man to the end of eternal happiness, which end is hindered by 
any sin, not only by external acts but also by internal ones.
260
 
 
But why does Aquinas never compare the divine law with the natural law? Such a comparison 
seems to be much more fitting, since then both would effect man‘s complete ordering, 
covering internal as well as external acts, and remain distinguished only by their different 
formal measures, namely reason and the divine rule. 
Certainly, the reader already anticipates our response: the human law, given for the sake of 
the human city, corresponds in some way to acquired virtues understood as political virtues. 
Admittedly, political virtues fail to avoid every sin,
261
 but they are sufficient to preserve the 
human community and they are powerful enough to enable the agent to observe all human 
                                                 
256
 ST I-II 99.3: ―Lex divina principaliter instituitur ad ordinandum homines ad deum; lex autem humana 
principaliter ad ordinandum homines ad invicem.‖ 
257
 ST I-II 99.2: ―Sicut intentio principalis legis humanae est ut faciat amicitiam hominum ad invicem; ita 
intentio legis divinae est ut constituat principaliter amicitiam hominis ad deum.‖ 
258
 For example ST I-II 98.1; 100.2. 
259
 See ST I-II 100.2 or 100.9. 
260
 ST I-II 98.1: ―Est autem sciendum quod est alius finis legis humanae, et alius legis divinae. Legis enim 
humanae finis est temporalis tranquillitas civitatis, ad quem finem pervenit lex cohibendo exteriores actus, 
quantum ad illa mala quae possunt perturbare pacificum statum civitatis. Finis autem legis divinae est perducere 
hominem ad finem felicitatis aeternae; qui quidem finis impeditur per quodcumque peccatum, et non solum per 
actus exteriores, sed etiam per interiores.‖ 
261
 Cf. ST I-II 63.2 ad 2.  
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laws. In a parallel fashion, the divine laws command all necessary prerequisites for divine 
friendship, and infused virtues enable the graced agent to observe completely these laws.  
 
An objection is duly raised at this point in our argument. Though the repeated juxtaposition of 
human and divine law in the treatise on law might be persuasive, there remain some 
difficulties. Does our interpretation of this juxtaposition not contradict the teaching that the 
formal notion of acquired virtues is reason and not human law? If our argument is correct, 
then why does Aquinas not describe the human law as the formal principle of acquired virtues? 
Moreover, wouldn‘t human law be quite a poor measure for moral virtue? 
Confronting these objections requires a short excursus on the function of human law. But it is 
worth the expense, since the result will allow a more profound understanding of the 
relationship of infused virtues to the divine law. 
 
 
a) The Human Law and Its Relation to Political Virtues 
 
For Aquinas, the purpose of human law is to promote the ―temporal tranquility of society‖262 
and the order of ―men to each other.‖263 Sometimes he also adds the acquisition of virtue: ―It 
was necessary to constitute laws in order that man might have peace and virtue.‖264 However 
– and this seems to undermine our argument – human laws neither prohibit all vices nor 
command all virtues which are helpful for the flourishing of the common good or which 
correspond to the order of reason. As Aquinas explains, every human society contains both 
virtuous and wicked citizens. The law of a community, however, has to be compliable for all 
members, even for citizen without virtues at all. As a consequence, human law prohibits ―only 
the more grievous vices from which it is possible for the majority to abstain, and chiefly those 
which imply injury of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be 
maintained.‖265 Acts which would destroy the good of peace and social order are forbidden, 
while other vices remain allowed by law, although they are against the order of reason. 
                                                 
262
 ST I-II 98.1: ―temporalis tranquillitas civitatis.‖ 
263
 ST I-II 100.2: ―homines ad invicem.‖ 
264
 ST I-II 95.1: ―Necessarium fuit ad pacem hominum et virtutem, ut leges ponerentur.‖ 
265
 ST I-II 96.2: ―Lege humana non prohibitur omnia vitia . . . solum graviora, a quibus possibile est maiorem 
partem multitudinis abstinere; et praecipue quae sunt in nocumentum aliorum, sine quorum prohibitione societas 
humana conservari non posset.‖ 
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Similarly, the prescription of acts of virtue: human law does not command all good actions 
since this would be impossible for many people to accomplish. It prescribes only acts which 
relate to the public order, either because they belong intrinsically to the common good (as e.g. 
the defense of the city), or because they generate a certain discipline through which a citizen 
will be disposed to preserve in the future the public order, although the act belongs properly to 
the good of the individual (as e.g. acts of temperance).  
 
The human law does not prescribe all the acts of every virtue, but only those that are 
ordainable to the common good, either immediately, as if certain things are done directly for 
the common good, or mediately, as if a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to good 
discipline, whereby the citizens are formed to conserve the common good of justice and 
peace.
266
 
 
This shows that the immediate and proper end of human law is the preservation of public 
order,
267
 while their remote and indirect end is the acquisition of corresponding virtues, 
attained by a life lived according to those precepts.
268
 This final point is important. Human 
laws are something written and therefore only external principles of actions. They determine 
what is to be done, but by themselves they do not produce virtue. Rather, they work by 
―compelling by the fear of punishment.‖269 As long as laws are observed by constraint, they 
just safeguard the human community. The individual citizen is rather acted on than acting. It 
is – so to speak – the law ―who‖ acts. But when the citizen accepts knowingly and voluntarily 
the human law as something to be done, he himself is acting by his reason and will. Though 
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 ST I-II 96.3: ―Non . . . de omnibus actibus omnium virtutum lex humana praecipit, sed solum de illis qui sunt 
ordinabiles ad bonum commune, vel immediate, sicut cum aliqua directe propter bonum commune fiunt; vel 
mediate, sicut cum aliqua ordinantur a legislatore pertinentia ad bonam disciplinam, per quam cives informantur 
ut commune bonum iustitiae et pacis conservent.‖ 
267
 In In ethic. III 8.2 Aquinas compares political peace for the community with sanity for the body. ―[Pax] se 
habet ad civitatem sicut sanitas ad corpus hominis, quae consistit in convenientia humorum sicut pax in 
convenientia voluntatum.― Müller notes: ―Der Friede ist das Hauptgut einer Gemeinschaft.‖ (Wilhelm Müller, 
Der Staat in seinen Beziehungen zur sittlichen Ordnung bei Thomas von Aquin (Münster: Aschendorffsche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1916), 29). Subordinate are virtues and even external goods. ―Iusta legalia dicuntur ea 
quae sunt factiva et conservativa felicitatis et particularum ipsius, idest eorum quae ad felicitatem ordinantur, vel 
principaliter sicut virtutes, vel instrumentaliter sicut divitiae, et alia huiusmodi exteriora bona.‖ (In ethic. V 2.4). 
For a good discussion of the ends of the political state, see Müller, Der Staat, 28-60. 
268
 The second part of ST I-II 92.1 distinguishes between laws, which make man only bonum secundum quid – 
even if he is a good citizen because of obeying the law, namely if the laws themselves are not directed to the true 
common good. The parallel to In polit. III 3.2 is obvious: laws make man bonus simpliciter, if they are given for 
the true common good, i.e. if it is ―ruled according to divine justice.‖ Worth to note that not human laws 
according to the rule of reason make the citizen bonus simpliciter but only the concordance to the divine law. 
―Proprius effectus legis sit bonos facere eos quibus datur, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Si enim intentio 
ferentis legem tendat in verum bonum, quod est bonum commune secundum iustitiam divinam regulatum, 
sequitur quod per legem homines fiant boni simpliciter. Si vero intentio legislatoris feratur ad id quod non est 
bonum simpliciter, sed utile vel delectabile sibi, vel repugnans iustitiae divinae; tunc lex non facit homines 
bonos simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet in ordine ad tale regimen.‖ (ST I-II 92.1). 
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the content of such acts is determined by the human law, they are formally specified by reason 
insofar as the citizen acknowledges the observance of laws as something good, and therefore 
it is reason which commands him to act according to the law. In this way, the external law 
becomes something internal, i.e. the beginning of virtue which acts from within. Admittedly, 
it is only an initial state of virtue which has to be developed, for a single deliberated and 
willed obedience to a written law does not summon forth virtue in its full sense. Aquinas 
notes, however, that the observance of law ―from the mere dictate of reason [is yet] a kind of 
principle of virtue.‖270 If an agent familiarizes himself with the law and interiorly decides to 
follow its precepts, then he begins to develop the virtues which are required of a good 
citizen.
271
  
This allows us to answer the first objection. The determination of the content of political 
virtues by human law does not cut across Aquinas‘s doctrine that reason is the formal 
principle of acquired virtues. The virtuous observance of the human law has to arise from 
reason as its formal principle. Otherwise, the acts would be neither virtuous nor human at 
all.
272
 
However, the second question remains. Is the mere observation of human law sufficient to 
promote moral virtue? Or shouldn‘t we expect much more than legal fidelity? 
It is important to remember that we are speaking about political virtue; i.e. virtue which 
perfects man in regard to the human city. Human laws are given to make good citizens. 
Aquinas quotes Aristotle: ―It is the will of every lawgiver to make good citizens.‖273 He 
explains further: ―The virtue of any subordinate thing consists in being well subordinated to 
the ruler.‖274 Thus, a citizen is good if he acts lawfully from his own volition and works 
thereby for the conservation of the city. This, however, implies (as we saw above) that his acts 
are ruled by reason, that he is inclined to achieve what he acknowledges as good in respect to 
the common good, according to the determination of the human law. But such a habit, once 
                                                                                                                                                        
269
 ST I-II 95.1: ―cogens metu poenae.‖ 
270
 ST I-II 92.1 ad 2: ―Ex solo dictamine rationis quod est quoddam principium virtutes.‖ 
271
 ST I-II 92.1 ad 3: ―Impossibile est quod bonum commune civitatis bene se habeat, nisi cives sint virtuosi, ad 
minus illi quibus convenit principari. Sufficit autem, quantum ad bonum communitatis, quod alii intantum sint 
virtuosi quod principum mandatis obediant.‖ 
272
 For a more detailed description of the development of virtue by observing laws, see Michel Therrien, ―Law, 
Liberty & Virtue: A Thomistic Defense for the Pedagogical Character of Law,‖ (S.T.D. diss., University of 
Fribourg, 2007, http://ethesis.unifr.ch/theses/downloads.php?file=TherrienM.pdf (accessed August 29, 2011)). 
See esp. the chapter ―Law and Virtue‖, 101-113. 
273
 ST I-II 92.1 sed contra: ―Voluntas cuiuslibet legislatoris haec est, ut faciat cives bonos.‖ 
274
 ST I-II 92.1: ―Virtus cuiuslibet subiecti est ut bene subiiciatur principanti.‖ And the text continues: ―Ad hoc 
autem ordinatur unaquaeque lex, ut obediatur ei a subditis. Unde manifestum est quod hoc sit proprium legis, 
inducere subiectos ad propriam ipsorum virtutem.‖ The final sentence is decisive: The law induces the citizens 
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acquired, shall act spontaneously even for more than just the observance of the human law if 
the citizen acknowledges further things as good. As Aquinas notes, the virtuous citizen acts 
potentially even against the human law, namely if the citizen acknowledges either the 
injustice of a law or the failure of a law in a particular case.
275
 Our thesis does therefore not 
restrict acquired virtues to the mere observance of human law. Laws are the strict minimum 
which acquired virtue can and has to achieve, though the virtuous citizen, of course, shall do 
much more. But this ―more‖ – and this is our point – is not the specific criterion of acquired 
virtue. Political virtues might be too weak to achieve each act according to the order of reason, 
but they are sufficient for observing infallibly human laws which assign the minimum for the 
common good.  
 
 
b) The Written Divine Law as Minimum Content of Infused Virtues 
 
The human law works for a harmonious relation of ―men to each other;‖ the divine law aims 
for man‘s friendship with God, the order of ―man to God.‖ ―As the principal intention of 
human law is to make friendship between man and man, so the intention of the divine law is 
to establish first of all friendship between man and God.‖276 
Since divine friendship demands different actions, the range of the divine law is widely 
enlarged. ―Many things are directed by divine law, which human law is unable to direct.‖277 It 
commands more virtues and prohibits all vices.
278
 In contrast to human law, it is impossible to 
observe divine law to its full amount without the corresponding virtues which consequently 
have to be infused.  
                                                                                                                                                        
(subiectos) to their specific virtues, to their virtues as citizen (ad propriam ipsorum virtutem). Laws do not 
provide a general goodness; but some perfection in regard to the corresponding law. 
275
 See ST I-II 92.1 ad 4, 96.6, and II-II 120. 
276
 ST I-II 99.2: ―Sicut intentio principalis legis humanae est ut faciat amicitiam hominum ad invicem, ita intentio 
legis divinae est ut constituat principaliter amicitiam hominis ad deum.‖ Cf. also ST I-II 99.1 ad 2. Worth to note 
that already in ST I-II 90.2 (the article which describes the essential relation of every law to the common good) 
Aquinas asserts that law leads to ―felicitas vel beatitudo.‖ Kossel observes that this twofold description can be 
read as anticipation of the beatitude which provides the human law (felicitas) or the divine law (beatitudo); 
Clifford G. Kossel, ―Natural Law and Human Law (Ia IIae, qq. 90-97),‖ in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. 
Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 183, footnote 9. The distinction fits to ST I-II 4.7. 
277
 ST I-II 93.3 ad 3: ―Multa autem diriguntur lege divina quae dirigi non possunt lege humana.‖  
278
 Man is united with God primarily by internal acts; therefore the divine law commands external acts as well as 
internal. Hence, not only external acts, but also internal acts of the will are meritorious or culpable; see ST I-II 
21.4; 100.2; 100.9; In sent. III 37.2B. 
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Despite these differences, there remains a striking parallel between human laws and divine 
precepts. Human laws demand the necessary minimum for the preservation of the human city, 
while the divine precepts ensure the minimum for divine friendship. Furthermore, political 
virtues enable the good citizen to perfectly observe the human law as a minimum and to 
achieve even more by means of his reason. Similarly, infused virtues enable the graced agent 
to perfectly observe the divine precepts as a minimum for the preservation of friendship with 
God, though he will achieve even more by means of his enlightened reason (and moved by the 
instigations of the Holy Spirit).
279
 Aquinas distinguishes very carefully the divine precepts 
which guarantee this ―minimum‖ for the union with God, and additional actions beyond those 
laws which serve for the ―well-being‖ of divine friendship. ―Certain matters, without which 
the order of virtue . . . cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; whereas other 
matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of 
counsel.‖ 280  Thus, the divine laws – written precepts – simply determine the ultimate 
minimum of the virtuous citizen of the Church, and the human law denotes the minimum for 
political virtues. A further similarity is that a virtuous citizen acknowledges by natural reason 
many things as good beyond the range of the human law, while the graced agent recognizes 
and realizes by the motion of the Holy Spirit (the New Law in the proper sense) many things 
which are beyond the written divine precepts. 
Acquired and infused virtues function in a parallel manner. Likewise, human laws and the 
written divine precepts relate in a parallel fashion. The former dispose man in regard to the 
human city, the latter do so in regard to God. ―Human precepts justify according to acquired 
justice‖281, whereas the divine laws correspond to ―justice which is by God.‖282 Hence, we can 
summarize the relation of acquired and infused virtues, their corresponding laws and their 
formal notion by the following table: 
 
                                                 
279
 ―Les vertus morales ‗infuses‘ nous permettent de réussir toutes les obligations de notre vie humaine en regard 
et en fonction de cette amitié vécue avec Dieu.‖ (Gardeil, ―Appendice,‖ 370). 
280
 ST I-II 100.2: ―Lex divina convenienter proponit praecepta de actibus omnium virtutum, ita tamen quod 
quaedam, sine quibus ordo virtutis . . . observari non potest, cadunt sub obligatione praecepti; quaedam vero, 
quae pertinent ad bene esse virtutis perfectae, cadunt sub admonitione consilii.‖ 
281
 ST I-II 100.12 ad 3: ―Praecepta legis humanae iustificant iustitia acquisita.‖ 
282
 ST I-II 100.12 ad 3: ―Iustitia quae est apud deum.‖ 
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in respect to the human city in respect to divine friendship 
human law  
determines the minimum for the 
preservation of the human community 
divine law (as written law) 
determines the minimum for the 
preservation of divine friendship 
political virtue  
achieves infallibly the requirements of the 
human law as a minimum, but works even 
beyond that according to the rule of… 
infused virtue  
achieves infallibly the requirements of the 
divine law as a minimum, but works even 
beyond that according to the rule of… 
(natural) reason  
formal notion of all acts of political virtue 
divinely enlightened reason
283
 
formal notion of all acts of infused virtue 
Figure 2 
 
 
2.3.6 Conclusion: The Misleading “Triangle” of Moral Virtues  
 
The purpose of section 2.3 was to determine the exact meaning of acquired virtues ―whereby 
man behaves well in respect of human things‖ and infused virtues ―whereby men behave well 
in respect of their being fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God.‖284 We 
have seen that the virtues regarding ―human things‖ can signify theoretically either man‘s 
overall perfection in relation to all practical things, according to the rule of reason, in regard 
to himself, to his neighbor, and ultimately to God as principle of his being, or it can signify 
man‘s virtue to lead a life appropriated to his social nature, i.e. to live in peace and concord 
with his fellow citizens. Both corresponding sets of virtues follow a natural standard, but the 
first would be perfect moral virtue, the second pagan political virtue. Based on Aquinas‘s 
general description of moral action depending formally on reason, one could indeed develop 
and defend both arguments. Starting from the lex naturalis one could argue toward perfect 
acquired virtue, or starting from the lex humana one could reach the pagan political virtues.  
Nonetheless, Aquinas actually uses the concept of acquired virtues only in the sense of 
political virtue. He never applies the term as a description of man‘s right ordering toward a 
(hypothetical) natural final end of the whole life. Again, Aquinas certainly mentions a natural 
relation between man and God. He is well aware of man‘s natural duties in regard to God, and 
                                                 
283
 Moved by the instigation of the Holy Spirit, mediated through the infused gifts; see section 1.3. 
284
 ST I-II 63.4; for the Latin text, see footnote 1. 
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he describes single acts which are directed towards God on the basis of mere nature.
285
 But he 
never uses the concept of ―acquired virtue‖ for denoting a natural virtue which would provide 
a natural perfect ordering towards God. Admittedly, Aquinas speaks of something like 
acquired religion, but instead of aiding man‘s right ordering towards God, this ―political 
religion‖ only promotes the achievement of external cultic acts for the sake of the common 
good.
286
 
Potentially Aquinas could have spoken about three different sets of virtue: pagan political 
virtues, perfect natural moral virtues and infused moral virtues. And he could have structured 
these three species in a kind of a triangle: two species on the level of reason (either in a 
restricted way in regard to the good of the human city, or including all practical matters), 
political virtue and perfect moral virtue; and a third species on the level of grace, namely the 
infused virtues. Aquinas could have made such a triangle, but in fact he didn‘t. Since he 
distinguishes moral virtue not only by its formal difference but also by its end, he ultimately 
obtains only two species of moral virtue, sc. regarding the earthly city and the Church, namely 
acquired and infused virtue. This determination of acquired and infused virtues by their 
different ends excludes an interpretation of perfect acquired virtue. In effect, there remain 
only two comparable species of moral virtues:  
 
acts… 
in regard of the human city 
(ad finem in aliquo genere) 
in regard to divine friendship 
(ad finem totius vitae) 
according to enlightened 
reason (by the div. law) 
––––– infused virtue 
according to the  
rule of natural reason 
acquired virtue 
as pagan political virtue 
[theoretically: perfect acquired virtue] 
Figure 3 
 
Our table shows why an exclusive reference to the formal difference is insufficient for the 
distinction of acquired and infused virtue. The formal cause alone leaves unclear whether 
acquired virtue means pagan political or perfect acquired virtue. (In this regard ST I-II 63.4 is 
somehow misleading, insofar as it seems to suggest two optional ways to distinguish acquired 
and infused virtues, namely the formal notions and different ends.) Through the simultaneous 
                                                 
285
 See the various quotations of St. Thomas in footnotes 220 and 221; for references to secondary literature on 
that issue, see footnote 222. 
286
 See ST I-II 99.3, quoted in footnote 233. Hence, the following claim of Osborne is ambiguous: ―We have seen 
that religion is an acquired moral virtue. Thomas does not oppose the religious to the political.‖ (Osborne, ―The 
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application of both criteria the proper significance of acquired virtues as ―ad res humanas‖ 
becomes unequivocal. They do not imply man‘s overall perfection according to reason, but 
his wellbeing in regard to the human society.
287
 
 
 
2.4 The Material Cause: Virtues as “Matter” of Other Virtues 
 
This fourth section of chapter 2 investigates the material cause of both acquired and infused 
virtue. Of course, matter is not a principle of distinction but rather the unqualified substrate 
which is determined by the form. Thus, it is clear from the very beginning that the causa 
materalis will not provide a further criterion for the distinction of acquired and infused virtues, 
but nevertheless our analysis will not only serve aesthetic reasons (for the completion of the 
four Aristotelian causes) but it will also provide a more accurate understanding of the 
cooperation of various virtues. And the later will be of great value for the next chapter 
concerning the cooperation of acquired and infused virtues (chapter 3). 
 
Some Preliminary Remarks 
We can speak of a material cause of virtues only in an analogous way, for virtues themselves 
are not material things. ―Virtue has no matter ex qua, neither any other accident; but it has 
matter circa quam, and matter in qua, namely the subject. But the matter circa quam is the 
object of the virtue.‖288 There is no need for a discussion of the matter in qua, namely the 
underlying subject of the various virtuous, i.e. the human powers. In ST I-II 56 Aquinas treats 
all the human faculties in which moral virtues can inhere: the intellect,
289
 the will,
290
 and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Augustinianism,‖ 290). Aquinas might know an acquired kind of religion regarding external acts; but such a 
virtue could not provide man‘s right order toward God; not even on a natural level.  
287
 In the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Aquinas describes first the end of the politica as ―bonum 
commune civitatis‖ (In ethic. I 2.10); subsequently this end is defined the best in human things. ―Finis politicae 
est humanum bonum, id est optimum in rebus humanis.‖ (In ethic. I 2.11). And the preservation of this order is 
the proper task of human virtue. ―Ad rationem virtutis humanae pertinet ut in rebus humanis bonum rationis 
servetur, quod est proprium hominis bonum.‖ (ST II-II 129.3). 
288
 ST I-II 55.4: ―Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa 
quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis.‖ 
289
 ST I-II 56.3. 
290
 ST I-II 56.6. 
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concupiscible and irascible appetite.
291
 The virtues perfect the natural orientation of those 
powers according the order of reason. 
More important for our study is the materia circa quam, i.e. the objects of virtues. In that 
regard, Aquinas distinguishes in his Commentary on the Ethics two further meanings. First, 
one may speak of virtue‘s the remote matter, such as external situations and material objects 
in the proper sense, which give rise to human actions. For example, food and dangerous 
situations, in respect to eating and courageous deeds. Secondly, there is virtue‘s proximate 
matter, which inclues the very actions and passions of man.
292
 In this second sense, Aquinas 
also refers in ST I-II 63.4 to the matter of virtue, namely to sensible pleasures (i.e. passions) as 
the matter of temperance. Elsewhere, he describes fears as the matter of fortitude, doubts as 
the matter of prudence, and selling and contracts as the matter of justice.
293
 Certainly this is 
the most proper meaning of―matter‖ in regard to virtues.  
However, in many places Aquinas describes certain virtues as the form of other virtues, and 
this implies conversely that some virtues can be understood as matter for other virtues. For 
example, according to the enduring teaching of St. Thomas, charity is the form of all virtues. 
Likewise prudence in regard to moral virtues. How have we to interpret this assertion? Can 
we deduce from this principle that all virtues relate to charity as matter to form?
294
 Or does 
Aquinas limit this principle to the dependence of virtuous acts in respect to their underlying 
virtue? And further, is charity to be understood as forma virtutum only in respect to the 
infused virtues, or to the acquired ones also? 
A. J. Falanga, for example, argued in his study Charity the Form of the Virtues According to 
Saint Thomas for an univocal application of the matter-form analogy in describing the 
relationship of charity to the infused and acquired virtues, and to their acts: ―Charity is the 
immediate form of the acts of the infused habit of prudence; prudence informed by charity is 
the immediate form of the acquired habit of prudence . . . and hence of all the other moral 
                                                 
291
 ST I-II 56. 4. 
292
 In ethic. IV 1.4: ―Est tamen considerandum quod aliquid potest dici materia virtutis moralis dupliciter. Uno 
modo sicut materia propinqua. Et hoc modo passiones sunt materia plurimarum virtutum moralium. Alio modo 
sicut materia remota, et hoc modo obiecta passionum ponuntur materiae. Sicut fortitudinis materia proxima est 
timor et audacia, materia autem remota pericula mortis. Temperantiae autem materia proxima concupiscentiae et 
delectationes, materia autem remota cibi et actus venerei. Sic igitur et liberalitatis materia quidem propinqua est 
cupiditas vel amor pecuniarum, materia autem remota ipsa pecunia.‖ For further statements see In sent. III 
33.3.2A; In sent. IV 25.3.1A; De virt. in com. 13. 
293
 Eg. ST I-II 61.3. 
294
 See for example R.J. Regan: ―God infuses supernatural moral virtues and the theological virtue of charity, 
which informs every moral virtue, whether naturally acquired or supernaturally infused, in those he justifies.‖ 
(Richard J. Regan, ―Introduction,‖ in Treatise on Law, (contains the text of Thomas Aquinas) (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), xviii ). 
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virtues which demand prudence that they may exist as perfect moral virtues.‖ 295 In more 
recent times, Dell‘Olio has suggested a similar view: ―Charity serves as the ‗remote‘ form of 
the acquired moral virtues by serving as the ‗proximate‘ form of infused prudence. For 
infused prudence itself serves as the proximate form of acquired prudence in the life of the 
Christian, and acquired prudence, since it directs all acquired moral virtues by right reason to 
their proper ends, serves as the proximate form of the other moral virtues. . . . In this sense, 
we may say that the infused virtues stand to the natural virtues as form stands to matter.‖296 
There are several scholars (e.g. Klubertanz, Bullet, Mirkes etc.) who favor the application of 
the matter-form analogy for describing the cooperation of acquired and infused virtue. This 
will be the topic of chapter 3. In the present chapter, however, we shall clarify in which way 
an inferior virtue might be considered as the matter of another virtue. 
As a kind of preparation, we inquire first into Aquinas‘s description of the collaboration of 
two acts by means of the form-matter analogy (section 2.4.1). Subsequently, we distinguish 
two different understandings of an act as the matter of another act (section 2.4.2). On this 
basis we will then be prepared to answer our main-question, namely in which sense a virtue 
can be the matter of another virtue. We determine first the mutual influence of different 
(acquired) moral virtues (section 2.4.3a), and then we apply these results to the relation 
between charity and the infused virtues (section 2.4.3b). 
 
 
2.4.1 The Matter-Form Analogy in the Context of Human Action 
 
It is impossible to refer to the concept of matter apart from form as its counterpart. Aquinas 
uses these complementary concepts to describe the mutual relation between two acts, or more 
exactly to clarify how one human act can be composed of two different components. 
Originally the idea stems from physics: natural things combined of matter and form are two in 
principle, but one in being, e.g. man composed of body and soul. Analogously, the human act 
can be ―made of‖ different parts, insofar as it arises from different powers. The act does 
remain one act, however, if those powers cooperate in the one act. For example, when Christ 
purified the Jerusalem temple with a whip, in this one action were involved his practical 
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 Anthony J. Falanga, Charity the Form of the Virtues According to Saint Thomas (Washington, DC: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 125. 
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intellect, his will, his irascible appetite, and the limbs of his body. All these various 
components worked together for one single, unified human action. Certainly, the one action 
cannot be ascribed to the various powers in a univocal way, but the action presupposes an 
order among them. It occurs non ex aequo, sed ordine quodam, as Aquinas explains.
297
 The 
order of the different ―parts‖ of one human act is grounded in the fact that one power can 
move or determine the other(s) to act. Christ‘s intellect proposed to his will the cleaning of 
the temple as an appropriate action. Thus, the will chose this option and approved the motion 
of his passions (holy anger), and subsequently executed the action by using the limbs as 
instruments. The common principle at play here is as follows: the superior power is able to 
move the inferior to its act. Our example combines the acts of three different powers, but 
because of their hierarchic ordering they constitute at the same time just one human act that 
stems from the intellect, the will and the irascible appetite.
298
 
Applying the matter-form analogy to the context of human action, the act of the inferior 
power relates as matter to the act of the superior as its formal principle, which determines the 
―material‖ part as its instrument. 
 
In human acts, the act of an inferior power relates as matter in regard to the act of a higher 
power, in so far as the inferior power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it; in this way 
also the act of the first mover relates as form to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident 
that the command and the act commanded are one human act, just as a whole is one, but many 
in its parts.
299
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 Andrew J. Dell‘Olio, Foundations of Moral Selfhood. Aquinas on Divine Goodness and the Connection of the 
Virtues (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2003), 134-135. 
297
 In a very similar context, namely regarding the question how one virtue can belong to different powers, he 
explains: ―Aliquid esse in duobus, contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod ex aequo sit in utroque. Et sic 
impossibile est unam virtutem esse in duabus potentiis, quia diversitas potentiarum attenditur secundum 
generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas 
potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur. Alio modo potest esse aliquid in duobus vel pluribus, 
non ex aequo, sed ordine quodam. Et sic una virtus pertinere potest ad plures potentias; ita quod in una sit 
principaliter, et se extendat ad alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis; secundum quod una 
potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia accipit ab alia.‖ (ST I-II 56.2). 
298
 ―Quando una potentia est movens alteram, tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus, nam idem est actus 
moventis et moti.‖ (ST I-II 17.4 ad 1). Klubertanz explains thereto in regard to the cooperation of intellect and 
will: ―In St. Thomas‘s psychology there is no separation of any kind between intellect and will, but only a 
distinction based on their formal objects and their causal order. Intellect and will are not just closed, 
noncommunicating essences; in the order of operation they interpenetrate.‖ (George P. Klubertanz, ―The Unity 
of Human Activity,‖ The Modern Schoolman 27 (1950): 91) 
299
 ST I-II 17.4: ―In actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, 
inquantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris moventis ipsam, sic enim et actus moventis primi formaliter 
se habet ad actum instrumenti. Unde patet quod imperium et actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus, sicut 
quoddam totum est unum, sed est secundum partes multa.‖ 
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Notable in this quotation is the reference to the command (imperium) and to the commanded 
act (actus imperatus). Human acts, composed of different parts, can only be described by the 
schema of command and commanded act. The command moves an inferior power to act for 
the sake of its own end (like as instrument) and functions thereby as unifying principle which 
provides the unity of the complete action. The command relates as form to commanded acts 
as matter.
300
  
According to Aquinas, the command is essentially an act of reason, since it implies the 
impressing of a certain order (or orientation) to the acts of other powers, but the task of 
ordering belongs to reason.
301
 However, the command does not only achieve the formal 
specification of the commanded act, but it also implies the realization of the act (i.e. the 
induction to acting). The exercise, however, does not belong to the intellect but to the will. 
Hence, the imperium of the intellect presupposes an act of the will, so that the intellect can 
perform the ordering and moving task as well. The command is an ―act of the reason, 
presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason moves by its command to the 
execution of an act.‖302 
We must also consider each act, insofar as being moved by reason and will results in an actus 
imperatus. These may include external acts of the body, the passions of the sensible appetite 
(insofar as they obey a voluntary command), and finally even acts of the intellect and will 
themselves.
303
 St. Thomas substantiates his statement with the examples of stealing for the 
sake of fornication. Stealing is the commanded act, whereas the unchaste desire works as a 
                                                 
300
 Cf. Klubertanz, ―The Unity of Human Activity,‖ 85-89. 
As an example of the formally unity of a material multiplicity we want to quote Aquinas‘s description of the 
virtue of worship (latria); it contains many singular actions (matter) which the one virtue commands according 
one unifying aspect, i.e. worship. ―Latria in se considerata est specialis virtus, quia habet specialem rationem 
obiecti et actus, scilicet ut exhibeatur aliquid deo in recognitionem servitutis, sicut feudatarius aliquid reddit 
domino suo in recognitionem dominii: unde actum et obiectum habet formaliter unum et specialem quantum ad 
praedictam rationem; quamvis materialiter sint multi actus et multa obiecta. Potest autem dici generalis quantum 
ad duos . . . modos. Potest enim uti actibus aliarum virtutum materialiter sub praedicta ratione proprii obiecti; et 
iterum ad actum eius praeexiguntur multae virtutes aliae, sicut fides quae ostendit cui exhibenda sit latria, et 
caritas, quae afficit ad eum cui exhibenda est; et sic possunt multae aliae concurrere. Quamvis autem utatur 
materialiter actibus aliarum virtutum sub ratione proprii actus, tamen utitur quibusdam actibus qui non sunt 
proprii alicuius alterius virtutis elicitive, sicut offerre sacrificia, facere protestationes, et huiusmodi: nisi forte 
sicut imperantur a caritate et ostenduntur a fide, non autem eliciuntur; et isti videntur proprie actus esse latriae.‖ 
(In sent. III 9.1B). 
301
 Cf. ST I-II 17.1. Helpful is also ST I-II 9.1 where Aquinas shows how the determination of a voluntary act 
essentially belongs to reason. 
302
 ST I-II 17.1: ―Primum autem movens in viribus animae ad exercitium actus, est voluntas, ut supra dictum est. 
Cum ergo secundum movens non moveat nisi in virtute primi moventis, sequitur quod hoc ipsum quod ratio 
movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis. Unde relinquitur quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupposito 
actu voluntatis, in cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus.‖ 
303
 See ST I-II 18: article 9 for the command of external acts, article 7 about passions, article 5 and 6 about 
commanded act of the will and the intellect. 
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command, and since the command relates to the commanded act as form to matter, the whole 
act is more an act of fornication than of stealing.
304
  
This example may seem to contradict the previous description of the command as an act of 
reason. In which way can fornication be considered as the command of stealing? Obviously 
Aquinas speaks elliptically in the example, for describing fornication (as the intended action) 
as the command of another act disregards reason‘s involvement. Command is defined as an 
―act of reason, presupposing an act of the will.‖ Thus, a detailed outline of the example would 
imply the following components. First, the volition of fornication, maybe preceded by the 
movement of some passions. Secondly, the ordering of the necessary means by reason, i.e. the 
command of theft. And thirdly, the execution of the act of theft. Though the efficient cause of 
the commanded act is a prior act of volition, nevertheless its formatting determination of the 
commanded act, i.e. the command properly speaking, is due (and always due) to reason.
305
  
This example makes clear that in a general sense every act can adopt the position of a 
command, as for instance adultery, namely insofar it provides the efficient cause for the 
execution of the commanded act of theft. However, its formal specification stems (necessarily 
and always) from reason.
306
 The commanding act works only in this way as the unifying 
principle of a compound human act. St. Thomas usually omits any mention of this 
involvement of reason. However, insofar as he refers in this context to the matter-form 
analogy, reason has to take part in the action.  
 
We have to observe in regard to the acts of the soul, that an act which belongs essentially to a 
power or habit, receives its form or species from a higher power or habit, insofar as the 
inferior is ordained by the superior; for if somebody performs an act of fortitude because of 
love of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally an act of charity.
307
 
 
At this point one might ask, what is meant by the assertion that the commanded act receives 
the form of the command? Does it lose thereby its own specification? The matter-form 
analogy reveals its advantage right there. Saying that a wooden table is materially wood and 
                                                 
304
 ―Ille qui furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per se loquendo, magis adulter quam fur.‖ (ST I-II 18.6). 
Aquinas quotes here Aristotle (NE 5.2 1130a24). The principle behind: ―Formalis ratio moralis actus accipitur 
per comparationem ad finem.‖ (De malo 4.2). 
305
 Consequently in irrational animals there is no command in the proper sense (ST I-II 17.2). 
306
 Cajetan describes even the relation between the presupposed motion of the will and the ordering act of reason 
by the matter-form-dichotomy: ―Consequens est ut ordinatio intimativa in imperio se habeat ut materia, et motio 
ut forma; ac per hoc, imperium est elicitive et essentialiter actus rationis, voluntatis vero primordialiter quoad 
formam.‖ (Cajetanus, ―Commentarium,‖ about ST I-II 17.1). 
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formally a table does not imply that it loses its being made of wood, but its specific 
determination as being a table stems from its form. Likewise, to refer to the actus imperatus 
as matter and to the command as form does not imply that the commanded act (the matter) 
loses its proper significance. In itself it remains determined by its proper object.
308 However, 
the concrete composed act (i.e. the actus humanus consisting of both actus imperatus and 
imperium) is determined by the unifying form which comes from the command. Though this 
does not abandon the proximate finality of the commanded act, nevertheless the command 
determines the character of the whole human act.
309
 Almsgivings moved one time by 
benevolence or another time for the sake of vain-glory are two specifically different acts, but 
nevertheless it remains one and the same species of almsgiving (matter) which is realized in 
both cases.
310
  
So far, so good. The distinction between command and commanded act bears particular 
importance for the determination of the morality of a concrete human act. The moral 
relevance of an action depends on its voluntariness.
311
 However, since only the will as rational 
appetite tends to the reasonable good as its proper object, good and evil pertain only to 
voluntary actions as a formal difference.
312
 As a consequence, only acts which arise from will 
and reason (i.e. from a command as described above) are morally relevant acts. The actus 
imperatus as material part does not imply per se a necessary relation to the reasonable good. It 
might bear only accidentally a moral qualification.
313
 The commanded act receives its moral 
qualification insofar as it is commanded by the intellectual powers and participate in this way 
in the moral qualification of the imperium of the practical reason. 
                                                                                                                                                        
307
 ST I-II 13.1: ―In actibus animae, quod actus qui est essentialiter unius potentiae vel habitus, recipit formam et 
speciem a superiori potentia vel habitu, secundum quod ordinatur inferius a superiori, si enim aliquis actum 
fortitudinis exerceat propter dei amorem, actus quidem ille materialiter est fortitudinis, formaliter vero caritatis.― 
308
 Aquinas emphasizes that the determination, which supplies the end, is more general and receives sometimes a 
further specification by the proper object of the commanded act. ―Differentia specifica quae est ex fine, est magis 
generalis; et differentia quae est ex obiecto per se ad talem finem ordinato, est specifica respectu eius.‖ (ST I-II 
18.7). The commanded act is (and remains) determined by the finis proximus, the command by the finis remotus. 
(Cf. Joseph Pilsner, The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 234-238). 
309
 Pilsner makes very well the difference between the species of the commanded act, determined by its own 
object and its proximate end, and the concrete human act which receives its form from the final end. See chapter 
9 in Ibid., 217-238. 
310
 Klubertanz shows analogously that the act of justice motivated by charity becomes formally an act of charity, 
but the internal structure of justice remains preserved (Klubertanz, ―The Unity of Human Activity,‖ 84). 
311
 Cf. ST I-II 1.3. 
312
 Cf. ST I-II 18.1 and 5. 
313
 It is in In sent. II 40.1 that Aquinas describes the actus imperatus as belonging only accidentally the species 
of moral acts: ―Quia, ut dictum est, hoc modo aliquid ad genus moris pertinet quo voluntarium est; ideo ipsi 
actus voluntatis, qui per se et immediate ad voluntatem pertinent, per se in genere moris sunt; unde simpliciter 
specie dividuntur interiores actus voluntatis per bonum et malum, sicut per differentias essentiales: actus autem 
imperati a voluntate, eliciti per alias potentias, pertinent ad genus moris per accidens, secundum scilicet quod 
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At this point a question arises regarding the material part of the human act: Does the 
commanded act as such, apart from the command, possess simply no relevance for the 
morality of the act? Is it to be understood as first matter, open for every kind of formation 
through the command of a superior faculty? Or are there commanded acts which bear in 
themselves a certain fittingness to the order of reason, or vice-versa some contrariety, so that 
in the latter case even a good command cannot make good use of it as its form? The questions 
show that the commanded act as matter requires further distinction.  
 
 
2.4.2 Two Different Meanings of “Matter” in the Context of Action 
 
a) The Commanded Act as “First Matter” 
 
A commanded act might be considered as wholly undetermined matter in respect to its 
command – as first matter – if it contains per se no concordance or repugnance to the order of 
reason. This might be the case in two ways. 
 
First, in the context of the involvement of passions for the moral act. As we have seen in 
section 2.1, Aquinas distinguishes between the consideration of passions per se, i.e. 
determined only by their proper object, namely the sensible good, and passions as 
participating in reason.
314
 According to the first, passions are neither morally good nor evil; 
they are just an affective response to a sensible good (pleasure or displeasure).
315
 They do not 
become morally relevant unless they are commanded (or at least approved) by an act of 
                                                                                                                                                        
sunt a voluntate imperati; et ideo actus illi secundum substantiam non distinguuntur secundum speciem per 
bonum et malum, sed per accidens, secundum quod ad genus moris pertinent.‖ 
314
 See ST I-II 56.4; cf. chapter 2.1.1.  
315
 See De virt in com. 4 ad 1: ―Actio concupiscibilis et irascibilis si secundum se consideratur, non est peccatum 
mortale, concurrit tamen in actu peccati mortalis, quando ratione movente vel consentiente tendit in contrarium 
legis divinae; ita actus eorumdem, si per se accipiantur, non possunt esse actus virtutis, sed solum quando 
concurrunt ad consequendum imperium rationis.‖ Aquinas distinguishes therefore a material and formal element 
in sins: ―Unum quod pertinet ad substantiam actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato, cum dixit, 
dictum vel factum vel concupitum; aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali.― (ST I-II 71.6). See also ST I-II 
80.3 ad 3: ―Concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum, quando ratio ei actualiter resistit, non est peccatum, sed 
materia exercendae virtutis.‖ 
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reason and will, depending on their forming through a commanding act.
316
 Thus, disregarding 
the order of reason, affections are to be considered ―first matter‖ of the moral act.317  
 
Secondly, there are also some corporeal actions which do not bear in themselves the 
qualification as morally good or evil, since their content lacks a necessary relation to the order 
of reason. In themselves, they are indifferent. Aquinas gives some examples: ―It happens that 
the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of reason; as for 
example to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and things like this. And 
such actions are indifferent according to their species.‖318 The moral quality of each act stems 
from its relation to reason. But if there is not such a relation, the action remains undetermined 
– first matter – in respect to its moral qualification. In those cases the formal determination of 
a concrete human act depends completely on the command: if somebody walks in the field for 
honest reasons, it is good. If the motives are condemnable, then the whole action is evil.
319
 
 
It is important to note, however, that not all acts of all human powers can be considered as the 
matter of moral acts, but only acts of powers which are principally suited to follow the 
command of reason, which might be moved (informed) by a command. Due to this the term 
of matter is used as something capable of being further determined by another principle. 
Hence, acts as matter must be capable of being commanded by reason. The vegetative powers 
are therefore principally improper as matter for virtues,
320
 but in contrast all acts which can be 
measured by reason are potential matter of a command.
321
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 ST I-II 17.7. 
317
 ―Cum virtutis sit reddere opus bonum, operatio potest dici bona vel formaliter, inquantum procedit ex potentia 
quae movetur in bonum secundum rationem boni, vel materialiter, secundum quod est congruus et connaturalis 
potentiae.‖ (In sent. III 23.2.4A). 
318
 ST I-II 18.8: ―Contingit autem quod obiectum actus non includit aliquid pertinens ad ordinem rationis, sicut 
levare festucam de terra, ire ad campum, et huiusmodi, et tales actus secundum speciem suam sunt 
indifferentes.‖ 
319
 ―Contingit autem in his quae ad aliud ordinantur, quod aliquid est bonum ex hoc solum quod ad aliud 
ordinatur, sicut potio amara ex hoc solo est bona, quod est sanativa. Unde non est alia bonitas sanitatis et 
potionis, sed una et eadem. . . . Sic ergo dicendum quod, quando actus exterior est bonus vel malus solum ex 
ordine ad finem, tunc est omnino eadem bonitas vel malitia actus voluntatis, qui per se respicit finem, et actus 
exterioris, qui respicit finem mediante actu voluntatis.‖ (ST I-II 20.3). 
320
 ―Materia enim uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis est id circa quod modum rationis imponit.‖ (In ethic. II 3.3). 
And: ―Agibilia sunt . . . materia moralium virtutum secundum quod sunt obiectum virtutis appetitivae, scilicet 
sub ratione boni.‖ (ST II-II 47.5 ad 3). 
321
 ―Omnia quaecumque rectificari possunt per rationem sunt materia virtutis moralis.‖ (ST II-II 58.8). 
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b) The Commanded Act as Yet Formed Matter 
 
In contrast to the previous paragraph, some commanded acts imply in themselves a 
concordance to the order of reason (or contradict it). Almsgiving to an indigent person is in 
itself reasonable (though it can become evil because of particular circumstances), whereas 
thievery as taking away something that belongs lawfully to another person is principally 
opposed to the order of reason.  
 
Every action receives its species from its object; and the human act, which is called moral, 
receives its species from the object in relation to the principle of human actions, which is 
reason. Therefore, if the object of an action includes something in accord with the order of 
reason, the act will be a good according to its species; for instance, to give alms to an indigent 
person. But if it includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act 
according to its species, as to steal, which consists in taking things of the other.
322
 
 
Hence, there are some commanded acts which are to be judged as good or evil independent of 
the moral specification of their command. Of course, the isolated goodness of the commanded 
act would be insufficient for the moral goodness of the human act as a whole. The actus 
imperatus alone remains a theoretical abstraction, unless it is judged in connection with the 
commanding act, its definite moral qualification is impossible.
323
 Almsgiving in itself may be 
good, but even this act becomes evil if it is commanded for vain glory. Only if the 
commanded act itself and the command (i.e. the end for which it is willed) are in concordance 
with reason, the human act is morally good.
324
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 ST I-II 18.8: ―Actus omnis habet speciem ab obiecto; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet speciem ab 
obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio. Unde si obiectum actus includat aliquid quod 
conveniat ordini rationis, erit actus bonus secundum suam speciem, sicut dare eleemosynam indigenti. Si autem 
includat aliquid quod repugnet ordini rationis, erit malus actus secundum speciem, sicut furari, quod est tollere 
aliena.‖ Cf. De malo 2.3: ―Quaedam peccata sunt in quibus actus exteriores non sunt secundum se mali, sed 
secundum quod ex corrupta intentione vel voluntate procedunt: puta, cum quis vult dare eleemosynam propter 
inanem gloriam; et in huiusmodi peccatis manifestum est quod omnibus modis peccatum principaliter consistit in 
voluntate. Quaedam autem peccata sunt in quibus exteriores actus sunt secundum se mali, sicut patet in furto, 
adulterio, homicidio et similibus.‖ 
323
 See ST I-II 18.9.  
324
 ―Actus aliquis determinatur ad speciem moris dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte obiecti, sicut fornicatio ex hoc 
quod est circa delectabilia tactus; et haec determinatio est materialis, et respicit habitum elicientem actum. Alio 
modo ex parte finis; et haec est formalis specificatio, et respicit habitum imperantem.‖ (In sent. IV 38.2.2B). 
According to a scholastic axiom the human act is good only if all its components are good: Bonum ex integra 
causa, malum ex singularibus defectibus (cf. ST I-II 20.2). In this way externally considered it might be often 
impossible to decide whether a certain action is only materially a virtuous act or also formally. Only in a 
negative sense a univocal judgment is possible from the outside: If the matter of an act contains an implicit 
malice or impropriate circumstances – for example thievery, speaking against truth etc. – the whole act never is 
virtuous, since the matter in itself is already inadequate. However, this indirect qualification is possible only in 
one direction, i.e. in the case of external evil acts, but not in respect to good external acts – because of the quoted 
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Even under the supposition that the commanded act is per se good or evil, it remains only the 
material part of the human act, whereas its form is determined further on by the command. If 
almsgiving is motivated by the desire for assimilation to the poorness of Christ, it is more an 
act of charity for Christ than a support of the poor (though without standing in contradiction). 
Likewise in the case of sins. Whoever steals for the sake of fornication performs rather an act 
of intemperance than of thievery. Or more exactly, formally he commits an act of 
intemperance, materially an act of injustice.
325
 
Aquinas explains that in the case of a yet determined commanded act the qualification of the 
matter depends on reason, for only the intellect can judge the appropriateness of the object of 
the commanded act in respect to the order of reason.
326
 The full perfection of the human act 
however is not achieved unless the commanded act (which is in accordance with reason) is 
performed also for a right end. Thus, it is due to the will to supply this second qualification. 
Therefore, the goodness of the material part depends on reason, while the goodness of the 
formal command belongs to will.
327
  
 
 
c) Excursus: The Material Aspect of an Action as Substantia Operis 
 
Sometimes Aquinas refers to the material aspect of an act by the term substantia operis. The 
following excursus is necessary since the distinction between an action quantum ad 
substantiam operis and quantum ad modum operis is often used in the context of the 
cooperation of acquired and infused virtues (see chapter 3). St. Thomas normally applies this 
distinction to resolve the issue whether moral precepts command only the external realization 
                                                                                                                                                        
axiom. See thereto also David M. Gallagher, ―Aquinas on Moral Action: Interior and Exterior Acts,‖ 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64 (1990): 118-129. 
325
 ―Actus enim unius vitii, secundum quod ordinatur ad finem alterius vitii, recipit formam eius; utpote qui 
furatur ut fornicetur, materialiter quidem fur est, formaliter vero intemperatus.‖ (De caritate 3). Similar in ST I-II 
18.6: ―Quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas 
utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis . . . Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur 
secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus.‖ Likewise ST I-II 75.4: ―Finis dat 
formam in moralibus, ut supra habitum est, ex hoc etiam sequitur quod unum peccatum sit formalis causa 
alterius, in actu enim fornicationis quae propter furtum committitur, est quidem fornicatio sicut materiale, furtum 
vero sicut formale.‖ Cf. De malo 2.2 ad 13. 
326
 ―Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior secundum se, propter debitam materiam et debitas 
circumstantias, non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a ratione.‖ (ST I-II 20.1). 
327
 ―In actu exteriori potest considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia, una secundum debitam materiam et 
circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota 
dependet ex voluntate. Illa autem quae est ex debita materia vel circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione, et ex hac 
dependet bonitas voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur.‖ (ST I-II 20.2). 
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of a certain operation or include also their mode.
328
 His answer is that a law obliges its 
subjects to perform certain just or courageous deeds (―man achieves just and courageous 
deeds‖329) – i.e. to realize the substance of certain operations, its ―matter.‖ The law, however, 
does not demand a certain mode of acting. Just acts can be achieved justly, and courageous 
deed courageously – i.e. out of virtue, with a promptness, delight, and constancy. In those 
cases not only the substance of the act but also its mode and form are virtuous.
330
  
So far, the common usage of the distinction. Sometimes, however, its meaning is enlarged. 
Generally, the modus operis can be understood in three different ways.
331
 First, to do 
something knowingly. Whoever accomplishes an operation unconsciously (ex ignorantia
332
) 
might achieve a somehow just ―substance,‖ but the act is not performed in a human mode. 
Secondly, to do something voluntarily. To perform an external virtuous act without an 
internal voluntary command is again substantially good, but as long as the will is not involved, 
it is not achieved humano modo. Thirdly, somebody accomplishes something knowingly and 
willingly, but not firme et immobilter, e.g. if he does not possess the corresponding virtues. 
Again, the substance of the act is good, but now the substance of the act denotes a true human 
act, though its mode is not yet unrestrictedly virtuous.
333
 
The three different meanings of the modus operis show that the concept of the substantia 
operis covers not in all cases the complete moral act. In the first and second cases it denotes – 
as the concept of matter – only the commanded act, disregarding the command which 
specifies the action morally.
334
 In these cases the substantia operis designs an action 
determined by its immediate object, which might imply per se a concordance or a 
contradiction to reason (matter in the second sense) or disregard completely the order of 
reason (as ―first matter‖). In both cases only the modus allows a definite moral qualification. 
                                                 
328
 See e.g. In sent. II 28.3; De veritate 24.14 ad 1; 2; 7; ST I-II 96.3 ad 2; 100.9; 4; 109.4; II-II 44.4 ad 1. 
329
 ST I-II 109.4: ―Homo operatur iusta et fortia.‖ 
330
 Ibid., ―Non solum quantum ad substantiam operis, sed etiam quantum ad modum agenda.‖ 
331
 See ST I-II 100.9. 
332
 For Aquinas‘s outline of ignorance as hindrance for the human act, see ST I-II 6.8 and 76.1-4. 
333
 For the third meaning, see ST II-II 32.1 ad 1: ―Actus virtutis dupliciter. Uno modo, materialiter, sicut actus 
iustitiae est facere iusta. Et talis actus virtutis potest esse sine virtute, multi enim non habentes habitum iustitiae 
iusta operantur, vel ex naturali ratione, vel ex timore sive ex spe aliquid adipiscendi. Alio modo dicitur esse 
aliquid actus virtutis formaliter, sicut actus iustitiae est actio iusta eo modo quo iustus facit, scilicet prompte et 
delectabiliter. Et hoc modo actus virtutis non est sine virtute. Secundum hoc ergo dare eleemosynas materialiter 
potest esse sine caritate, formaliter autem eleemosynas dare, idest propter deum, delectabiliter et prompte et 
omni eo modo quo debet, non est sine caritate.‖ Also In sent. III 23.2.3C and IV 15.1.1A. 
334
 Cajetan identifies explicitly the substance and the matter of an human act: ―Actus compositus ex duobus 
spectantibus ad diversas potentias, illius est potentiae essentialiter et elicitive, cuius est materialiter, seu quantum 
ad substanitam actus.‖ (Cajetanus, ―Commentarium,‖ about ST I-II 17.1). Likewise Labourdette – stressing the 
unity of the human act – explains that the human act belongs per modum substantiae to the power of the 
commanded act, but per modum formae to the power of the command (cf. M.-Michel Labourdette, Cours de 
théologie morale: Les actes humains (Ia-IIae, 6-48) (Toulouse, 1962), 73). 
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Hence, it is important to see that the modus operis is certainly not randomly accidental. 
Speaking about the substantia operis might be misleading, since in Thomistic language the 
substance denotes usually the very basis and foundation of a being.
335
 In the third case it 
indicates the very being of an action which also disregards the virtuous mode of a definite 
moral qualification.
336
 However, according to the first and second meaning the substantia 
operis does not contain the whole determination of the act, but only the material aspect of an 
action. Vice versa, the modus operis does not denominate a mere accidental accessory but the 
formal determination which gives the ultimate specification to the human act as a whole. ―The 
end, even if it does not denote the substance of the act, is nevertheless the most principal 
cause of the act [causa principalissima], insofar as it moves to the act.‖337 
If only the substance of an act is considered, it would makes no difference if a dangerous 
situation is endured because of charity, because of a judgment of natural prudence, or because 
of vain glory: The substance of the act – namely enduring dangers – remains three times the 
same. The substance takes in account only the actus imperatus as such, abstractly 
considered,
338
 in its species naturae,
339
 but disregards the intention which specifies the act 
(imperium).
340
 Nevertheless, the two concrete courageous acts as human acts (one time 
because of charity, another time because of vanity) are specifically different, although they 
contain the same commanded act, i.e. the same substance.  
This shows that it is impossible to describe the moral qualification of an act only by reference 
to its substance, to its material part. Only if the substance is determined by the right mode, it 
is formally good. 
 
 
                                                 
335
 Cf. In sent. III 23.21 ad 1: ―Substantia est fundamentum et basis omnium aliorum entium.‖ 
336
 In this sense Aquinas explains elsewhere about the act of sin: ―Substantia actus peccati est a deo, non autem 
deformitas.‖ (De potentia 3.6 arg. 21 – affirmative). 
337
 ST I-II 7.4 ad 2: ―Finis, etsi non sit de substantia actus, est tamen causa actus principalissima, inquantum 
movet ad agendum.‖ Cf. also ST I-II 7.4: ―Principalissima est omnium circumstantiarum illa quae attingit actum 
ex parte finis, scilicet cuius gratia, secundaria vero, quae attingit ipsam substantiam actus, idest quid fecit.‖ 
338
 We should note that actus imperatus designates often an external act, but not necessarily. Even the act of the 
intellect can be commanded by the will, so that one can abstract the substance of the act. 
339
 See ST I-II 18.7 ad 1: ―Actus qui secundum substantiam suam est in una specie naturae, secundum 
conditiones morales supervenientes, ad duas species referri potest.‖ 
340
 Aquinas notes that quantum ad substantiam operis all acts of virtues can be commanded even without such 
virtues, by the mere command of reason and will (cf. De Veritate 24.14 ad 1 and ad 2 – at least for most times; cf. 
ad 7; ST I-II 109.4); also the grave sinner can fulfill the acts of the Christian fasting quoad substantiam operis, 
according to St. Paul even martyrdom is possible without the corresponding virtue of charity (cf. 1 Cor 13.3). 
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2.4.3 Virtue (qua habitus) as Matter of Another Virtue 
 
Having discussed the various possibilities of how one human act may be composed of 
different parts and how those parts relate to each other as matter and form, we pose the 
question whether the relation between various virtues can be described by the matter-form 
analogy: can we understand temperance – as habit – as the matter of prudence? Or even as the 
matter of justice? And can we interpret the infused moral virtues as the matter of charity? 
Admittedly, Aquinas suggests quite clearly such a relation in many of his texts. For example: 
―It is fitting that habits which are in inferior powers are informed by habits which are in 
superior powers; and in this way the formation of the inferior virtues has to stem from any 
superior virtue.‖341 And subsequently he concludes for charity: ―Therefore it is said somewhat 
commonly that charity, quasi the most principle of all virtues, is the form of the other 
virtues.‖342 But does Aquinas speak here about the formation of virtues themselves or only of 
their acts? 
In the following, we shall first clarify the issue of the relationship linking the different virtues 
on the natural level, and then in a second subchapter we will apply our findings to the 
relationship between charity and infused virtues. 
 
 
a) Can One Acquired Virtue Relate to Another as Matter? 
 
The interpretation of one virtue as the matter of another raises the following question: if we 
understand the commanding virtue as the form of the one commanded, it seems that the latter 
becomes finally the former. Why? At the beginning of section 2.4 we asserted the following 
principle: the command relates to the commanded act as form to matter. The commanded act 
receives its specific character from the command. Stealing because of adultery is formally 
speaking an act of intemperance. Analogously, to argue that an inferior virtue receives as 
habit the form of the superior seems to imply that the inferior virtue becomes the superior one. 
So are all moral virtues finally just one virtue? As clearly as Aquinas defends the matter-form 
                                                 
341
 De veritate 14.5: ―Oportet quod habitus qui sunt in inferioribus viribus formentur per habitus qui sunt in 
superioribus; et sic ab aliqua virtute superiori debet esse inferiorum virtutum formatio.‖ 
342
 Ibid., ―Unde quasi communiter dicitur, quod caritas, quasi praecipua virtutum, sit aliarum virtutum forma.‖ 
Similar in De caritate 3. 
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analogy in the case of command and commanded act, he negates the principle in the case of 
the virtues: 
 
The act of one habit, insofar as it is commanded by another habit, takes its moral species, 
formally speaking, from that [commanding] act. Hence, when a man commits fornication in 
order to steal, the act may be materially of intemperance, but formally it is of avarice. But 
although an act of intemperance may in a certain sense receive its species from avarice 
because it is commanded; nevertheless, it does not follow from this that intemperance takes its 
species from the fact that its act is commanded by avarice.
343
 
 
The assertion is completely clear. But there are other texts (we quoted two above) which 
claim such an ―informing‖ of one virtue by another virtue. Thus, is there any qualified sense 
in which one virtue can be described as form of another – qua virtus?  
 
 
i) The Relation of One Virtue in Regard to the Act of Another 
 
In a first step toward answering this question, we investigate the implications of one virtue for 
the acts of another one. The point that two virtues relate to each other as form to matter can 
mean that one virtue works as form of the act of the other. St. Thomas explains: ―When 
something, what belongs to one habit, relates as form to the act of another habit, then the one 
habit relates to the other habit as form.‖344 The statement is not really surprising. It is just a 
consequence of his doctrine about human acts combined of imperium and actus imperatus: the 
commanded act belongs to the inferior virtue, moved by the command of another virtue. If, 
for example, the virtue of justice commands an act of temperance, justice can be described as 
form of the virtue temperance. Of course, we should not ignore the essential contribution of 
reason for the commanding act. Justice by itself is a moral virtue of the reasonable appetite. 
                                                 
343
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 10: ―Actus alicuius habitus, prout imperatur ab illo habitu, accipit quidem speciem 
moralem, formaliter loquendo, de ipso actu; unde cum quis fornicatur ut furetur, actus iste licet materialiter sit 
intemperantiae, tamen formaliter est avaritiae. Sed licet actus intemperantiae accipiat aliqualiter speciem, prout 
imperatur ab avaritia; non tamen ex hoc intemperantia speciem accipit secundum quod actus est ab avaritia 
imperatus.‖ And Aquinas substantiates the principle by the example of charity: ―Ex hoc ergo quod actus 
temperantiae vel fortitudinis imperantur a caritate ordinante eos in ultimum finem; ipsi quidem actus formaliter 
speciem sortiuntur: nam formaliter loquendo fiunt actus caritatis; non tamen ex hoc sequeretur quod temperantia 
vel fortitudo speciem sortiantur.‖ (Ibid.). 
344
 De caritate 3: ―Quando id quod est unius habitus, est ut formale in actu alterius habitus, oportet quod unus 
habitus se habeat ad alium ut forma.‖ Likewise In sent. II 26.4 ad 5: ―Caritas enim est forma virtutum ex parte 
actus, inquantum scilicet omnes actus virtutum in suum finem convocat, eo quod eius obiectum est finis ultimus. 
Sic enim est in omnibus potentiis et actibus ordinatis, quod illa quae altiorem finem respicit, largitur formam arti 
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Hence, by itself it provides only the efficient cause for another act, but its formal 
determination remains due to reason. Consequently, there is always need for a certain 
involvement of prudence. Or to be more precise, justice determines the end and motivation of 
the whole action, but the informing of the commanded act is due to prudence which works in 
virtue of the inclination of justice. Thus, properly speaking, prudence achieves the formal 
determination of the temperate act, but moved by justice towards the end of justice.  
Is this already the whole meaning of virtue as matter of another virtue? Can we interpret only 
the act of one virtue as matter of a superior virtue? Or is there also a possibility to understand 
the habit itself of the commanded virtue as matter of the commanding? 
 
 
ii) The Relation of One Virtue qua virtus as Matter of Another 
 
In section 2.1 we outlined at great length the nature of moral virtue as the participation of an 
appetitive power in the order of reason, or as a reasonable inclination of the human appetite 
towards those goods which man recognizes immediately as good by the practical intellect (i.e. 
the synderesis). Prudence appears only on the basis of this orientation of moral virtues toward 
the achievement of its proper task, namely to inquire, choose, and then command the fitting 
actions of these virtues to attain their ends. 
This short flashback shows that there may be a twofold informing of a given virtue. On the 
one hand, if prudence chooses and commands the concrete acts of moral virtues (namely on 
the basis of their general inclination to their specific ends), it determines formally the concrete 
act of the commanded virtue. This is the conclusion reached in the previous paragraph. On the 
other hand, moral virtue itself consists in an inclination towards its proper end, which is 
known by the natural habit of synderesis. Hence, in a certain way even virtue as virtue is 
somehow formed by the practical intellect. St. Thomas explains: 
 
In these virtues [i.e. in moral virtues] there is something formal, and something quasi material. 
The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the 
passions and operations according to a certain mode. But since this mode is determined by 
reason, the formal element is this order of reason.
345
 
                                                                                                                                                        
quae sub ipsa est, cuius actus in suum finem ordinatur.‖ See on this issue Klubertanz, ―The Unity of Human 
Activity,‖ 77; 82 and 85. 
345
 ST I-II 67.1: ―In huiusmodi virtutibus aliquid est formale; et aliquid quasi materiale. Materiale quidem est in 
his virtutibus inclinatio quaedam partis appetitivae ad passiones vel operationes secundum modum aliquem. Sed 
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In many texts Aquinas attributes this formatting function of reason to prudence. ―Prudence is 
the form of the other moral virtues insofar as the sealing of prudence in the inferior powers 
gives to the habits which are there the notion of virtue.‖346 Or, as he says elsewhere in a more 
detailed manner: 
 
A lower power does not have the perfection of virtue except by participating in the perfection 
of a higher power, as for example a habit in the irascible power does not have the nature of 
virtue . . . except inasmuch as it receives understanding and distinction from reason, which is 
perfected by prudence; and accordingly, prudence places a form and a appropriate manner of 
acting into all the other moral virtues.
347
 
 
In these citations St. Thomas refers to prudence not in its specific sense, i.e. as the virtue 
which inquires, chooses, and commands the concrete actions of a certain moral virtue. Hence, 
prudence informs just the practical intellect insofar as it determines the end of moral virtue 
(which is known by synderesis).
348
 In this qualified sense, however, prudence is not only the 
form of virtuous acts, but it also determines the orientation of moral virtues. And in this way 
prudence can be called the form of all moral virtues.
349
 
If our interpretation is correct, we can even go a step further. It should now be possible to 
describe indirectly the mutual relation of various moral virtues by the matter-form analogy. 
For example, according to what logic can we describe justice as the form of fortitude? In 
section 2.3, we distinguished virtues which perfect the agent either as an individual or as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
quia iste modus determinatur a ratione, ideo formale in omnibus virtutibus est ipse ordo rationis.‖ Already ST I-II 
66.2 refers to the matter-form-analogy for describing the relation between prudence and the other moral virtues 
and clarifies how all moral virtues can be equal: Since all acts of moral virtues have to be formed by the one 
virtue of prudence, they are formally equal. ―Sic igitur et ratio aequalitatis virtutum potest accipi ex parte 
prudentiae, quantum ad id quod est formale in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, existente enim ratione aequaliter 
perfecta in uno et eodem, oportet quod proportionaliter secundum rationem rectam medium constituatur in 
qualibet materia virtutum. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in virtutibus moralibus, scilicet inclinationem 
ipsam ad actum virtutis; potest esse unus homo magis promptus ad actum unius virtutis quam ad actum alterius, 
vel ex natura, vel ex consuetudine, vel etiam ex gratiae dono.‖ (ST I-II 66.2). Similar in De virt. in com. 12 ad 23: 
―De prudentia vero manifestum est quod quodammodo est generalis, in quantum habet pro materia omnia 
moralia, et in quantum omnes virtutes morales quodammodo eam participant, . . . et hac ratione dicitur quod 
omnis virtus moralis debet esse prudens.‖ 
346
 In sent. III 27.2.4C ad 1: ―Prudentia est forma aliarum virtutum moralium, inquantum sigillatio quedam 
prudentiae in inferioribus viribus dat habitibus qui ibi sunt, rationem virtutis.‖ 
347
In sent. III 27.2.4C: ―Inferior enim potentia non habet perfectionem virtutis nisi secundum quod participat 
perfectionem potentiae superioris; sicut habitus qui est in irascibili, non habet rationem virtutis, ut dicitur in 4 
ethic., nisi inquantum intellectum et discretionem recipit a ratione, quam perficit prudentia; et secundum hoc 
prudentia ponit modum et formam in omnibus aliis virtutibus moralibus.‖ See also De veritate 27.5. ad 5. 
348
 See thereto footnote 33 in section 2.1. 
349
 In sent. IV 15.1.1B ad 3: ―Quaelibet virtus moralis participat actus prudentiae, eo quod formaliter ipsa 
complet in eis rationem virtutis, cum secundum eam medium accipiatur in singulis virtutibus moralibus.‖  
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citizen. The former are first of all the affective virtues, while the latter involves justice and its 
parts. The good function of justice in regard to one‘s neighbor, however, presupposes and 
includes also affective virtues, or temperance and fortitude not as virtues of the good 
individual (inclined to the proper good of the individual) but as political virtues. Aquinas 
knows a specific fortitude which works for the good of the individual and also a political 
fortitude which makes the good citizen.
350
 The special character of the latter consists in the 
inclination of the irascible appetite towards the end of justice – ―civil fortitude strengthens 
man‘s mind in regard to human justice‖351 – namely the wellbeing of the human city.352  
Thus, in this indirect way it should be possible to describe justice as the form of political 
fortitude, for justice inclines the good citizen towards the common good as to his end. This 
end, however, is relevant even for political fortitude. It is the inclination of justice (to the 
common good) which determines likewise the end of political fortitude. Hence, justice relates 
to this species of fortitude as a formal principle. Or more precisely, justice determines the end 
which is imprinted on the irascible appetite by the mediation of prudence. As we have seen, 
the task of ordering is due to reason, so the immediate informing of the sensitive appetite also 
stems from reason (prudence). Nevertheless, the general ―focus‖ on the common good as the 
end of human action is constituted by justice. And in this indirect way justice can be 
portrayed as the form of the political virtues.  
In the next chapter we will examine whether it is possible to apply these results analogously 
to the relationship of charity and the infused moral virtues.  
 
 
b) Infused Virtues as Matter Respectively of Charity 
 
We have clarified how virtues can be addressed as the form of other virtues, either of their 
acts or even (in a more qualified sense) of virtues themselves. What consequences arise from 
this for understanding charity and the other infused virtues?  
                                                 
350
 See De virt. in com. 10 ad 4: ―Fortitudo, quae est virtus hominis qua homo, non ordinat actum suum ad 
bonum politicum, nisi mediante fortitudine quae est virtus hominis in quantum est civis.‖ 
351
 ST II-II 124.2 ad 1: ―Fortitudo civilis firmat animum hominis in iustitia humana, propter cuius 
conservationem mortis pericula sustinet.‖ 
352
 In sent. III 33.3.3C ad 1: ―Fortitudo politica dicitur ex motivo, quia scilicet aliquod bonum quod a civitatibus 
praestari fortibus solet, ad actum fortitudinis movet.‖ 
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i) Charity as Form of Acts. Aquinas’s Elliptical Way of Expression  
 
On many occasions Aquinas quotes the famous principle caritas forma virtutum – a quasi 
common concept for the Middle Ages.
353
 The assertion often describes charity‘s influence on 
the acts of other virtues. In particular, charity is portrayed as the form of commanded acts 
which are in turn portrayed as its matter. For example, the temperate act commanded by 
charity belongs materially to infused temperance but formally to charity. And since charity 
constitutes the ultimate end of all acts in the justified person, consequently all virtuous acts 
are performed in some way for the sake of charity. Charity is therefore forma virtutum 
omnium; it moves all virtues to their proper act. ―By charity the acts of all other virtues are 
directed to the ultimate end. And therefore, it gives the form to all acts of the other virtues. 
And precisely in this sense charity is called the form of the virtues, even these are called 
virtues in relation to informed acts.‖354  
This assertion, however, requires some qualification. The previous section has shown that 
justice – commanding temperance – can do so only by the involvement of prudence. 
Something analogue has to be said in the present case. Charity belongs to the will. It provides 
the inclination towards God as final end of all actions. Consequently, it might command the 
acts of all other virtues. It causes the exercitium actus insofar as it works as an efficient cause, 
but it requires the cooperation of a cognitive virtue for the specificatio actus.
355
 This is due to 
(infused) prudence which inquires, chooses, and commands the concrete actions in respect to 
the final end of charity.
356
 
                                                 
353
 The axiom became diffused by the Sentences of the Peter Lombard where it is written: ―Fides autem qua 
creditur si cum caritate sit, virtus est, quia caritas, ut ait Ambrosius super Epist. ad Rom., mater est omnium 
virtutum, quae omnes informat, sine qua nulla vera virtus est.‖ (Peter Lombard, Libri Sententiarum, dist. XXIII, 
no. 3, PL 192, 805). Though Ambrose is quoted in this context (in reality it is a text of the Ambrosiaster), the 
original citation speaks only of charity as mother of all virtues, which ―informs‖ the other virtues (see Falanga, 
Charity the Form, xiii; xv-xvi). 
354
 ST II-II 23.8: ―Per caritatem ordinantur actus omnium aliarum virtutum ad ultimum finem. Et secundum hoc 
ipsa dat formam actibus omnium aliarum virtutum. Et pro tanto dicitur esse forma virtutum, nam et ipsae virtutes 
dicuntur in ordine ad actus formatos.‖ Cf. ST II-II 23.4 ad 2: Charity extends to all other human acts ―per modum 
imperii, non quasi immediate eliciens omens actus virtutum.‖ See also In sent. III 27.2.4C; De veritate 14.5 (esp. 
ad 5); De malo 8.5; De virt. in com. 12 ad 9; De caritate 3; ST I-II 65.2. In order to describe the function of 
charity as commanding the acts of other virtues Aquinas uses alongside the concept of forma also terms as radix, 
motor, finis, mater and fundamentum (for a detailed outline: J.E. van Roey, De virtute charitatis: Quaestiones 
selectae (Mechelen: H. Dessain, 1929), 39-41). 
355
 This is nothing else than the application of the description of the general structure of the act of the will (cf. 
esp. ST I-II 9.1) to the supernatural act of charity. For a more extensive account see Michael S. Sherwin, By 
Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, 
DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 186-192. 
356
 Enlightening in this context is ST II-II 27.6 ad 3 where Aquinas argues that the internal act of charity (i.e. the 
act of love toward God) is not measured by reason since it exceeds every measure, whereas commanded acts of 
charity (Aquinas speaks of actus exteriores) are to be commensurate to charity as well as reason. ―Obiectum 
divinae dilectionis, quod est deus, excedit iudicium rationis. Et ideo non mensuratur ratione, sed rationem 
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As a result, the axiom of charity as the form of each act of an infused moral virtue has to 
include an interconnection of charity and infused prudence. Such an interconnection may be 
describd as follows. Charity provides the general orientation regarding the final end, while it 
is by infused prudence that graced actions of created things are specified. Thus, only the 
motive cause to the exercise of those acts is due to charity itself.  
Admittedly, Aquinas usually skips this more elaborate expression and refers elliptically just to 
charity as form of all virtues.
357
 But obviously he is aware of that relationship, as we can 
recognize on the basis of a few short remarks.
358
  
As an example emblematic of St. Thomas‘s thought, we refer to a short note that appears in 
De veritate: the act of moral virtues (e.g. temperance) relate as matter to the command of 
prudence, which designates the right mean. However, just this act (as derived from 
temperance and prudence) relates again as matter in respect to charity, which commands the 
prudent act for attaining of the final end. Hence, the complete virtuous act can be considered 
as matter in a twofold way: in respect to prudence and in respect to charity. The informing of 
charity works simultaneously through prudence, and therefore the act is informed in two ways:  
 
In one way, in so far as the due conditions for the substance of the act are placed, by whose 
limits it is constituted in the mean of virtue. And this the act of virtue has from prudence; since 
the mean of virtue is determined according to right reason, as said in the Ethic. II. And in this 
sense prudence is called the form of all the moral virtues. But the act of virtue thus constituted 
in the mean relates quasi-material in regard to the order to the ultimate end; this order is 
                                                                                                                                                        
excedit. Nec est simile de interiori actu caritatis et exterioribus actibus. Nam interior actus caritatis habet 
rationem finis, quia ultimum bonum hominis consistit in hoc quod anima deo inhaereat, secundum illud psalm., 
mihi adhaerere deo bonum est. Exteriores autem actus sunt sicut ad finem. Et ideo sunt commensurandi et 
secundum caritatem et secundum rationem.‖ (ibid.). This shows: It is not due to charity itself to determine the 
right mean of a virtuous action whose proper object are created things (e.g. external acts); charity‘s proper object 
is God himself. To determine the right mean in respect of things requires the measure of elevated reason – in 
other words: infused prudence. See thereto Ibid., 176-187. 
357
 Certainly in agreement with the prior tradition. See e.g. ST I-II 65.2. A concrete case is described by Aquinas 
in ST II-II 124.2 ad 2 where he explains that charity commands martyrdom as an act of fortitude.  
358
 Aquinas explains for example that faith causes through charity the acts of the other virtues. ―Fides interior, 
mediante dilectione, causat omnes exteriores actus virtutum mediantibus aliis virtutibus, imperando, non 
eliciendo.‖ (ST II-II 3.1 ad 3). Yet in his Commentary on the Sentences he touches the cooperation of faith and 
charity in regard to the practice of supernatural actions. In In sent. III 9.1B the virtue of latria depends on faith 
regarding its specification and on charity according its exercise. (―. . . fides quae ostendit cui exhibenda sit latria, 
et caritas, quae afficit ad eum cui exhibenda est.‖ And later on: The acts of latria ―imperantur a caritate et 
ostenduntur a fide‖). Further examples: In sent. III 27.2.4C ad 2 and ad 5; De veritate 27.5 ad 5. 
Helpful also the following notice of Cajetan: ―Sicut in virtutibus acquisitis synderesis non ponit medium nisi 
mediante prudentia, et morales appetitivae medium illud exequuntur; ita in infusis fides, finem ultimum firmans 
et largiens, mediante prudentia infusa, medium moralibus infuses imponit, et illas oportet medium illud habilitare. 
Fides ergo medium non dat nisi remote: prudentia autem infusa proxime.‖ (Cajetanus, ―Commentarium,‖ about 
ST I-II 63.3). 
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applied to the act of virtue by the command of charity; and in this sense charity is said to be 
the form of all the other virtues.
359
 
 
We can summarize our findings here as follows. The formation of the charitable act in the 
proper sense is due to faith and infused virtue, and charity itself works as causa efficiens. 
―Charity is called the form of the other virtues not in an exemplar or essential way, but rather 
by way of efficient cause.‖360 
 
 
ii) Charity as Form of Virtues as Habits 
 
In a second step we investigate whether charity can also be understood as form of other 
virtues as habits.
361
 We have seen already how the bonum rationis – known by synderesis and 
proposed to the appetites by prudence – might be interpreted as the form of moral virtues. In a 
more qualified sense even moral virtues can be considered as form of others virtues, insofar as 
they determine the end of other virtues by the mediation of prudence (e.g. justice in respect to 
the other political virtues). Hence, it should be possible to draw an analogy to infused virtues.  
Charity directs the graced agent to a new supernatural end (in cooperation with faith; see 
section 2.1) which develops and elevates man‘s already natural orientation to the reasonable 
good (see section 1.1 about the natural seeds of virtue). Now, as the acquired moral virtues are 
virtues simply because of their inclination to the ends known immediately by synderesis, 
infused virtues consist in the inclination of the appetitive powers towards the ends determined 
by the theological virtues. Of course, since charity is a virtue of the will, it fails to provide the 
order of other virtues on its own account, but it does constitute the general orientation towards 
a new supernatural end. And only on this basis does the practical intellect of the graced agent 
achieve the informing of the moral virtues regarding the new supernatural end. Hence, in this 
                                                 
359
 De veritate 27.5 ad 5: ―Uno modo in quantum circa substantiam actus apponuntur debitae conditiones, per 
quarum limitationem in medio virtutis constituitur. Et hoc habet actus virtutis a prudentia; nam medium virtutis 
accipitur secundum rationem rectam, ut dicitur in libro II ethic. Et sic prudentia dicitur forma omnium virtutum 
moralium. Actus autem virtutis sic constitutus in medio, est quasi materialis respectu ordinis in finem ultimum, 
qui quidem ordo apponitur actui virtutis ex imperio caritatis; et sic caritas dicitur esse forma omnium aliarum 
virtutum.‖ 
360
 ST II-II 23.8 ad 1: ―Caritas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutum non quidem exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed 
magis effective.‖ See thereto: Sherwin, By Knowledge and by Love, 197-202. 
361
 Scholars who refer to the axiom of charity as forma virtutum often lack this distinction (cf. e.g. Schuster, 
Moralisches Können, 201-202) or even negate such a possibility (e.g. Reginaldus M. Schultes, ―‗De caritate ut 
forma virtutum:‘ Summa theologica, II.a IIae, q. 23, a. 6-8,‖ Divus Thomas (Piac.) 31 (1928): 5-28; Roey, De 
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indirect way charity is the forma virtutum since the moral virtues ―substantiate‖ the order of 
charity in the various human powers, in respect to diverse created things. 
 
A inferior power has not the perfection of a virtue, except if it participate in the perfection of a 
higher power . . . Therefore, it is impossible that a habit of any power of the soul possess the 
notion of virtue in the sense of meritorious virtues – which are relevant here – except if this 
power participate in something of the perfection of the will which is perfected by charity; and 
therefore charity is the form of all other virtues, as prudence in respect to all moral [virtues].
362
 
 
We may therefore describe the connection of charity and the infused virtues as follows. 
Charity constitutes a new super-rational order, and thus infused moral virtues orient the 
various human appetites according to this new order in regard to their proper matter, sc. 
infused justice, infused fortitude, and infused temperance. Thereby, charity can be called the 
form of those virtues, though charity itself is not the immediate informing principle.  
Aquinas himself is very cautious to avoid the misconception that charity would inform the 
infused moral virtues immediately by itself. As the form of the virtues, charity provides for 
infused virtues only their common character as supernatural virtue; it supplies – as he says – 
the species communis virtutis.
363
 The various infused virtues, however, differ by reason of 
their underlying powers and their proper objects.
364
 He asserts therefore simultaneously that 
―charity is not an intrinsic form.‖ 365  Elsewhere does he call charity even somewhat 
ponderously a ―forma quasi-informans,‖366 i.e. providing the supernatural perfection for the 
infused virtues but leaving untouched their proper specification by their objects.
367
  
                                                                                                                                                        
virtute charitatis, 34-36; 44-60). For a positive affirmation, see M.-Michel Labourdette, Cours de théologie 
morale: La charité (IIa-IIae, 23-46) (Toulouse, 1960), 59-63, esp. 62. 
362
 In sent. III 27.2.4C: ―Inferior enim potentia non habet perfectionem virtutis nisi secundum quod participat 
perfectionem potentiae superioris . . . Unde non potest esse quod aliquis habitus existens in aliqua potentia 
animae habeat rationem virtutis loquendo de virtutibus meritoriis, de quibus hic loquimur, nisi secundum hoc 
quod in illa potentia participatur aliquid de perfectione voluntatis quam caritas perficit; et ideo caritas est forma 
virtutum aliarum omnium, sicut prudentia moralium.‖ In this article of the Commentary on the Sentences, in 
which Aquinas explicitly expounds the axiom caritas forma virtutum, he himself mentions our two possible 
interpretations of the principle: Charity as form of virtus can understood as motor omnium aliarum virtutum, i.e. 
charity is able to command the acts of all other virtues (see above). But he continues that the axiom can also 
mean that charity ―est forma perficiens unamquamque virtutem in ratione virtutis.‖ (Ibid.) Hence, in this sense 
charity is actually the form of the other virtues as virtue. 
363
 ―Caritas non det unicuique virtuti propriam speciem, dat tamen unicuique virtuti communem speciem 
virtutis.― (De caritate 3 ad 1; see also ad 5). 
364
 ―A proprio fine et a proprio obiecto quaelibet virtus habet formam specialem, per quam est haec virtus; sed a 
caritate habet quamdam formam communem, secundum quam est meritoria vitae aeternae.‖ (De caritate 3 ad 9); 
see thereto: Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 73-75. 
365
 De caritate 3 ad 18: ―Caritas autem non est forma intrinseca.‖ See also ST II-II 23.4 ad 1 and 8 ad 1. 
366
 ―Caritas non est forma virtutum quae sit pars essentiae virtutum, . . . sed est forma quasi informans.‖ (De 
caritate 3 ad 16; also ad 18). 
367
 Scholars as Lottin or Sherwin noted a certain development on this question in Aquinas work. In ST II-II 23.8, 
presumable the latest text of Aquinas about charity as the form of virtues (caritas forma virtutum), he avoids to 
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refer to charity as formal cause of the other virtues, but he explains the axiom at issue as indicating the causa 
efficiens of supernatural acts. In ST II-II 23.8 ad 1 he says explicitly: ―Caritas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutum 
non quidem exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed magis effective.‖ (Cf. Lottin, Morale fondamentale, 390-396, esp. 
395-396; Sherwin, By Knowledge and by Love, 192-202, esp. 197-202).  
However, both scholars draw quite different conclusions from this observation: 
According to Lottin, the final assertion gives reason to argue that charity‘s intention of the supernatural end can 
move as efficient cause all other human acts which become thereby supernaturalized. ―L‘intention charitable 
pénètre donc, à la manière d‘une ‗intention virtuelle‘, les actes de toutes les autres veruts. Cette penetration qui, 
par definition, est intrinsèque à ces actes, n‘affect cependant pas la substance de ces actes à la façon d‘une forme 
substantielle.‖ (Lottin, Morale fondamentale, 401). From this view it is the consequent conclusion that infused 
moral virtues are a redundant construct. The charitable intention is able to elicit even from acquired virtues 
supernatural acts (see also Lottin, Morale fondamentale, 408-414; likewise in Lottin, ―A propos des vertus 
morales infuses,‖ 220-225).  
By contrast, the majority of the classic commentators do not interpret ST II-II 23.8 as negation of a quasi-
intrinsic formation of the infused virtues through charity. For example, Cajetan comments in the same sense on 
ST II-II 23.8: ―Quia habent [sc. virtues infusae] quod sint virtutes in ordine ad actus formatos, ut in littera dicitur; 
et formatio est ex caritate ordinante omnium virtutum actus in finem ultimum simpliciter: ideo caritas est forma 
virtutum tanquam constituens eas in esse virtutis simpliciter. Non solum igitur caritas informat effective quia 
imperat et ordinat (hoc enim commune est omni imperanti et ordinanti); sed quia participatio passiva imperii et 
ordinationis suae est velut forma constituens actus alios in esse virtuoso simpliciter; ab hac enim participatione 
actus aliarum virtutum dicitur et sunt formati. Et hoc est proprium cariatis.‖ (Cajetanus, ―Commentarium,‖ about 
ST II-II 23.8). Likewise Banez: ―Caritas non solum informat effective quatenus imperat et ordinat actus virtutum: 
hoc enim commune est omni virtuti imperanti, sed etiam quia ipsa participatio passiva imperii fuit recepta in 
actibus virtutum constituit illos in esse virtutis simpliciter.‖ (Dominico Banes, Scholastica commentaria in 
secundam secundae angelici doctoris S. Thomae: Quibus, quae ad fidem, spem, et caritatem spectant; clarissime 
explicantur, vol. 3 (Typographia Petri Borremans, 1615), about ST II-II 23.8). Equally the Salmanticenses: 
―Dicendum est secundo, virtutes et earum actus formari per aliquod reale intrinsecum derivatum ex caritate. . . . 
Quoniam formatio actus virtutis inferioris per cariatem importat aliquid reale intrinsecum derivatum ex caritate: 
ergo idem proportionabiliter importat formatio habitus virtutis inferioris per caritatem. . . . Cum aliquis actus 
attingit aliquem finem, nequit non dicere verum ordinem sive habitudinem realem ad talem finem; ergo quando 
actus virtutis inferioris ordinatur ad finem caritatis illumque attingit, nequit non importare verum ordinem et 
realem habitudinem ad talem finem; cumque huiusmodi ordo non conveniat actui virtutis inferioris ex propria 
ratione, sive ex parte virtutis proximae a qua elicitur, opus est quod illum participet ex influxu caritatis, cui per 
se convenit illum finem attingere.‖ (Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus summam theologicam angelici doctoris 
D. Thomae complectens, vol. 12 (Paris: Societas generalis librariae catholicae, 1878), tractatus XIX (De caritate), 
disp. 7, dub. 3 § 2, no. 48-49). Urmanowicz explains in his extensive study, ―ut caritas ponatur etiam in 
definitione aliarum virtutum secundum speciem communem virtutis, quatenus scilicet unaquaeque virtus 
participet a caritate ordinem ad finem ultimum atque modum actionis ipsi correspondentem.‖ (Valentino 
Urmanowicz, De formatione virtutum a caritate seu de caritate, qua forma virtutum secundum doctrinam sancti 
Thomae Aquinatis (Vilna: Libraria S. Adalberti, 1931), 56). And further on: ―Caritas autem non est forma 
aliarum virtutum nisi in sensu extensivo seu analogo. Hinc tamen non datur intelligi, ipsam esse aliis virtutibus 
ita extrinsecam, sicut exemplar, seu forma exemplaris in sensu proprio est extrinseca formatis ab ipsa. 
Quapropter theologi cum sancto Thoma dicendo, caritatem non esse aliarum virtutum formam ‗exemplariter aut 
essentialiter‘, caute procedunt; quasi mediam viam eligentes dicunt, caritatem esse formam aliarum virtutum 
‗magis effective‘, quo datur subintelligi: si caritas non sic intrinsece perficiat ceteras virtutes, sicut forma 
essentialis materiam, id est unum simpliciter in esse entis cum ipsa constituens; non amplius tamen est ipsis sic 
extrinseca sicut formam exemplaris formatis ab ipsa. Caritas est forma omnium virtutum non solum in esse 
morali, seu meritorio, quatenus scilicet omnes actus omnium virtutum in finem ultimum referat, sed etiam in esse 
entis, seu psychologico, id est quatenus ipsos habitus virtutum vere intrinsece, physice et realiter perficit.― (Ibid., 
59-60). Cf. also Gérard Gilleman, The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology (Westminster, MD: The Newman 
Press, 1959), 45-54. 
No matter whether charity provides an intrinsic character to the commanded virtues, Sherwin suggests another 
explanation for the cautious formulation in ST II-II 23.8 (Sherwin, By Knowledge and by Love, 197-202): The 
negation of a formal causality of charity respectively infused virtues must not be understood as denial of an 
intrinsic transformation of the moral virtues, but relates to Aquinas‘s insight that the formation of acts is not due 
to charity (as virtue of the will) but due to faith and infused prudence (as virtues of the intellect; cf. the 
distinction of libertas determinationis and exercitii in ST I-II 9.1). In this way the later text does not contradict 
the assertions in In sent. III 27.2.4C. 
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Consequences for the Distinction of Acquired and Infused Moral Virtues 
What is the benefit of this description of charity as a form of infused virtues? It is not just a 
matter of ―scholastic hairsplitting‖ when interpreting various texts of Aquinas, but ultimately 
this designation of charity is highly relevant for understanding the difference between 
acquired and infused virtues. If the informing function of charity were limited to its efficient 
causality with regard to the act of other virtues, then it would be hard to define the proper 
difference between infused and acquired virtues (qua habitus). Aquinas, however, explains 
explicitly: ―Infused temperance and fortitude do not differ specifically from acquired 
temperance and fortitude because of the fact that their acts are commanded by charity, but 
because their acts consist in a mean which orders them to the ultimate end, which is the object 
of charity.‖368 Acquired and infused moral virtues are different, therefore, because they imply 
an inclination to two different orders of goods. The commanding virtue does not only direct 
the particular acts of an inferior virtue to its own end leaving the commanded virtue 
untouched. Rather, also it provides a certain general specification of the virtue itself, though it 
remains likewise specified by its proper objects.
369
 Hence, the difference between acquired 
and infused virtues is not merely on the level of action. It does not consist only in an ―actual 
relation‖ (relatio actualis) between the concrete act of temperance and the command of 
charity (mediated by infused prudence). Below the level of action, the moral virtue is 
specified by a ―relatio originalis,‖ i.e. by its relation to the final end: ―A different end implies 
a different proportion in the act as well as in the habit.‖370  
 
 
                                                 
368
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 10: ―Non igitur temperantia et fortitudo infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis ex hoc 
quod imperantur a caritate earum actus; sed ex hoc quod earum actus secundum eam rationem sunt in medio 
constituti, prout ordinabiles ad ultimum finem qui est caritatis obiectum.‖ Similar in In sent. IV 14.1.1C: ―Nulla 
virtus recipit speciem ex hoc quod imperatur ab alia virtute. Quod autem dicitur: ex spe veniae, nihil aliud dicit 
quam imperium spei. Unde ex hoc non haberet quod esset specialis virtus; sicut nec actus castitatis, propter hoc 
quod a caritate imperatur, speciem recipit virtutis specialis.‖  
369
 ―Ultimus finis non dat speciem in moralibus nisi quatenus in fine proximo est debita proportio ad ultimum 
finem; oportet enim ea quae sunt ad finem, esse proportionata fini.‖ (De virt. in com. 10 ad 9). 
370
 In sent. III 33.1.2D ad 4. In this forth objection Aquinas makes the following argument: ―Si dicatur, quod 
infusae propter deum operantur, non autem acquisitae; contra. Deus non est obiectum cardinalium virtutum, sed 
theologicarum. Cum igitur virtutes non recipiant speciem a fine ultimo, sed ab obiecto et actu, videtur quod 
adhuc per hoc non differant specie virtutes acquisitae et infusae.‖ In the answer (ad 4) he clarifies that – although 
a common final end does not provide an identity of the subordinate virtues – a different final end suffices to 
distinguish all inferior virtues. And this not only because of a different commanding act, but since it is due to 
every virtue to incline its underlying power to the right means in respect to the final end – short, virtues 
themselves bear somehow the form of the superior virtue. ―Quamvis finis ultimus non faciat identitatem in 
specie, facit tamen diversitatem, sicut generis diversitas facit diversitatem in specie. Tamen sciendum, quod 
relatio actualis ad remotum finem non facit praedictam differentiam, sed originalis relatio ad ipsum, secundum 
scilicet quod ex diversitate finis fit diversa proportio in actu et habitu.‖ 
Chapter 2. Differences of Acquired and Infused Virtues: Four Clarifications 
 149 
2.4.4 The Problem of the Cooperation between Acquired and Infused 
Virtues 
 
Having clarified how one virtue can be understood as the matter of another commanding 
virtue, we want to draw some conclusions regarding the cooperation of acquired and infused 
virtue. This will be the topic of the following chapter. 
There is no problem in applying the matter-form analogy to the cooperation of acquired and 
infused virtues in regard to their acts. An act of infused fortitude can, of course, make use of 
the human disposition to endure dangers for the human common good and command this act 
for the sake of charity (and mediated through the judgment and the command of infused 
prudence). This conclusion derives simply from the general understanding of command and 
commanded acts. It is, however, a different issue whether acquired virtue can be considered as 
matter of infused virtue as habit in the above described sense. In the introduction to section 
2.4, we quoted Falanga‘s description of charity as the form of infused prudence, and the latter 
as form of acquired prudence and thereby of all other acquired moral virtues.
371
 Our 
investigation has shown in what specific sense charity can be considered as the form of the 
infused virtues, and how (acquired) prudence can be seen as the form of moral virtues. But is 
it likewise possible to interpret infused prudence as form of acquired prudence, or more 
generally, infused virtues as the form of acquired virtues?  
We do not think so. As shown above, for Aquinas the informed habit becomes directed to the 
same good as the informing virtue. Political fortitude consists in an inclination to the end of 
justice which is the commanding virtue, namely the common good (of course, by mediation of 
prudence). Both virtues belong to the same order, and both follow the same rule, though as 
different virtues they inhere in different appetites. From this perspective it should be clear 
why it is inappropriate to portray the relation of acquired and infused virtues – which differ 
regarding their end as well as regarding their specific rule – by the matter-form analogy. If an 
infused virtue served as as form of an acquired virtue in the described sense, acquired virtue 
itself would be directed to the supernatural end, and it would possess the finality of an infused 
virtue. This implies that the matter-form analogy is useless with regard to the relationship of 
acquired and infused virtues as habits.  
                                                 
371
 See Falanga, Charity the Form, 125, quoted in footnote 295. 
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But how else can we describe the cooperation of acquired and infused virtues? How can a 
natural disposition support an infused virtue? And conversely, how do the latter make use of 
the former? These questions will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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3. Different Theories Concerning the Cooperation of Acquired and Infused 
Virtues Developed by the Commentators  
 
J. Porter noted at the end of her seminal article ―The Subversion of Virtues‖ that a 
contemporary appropriation of Aquinas‘s theory of virtue must offer ―some account of the 
relation of acquired to infused virtues in the case of the individual who possesses both.‖1 
Shanley calls it a ―perennially thorny question,‖2 controversially discussed among Aquinas‘s 
commentators and interpreters. In which way do both sets of virtues interact in the justified 
person? It is clear that according to St. Thomas an individual may have both kinds of virtue at 
the same time.
3
 Moreover, he explicitly claims a certain cooperation to obtain between the 
acquired and infused virtues. In De virt. in com. 10 ad 4 he argues: ―Together with charity 
simultaneously all other virtues are infused. Thus, the act of acquired virtues cannot be 
meritorious without mediation of infused virtue.‖4 But how does such cooperation work? 
Unfortunately, Aquinas has treated the issue ex professo in none of his texts. Consequently, 
there is ample space for different interpretations, and commentators have made extensive use 
of this freedom. 
One of the purposes of this third chapter is to give a systematic overview of the actual 
solutions proposed by scholars. Further on we want to draw attention to an analogy used by 
Aquinas himself in the context of infused virtue, which, according to our view, allows a better 
understanding of the cooperation of acquired and infused virtues. To the best of our 
knowledge this analogy has not yet been used by scholars to clarify the issue at hand. 
We shall proceed in the following Stepps. It is important to establish first a reasonable 
criterion for classifying the diverse theories on the matter (section 3.1). Then we will 
summarize the different theories according to their conception of the relation of acquired 
virtue to infused virtue (section 3.2), and conversely of infused virtue to acquired virtue 
                                                 
1
 Porter, ―The Subversion of Virtue,‖ 38. 
2
 Shanley, ―Aquinas on Pagan Virtue,‖ 555. 
3
 This is just a consequence of the two different formal objects (cf. 2.2). Aquinas explains: ―Duae formae 
eiusdem speciei non possunt esse in uno subiecto. Sed virtus infusa est simul cum virtute acquisita, ut patet in 
adulto qui habens virtutem acquisitam ad baptismum accedit, qui non minus recipit de infusis quam puer. Ergo 
virtus acquisita et infusa differunt specie.‖ (In sent. III 33.2D sed contra 2). Similar in In sent. III 23.3.4A sed 
contra 1: ―Dona infusa sunt permanentiora quam acquisita. Sed gratia adveniens non tollit habitus acquisitos.‖ 
Further: ST II-II 47.14 ad 1; 53.1 ad 3. See also the argument of Hause, ―Aquinas on the Function of Moral 
Virtue,‖ 14. 
4
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 4: ―Cum caritate autem simul infunduntur aliae virtutes; unde actus virtutis acquisitae 
non potest esse meritorius nisi mediante virtute infusa.‖ P. Kreeft clarifies the issue by using a catchy image: 
supernatural virtues relate to natural ones ―not like gluing a rabbit onto a carrot but like a rabbit‘s eating and 
digesting a carrot.‖ (Peter Kreeft, Back to Virtue. Traditional Moral Wisdom for Modern Moral Confusion (San 
Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1992), 54).  
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(section 3.3). After evaluating these different theories we will present our own solution in 
section 3.4. The concluding section 3.5 will include a short evaluation of the various theories 
proposed by theologians. 
 
 
3.1 Some Preliminary Remarks 
 
3.1.1 The Predominance of the Issue of Facility in the Secondary   
Literature 
 
Surveying the secondary literature regarding the cooperation of acquired and infused virtues, 
one notices that the question is treated in many cases within the framework of facility, i.e. to 
explain the empirical fact of ease and delight which is developed by repeated practice of the 
infused virtues (or also the absence of that experience).
5
 Though this issue is certainly 
connected to the question of the cooperation between both kinds of virtue, it is nevertheless a 
different perspective, and one that is not necessarily the most helpful way to clarify common 
questions concerning cooperation, since it focuses only on one partial aspect of that interplay. 
As we will see in section 3.2, theologians in general agree that acquired virtues provide a 
certain kind of facility with respect to the practice of infused virtues. However, this account 
leaves many other questions untouched. Some examples include: whether the act of infused 
virtue makes positive use of acquired virtue, whether an acquired habit is enforced by 
supernatural acts, whether every supernatural act provokes some consequences for its natural 
counterpart, and whether there can be a mere supernatural act or (in the justified agent) a pure 
natural act.
6
 
                                                 
5
 For a good survey of the different theories concerning the facility of infused virtues see Coerver, The Quality of 
Facility in the Moral Virtues, 35-72; A. Michel, ―Vertus,‖ in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholiqueed., Vol. 15/2, 
ed by A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and É. Amann, Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1950, 2766-2768; Harvey, ―The 
Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues,‖ 193-211; Gabriel Bullet, Vertus morales infuses et vertus morales acquises 
selon saint Thomas d’Aquin (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1958), 125-135. 
6
 Authors who work on the question of facility regularly switch over from arguments concerning facility to more 
general aspects of the cooperation of acquired and infused virtue. Of course, there is nothing to criticize such 
expanding, as long as the differences of those further aspects are not confused as differences of the issue of 
facility. And conversely, as long as external agreements concerning the question of facility does not mislead to 
the superficial conclusion of a common agreement of two fundamentally contrary thinkers relating the whole 
question. 
Harvey for example describes the theory of Suarez and Mazzella concerning facility as opposed to that of Molina 
and Billot (Harvey, ―The Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues,‖ 205-211). Admittedly, it is true that both groups 
don‘t agree in many questions – e.g. whether (or how) a supernatural act can generate an acquired virtue. But 
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To sort out the problem of interaction between acquired and infused virtue it is insufficient to 
simply repeat the distinctions which were proposed for solving the question of facility. 
 
 
3.1.2 The Interference of Acts and Habits: A Proposal for a Classification 
 
There is a second, maybe even more important difficulty. In the majority of cases scholars 
limit their discussion of the relation between natural and supernatural virtues to a relation 
between two habits.
7
 But is this enough to fully describe the precise cooperation between the 
acts of two different kinds of habit? For example, it is generally conceded that the infusion 
and practice of supernatural virtue do not presuppose the presence of acquired (i.e. a natural) 
virtue in the subject.
8
 Although a supernatural operation without acquired virtue may suffer a 
certain external imperfection (since opposite vices decline man to contrary actions, see section 
3.4), it would be a true supernatural act which earns supernatural merit. So far, so good. But it 
would be too hasty to conclude from this independence of infused and acquired virtues as 
habit that there is no possible connection at all. Couldn‘t it be that – although the supernatural 
act does not presuppose a natural virtue as habit – it nevertheless contains the perfection of a 
natural act? Wouldn‘t this imply the existence of an important connection between infused 
                                                                                                                                                        
that‘s not directly on issue in the context of facility. To conclude from those differences a contrary account of 
facility is in danger to confuse the point of question.  
Further, as we will see later on, Billot holds the position that supernatural acts of infused virtues create per se 
their acquired counterparts which facilitate on their part reciprocally future acts of infused virtues. From the 
viewpoint of facility the same position is hold by authors as Mirkes and Baumann (see section 3.3.3b-ii): Both 
defend the idea that the practice of infused virtue leads necessarily to the acquisition of its natural counterpart 
which facilitates the future supernatural action. On the contrary, authors as Bullet and Klubertanz deny such a 
necessary connection. The practice of infused virtues creates only a natural disposition in the human potency, 
which provides facility in supernatural acts promoted by infused virtues. Hence, from the standpoint of facility 
the difference between Bullet/Klubertanz and Mirkes/Baumann is greater as to Billot. But as we will see, Billot‘s 
theory is based on a fundamentally different understanding of the relationship between natural and supernatural 
acts. Such decisive differences easily escape if the classification of the proposed theories is follows exclusively 
to the question of facility. 
7
 A good example of such an attempt is the recent article of Angela McKay Knobel, ―Two Theories of Christian 
Virtue,‖ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2010): 599-618. Knobel distinguishes two large groups 
of theories regarding the relationship of acquired and infused virtues, namely coexistence theories and 
unifications theories. The proponents of the former claim the continuity of acquired and infused virtues as 
specifically different sets in a graced agent (Knobel names A. Falanga, Th.M. Osborne, R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 
D. Bradley, A. Dell‘Olio, D. Westberg, R. Coerver and J. Harvey). According to the unification theory, infused 
virtues are to be understood as perfections of the acquired ones (E. Gilson, T. Irwin, R. Mirkes, J. Inglis, S. 
Pinckaers and R. Cessario). The results of this division, however, remain somehow unsatisfactory. Though some 
statements of these authors may be classifiable in this way, it does not clarify the possible mutual interaction of 
acquired and infused virtues, since it considers only their relation in the perspective of two different habits. 
8
 Even Yearley who is often accused to demand for acquired virtues as presuppositions of infused virtues 
presents actually a more sophisticated position (Lee H. Yearley, ―The Nature-Grace Question in the Context of 
Fortitude,‖ The Thomist 35 (1971): 557-580). See footnote 75. 
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and acquired virtue (or better, between the supernatural and natural orders) which necessarily 
escapes a description limited to a mere comparison of the two virtues as habits? 
Thus, we want to argue that it is not enough to see the relationship of acquired and infused 
virtue as that of two different habits. Habits are understood from their direction towards 
specific acts. Consequently, an understanding of the precise function of the cooperation 
between two different sets of virtue requires us to determine the relation of the proper acts of 
the first virtue to the other virtue as habit. Concretely, it makes a difference whether we ask 
about the effects of acquired virtue for supernatural actions, or whether we focus on the 
effects of the acts of acquired virtue for infused virtue. And from the opposite angle, 
determining the structure of the act of acquired virtue in a human agent who possesses infused 
virtue is a quite different thing than describing the consequences of a supernatural act with 
respect to acquired virtue. 
 
Hence, we have to determine the following four relationships: 
1. What does acquired virtue (as habit) imply for the act of infused virtue? 
2. What does the act of acquired virtue imply for infused virtue (as habit)? 
3. What does infused virtue (as habit) imply for the act of acquired virtue? 
4. What does the act of infused virtue imply for acquired virtue (as habit)?9 
 
Although the questions in dispute have been multiplied, there is a dual advantage to such an 
enlarged project. First, only by considering all possible relationships we will reach a clear 
criterion for a serious classification of the different theories. Secondly, we will observe that 
there already exists a general consensus regarding the first two questions. In truth, only the 
third and fourth questions are answered controversially.
10
 
                                                 
9
 One may wonder why we don‘t ask in addition for the implications of the act of an infused virtue for the act of 
an acquired virtue, or the implications of an infused virtue as habit for an acquired virtue as habit (and vice 
versa). The explanation is simple: the acts of acquired and infused virtues are formally different. Thus, one and 
the same action cannot be an act of both virtues at the same time and in the same respect. If an act of an acquired 
virtue has an effect on the act of an infused virtue, it does so by modifying the underlying infused virtue. 
Something similar is true for the implication of acquired and infused virtues as habits: If there is a mutual 
interference between these two habits, then only by means of the acts of these virtues (insofar as the act of one 
virtue may effect a modification of the other one). Therefore, the mentioned four relationships are enough. 
10
 The suggested distinctions are useful not only regarding the cooperation between the natural and supernatural 
order, but clarify also the causation of acquired and infused virtues themselves. Even in this context it makes a 
huge difference to ask for (a) what acquired virtue as habit implies for the act acquired virtue, and (b) what the 
act of acquired virtue implies for the acquired virtue as habit. And likewise in the case of infused virtues: To ask 
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Therefore, we will treat the four relationships in two sections. The first two questions concern 
the influence of acquired virtue (either as habit or as act) in respect to infused virtue; we 
discuss them together in section 3.2. The last two questions examine the impact of infused 
virtue (either as habit or as act) on acquired virtue. Concerning these two issues, scholars 
developed many different (and contrary) solutions. We will review them in section 3.3.  
 
 
3.2 Implications of Acquired Virtues for Infused Virtues: Extrinsic Facility 
 
The first two relations determine the implication of acquired virtue for infused virtue, looking 
up from the former toward the latter. On the one hand, the implications of acquired virtues 
concerning the act of infused virtue, on the other hand, the implications of the acts of acquired 
virtues regarding infused virtues.  
 
The first question. We begin with the first issue: What does acquired virtue imply for the act 
of infused virtue?  
Let us compare two examples. A pagan possesses the natural virtue of temperance, acquired 
by purely natural motives. One day, he is converted and baptized, at which point he receives 
all infused moral virtues. Another pagan lives a vicious, intemperate life for a long time. 
Suddenly he repents, receives baptism and its habitual grace, including infused temperance. 
From the point of infused virtues, both are equally able to realize supernatural acts since both 
received infused virtue. Nevertheless, according to human experience, the first person will 
(probably) fulfill the acts of supernatural temperance with ease and delight, whereas the 
second one may remain strongly attracted to vicious deeds, at least for some time after his 
conversion.  
For a detailed explanation of this experience we can refer to section 1.2.1, where we already 
discussed the issue in the context of general objections against the doctrine of infused moral 
virtue. Although previously acquired virtues do not directly support the act of infused virtues 
because of their different formal objects, they provide indirectly a certain facility insofar they 
guarantee freedom from contrary vicious inclinations. Hence, the experienced facility of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
for (c) what infused virtue as habit implies for the act of infused virtue is a different account than to ask for (d) 
what the act infused virtue implies for the infused virtue as habit. This questions, however, are beyond the scope 
Chapter 3. Different Theories Concerning the Cooperation of Acquired and Infused Virtues 
 156 
graced agent is not due to acquired virtues as such but rather to the absence of lingering 
opposing inclinations, so that the new infused virtue comes fully into one‘s own. In this 
indirect way the acquired virtues play an important role for the practice of infused virtue. On 
this score St. Thomas is unambiguous.
11
 
The commentators refer to this indirect support of acquired virtue for the act of infused virtue 
as extrinsic facility. Although it is beyond the limits of the current project to address the issue 
of facility in more detail, it is worth it to dedicate a paragraph to the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic facility, which is a commonly excepted distinction – as far as we can 
see.
12
 
According to the research of R.F. Coerver, Suarez was the first theologian who distinguished 
intrinsic and extrinsic facility explicitly in the context of the virtues.
13
 To do so, Suarez was 
able to invoke Aquinas himself, who had distinguished in his De Veritate an indirect facility 
through the removal of impediments and a direct apposition of help. ―Something is said to be 
easy in two senses: in one way because of the removal of an impediment, and in another way 
because of the reception of help. The ease which belongs to a habit is had by the reception of 
help, for a habit inclines a power to act.‖14 Thus, for the virtues it follows that the second kind 
of facility consists in the proper inclination of a human power itself to its good act. In other 
words, it consists in an intrinsic facility. The first kind implies the elimination of contrary 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the present chapter (which is about the cooperation of acquired and infused virtues).  
11
 See for example In sent. IV 14.2.2 ad 4 and ad 5; ST I-II 65.3 ad 2; ST III 89.1 ad 3; De virt. in com. 10 ad 15 
etc.  
12
 Even scholars, who are in other respects strongly opposed to each other, agree in this point: the simultaneous 
presence of acquired virtues in the justified provides an external facility for achieving the supernatural act. On 
the contrary, whether infused virtue itself facilitates the supernatural operation is a controversial issue; for the 
various positions see Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 22-26; a convincing apology for 
facility by the infused virtues presets McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖; even more recently Hause, 
―Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue,‖ 17-18). 
13
 See Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 26. The statement of Suarez: ―Duplex enim est 
facilitas vel difficultas (ut supra tetigi) distingui potest: una est intrinseca, quae per se inest cuicumque facultati 
respectu actus ad quem inclinatur; alia est per ablationem impedimentorum quae per accidens occurrunt. Hae 
igitur virtutes priorem dant facilitatem, eo ipso quod intrinsecam conferunt operandi facultatem ad actus ad quos 
connaturaliter inclinantur tanquam ad finem suum, et ultimum actum. Unde cum hae virtutes intrinsece insint 
suis potentiis, sunt veluti pondera quaedam ad suos actus inclinantia potentias. Hoc ergo modo dant intrinsecam 
facilitatem, sicut supra etiam de theologicis virtutibus tetigimus. Ad vero extrinsecam facilitatem non praebent, 
quia contraria difficultas provenit aut ex naturali ignorantia vel inconsideratione, aut ex fomite concupiiscenitiae, 
vel corporis corruptibilitate; haec autem impedimenta per has virtues non auferuntur.‖ (Francisco Suárez, Opera 
omnia, vol. 9 (Paris, 1858), liber VI, cap. 9, no. 9).  
14
 De veritate 24.4 ad 1: ―Aliquid dicitur esse facile dupliciter: uno modo propter remotionem impedimenti; alio 
modo propter appositionem adiutorii. Facilitas igitur pertinens ad habitum est per adiutorii appositionem: nam 
habitus inclinat potentiam ad actum.‖ Suarez thereto: ―Facilitas quae in exercendis actibus infusis invenitur, per 
se quidem provenire potest ex gratia dei, vel physice augente virtutem effectivam habitus, vel moraliter dante 
maiorem suavitatem, aut illustrationem, vel affectionem maiorem in operando.‖ (Suárez, Opera omnia, liber VI, 
cap. 14, no. 7). ―Ergo concludo non posse habitum acquisitum dare facilitatem agendi in actibus infusis, tanquam 
principium per se influens aliquid in ipsum actum.‖ (Ibid.). 
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habits, i.e. vices, and renders an extrinsic facility to virtue. It does not belong per se to the 
habit itself, but it allows indirectly the good functioning of the habit. 
If we make use of this distinction in the context of infused virtue, the intrinsic facility is 
supplied by the virtue itself; it consists in the strong inclination to its proper action.
15
 
However, this supernatural intrinsic inclination (Suarez calls it a ―pondera quaedam‖16) does 
not necessarily prevent the interference of other contrary inclinations. Since it is infused at 
once, previous habits are not immediately abolished (at least as inclinations). In contrast, 
since acquired virtues are developed only by long training, it is due to them to remove 
contrary tendencies step by step.
17
  
The teaching of Aquinas regarding this point is univocal and clear. Commentators therefore 
universally acknowledge the positive but indirect consequences of the acquired virtues in 
respect to the acts of infused virtue. For example, Gregory of Valencia fully agrees with this 
view.
18
 The Salmanticenses used the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic facility verbatim and 
agreed at least in this point with the Jesuitian theologian.
19
 The use of the same terminology 
can be found in Billuart,
20
 Mazzella,
21
 Gonet,
22
 and Schiffini.
23
 
                                                 
15
 ―Virtus enim infusa facti quod nullo modo obediatur concupiscentiis peccati; et facit hoc infalibiliter ips 
manente.‖ (De virt. in com. 10 ad 14). 
16
 Suárez, Opera omnia, liber VI, cap. 9, no. 9. 
17
 St. Thomas: ―Per frequentes actus quibus homo est assuefactus ad virtutem, homo iam dissuevit talibus 
passionibus obedire, cum consuevit eis resistere; ex quo sequitur quod minus earum molestias sentiat.‖ (De virt. 
in com. 10 ad 15). Quite different for infused virtue: ―Virtus enim infusa facit quod nullo modo obediatur 
concupiscentiis peccati; et facit hoc infallibiliter ipsa manente.‖ (Ibid.). And Suarez comments: ―Illa facilitas 
magna ex parte provenit ex memoria et phantasmatibus, vel ex aliqua dispositione appetitus, qui per actus 
naturalis cooperatur dum voluntas supernaturaliter amat; potest etiam corporis disposition ad id conferre, saltem 
impedimenta auferendo; fortasse etiam nonnihil conducit intensio habitus infusae charitatis, quae saltem 
meritorie per actus obinetur.‖ (Ibid., liber VI, cap. 9, no. 13). And in no. 7 he describes the per accidens causa of 
facility of the supernatural acts as follows: ―Per accidens autem potest ex consuetudine provenire, quatenus per 
illam vel tolluntur aliqua impedimenta, vel naturales potentiae, aut organa ministrantia his actibus, uso ipso 
melius disponuntur.‖ 
18
 It should be noted that Gregory of Valencia often is interpreted as unique proponent of a different position (see 
e.g. Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 25-26; 33; Harvey, ―The Nature of the Infused Moral 
Virtues,‖ 197). But a close reading of the original text does not justify this judgment. It is true that Gregory of 
Valencia attributes to infused virtues itself a certain facility. ―Virtutes infusas praestare homini per se 
promptitudinem ad bonos actus in materia morali.‖ (Gregorius de Valentia, Commentariorum theologicorum, vol. 
2 (Lugduni, 1603), disputatio V, quaestio 6, punctum 1, responsio ad 3). But on that he is in good company with 
Aquinas himself (cf. De virt. in com. 10 ad 14) as well as with other scholars. But there is no doubt that Gregory 
of Valencia ascribes to acquired virtues also the important role to domesticate and suppress man‘s inordinate 
passions. ―Cum virtutes infusae sint per se distinctae virtutes a virtutibus acquisitis, tametsi, ut dixi, promptitudo, 
quam illae praebent, non adeo facile sine acquisitis virtutibus sentiatur.‖ (Ibid., responsio ad 1). He even 
concedes to acquired virtues and vices even a special extensive influence for the act of supernatural virtues. 
―Certe experientia videtur docere, eos, qui in gratiam dei recipiuntur, etiam quod ad studium virtutum attinet, 
esse plerumque quasi alios homines. Quod si interdum iustus videtur habere aequalem vel maiorem difficultatem, 
quam alius, non erunt caetera paria, sed id accidet vel ob naturam vehementiorem, vel ob alias dispares 
personarum aut rerum circumstantias.‖ (Ibid.). 
19
 ―Respondetur duplicem esse facilitatem respectu alicuius actus: Aliam per se et intrinsecum, quae consistit in 
eo quod principium elicitivum talis actus sit sufficienter proportionatum ac completum respectu illius: aliam 
extrinsecam, quae provenit ex remotione impedimentorum, aut indispositionum, quae, etiam existente perfecto et 
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Of course, not all theologians discuss the facility of infused virtues with an explicit reference 
to the concept of ―extrinsic‖ and ―intrinsic‖ facility. Nevertheless, all seem to concede some 
communication of facility from the acquired to the infused virtues. John of St. Thomas takes 
this fact for granted.
24
 Similarly does Medina.
25
 Ripalda concedes that acquired virtues 
remove hindrances of the practice of infused virtue, but he attributes only the provision of the 
supernatural posse to the latter and negates a supernatural facility.
26
 
                                                                                                                                                        
completo praedicto principio, impediunt vel reddunt difficile exercitium operationis. Virtus ergo sive acquisita, 
sive infusa tribuit primam facilitatem, quia essentialiter habet complere potentiam elicitivam actus: secundam 
vero tribuit virtus acquisita, non formaliter quasi ipsa sit ablatio talium impedimentorum, sed concomitanter, 
quia requirit ad sui generationem exercitium multorum actuum per quos praedicta impedimenta tolluntur.‖ 
(Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, vol. 6, tr. 12, q. 63, disp. 3, dub. 1, n. 23). See also ibid., tr. 12, disp. 3, dub. 
3, no. 54: ―Habitus infusum dici confirmari per actus, non intrinsice quasi ab ipsis actibus aliquem gradum 
intentsionis recipiat: sed extrinsece, quia per actus tolluntur impedimenta ad bonum et inclinationes ad malum: 
vel saltem actualia peccata: quibus sublatis virtus manet firma: quia non est per quod exludatur.‖ 
20
 ―Duplex est facilitas potentiae respectu alicuius actus: una intrinseca, quae consistit in hoc quod potentia sit 
completa, perfect et connaturaliter proportionata actui; hanc praebent virtutes infusae in ordine supernaturali, 
sicut acquisitae in ordine naturali. Altera est facilitas extrinseca, quae consisti in remotione impedimentorum 
quibus actus, non obstante perfectione et proportione potentiae, reddidutr difficilis: hanc confert virtus acquisita 
non per se et formaliter, quasi ipsa esset horum inpedimentorum [sic] ablatio, sed concomitanter, quia nempe 
acquiritur per repetitos actus quibus ista impedimenta appetitus sensitivi tolluntur.‖ (Carolus R. Billuart, Cursus 
theologiae iuxta mentem divini Thomae, vol. 4 (Paris: Jacobus Lecoffre, 1878), Dissert. II, art. 3, resp. ad obi. 1). 
21
 Camillus Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis praelectiones scholastico-dogmaticae, 6 ed. (Naples: Typogr. 
Pontificia M. D'Auria, 1908), 35. It might be mentioned that Mazzella criticizes the distinction of extrinsic and 
intrinsic facility as useless (see ibid., 36); however his critique refers to the issue of an intrinsic facility of 
infused virtues. The fact that acquired virtues remove obstacles which hinder the delightful operation of infused 
virtues is even for him undisputed. 
22
 ―Duplex dari potest facilitas respectu alicuius actus; alia per se et intrinseca, quae consistit in eo quod 
principium elicitivum talis actus sit sufficienter proportionatum et completum respetu illius: alia extrinseca, quae 
provenit ex remotione impedimentorum, aut indispositionum, quae etiam existent perfecto et completo praedicto 
principio, impediunt vel reddunt difficile exercitium operationis. Virtus ergo sivie acquisita, sive infusa, tribuit 
primam facilitatem, quia essentialiter habet complere potentiam elicitivam actus: secundam vero tribuit virtus 
acquisita, non formaliter, quasi ipsa sit ablatio talium impedimentorum, sed concomitanter, quia requirit ad sui 
generationem exercitium multorum actuum, per quos illa impedimenta tolluntur.‖ (Joannis B. Gonet, Clypeus 
theologiae thomisticae: Contra novos ejus impugnatores, vol. 4 (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1876), Tractatus IV, 
Disputatio IV, art. 1, § III, no. 16). 
23
 Sancto Schiffini, Tractatus de virtutibus infusis (Freiburg: Herder, 1904), 45-46.  
24
 John of St. Thomas does not use the term of a facilitas extrinsica but he argues that – because of the common 
matter of acquired and infused virtues – the presence of the one virtue facilitates the act of the other, since it is 
easy to switch over to a related motive. ―Licet enim dubitare non possit quod circa materiam virtutum infusarum 
etiam theologicarum potest generari habitus aliquis acquisitus, qui diverso motivo et sub diversa ratione formali 
versetur circa illam materiam, et ad illum habitum generandum facilitari possit animus ex frequentatione actuum 
infusorum, quatenus si illa materia est magis frequentata, et sic facilius poterit etiam tractari ex alio simili motivo, 
sicut circa materiam, quam saepius demonstrando tractamus, possumus etiam probabilibus rationibus adiuvare, 
et facilius acquire poterit talis habitus probabilis.‖ (Johannes a Sancto Thoma, Cursus theologicus: In Iam-IIae; De 
virtutibus (Québec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1952), disp. 16, art. VII, no. 1305). 
25
 ―Certum et nulla ratione negari potest, quod per actus praecedentes virtutum infusarum manent passiones 
moderate et in ordinem reductae, etiam deperditis virtutibus infusis, ut experientia docet: ergo manet habitus 
aliquis, qui istas passiones moderatur.‖ (Bartholomeus a Medina, Expositio in primam secundae angelici 
doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis (Venice: Bernardum Basam, 1590), about ST I-II 51.4). 
26
 See Joan. M. de Ripalda, De ente supernaturali disputationes theologicae, vol. 2 (Rome: Libraria S. 
Concregationis de Propaganda Fide, 1870), liber VI, disputatio 118, sectio III. 
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We can list even Billot as favoring this opinion,
27
 which is noteworthy since his overall theory 
of acquired and infused virtues differs in important points from other scholars (as will be seen 
later on). He makes the interesting observation that facility can be directed either toward the 
object of the act or toward the act itself. A sick man has a strong desire to be healthy, but is 
not inclined to make use of the necessary medicine because of an aversion that he has for it. 
Another man has no special desire for health, but he feels no difficulty in taking the medicine 
because of an acquired disposition toward its use. Comparing both men, in one respect the 
first individual is better disposed than the second, because his intense desire for health will 
prompt him to take the medicine despite the repugnance against it. In another respect the 
condition of the second patient is better, because of his proclivity toward using the means of 
acquiring health.
28
 Applying this analogy to the matter of infused and acquired virtue, we get 
Billot‘s notion of facility. Simply stated, acquired virtue confers the destruction of evil 
inclinations. They restrain the passions and allow the right use of all necessary means for a 
desired action. However, the inclination toward the supernatural action itself is due to infused 
virtue, so the acquired virtues allow only the necessary ―proclivitas in exercitium actus 
illiusmet.‖29 
More recently, Garrigou Lagrange defended the facilitation of supernatural acts by acquired 
virtues,
30
 and likewise did Huarte,
31
 Noble,
32
 Parent,
33
 Parente,
34
 Vignon,
35
 Merkelbach,
36
 
Labourdette,
37
 and others. 
                                                 
27
 ―Sciendum est inclinationem istam esse duplicem. Unam quam possumus dicere inhaesionis ad bonum quod 
est obiectum virtutis. Alteram quam possumus appellare proclivitatis in exercitium actus illiusmet. Certe duo ibi 
sunt non solum formalitate et conceptu distincta, sed etiam inter se diversa, ut primum possit adesse absque 
secundo, et secundum non sit semper in proportione cum primo.‖ (Ludovicus Billot, De virtutibus infusis: 
Commentarius in secundam partem S. Thomae (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1921), 34). 
28
 See Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, ―Les vertus morales dans la vie intérieure,‖ La Vie Spirituelle 41 (1934): 225-
236. 
31
 See Gabriel Huarte, Synopsis de virtutibus infusis (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1921), 39-54. 
32
 See H.-D. Noble, La conscience morale (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1923), 253-258. 
33
 See Parent, ―Les vertus morales infuses dans la vie chrétienne,‖ 211. 
34
 Parente concedes indirectly the fact of extrinsic facility: ―By means of such infused principles [sc. infused 
virtues], supernatural acts are made possible, but it does not always follow that they are made easy, although the 
inclination to the good that they involve removes some of the difficulty.‖ (Pascal P. Parente, The Ascetical Life 
(London: Herder, 1944), 125). 
35
 Vignon emphasizes that acquired virtues not only do not hinder the practice of the infused virtues but render a 
positive disposition in respect to supernatural action. ―Virtutes autem naturales nullatenus existimandae sunt 
homini iusto inutiles. Easdem enim potentias regulant ac ipsae virtutes supernaturales et circa eadem obiecta 
materialia. Sicut igitur concupiscentiae naturales virtutibus superanturalibus contrariantur, sic pariter virtutes 
naturales huiusmodi indispositionem utilissime minuunt vel tollunt. Immo positive virtuti supernaturali 
deserviunt, cum potentias proclives faciant ad fines morales prosequendos; ideoque non parum conferunt ad 
stabilitatem firmandam ipsius virtutis supernaturalis.‖ (Henricus Vignon, Adnotationes in tractatum de virtutibus 
infusis (Rome: Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1943), 299). The foundation of his position is the following 
principle: ―Neque mensura rationalis virtutis naturalis virtute supernaturali praetermittitur, et multo minus 
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This summary of our overview shows that theologians universally agree that acquired virtues 
facilitate the action of infused virtue in a certain way by removing dispositions contrary to 
supernatural acts. Hence, there is some form of cooperation, but only an indirect one. Per se, 
however, the acquired virtues do not support the operation of infused virtues. 
 
The second question. In the following step we clarify the implications of acts of acquired 
virtues regarding infused virtues (as virtues). The question sounds similar to the previous one, 
but it differs in an important point. The former question focused on the supernatural act as 
conditioned by acquired virtue. Now we inquire into the effect of a natural act regarding 
infused virtue as habit. 
First, a specification. At the present stage we want to abstract from the question how the 
graced agent (i.e. a person who is directed to God as supernatural beatitude) can perform pure 
natural good acts in regard to his final end, or whether he can do so at all. The question 
imposes itself, since we ask for the effect of the natural acts regarding infused virtues. Hence 
by definition our agent is in the state of grace, i.e. he is directed to a supernatural end. 
However, for the moment we have to put aside this issue, otherwise we would mix two 
different relations. The question of the possibility of pure natural acts in the state of grace will 
be treated in the next chapter (since it belongs to the question: what does infused virtue imply 
for the act of acquired virtue?). 
A second clarification. For the sake of speaking more generally we will not presuppose an 
agent who has acquired virtue, but instead we will focus simply on the practice of a natural 
good act, independent of the agent‘s possession (or lack) of a corresponding virtue.38 
Following these preliminary remarks, we now inquire into the interconnection between 
naturally good acts and infused virtue. The answer of Aquinas is short and clear. Good natural 
                                                                                                                                                        
contradicitur: gratia naturam non tollit, at contra, ipsas leges ethicae naturalis maiore auctoritate sancit et imperat, 
atque ad altiorem finem ordinat. Virtutes igitur supernaturales assumunt atque consecrant totum ordinem 
officiorum naturalium, tanquam ad finem supernaturalem ordinabilem.‖ (Ibid.). 
36
 See Benedikt H. Merkelbach, Summa theologiae moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi, vol. 
1 (: Desclée de Brouwer et Soc., 1954), 485-486. 
37
 ―Les caractères traditionnels de l‘habitus: promptitude, facilité, délectation, ne se manifesteront que quand 
seront possédées les vertus acquises, parce que ce sont elles qui assouplissent connaturellement les facultés et en 
écartent effectivement par l‘exercice les obstacles psychologiques.‖ (Labourdette, Les principes des actes 
humains, 165). 
38
 Aquinas himself notes that in respect to the development of virtue even good acts which don‘t arise from 
virtue have effects on virtue itself. See De virt. in com. 9 ad 13: ―Virtus generatur ex actibus quodammodo 
virtuosis et quodammodo non virtuosis. Actus enim praecedentes virtutem, sunt quidem virtuosi quantum ad id 
quod agitur, in quantum scilicet homo agit fortia et iusta; non autem quantum ad modum agendi: quia ante 
habitum virtutis acquisitum non agit homo opera virtutis eo modo quo virtuosus agit, scilicet prompte absque 
dubitatione et delectabiliter absque difficultate.‖ He makes the same claim in In sent. II 44.2.1 ad 6. 
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acts are able to generate and augment natural acquired virtue. They are unable to work the 
same effect, however, in respect to infused virtue. The augmentation of infused virtue requires 
in any case a divine intervention. 
 
The virtue of man, which is directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of 
human reason, can be caused by human acts: insofar as such acts proceed from reason, by 
whose power and rule this good is caused. But virtue which directs man to good as defined by 
the divine law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, whose principle is 
reason, but is caused only by divine operation within us. Hence, Augustine – defining that 
virtue – inserts the words, which God works in us without us.39 
 
However, this negative assertion is not completely negative. Since repeated natural acts work 
for the augmentation of acquired virtue, they also prepare and promote indirectly infused 
virtue (we disregard the issue whether the graced agent should practice acts of acquired 
virtue), for acquired virtues draw the human powers away from vicious habits. Therefore, 
they can provide an agent the necessary disposition for the growth of the infused virtues 
granted him by God. ―Virtue is twofold . . . namely acquired and infused. An action 
contributes something by customization to both, although in different ways; it causes the 
acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it [i.e. infused 
virtue] when it already exists.‖40  
To answer this question further we can refer back to the previous paragraph. If acquired 
virtues (as habits) provide an extrinsic facility for the practice of infused virtues, but good 
natural acts confirm such virtues, then there must be at least some faint connection (in a 
certain way it is a double indirect relation) between the two. 
Although the cooperation is indirect, it remains important. For example, in ST II-II 24.9 
Thomas describes the development of charity and distinguishes therein the stages of incipiens, 
proficiens, and perfectus. All three grades already pertain to the supernatural level, but the 
                                                 
39
 ST I-II 63.2: ―Virtus igitur hominis ordinata ad bonum quod modificatur secundum regulam rationis humanae, 
potest ex actibus humanis causari, inquantum huiusmodi actus procedunt a ratione, sub cuius potestate et regula 
tale bonum consistit. Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum secundum quod modificatur per legem divinam, 
et non per rationem humanam, non potest causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio, sed causatur 
solum in nobis per operationem divinam. Et ideo, huiusmodi virtutem definiens, Augustinus posuit in definitione 
virtutis, quam deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.‖ Cf. 51.2 and 4; In sent. III 33.1.2B ad 1; also 2D ad 1. 
40
 ST I-II 92.1 ad 1: ―Duplex est virtus, ut ex supradictis patet, scilicet acquisita, et infusa. Ad utramque autem 
aliquid operatur operum assuetudo, sed diversimode, nam virtutem quidem acquisitam causat; ad virtutem autem 
infusam disponit, et eam iam habitam conservat et promovet.‖ See also De virt. in com. 11: ―Sicut virtutes 
acquisitae augentur ex actibus per quos causantur, ita virtutes infusae augentur per actionem dei, a quo causantur. 
Actus autem nostri comparantur ad augmentum caritatis et virtutum infusarum, ut disponentes, sicut ad caritatem 
a principio obtinendam; homo enim faciens quod in se est, praeparat se, ut a deo recipiat caritatem.‖ Similar in 
ad 17: ―Virtus infusa non causetur ex actibus, tamen actus possunt ad eam disponere.‖  
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essential character of the beginner is the fight against sin and vice, i.e. against remaining evil 
dispositions.
41
 But supernatural acts as well as natural ones operate against those hindrances. 
From this viewpoint the important role that naturally good deeds play with respect to the 
growth of infused virtues becomes apparent. 
Since the commentators agree on this question, we may pass over providing a list of various 
authors and examining the specific content of their doctrines. 
 
 
3.3 Implications of Infused Virtues for Acquired Virtues: Various Positions 
 
In the following section we want to investigate the consequences of infused virtue (as habit as 
well as their repeated acts) for acquired virtue. We proceed in three Stepps. First, we will give 
a short overview of the relevant texts in Aquinas. Secondly, we will discuss the position of 
some scholars who argue for a strict detachment between both kinds of virtue. Such are the 
so-called ―exclusive-order-theories.‖ Thirdly, we will survey authors who allow for certain 
ways in which the infused virtues (and their acts) can influence their natural counterparts (the 
―connected-order-theories‖). 
After having untangled these different opinions we shall present in the next chapter our own 
solution. 
 
 
3.3.1 The Textual Basis in Aquinas’s Works 
 
As already mentioned Aquinas never treats the mode of cooperation between acquired and 
infused virtues explicitly, but there are at least some hints which suggest how he would have 
answered the question about the effects of the acts of the infused virtues on the development 
of the acquired virtues (relation no. 3). To the best of our knowledge there are three important 
texts where he touches the question whether the repetition of supernatural acts cause a habit to 
develop in the agent.  
                                                 
41
 ―Diversi gradus caritatis distinguuntur secundum diversa studia ad quae homo perducitur per caritatis 
augmentum. Nam primo quidem incumbit homini studium principale ad recedendum a peccato et resistendum 
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The first one is found in De veritate 17.1, response to sed contra 4. Here, Aquinas admits that 
the repeated act of charity causes an acquired habit of charity, or at least the repetition 
augments a previous acquired habit. 
 
From acts there does not arise a habit of a different mode as the habit by which the acts are 
elicited, but either a habit of the same notion [is formed], as the acquired habit of love
42
 is 
formed from acts of infused charity, or an already present habit is strengthened, as in one who 
has acquired the habit of temperance from repeated acts of temperance, the habit itself is 
strengthened.
43
 
 
In two other passages Aquinas is more cautious. Acts of infused virtue do not create new or 
different habit, but confirm a preexistent one.  
 
Acts which are produced by an infused habit do not cause another habit, but strengthen the 
already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is health by nature 
do not cause another kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.
44
 
 
Acts of infused virtue do not cause another habit, but by them a preexisting habit is 
strengthened. Since by the acts of an acquired virtue is not another habit generated; otherwise, 
the habits would be infinitely multiplied.
45
 
 
The three quotations show that Aquinas allows for an augmentation of certain habits by 
repeated supernatural acts. But many issues remain unclear. Does the term of habitus 
acquisitus in De veritate 17.1 refer to a natural or to a supernatural virtue? Both 
interpretations are possible.
46
 Further, do the supernatural acts work by themselves for a 
                                                                                                                                                        
concupiscentiis eius, quae in contrarium caritatis movent. Et hoc pertinet ad incipientes, in quibus caritas est 
nutrienda vel fovenda ne corrumpatur.‖ (ST II-II 24.9). 
42
 This is the critical text of the Leonina. In other editions the word acquisitus is omitted (―aliquis habitus 
dilectionis‖). 
43
 De veritate 17.1 ad sed contra 4: ―Ex actibus non generatur habitus alterius modi ab illo habitu a quo actus 
eliciuntur; sed vel aliquis habitus eiusdem rationis, sicut ex actibus infusae caritatis generatur aliquis habitus 
acquisitus dilectionis, vel etiam habitus praeexistens augmentatur: sicut in eo qui habet habitum temperantiae 
acquisitum ex actibus temperantiae, ipse habitus augmentatur.‖ 
44
 ST I-II 51.4 ad 3: ―Actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant 
habitum praeexistentem, sicut medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant aliquam 
sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.‖ 
45
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 19: ―Actus virtutis infusae non causant aliquem habitum, sed per eos augetur habitus 
praeexistens: quia nec ex actibus virtutis acquisitae aliquis habitus generatur; alias multiplicarentur habitus in 
infinitum.‖ 
46
 Indeed, strictly speaking the second and third quotation does not exclude absolutely the acquisition of a natural 
virtue by the acts of infused virtue. The replies intend to deny the acquisition of an infinite number of new habits; 
several acts of an infused virtue work for the acquisition of one virtue. However, whether this affirmed virtue is 
the supernatural virtue itself or a natural virtus acquisita – as to that the intention of Aquinas is hard to determine 
from these texts alone. 
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growth of these virtues or do they require an augmentation by God? Does every supernatural 
act acquire such a virtue or only if achieved by an explicit attention to the rule of natural 
reason? Do they cause acquired virtues or only acquired dispositions? (Aquinas speaks only 
of a ―habitus acquisitus‖). Thus, these three texts of Aquinas leave sufficient space for 
different interpretations. And indeed, in contrast to the positive impact of acquired virtues in 
respect to infused virtues (the extrinsic facility), the commentators have proposed many 
different solutions to this question. We will try to give a brief overview of their varying 
answers. 
 
 
3.3.2 Various “Exclusive-Order-Theories”  
 
The first group of theories which we shall consider can be called exclusive-order-theories. 
Their proponents argue that there is no positive cooperation or connection between acquired 
and infused virtue. Based on the fact that both sets of virtue are different in species by their 
formal measure (divine rule vs. human reason) and end (community of saints vs. civil 
society),
47
 these theologians deny any kind of positive influence. The justified person may 
certainly possess both infused virtue and acquired virtue. Nevertheless, both sets exist side by 
side in an unconnected fashion, and the agent acts either by his natural or by his supernatural 
virtues. 
Hence, the question whether an act of infused virtue implies any positive ramifications with 
respect to acquired virtue has to be answered negatively. The act of infused virtue neither 
generates nor confirms acquired virtue.  
Consequently, even the question about acts of an acquired virtue under the condition of a 
present infused virtue is answered: infused virtues imply no change for acquired virtue. 
According to the exclusive-order-theory, it is just up the agent to act either by his natural habit 
or by his supernatural habit, depending on his voluntary choice. Pure natural acts are possible 
as well as purely supernatural ones.
48
 
                                                 
47
 Cf. for example the comparison of acquired and infused virtues in In sent. III 33.2C ad 2; 2D (esp. ad 2); ST I-
II 63.4; De virt. in com. 9 and 10. 
48
 In fact, Aquinas states the principle that is due to the human will to use a habit or not (see ST I-II 52.3, quoted 
in footnote 253. 
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The exclusive-order-theory claims a sharp division between acquired and infused virtue. Each 
acts independently of the other one. The effects of an action are limited to its own habit. On 
the one hand, supernatural acts earn the augmentation of the infused virtues given by God. On 
the other hand, natural acts generate and confirm natural virtues.
49
 Both sets of virtue 
establish a separate, exclusive order. Each is closed in on itself and necessarily against the 
other. 
 
Some Proponents of a Disconnected-Order-Theory 
We will now illustrate this theory by offering a few examples of its use. F. Suarez is probably 
its most prominent representative. He devotes a particular chapter to the question by 
disucussing how natural virtues can be acquired in addition to infused virtues.
50
 For Suarez, 
there are two potential explanations. Either the repetition of supernatural acts generates those 
acquired natural virtues, or they are caused by a different species of action.
51
 He argues 
clearly for the second option, since supernatural actions – flowing from infused virtues – 
cannot cause formally different habits. ―I claim generally that from the power of supernatural 
acts no acquired habit can accompany the infused habits about the same matter . . . since an 
act does not produce a habit, except about the same material and formal object in which it 
tends.‖52  
Nevertheless, he admits a simultaneous existence of both sets of virtue. A man might possess 
well-ordered passions according to divine rule as well as to human reason. On the one hand 
with respect to the full submission of the body to the spirit, and on the other hand with respect 
to corporeal health. However, Suarez assigns this concomitance as wholly accidental and 
contingent; per se it is not required by the essence of those virtues itself. 
 
The concomitance of an acquired habit [with an infused one] is wholly [omnino] accidental 
and contingent, since such a habit is in no way acquired by the efficiency of the infused habit, 
be it by itself or by its acts. But [it might be acquired] by the exercise of other acts which 
                                                 
49
 Nevertheless its proponents can defend an extrinsic facility which is provided to supernatural acts by acquired 
virtues. However they would negate the acquisition and confirmation of acquired virtues by supernatural acts. 
50
 See Suárez, Opera omnia, liber VI, cap. 14. The following quotations relate to this chapter, unless it is 
assigned different. 
51
 See Ibid., no. 2. 
52
 Ibid., no. 10: ―Generaliter assero, ex vi actuum supernaturalium nullum habitum acquisitum comitari infusos 
circa eorum materias . . . quia actus non producit habitum, nisi circa idem obiectum materiale et formale in quod 
ipse tendit.‖ 
Chapter 3. Different Theories Concerning the Cooperation of Acquired and Infused Virtues 
 166 
might mingle or interpose to the infused acts accidentally, and successively, and to different 
times.
53
 
 
Thus, the exercise of supernatural virtues per se has no effect on the state of acquired virtues. 
Since they belong to a different order, they remain unaffected by the practice of graced 
actions. The strictly limited effects of supernatural actions are, however, not regrettable for 
the agent, since the acquisition of natural virtues ―is not necessary for the perfection or the use 
of infused habits, but only contingently and concomitantly joint with them.‖54 
Thereby the question of pure natural acts is also answered, at least implicitly. Since Suarez 
grants the possible existence of two parallel and independent virtues regarding the same 
matter, but negates the acquisition of natural virtue by supernatural acts, he has to concede the 
possible existence of pure natural acts. Only by these pure natural acts can acquired virtues be 
generated and developed. ―By other natural acts which are performed about the same matter 
as the infused habits . . . habits are produces which are proportioned to such acts.‖55 The 
expression ―proportioned to such habits‖ clearly indicates the production of natural virtues, 
generated by proportioned – i.e. natural – acts.56  
Consequently, the justified person chooses between two modes of action. He acts either 
supernaturally or naturally, depending on the habit he intends to use.
57
 Natural virtues 
therefore do not play any positive role in the exercise of infused virtue.
58
 
                                                 
53
 Ibid., no. 2: ―Concomitantia habitus acquisiti [sc. ad habitum infusum] omnino accidentaria est et contingens, 
quia talis habitus nullo modo acquiritur per efficentiam habitus infusi, aut per se, aut per actus suos, sed per 
exercitium aliorum actuum quos per accidens, et successive, ac diversi temporibus contingit misceri seu 
interponi cum actibus infusis.‖ Suarez explains the impossibility of an essential relation of both virtues by the 
following argument in more detail: ―Quia habitus qui acquiritur circa actus naturales, inclinat ad actus eiusdem 
rationis cum his a quibus genitus est, et ad idem obiectum sub eadem ratione formali; in praesenti autem habiuts 
acquisitus non postest inclinare ad idem obiectum sub eadem ratione formali, quia illud obiectum supernaturale 
est . . . neque etiam potest tali habitus ad actus infusos inclinare, tum quia naturalis qualitas nont habet naturalem 
appetitum ad supernaturalia; tum etiam quia naturalis inclinatio habitus ad actum fundatur in virtute activa 
naturali talis actus; hanc autem virtutem non habet habitus acquisitus circa actus infuses.‖ (Ibid., no. 7). 
54
 Ibid., no. 23:―Acquisitionem horum habituum [scilicet naturalium] nunquam esse per se necessariam ad 
perfectionem vel usum habituum infusorum, sed contingenter tantum et concomitanter cum illis coniungi.‖ 
55
 Ibid., no. 2: ―Per alios actus naturales qui circa easdem materias habituum infusorum fieri possunt . . . 
producuntur habitus talibus actibus proportionati.‖ 
56
 ―Per actus naturales, qui circa materiam virtutum infusarum fieri possunt, habitus etiam naturales et acquisiti 
generari possunt.‖ (Ibid., no. 22). 
57
 In fact Suarez supposes that in spite of the possession of infused virtues man might act only naturally for the 
most times. ―Licet habeant virtutes infusas morales, saepe et fortasse frequentius per acquisitas operantur.‖ (Ibid., 
21). 
58
 ―Actus aquisiti non sunt necessarii ad infusos; ergo neque habitus acquisiti ad infusos. . . . Quod . . . actus 
naturales non sint necessarii ad supernaturales, probatur, quia nec sunt causae, nec principia illorum, nec 
conditiones omnino requisitae; quia nescit tarda molimina Spiritus Sancti gratia, et ideo non indiget actu naturali 
ad efficiendum in nobis supernaturalem actum.‖ (Ibid. no. 23). 
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One may raise the following objection to this outline of the doctrine of Suarez. According to 
our findings in the previous chapter, Suarez concedes to acquired virtue a certain impact on 
infused virtue through the removal of contrary vices. Though the acquired virtues by 
themselves incline to specifically different acts, nevertheless they provide a good basis to 
follow even supernatural motives, since both motives are at least similar.
59
 One might 
therefore be tempted to conclude that the disconnection between both orders is not as strict as 
just suggested. Might there exist at least a certain interaction?
60
 
This objection, however, results from a blurred distinction between acts and virtues (cf. the 
remarks in section 4.1.2). Of course, Suarez argues that acquired virtues can provide helpful 
dispositions for supernatural acts, but that‘s not at issue here. We are concerned whether 
supernatural acts generate acquired virtues, and Suarez explicitly negates this claim.
61
 For him, 
acquired virtues are produced by natural acts and only by natural acts, which he delimits from 
supernatural acts practiced at different times (―diversi temporibus―62). Subsequently, acquired 
virtues might support the acts of infused virtues in an indirect way, but that‘s a different issue. 
Besides Suarez, also B. Medina
63
 and F. Sylvius
64
 defended this same position.
65
 In the 19
th
 
century, the position was again proposed by Mazzella.
66
 
                                                 
59
 ―Dico hos habitus [scilicet naturales acquisites] frequenter requiri et coniungi infusis, et suo modo iuvare 
illos. . . . Licet actus naturales, productivi talium habituum, per accidens sint, et contingenter fiant respectu 
virtutum infusarum, nihilominus quia motiva eorum magis familiaria sunt, et ex rebus sensibilibus saepe 
sumuntur, ideo facilius fiunt, et ideo verisimile est vel frequentius, vel satis frequenter exerceri, ac proinde 
habitum inducere.‖ (Suárez, Opera omnia, liber VI, cap. 14, no. 24). See also the quotations in footnote 13 and 
17.  
60
 This interpretation of Suarez is suggested by Bullet who groups the theory of Suarez for that reason together 
with John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses (cf. Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 131-134). 
61
 Suarez expresses himself explicitly in ibid., no. 2 (see footnote 55). 
62
 See again footnote 53. 
63
 Medina holds that the act of infused virtue nor generates acquired virtue nor works immediately for the 
augmentation of infused virtue. ―Si isti actus virtutum infusarum generant denuo aliquem habitum; vel est 
eiusdem speciei, vel diversae: non primum; tum, quoniam duae qualitates eiusdem esse non possunt; tum vero, 
quoniam virtus infusa iam esset omnino otiosa et supervacanea: tum ultimo, quoniam si haec virtus acquisita 
esse eiusdem speciei cum infusa, consequens est, quod virtus acquisita per vires naturae, posset consequ finem 
supernaturalem, quod asserere, Pelagianum est. . . . Nam actus similes producunt habitum eiusdem speciei, ut 
asserit Aristoteles. Actus enim temperantiae non producunt habitum iustitiae: ergo actus virtutum infusarum, non 
producunt habitum acquisitum alterius speciei.‖ (Medina, Expositio, about ST I-II 51.4). In his commentary to ST 
I-II 63.4 Medina asserts that supernatural acts augment infused virtutes only per modum meriti but not effective.  
64
 According to Sylvius the practice of infused virtues cannot acquire natural virtues. For the frequent experience 
that after the loss of infused virtues often remains a certain facility for natural good acts he suggests the 
following explanation: ―Si dicas, eum qui plures actus alicuius virtutis infusae exercuit, postquam peccando 
virtutem illam amisit, esse promptiorem ad similes actus exercendos, quam si nullus exercuisset. Resp. id 
accidere, vel quia praeter actus virtutis infusae, exercuit alios moraliter bonos, ex quibus quidam habitus sit 
acquisitus: vel quia ex virtutis infusae exercitio passiones manent moderatae, et difficultates separatae: vel 
denique, quia licet ex actibus virtutis infusae non fuerit generatus proprie dictus habitus, eo ipso tamen quo per 
eos corroboratus et confirmatus fuit habitus praeexistens: potentia in qua est talis corroboratio et confirmatio, 
facta est propensior et promptior ad similiter operandum: quae quidem maior propensio erat illi per habitum 
infusum, non videtur tamen tota deperdi, ipso habitu perdito. . . . Confirmatur: Si generaretur aliquis, vel ille 
inclinaret ad actus supernaturales; vel ad naturales: Non ad supernaturales, cum habitus acquisitus non inclinet 
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In more recent times, A. McKay has suggested in her dissertation, The Infused and Acquired 
Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy, a quite similar account of the relation between 
acquired and infused virtue. After discussing Aquinas‘s teaching on acquired and infused 
virtue in general, and in the treatise on prudence and fortitude in the ST II-II in particular, the 
concluding chapter treats the connection between both sets of virtue. First, McKay argues 
against the so called strong-connection-theory, i.e. against the position which states an 
essential cooperation between acquired and infused virtues (we will refer to it in section 
3.3.3).
67
 Secondly, she tries to determine the positive effects between both sets of virtue. She 
concedes to acquired virtues the function of removing contrary vices, and she even admits that 
infused virtues ―make use‖ of their acquired counterparts, although without determining how 
this could work.
68
 However, she stresses that the acquisition of those virtues should never be a 
goal of the moral life.
69
  
Although these final remarks are quite short, the overall tenor of her study shows clearly the 
basic agreement between the exclusive-order-theory and to the argument of Suarez on this 
particular point.
70
 Referring to the example of a holy priest who is at times strongly inclined 
to drunkenness through the acquired vice of immoderateness,
71
 she wants to illustrate the 
essential independence of acquired and infused virtues. On the one hand, the priest acts 
according to a high level of charity and infused virtues, but simultaneously he suffers acquired 
vices. McKay emphasizes here that the perseverance and even augmentation of infused virtue 
is strictly independent from the continuity of acquired vice – and not only independent of the 
vicious inclination as habit, but even independent of vicious acts. McKay: ―Even when the 
                                                                                                                                                        
ad eliciendos actus superantes suam facultatem: non etiam ad naturales, quia habitus solum inclinat ad actus 
similes illis a quibus fuit causatus: non est autem causatus ex actibus naturalibus.‖ (Franciscus Sylvius, 
Commentarii in totam primam secundae S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici et communis, vol. 2 (Antwerp, 
1714), about ST I-II 51.4, conclusio 3). 
65
 Coerver enumerates further Gregory of Valentia and J. de Lugo among the proponents of the exclusive-order-
theory (see Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 44-49). However those commentators ascribe 
to the supernatural act at least the acquisition of a natural disposition which can facilitate externally further 
supernatural acts (see section 4.3.3.1B). 
66
 See e.g. Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis, 44: ―Vi actuum supernaturalium, qui ex habitibus infusis eliciuntur, 
nullus producitur habitus, sive naturalis sive supernaturalis acquisitus.‖ 
67
 McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 190-195. 
68
 Ibid., 198-199.  
69
 Cf. Ibid., 196-198. The latter assertion permits in fact a more precise determination in which way McKay 
thinks a possible use of the acquired virtues by the infused ones – and in which way not. On page 198-199 she 
refers to De virt. in com. 10 ad 4, where Aquinas underscores that the acts of acquired virtues are meritorious 
only by mediation of infused virtues. However, according to McKay this does not imply the conception that 
infused virtues interact with acquired virtues as something of value. ―Aquinas nowhere indicates that the 
justified individual ought to consciously strive for the acquired virtues. . . . It would be odd at best to conclude 
that one in the state of grace ought to put the quest for eternal life ‗on hold,‘ so to speak, while he first pursues 
the acquired virtues.‖ (McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 197-198).  
70
 Not by chance she attacks the so called strong-connection-theories (McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 
190-195). 
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priest acts contrary to right reason, as he so often does, he does so without ‗damaging what is 
indispensable for salvation.‘‖72  She justifies her claim by noting that infused virtues are 
destroyed only by an act contrary to the supernatural final end but not by acting against 
particular (although genuine) goods.
73
 Hence, the development of infused virtues can take 
place without necessarily implying any change on the side of the natural (vicious) inclinations. 
Per se both orders are disconnected in a way that ―an individual could diminish in acquired 
virtue and at the same time be granted an increase in infused virtue.‖74 
The parallel here to Suarez is obvious. The practice of infused virtues does not imply any 
immediate consequence with respect to acquired habits. It neither contains the perfection of a 
corresponding natural good act nor does it cause an augmentation of acquired virtue. The 
natural habit can even progress in the opposite (i.e. vicious) direction. The acquisition of 
natural virtues would presuppose the constant practice of natural acts, but those habits are not 
to be assigned as the end of the moral life. 
We summarize the principle idea of the exclusive-order-theory as follows. In the state of 
grace, two different modes of acting are available to the human agent: by infused virtues he 
acts supernaturally, and by acquired habits he acts naturally. Both levels of activity exist in a 
parallel fashion without any per se cooperation. Furthermore, a habit of infused virtue 
influence does not influence a natural act, nor does a supernatural act enforce acquired virtue. 
 
 
3.3.3 The “Connected-Order-Theories” 
 
Some Common Features of the Connected-Order-Theory 
Unlike proponents of the first theory, many interpreters of St. Thomas argue for a certain 
impact of infused virtues to obtain in regard to acquired virtues, and videlicet in both respects. 
                                                                                                                                                        
71
 She refers to the saintly ―whiskey priest‖ in Graham Green‘s The Power and the Glory. 
72
 McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 119; cf. McKay, ―Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue,‖ 552-555. 
73
 ―One can lack command with respect to some genuinely good end, but not lack command with respect to the 
end of all life. When such a man views a choice under the aspect choosing a genuinely good end which is not the 
end of all life, he fails. Yet so long as he does not fail to exercise command when presented with choices that 
concern the end of all life, he does not lose infused prudence.‖ (McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 116). 
74
 Ibid., 85. Arguing from a different viewpoint, also Porter suggests a similar conclusion: Essential for a saint is 
his exemplarity in love disregarding of his further moral perfection. ―To be a saint is not to be morally perfect, 
but to be exemplary in love.‖ (Porter, ―Virtue and Sin,‖ 521-539, here 539). Hence, infused virtues are 
compatible even with serious sins (ibid., 538). 
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Supernatural acts can have some effect on the development of acquired virtues, and 
conversely, infused virtues influence the framework of the acts of acquired virtues.  
Of course, some positions are mutually conceded by the proponents of the connected-order-
theory and the exclusive-order-theory. Both agree that the two sets of virtue can coexist in a 
single agent, and that each of them possesses its own finality – for example, acquired 
temperance works for the preservation of health, infused temperance for man‘s conformity 
with Christ. But the connected-order-theories go a step further. Though the acquired virtues 
fail to perfect man in regard to his ultimate end, they are not completely alien to this end. 
Rather, the infused moral virtues are able to redirect the natural virtues toward their own 
higher end; they can ―use‖ a natural habit for their own purpose. The proper structure of 
acquired virtues is not destroyed thereby, but elevated. By themselves they work for their 
natural end, but in virtue of the infused habit they work implicitly even for the supernatural 
end. Hence, in the best case scenario both are oriented in cooperation toward one final end, 
though the acquired virtues by themselves remain directed to their proper end. 
Further, since acquired virtues act for true human goods (i.e. the good of the human city), 
according to a connected-order-theory a human being remains essentially imperfect, as long 
as he is not perfect in both respects, that is according to the human good and the divine good 
(although only one of the two is the ultimate end). Therefore, the connected-order-theories 
argue for a redirection of the teleology of acquired virtues according to the finality of infused 
virtues.
75
 
                                                 
75
 It should be noted that the connection-theory does not describe acquired virtue as presupposition for infused 
virtue. Certainly it claims that a supernatural act has to contain the perfection of a natural good act. But this does 
not imply a necessary presupposition of an acquired habit. Lacking this distinction one is in danger to become 
entangled in a many ambiguities. 
As an example of a lack of this distinction – and of the resulting confusions – we can take the final chapters in 
McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 190-195 about (or against) the ―strong connection theory.‖ McKay 
criticizes those theories which argue for a connection between acquired and infused virtues and which interpret 
acquired virtues as preconditions for infused virtues. McKay attributes this position to authors as L. Yearley, R.F. 
Coever, R. Mirkes and G.P. Klubertanz, and resumes whose idea as following: ―The successful act of infused 
virtue ‗presupposes‘ the presence of acquired virtues.‖ (Ibid., 190). And: ―One must rid oneself of bad 
dispositions before one can even participate in the supernatural life.‖ (Ibid., 195). However, it is doubtable, if 
anyone of the mentioned scholars really holds a ―strong-connection-theory‖ in this sense. At least to the best of 
our knowledge none of those authors defend this position in his writings; not even Yearly who is most criticized. 
There is no absolute presupposition for grace. Even if we do not agree with Yearley in his overall theory, he 
clearly does not hold a presupposition-theory in this sense. On the contrary, he explicitly explains: ―One must 
always be aware of the dangers involved in overstressing the ‗presupposed‘ aspect. It can be misleading both in 
breaking down too neatly the sequential steps and, more important, in making the assent to God too continuous 
and gentle a process thereby underplaying or demeaning the revolutionary change that is justification. God is not 
absolutely bound to work in any particular way.‖ (Yearley, ―The Nature-Grace Question,‖ 575). It is Yearley‘s 
intention to show that infused virtues have to account for the natural order. Supernatural temperance not must 
ignore the value of health – although health it not its proper end. In this sense he explains: ―If there is to be a real 
act of supernatural fortitude it must presuppose the recognition of the value of goods of the world that is essential 
to natural fortitude.‖ (Ibid., 574). This assertion, however, does not imply an essential necessity for the presence 
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Recent Proponents of the Connected-Order-Theory 
In the 20
th
 century the majority of scholars advocated a version of the connected-order-theory. 
However, they mostly didn‘t bother to provide a plausible explanation of how the relation in 
question does work. Only occasionally did a scholar take the special trouble to determine 
what a supernatural act effects with regard to natural habits, or what the presence of infused 
virtue implies for the natural act. Normally, authors are content to notice a subordination of 
acquired virtues regarding infused ones. But is such a reordering necessary or contingent? 
Though we don‘t want to devalue the mentioned outlines generally, we should mention their 
explanatory limits regarding the precise structure of the cooperation of infused and acquired 
virtues.  
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to give a short overview of some of the terms those scholars 
used to present their position concerning the relation between both sets of virtue. 
Some scholars delineate the relation of acquired and infused virtues under the respect of order. 
Supernatural motives can order natural motives toward inferior ends to their own proper 
(superior) end. The acts of acquired virtues are to be ordered to the end of infused virtues. For 
example, Bernard describes the use of acquired virtues by supernatural acts as a ―harmonious 
subordination‖,76 the former can be ―superposed‖77 by the latter. Parent specifies the relation 
as a ―concourse‖78, or a ―very close collaboration‖,79 wherefrom originates an ―action which 
is conjunct in a harmonious subordination.‖80 Utz uses a similar phrasing.81 According to 
Bradley, the infused virtues ―necessarily supersede [emphsasis added] the humanly acquired 
moral and intellectual virtues.‖82 Not, however, by the way of destruction, but the human 
virtue is ―subsumed‖83 and ―incorporated‖84 into the supernatural moral order.85 Likewise, 
Hughes stresses that acquired virtues are somehow ―contained‖ in the infused ones.86 
                                                                                                                                                        
of acquired virtue. Yearley only emphasizes that natural virtue is ―usually necessary‖ (ibid., 572). If Yearley 
speaks of ―presupposition,‖ he does so in this qualified sense. 
76
 R. Bernard, ―Appendice,‖ in Somme théologique: La vertu, vol. 2 (Paris: Société Saint Jean L‘Évangéliste 
Desclée & Cie, 1934): 459: ―harmonieuse subordination.‖ 
77
 Ibid., 460: ‖superposée.‖ 
78
 Parent, ―Les vertus morales infuses dans la vie chrétienne,‖ 210: ―concours.‖ Likewise on page 220. 
79
 Ibid., 212: ―collaboration très étroite.‖ 
80
 Ibid., 220: ―action conjuguée dans une harmonieuse subordination.‖ 
81
 A.F. Utz, ―Anmerkungen,‖ in Die deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe: Summa Theologica; Recht und Gerechtigkeit, 
vol. 18 (Graz: Anton Pustet, 1953), 603: ―Die erworbenen und eingegossenen sittlichen Tugenden stehen nicht 
beziehungslos oder gar gegensätzlich einander gegenüber. Die erworbene Tugend ist vielmehr der eingegossenen 
Tugend untergeordnet. . . Jede hat ihre Eigenaufgabe, die erworbene jedoch nicht ohne Selbstberichtigung an der 
eingegossenen. So bilden beide zusammen ein abgestuftes einheitliches Ganzes übernatürlich-menschlicher 
Vollendung.‖ 
82
 Denis J.M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral 
Science (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 17. 
83
 Ibid., 20. 
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Sometimes acquired virtue is seen as an instrument moved by the supernatural virtue. Bernard 
describes it as a ―good instrument in service of the infused virtue.‖87 Similarly, Parent refers 
to the fact that an instrument, being moved by a higher cause, becomes able to produce an 
effect which essentially surpasses its natural capacities, thought the instrument does not lose 
its proper natural perfection. Analogously, the infused virtue is able to make use of and to 
elevate an acquired disposition as its instrument.
88
 
Many authors use the matter-form-analogy for the relation of acquired and infused virtues. 
Acquired dispositions, they say, relate to the command of infused virtues as matter relates to 
form. In this context ―matter‖ should not be taken to imply the total absence of any formal 
determination (as first matter). Both orders are determined by their special formal object, but 
the lower order remains open for further formation, as in material things the materia signata 
is open to receive a certain determination. In this way, acquired virtue is considered as the 
material principle in relation to infused virtue as its formal element. The analogy is used in 
this context in the dissertation of Lanfranco.
89
 He clarifies this by applying the analogy of the 
unity of a single act stemming from two different operative habits which contains 
simultaneously both motivations; the infused virtue does not extinguish natural motives but 
absorbs them.
90
 Subsequently, the matter-form-analogy became a fertile instrument to delve 
                                                                                                                                                        
84
 Ibid., 21. 
85
 According to Bradley, only by such a transformation a human virtue ―is made a perfect token of its type,‖ 
although in itself it remains ―because of its this-worldly end a ‗conditional‘ virtue.‖ (Ibid.) 
86
 W.D. Hughes, ―Appendix 3: The Infusion of Virtues,‖ in Summa Theologiae: Virtue (Ia2ae. 55-67), vol. 23 
(London: Blackfriars, 1969), 247-248: ―The moral virtues infused by God lead the powers of the soul from their 
pursuits within the earthly city to a fellow-citizenship with the saints in heaven. The end is said to draw, and a 
new and supernatural end for each virtue draws the power which it endows from its commonly addressed object 
to a higher and more absorbing one. Yet the lower is not cast aside, but rather is contained in the higher, and is a 
condition of it, for a purely supernatural man or a purely supernatural human act is strictly speaking a 
contradiction in term. For example, the aphorisms of Proverbs lose nothing of their native salt when they are 
taken into sacra lectio. For St Thomas grace permeates nature, neither destroying nor leaving it alone.‖ 
87
 Bernard, ―Appendice,‖ 459: ―bon instrument au service de vertu infuse.‖ 
88
 See Parent, ―Les vertus morales infuses dans la vie chrétienne,‖ 212: ―Grâce à la vertu infuse qu‘elle sert, la 
vertu acquise - tout comme l‘instrument sous la motion de la cause principale - produit un effet supérieur à son 
degré d‘être. Ordonnée de soi à une fin naturelle elle ne saurait produire un acte méritoire de la vie éternelle sans 
l‘intervention de la vertu infuse. Mais cette intervention d‘une vertu supérieure ne rend pas inutile la vertu 
inférieure, puisque, comme nous l‘avons vu, l‘action de la première est facilitée par la second. On peut même 
discerner en celle-ci, comme en tout instrument, une activité instrumentale et une activité propre: la première est 
exercée sous la motion de la vertu infuse, la seconde relève immédiatement de la vertu acquise. Mais, l‘une et 
l‘autre sont liées de sorte que la vertu acquise par son action propre consistant à éliminer les dispositions 
contraires et à soumettre l‘appétit à la raison concourt instrumentalement à l‘action plus élevée de la vertu 
infuse.― 
89
 Annibale Lanfranco, La necessità delle virtù morali infuse secondo S. Tommaso (Casale Monf. Unione 
Tipografica Botto, Alessio, 1942), 20: ―Tale onestà o giusto mezzo naturale delle virtù morali acquisite è come 
un elemento materiale [emphasis in the original] rispetto a quello della virtù morale infusa che è formalmente 
specificata dall‘onestà o giusto mezzo soprannaturale.‖ 
90
 ―Nell‘ordine concreto della vita spirituale . . . la debole luce della prudenza e motivo virtuoso naturale viene 
come assorbito [emphasis in the original] nella pienezza di luce soprannaturale emanante dalla fede e dalla 
prudenza infusa.― (Ibid., 20-21). 
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deeper into the interaction of both kinds of virtue, even if it can be (and was) interpreted in 
quite different ways.
91
 
Moreover, the cooperation of acquired and infused virtues is described as a complementarity, 
for example, by Coerver. This terminology accentuates the mutual supplementation of both 
principles, namely the removal of contrary vices by the acquired virtues and the redirection 
toward the supernatural end by infused virtues. The concept of complementarity avoids also 
the danger of a contradictory opposition between both habits. Although both are formally 
different, they do not ever contradict each other. Hence, as Coerver explains, both virtues are 
―not opposed, but as complementary to one another.‖92 Even more, Coerver concludes that 
one virtue needs the other for its own perfection.
93
 For Harvey, both kinds are even ―essential 
to one another.‖ 94  Nevertheless, the supernatural habit retains its primacy, which leads 
Schockenhoff to speak of a ―reciprocal priority‖ of infused virtue.95  
Likewise, Cessario often mentions the importance of infused virtues for Christian morality, 
always emphasizing the true value of natural virtue but at the same time their need of 
elevation through supernatural virtue for becoming meritorious in terms of eternal life.
96
 
In the past fifteen years, several articles have been published relevant to the question of the 
cooperation between natural and supernatural virtue. Almost unanimously, the authors of 
these articles argue that acquired virtues are suited to be transformed and elevated to the 
supernatural order by means of infused virtues. 
                                                 
91
 For example the following four authors make use of the matter-form-analogy: Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 
130; 143; 146-149; George P. Klubertanz, ―Une théorie sur les vertus morales ‗naturelles‘ et ‗surnaturelles‘,‖ 
Revue Thomiste 59 (1959): 569-575; Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum hominis’, 334-340; Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity 
of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 61-231. But since each of these scholars uses the analogy in a different way, they will 
be discussed later in more detail. 
92
 Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 100.  
93
 ―Just as nature and grace are mutually complementary, so also are the acquired and the infused moral virtues. 
Neither the one nor the other is complete of itself, each needs its complement in order to attain true perfection.‖ 
Ibid., 119. 
94
 ―The natural and the supernatural orders are complementary and essential to one another. While it is true that 
no natural act has any positive efficacy to lead us to salvation, unless it be vitalized by the supernatural, it is also 
true that no supernatural act can be done by us except through the operation of faculties which are in themselves 
natural. Neither the acquired nor the infused virtues are complete in themselves; each needs the other to attain 
perfection.― (Harvey, ―The Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues,‖ 215). 
95
 Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum hominis’, 335: ―reziproken Priorität.‖ Interesting to note that in a recent publication 
Schockenhoff became rather unpretending concerning the need for infused moral virtues. Infused virtues are just 
―der in die nüchterne Form eines theologischen Konvenienzargumentes gebrachte Reflex eines Staunens, das in 
gläubigem Nachdenken der Angemessenheit der Wege Gottes gewahr wird und einsehen kann, wie diese jener 
Güte und Weisheit entsprechen, die der glaube und die Vernunft mit Gottes Handeln verbindet.‖ (Schockenhoff, 
Grundlegung der Ethik, 164). 
96
 See Romanus Cessario, ―The Meaning of Virtue in the Christian Moral Life: Its Significance for Human Life 
Issues,‖ The Thomist 53 (1989): 193-195; Cessario, Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 123-125. 
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O‘Meara (1997) asserts that natural habits retain their natural dynamic even under the 
dominion of grace, but simultaneously they become equipped by a higher capability and new 
orientation.
97
 Thereby, both virtues act to form an intertwined unit.
98
  
Likewise for Cole (1999) the infused virtues perfect their natural counterparts through a 
reorientation toward a higher end.
99
  
The key term used by Inglis (1999) is redirection. Acquired virtues have to be redirected by 
the infused ones to the higher end of the latter.
100
 In this way natural virtues provide just a 
disposition for supernatural virtues, which do not replace the natural virtues but rather build 
upon them.
101
 Vice versa, the acquired virtues become strengthened by the infused virtues.
102
 
Hence, a single action can spring synchronically from the cooperation of acquired and infused 
virtue.
103
  
Miner (2000) underlines the fact that neither order enjoys complete autonomy, but rather there 
exists between them a well ordered cooperation under the guidance of charity.
104
 Acquired 
                                                 
97
 ―Each virtue retains its natural dynamic of exercise and habit in the created human personality, but this is 
expanded by grace whose animations of the virtues are found . . . in a vital form which brings higher capability 
and orientation.‖ (Thomas F. O‘Meara, ―Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,‖ Theological Studies 58 
(1997): 265). 
98
 ―Some traits of the acquired virtues remain in their infused counterparts, for the two are intertwined in living.‖ 
(Ibid., 266). 
99
 “A Christian can possess both the natural moral virtues and the infused virtues, which actually bring the 
natural virtues to completion insofar as they are reoriented toward the supernatural end. So, for example, 
both the Christian and non-Christian soldier can be courageous in battle, but while the non-Christian 
soldier’s courage is oriented solely toward an earthly end, the courage exemplified by the Christian soldier 
is oriented toward a supernatural end.” (Darrell Cole, “Thomas Aquinas on Virtuous Warfare,” Journal of 
Religious Ethics 27 (1999): 76). 
100
 ―In order to attain the highest good, acts of the civil virtue of fortitude would need to be redirected to a 
suprapolitical end through infused fortitude.” (Inglis, “Aquinas’s Replication,” 17). 
101
 “The acquired virtues dispose a person to receive infused moral virtue. . . . With the example of 
martyrdom in mind, we could put it this way: a person who is strong in regard to the civil life is more like 
one strengthened in regard to martyrdom than a person who lacks the acquired virtue of fortitude. The 
strength of the former stands in need of redirection, whereas the latter needs to receive both strength and 
the proper teleology. This view could be interpreted to suggest that, according to Aquinas, infused virtue 
replaces acquired virtue for the Christian. After all, if acquired fortitude prepares one to receive infused 
fortitude, there is no reason why the acquired must persist after the reception of the infused. Why not say 
that when the infused virtue governs and directs a person’s actions, the corresponding acquired virtue 
disappears—like the proverbial ladder that can be kicked away when the climber is secure on the higher 
level? My claim is that the infused virtue does not replace the acquired virtue for Aquinas, but rather 
builds upon it.” (Ibid., 19). “Infused virtue builds upon, but does not destroy, virtuous characteristics 
acquired through human effort.” (Ibid., 21}). 
102
 “One prepares for the infusion of moral virtue through the acquisition of moral habits that are 
themselves strengthened by infusion.” (Ibid., 20). 
103
 “A single action can be simultaneously one of acquired and infused moral virtue. Infusion strengthens 
those characteristics of acquired virtue that remain, and it supplies an overriding final cause that 
transforms the virtue. . . . Within this context, acquired virtue retains a role while a priority is reserved for 
infused virtue.” (Ibid., 22). 
104
 ―Any strong idea of the autonomy of acquired prudence cannot be ascribed to Thomas. Not only do 
nature and grace cooperate, but all the virtues in a well-ordered soul are unified in charity.” (Robert C. 
Miner, “Non-Aristotelian Prudence in the ‘Prima Secundae’,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 419). 
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habits become virtues in the full sense not before being informed by their infused 
counterparts.
105
 Strictly speaking acquired virtues are not necessary. The infusion of grace 
does not pose any preconditions on the side of nature, but the cooperation of both principles is 
the ordinary end and goal. Infused virtues integrate natural habits, but the concept of acquired 
virtue survives their integration into infused virtue.
106
 
Hardon (2001), who gives a good overview about the need for infused virtues according to 
Aquinas, completely omits a description of the reciprocal relation between acquired and 
infused virtues.
107
 
Kent (2002) mentions that man might operate in one and the same act according to both 
virtues, namely if he achieves at the same time good deeds ―for their intrinsic worth and for 
the sake of God.‖108 In this way, the exercise of acquired virtues becomes an ―expression‖ of 
the love of strictly human goods and the supernatural love for God.
109
 
Dell‘Olio (2004) defends the coexistence of acquired and infused virtues. The former must be 
―subordinated‖ to the supernatural ones without being destroyed thereby.110 
Jones (2006) refers again to an ―information‖ and ―transformation‖ of acquired virtues 
through the infused ones.
111
 
Irwin (2007) holds that for Aquinas ―the infused virtues are the perfections of the acquired 
virtues.‖112 The former do not introduce a wholly new set of virtues. Rather they ―extend the 
outlook of the acquired virtues, and do not supplant it with a completely different outlook.‖113 
                                                 
105
 “Unless it is informed by charity and, concomitantly, infused prudence, acquired prudence is not a 
virtue in the full sense.” (Ibid.). 
106
 “If the infused virtues are virtues in the proper sense, then where is the need for acquired virtues? Does 
the prudence infused by grace obviate the need for acquired prudence? It is true that infused prudence 
can operate without acquired prudence; the operation of grace can never be said to require nature. . . . It is 
possible for a person to act, and act repeatedly, in accord with prudence despite a settled disposition to 
the contrary. Nonetheless, grace ordinarily involves the cooperation of nature. The creature on the way 
toward his ultimate end will hope to possess both types of virtue, and integrate them into a unified habit 
of prudence. The concept of acquired prudence, then, survives the introduction of infused prudence.” 
(Ibid., 421). 
107
 See John A. Hardon, ―The Meaning of Virtue in St. Thomas Aquinas,‖ Faith & Reason 26 (2001): 14-17. 
108
 Kent, ―Habits and Virtues,‖ 125. 
109
 Cf. Ibid., 126. 
110
 See Dell‘Olio, Foundations of Moral Selfhood, 134: ―We may then say that, in addition to the infused virtues, 
Christians may, and should, possess all the natural acquired virtues they need to perfect their natures. . . . In the 
life of grace, for Aquinas, the natural end of the human being is subordinated to the supernatural end, but it is not 
destroyed by this subordination.‖ Dell‘Olio uses the following analogy to clarify the kind of cooperation of 
acquired and infused virtues: ―The situation is analogous to the case of a lower ranking officer who performs his 
own proper acts with their own proper ends, for example, winning a particular battle. Yet these ends, while 
possessing their own forms, nonetheless fall under the more general intention of winning the war, the end 
directly intended by the supreme commanding officer.‖ (Ibid. 131). 
111
 Cf. David A. Jones, “Sin, Suffering, and the Need for the Theological Virtues,” Christian Bioethics 12 
(2006): 192-193. 
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An exception to this common agreement seems to be made by Hause (2007). He explicitly 
claims that ―the acquired virtues are not transformed‖ by the infused ones, ―but remain side 
by side with the infused virtues.‖ 114 However, the disagreement here is more a question of 
words than of contrary ideas. Hause stresses the fact that infused virtues don‘t supercede 
natural habits. Rather, he argues, they retain their proper finality, specified by their different 
formal objects. This kind of difference, however, doesn‘t hinder Hause to agree to virtues‘ 
mutual cooperation, as for example the strengthening of an acquired virtue through the 
practice of an infused one.
115
 
 
In summary, it is common to all these scholars to concede a certain cooperation of acquired 
and infused virtues, admittedly by using different concepts. However, in the end, none of 
them explains why and how this cooperation works. They argue for a determination of the 
lower virtue through the higher, but they skip an explanation of whether every supernatural 
act will perform such a ordering by itself or whether something special is required. In other 
words, the justified person (having infused virtue) sometimes achieves pure natural acts, i.e. 
acts solely by his natural virtue, and if so does the agent of these natural acts – performed 
apart of an actual intention of the supernatural end – commit sin? Hence, we see that the mere 
affirmation of a redirection of acquired virtue by infused virtue remains imprecise and 
incomplete.  
Actually, this is the problem we mentioned at the beginning of chapter 3. The mere 
description of the relation between acquired and infused virtues as habits does not cover the 
whole question. It is always the relation between an act and a virtue (and vice versa) which is 
in question. 
Therefore, we introduce a further distinction that helps to establish a better starting-position 
from which to settle the questions raised by the different kinds of connection-theories. The 
assertion of a connection between acquired and infused virtues can imply, first of all, that 
infused virtues can redirect the act of acquired virtues, or secondly that infused virtues always 
                                                                                                                                                        
112
 Terence H. Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, vol. 1 (From Socrates to the 
Reformation) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 647. 
113
 Ibid. Consequently, Irwin speaks of a ―continuity of the infused with the acquired virtues― (Ibid.). 
114
 ―A morally virtuous person who receives grace and the theological virtues will receive, side by side with 
them, infused moral virtues, so that there will be two temperances, two courages, and two justices. And this will 
not, Aquinas assures us, be a redundant doubling, for the virtues belong to different species and have different 
effects. The acquired virtues are not replaced. . . . The acquired virtues are not transformed, he contends, but 
remain side by side with the infused virtues.‖ (Hause, ―Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue,‖ 14). 
115
 See Ibid., 17. 
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include in their very essence an act of the latter. Both positions require a connection, but the 
first argues for an accidental relation between the two kinds of virtue, while the second 
implies a necessary connection. In the subsequent section we will refer to the first as the 
accidental-relation-theories, and to the second as the inclusive-order-theories. 
 
 
a) Accidental-Relation-Theory 
 
The proponents of a so called accidental-relation-theory concede all positions which we have 
summarized in the previous chapter concerning the connected-order-theories. However, they 
are emphatic to stress the mere possibility of a reorientation of acquired virtues by the infused 
ones. It is not strictly necessary that every supernatural act involves its acquired counterpart. 
Consequently, the interplay between acquired and infused virtue is not necessary but only 
accidental, depending on certain circumstances.  
For further clarification we shall distinguish two subspecies of the accidental-relation –theory. 
Some theologians hold the position that acts of infused virtue can include the perfection of a 
natural act, if the agent considers not only supernatural but also natural reasons. In such cases, 
acts of infused virtue generate simultaneously an acquired natural virtue. Otherwise, they do 
not.  
A second group of scholars goes even further. For them, the practice of infused virtues causes 
per se a certain disposition in the human faculty, which provides a facility for further good 
natural deeds. Such a disposition, however, is not simply identical with acquired virtue. 
 
 
i) The Acquisition of Natural Virtues by Supernatural Acts While 
Attending Natural Motives  
 
Some scholars claim that supernatural acts can contain an involvement of acquired virtue and 
can generate acquired virtue, although they do not necessarily do so. The argument starts 
from the principle that supernatural actions are measured by the divine rule; apart from this 
formal determination there is no supernatural act. But a supernatural act is not necessarily 
limited to mere supernatural motives. It can include also natural reasons, namely if the agent 
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considers even natural ends and includes them intentionally. Under the assumption that the 
agent is attentive to both rules – the supernatural as well as the natural – an action would be 
per se supernatural (because achieved by the infused virtue), but likewise there would be an 
involvement of acquired virtue (or at least of a natural perfection – if the acquired virtue is not 
yet developed). For example, someone in the state of grace fasts in light of supernatural 
motives. Such fasting constitutes a supernatural act. But if the same person simultaneously 
attends to the rule of reason and includes the preservation of health in his intention, then the 
act would also pertain to acquired temperance. It wouldn‘t be correct to call his fasting a 
natural act, since it is obviously supernatural, but likewise it wouldn‘t be right to deny this 
fasting its natural perfection, since it is undertaken in relation to health and indeed was 
intended also for this reason. It seems fitting therefore to attribute to such a supernatural act a 
double perfection: the perfection of the infused virtue as well as a natural perfection.  
Under such conditions it is easy to agree that the practice of an infused virtue simultaneously 
contains the acquisition of acquired virtue. Certainly the formal object of the supernatural act 
does not simply correspond to the object of the acquiring virtue. The perfection of the latter is 
expressively intended and included, namely by the agent‘s attention to the rule of reason.116 
The decisive concept of this theory is the little word ―can.‖ It does not belong to the essence 
of the supernatural act to involve the perfection of acquired virtue and to work for its 
confirmation. Rather, it is due to an additional intention of the agent that accounts for that 
special effect. Supernatural acts therefore can cause natural virtue, but they do not necessarily 
do so.  
Proponents of this thesis emphasize this specification since just this accidental potentiality, 
depending on the agent‘s actual attention, allows for a good explanation of a common 
experience. In many cases even often repeated supernatural acts don‘t seem to acquire natural 
habits. Scholars refer to the example of the ―lax seminarian‖ who receives regularly the 
sacraments and practices acts of infused virtue over years of his formation, but whose 
acquired virtues don‘t grow significantly. Rather, he remains tepid or lax in his daily actions 
and relapses constantly into the same (at least venial) sins. If he falls in mortal sin, seemingly 
nothing remains of his religious practice. In other seminarians, however, the repetition of the 
same supernatural acts provokes an acquired habit. The proponents of the accidental-relation-
theory argue that the lax seminarian missed the opportunity to acquire natural virtue by failing 
                                                 
116
 As Gardeil points out: ―Sans dout, un acte moral peut être à la fois commandé par la vertu naturelle et par la 
vertu ‗infuse‘, par exemple ne pas médire de son prochain; mais, sans rejeter le motif de justice naturelle, la 
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to attend sufficiently to the rule of reason. During his repeated supernatural activity, he 
focused exclusively on supernatural motives and missed the chance to develop natural virtue. 
This leaves the seminarian in a precarious state, for if he loses infused virtue, his sole 
motivation for good deeds is taken away, leaving him with no habit to act virtuously. 
 
Therefore, we can summarize the main theses of this theory in the following manner: 
 
a) The acts of infused virtue per se neither include an involvement of acquired virtue nor 
cause per se acquired natural virtue; but per accidens they can do so if the agent 
attends simultaneously to the rule of reason. Otherwise, the agent performs mere 
supernatural acts. 
b) Acts of acquired virtues can earn supernatural merit if they proceed from a 
supernatural motivation, i.e. inspired by charity, ruled by the divine law of infused 
virtue. Otherwise they remain mere natural acts. 
 
Some Proponents of the Accidental-Relation-Theory 
Among the great commentators John of St. Thomas (1589-1644) defends the idea of an 
accidental cooperation and acquisition of natural virtue by supernatural acts. For him, aquired 
virtues are not annexed per se to infused ones, but the latter are able to command the former. 
He explains as follows:  
 
Hence, since it is clear from faith that we are rectified by infused theological virtues, which 
are about the final end, it is fitting to assign some other virtues which are per se annexed to 
that supernatural intention and which are derived from it [i.e. the infused moral virtues]; but 
there are not per se some acquired virtues annexed to it, although it can command them, since 
this command is vague and per accidens, and it uses them [i.e. the acquired virtues] neither 
connatural and proportioned, nor according to the exigency of such a supernatural rectitude.
117
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
conscience le commande au nom de la charité; et c'est là son motif formel; devant la volonté, c‘est le motif 
premier et essentiel de le poser.‖ (Gardeil, ―Appendice,‖ 372-373). 
117
 Johannes a Sancto Thoma, Cursus theologicus, disputatio XVI, art. VII, no, 1262: ―Unde cum constet de fide 
nos rectificari per virtutes theologales infusas, quae versantur erga finem, oportet assignare aliquas virtutes per se 
annexas isti intentioni supernaturali et ex ea reduntante [sc. virtutes morales infusae], non sunt autem per se illi 
annexae virtutes acquisitae, etiamsi possit illis imperare, quia hoc imperium est vagum et per accidens, nec 
connaturaliter et proportionate utitur illis, nec secundum exigentiam talis rectificationis supernaturalis.‖ 
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John of St. Thomas puts emphasis on the fact that such commanded natural acts are in 
themselves neither connatural to the infused habit, nor proportioned to it, nor related 
according to the standards of its order. Nevertheless, the superior virtue can command them 
(possit illis imperare). Consequently, those commanded acts develop to acquire natural habits 
that are annexed to the supernatural ones incidentally. Hence, there is a real but only 
accidental interaction of both orders of virtue. 
The Salmanticenses assume the same doctrine. They argue that charity can command actions 
which belong substantially to the natural order, and those acts in turn are capable of 
generating other acquired virtues.  
 
By an act of infused charity can be understood not only supernatural acts which are elicited by 
charity, but also commanded acts which belong by its substance to the natural order; it is 
probable that by those acts some habit of natural love or friendship is acquired – as by other 
natural acts the other acquired virtues are generated.
118
 
 
In the twentieth century it was Klubertanz, who in his influential article ―Une théorie sur les 
vertus morales ‗naturelles‘ et ‗surnaturelles‘‖ proposed the same idea.119 For Klubertanz, the 
matter-form-relation is the analogy most adept at clarifying the relation between acquired and 
infused virtue. As matter is determined by form, likewise can acquired virtues be redirected 
by infused virtues.
120
 Both habits, residing in one and the same human faculty but differing in 
their formal object, relate to each other in the manner of determining and being determinable. 
Nonetheless, the supernatural rule commands actions in conformity with the light bestowed 
upon us by nature. Hence, the judgments of infused prudence can be supported even by 
natural motives derived from the first principles of practical reason, i.e. from the seeds of 
acquired virtue. The infused and acquired virtues are therefore generally not opposed. Since 
the former are derived from a higher rule, they relate to the latter as a formal principle to a 
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 Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, vol. 6, tractatus XII (de virtutibus), disp. III, dubium III, no. 55: ―Per 
actus infusae caritatis possunt intelligi, non actus supernaturales a caritate eliciti, sed actus imperati, qui 
secundum substantiam sunt ordinis naturalis; per quos actus probabile est generari aliquem habitum dilectionis, 
sive amicitiae naturalis: sicut per alios actus naturales generantur aliae virtutes acquisitae.‖ However, the 
theologians of Salamanca emphasize the impossibility of a positive acquisition of a supernatural habit by 
supernatural acts. ―Tum denique nam esto sit sermo de actibus supernaturalibus, et de generatione habitus, potest 
intelligi non de concursu illorum effectivo, sed tantum dispositivo: quatenus actus caritatis et contritionis sunt 
dispositiones ad ipsam caritatem et ad gratiam, concurruntque in praedicto genere causae dispositivae ad earum 
infusionem.‖ (Ibid.). 
119
 Klubertanz, ―Une théorie,‖ 565-575. 
120
 For the basic outline of this thesis, see Ibid., 569-571; however, as we have already seen, Klubertanz is not 
original to use the matter-form-analogy for the relation of acquired and infused virtue. Lanfranco and Bullet 
made use of this analogy already before him. (See Lanfranco, La necessità delle virtù morali infuse secondo S. 
Tommaso, 20); Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 130;143;146-149).  
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material one. ―Far from being opposed or to exclude each other as incompatible, these 
principles are mutually complements.‖121 
Though both sets of virtue are complementary, it is important to remember that they don‘t 
necessarily imply each other. Of course, natural acts by themselves don‘t imply supernatural 
virtue, but is this also true vice versa? Does an act of infused virtue, from the viewpoint of the 
matter-form –analogy, include necessarily the development of a natural habit? Klubertanz 
denies this consequence explicitly. Let us suppose a graced agent resolves to perform an 
action only on account of the divine rule, accepted exclusively on the authority of God. For 
Klubertanz, such an act would contain only a supernatural perfection and therefore would fail 
to generate or confirm a natural habit. Something supernatural is unable to cause something 
natural.
122
 Only if the supernatural motives are conjoint with natural reasons of human 
intelligence, only if there is special attention given to the formal objects of acquired virtues, 
only then can an action contain a supernatural perfection as well as a natural one, and only 
then might it cause a natural virtue.
123
 Hence, the act of infused virtue can generate an 
acquired one, but intrinsically there exists no essential relation. 
On the other side, if we ask for the possible achievement of pure natural acts by a justified 
person (i.e. under the condition of infused virtue), we find, vice versa, a similar independence. 
If an agent attends only to natural motives but fails to consider supernatural reasons, he does 
not use his infused disposition but acts only on a natural level.
124
  
A very similar account is suggested by G. Bullet in his remarkable study Vertus morales 
infuses et vertus morales acquises selon saint Thomas d’Aquin. Bullet states the following 
principle: the exercise of a virtue requires actual attention to its respective rule.
125
 To act 
merely from convention or by spontaneous intuition would be insufficient to account for a 
                                                 
121
 Klubertanz, ―Une théorie,‖ 571: ―Bien loin de s‘opposer, ou de s‘exclure comme incompatible, ces principes 
sont mutuellement complémentaires.‖ 
122
 ―Supposons une personne en état de grâce qui porte un jugement prudentiel uniquement d‘après la foi, c‘est-
à-dire en raisonnant à partir d‘une règle d‘action révélée acceptée uniquement sur autorité. Un tel acte, par 
conséquent, ne manifesterait que la perfection de la vertu surnaturelle. Et, en conséquence, aucune vertu acquise 
ne serait produit. En d‘autres termes, l‘acte de la vertu surnaturelle comme telle ne cause pas une vertu naturell.‖ 
(Ibid., 572; see already 569). 
123
 Such an act would be ―formellement surnaturel, contenant la perfection de la vertu surnaturelle, et en même 
temps matériellement naturel, contenant la perfection de la raison droite en acte. En tant qu‘il contient cette 
dernière perfection, les actes répétés de jugement et d‘imperium produiront dasn l‘intellect la vertu acquise de 
prudence.‖ (Ibid.). 
124
 See Ibid. note 3. 
125
 Bullet distinguishes several kinds of attention: It could be actual or past (with or without further acting 
effects); the actual one can be explicit or implicit etc. Bullet sees an actual attention as the necessary condition 
for a true human act; see Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 150-154. ―On ne conçoit pas l‘exercice des vertus 
morales sans une certaine attention actuelle à la règle. La vertu morale n‘est pas un automatisme instinctif.‖ 
(Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 152). 
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true virtuous act. Consequently, the use of an infused virtue presupposes an actual 
consideration of the divine rule, for otherwise it would lack the aspect of a supernatural act.
126
 
But then the question arises of how to describe the acts of acquired virtue of a graced agent 
who also possesses the infused virtues. Do they count as supernatural acts? Without a 
supernatural formal object? Are they mere natural acts, or even sinful? The failure to consider 
the divine rule seems to imply an acting praeter finem – the thomistic definition of venial 
sin
127
 – and consequently some scholars describe such actions as sinful.128 
Bullet, however, argues for a different solution to the question. If the agent does not give 
attention to the divine rule but only to natural motives, then the act remains intrinsically and 
formally natural. However, if the defect occurs inculpably – e.g. because of the multiplicity of 
daily affairs of a saintly Christian housewife – while the person remains principally orientated 
by charity towards God as her supernatural end, then such formally natural acts are implicitly 
orientated toward the supernatural end and thereby become supernaturalized and meritorious. 
In this way, Bullet distinguishes two different modes of supernatural operations: on the one 
hand, the proper acts of infused virtues (attending the divine rule), and on the other hand acts 
of acquired virtue presupposing a non-culpable defect of attention to the divine rule. The first 
type of action is supernatural intrinsically (quoad substantiam) since its mean is determined 
by the divine rule, for they are immediately commanded by charity (―actes impérés―). Acts of 
the second kind are supernatural only extrinsically (quoad modum) since they are oriented to 
their supernatural end while their formal object remains natural. They are caused by natural 
motives, but oriented to the supernatural end by charity (―actes orientés―).129  
Bullet clearly defends an accidental relationship between acquired and infused virtues. As a 
result of this relatioship, the justified person is able to practice acts of acquired virtue without 
the invention of infused virtue. Those acts are culpable if the agent is guilty of an inattention 
to the divine rule. Otherwise, they remain meritorious, even – and this is the decisive point – 
                                                 
126
 ―Si l‘on ne peut concevoir l‘exercice de la vertu morale sans une attention actuelle à la règle de raison, on ne 
peut également concevoir l‘exercice des vertus infuses morales sans une certaine attention actuelle à la règle de 
foi.‖ (Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 153). 
127
 Cf. De malo 12.3 ad 8. 
128
 See for examples the discussion which is summarized in the appendix of Harvey, ―The Nature of the Infused 
Moral Virtues,‖ 218-219. 
129
 ―Les actes de la vertu acquise, orientés par l‘intention virtuelle de la fin surnaturelle, sont-ils surnaturels en 
vertu de la causalité motrice et finale, et non en vertu de la causalité formelle; en vertu de la causalité extrinsèque, 
et non en vertu de la causalité intrinsèque.‖ (Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 159). And comparing both kinds of 
action Bullet emphasis that in the second way the supernatural act remains formally natural. ―Il y a, nous sembe-
t-il, dans le premier mode d‘information, une réelle dependence causale qui n‘existe pas dans le second cas, en 
ce sens que l‘acte comme tel de la vertu acquise aurait pu être posé essentiellement le meme, quant à la 
specification reçue de l‘objet formel, sans l‘influence virtuelle de la charité.‖ (Ibid., 160}. See to the whole 
question: Ibid., 154-163). 
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apart of infused virtues.
130
 Only by a twofold attention to both the rule of divine law as well 
as the rule of reason are both kinds of virtue involved in a supernatural act.
131
 
The same understanding of the relation between acquired and infused virtue is prevalent in the 
texts of some authors, even if they do not address this position explicitly. 
A good example her is Maritain. In Science and Wisdom, he dedicates a special chapter to the 
relationship of natural and supernatural virtue.
132
 To determine the involvement of acquired 
virtues in a supernatural act, he introduces the distinction of a―strictly instrumental‖ and a 
―non-instrumental‖ elevation of acquired virtues through infused ones. Human activity might 
be referred directly towards the supernatural end that is above the natural order, e.g. to resist 
temptation only for seeking conformity to the sufferings of Christ. In such cases, acquired 
virtues are used only instrumentally, since the natural virtue is effective ―not in the order of 
specification but in the order of the conditions of exercise.‖133 The supernatural action uses 
the acquired habit for its own end,
134
 but on the other hand, a graced agent might exercise an 
acquired moral virtue also in relation to its proper (natural) end, i.e. the civic life. Those 
actions are, according to Maritain, surely elevated by charity and infused virtues, but in a non-
instrumental way since the formal determination stems from acquired virtues referring to their 
own ends, even though the acquired virtues need the help of infused ones for being carried 
beyond their purely natural point of specification (sc. the temporal life). 
Maritain does not discuss the consequences of supernatural acts for acquired virtues, but he 
obviously would agree with Klubertanz and his argument for the possibility of supernatural 
action apart from reasonable motives. In the case of Maritain‘s instrumental use of acquired 
virtue, a supernatural act disregards natural motives. The acquired virtues just facilitate the 
action by the way of removing obstacles. The motivation as well as the specification of the 
acts stems exclusively from the intended end of infused virtue.
135
 
                                                 
130
 ―Il ne nous semble pas nécessaire, métaphysiquement, que l‘influence virtuelle de la charité, surnaturalisant 
extrinsèquement la vertu acquise, se fasse par l‘intermédiaire de la vertu morale infuse correspondante.‖ (See the 
detailed footnote 1 in Ibid., 161). 
131
 Cf. Ibid., 162. 
132
 See for the following: Maritain, Science and Wisdom, 210-220. 
133
 Ibid., 214. 
134
 Hence, the ―instrumental‖ elevation of the acquired virtue by the infused one does not mean that the proper 
teleology of the acquired virtue is used in the supernatural act, but on the contrary: For example infused fortitude 
makes ―use for its own end of the acquired fortitude, and of all the facilities prepared in the subject by the latter.‖ 
(Ibid.). 
135
 Worth to note that such an understanding of an instrumental elevation of acquired virtue is not necessarily 
combined with the concept of an ―instrumental use.‖ In itself the idea of an instrumental use could also cover 
actions which attend the internal teleology of their instruments (i.e. the proper ends of acquired virtue). But in 
the present case Maritain‘s explicit differentiation of the instrumental use from non-instrumental elevation in 
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Maritain‘s distinction also implies consequences for the possibility of pure natural acts. His 
position on that score is similar to Bullet‘s, though it is not identical to it. In the case of a non-
instrumental use of an acquired virtue, the agent uses his natural habit as the primary and 
principal cause of his action. ―In this case the acquired virtue has the initiative in the operation, 
and acts as principal cause.‖136 It works ―with its own energy . . . [and] tends to its own 
end.‖137 Consequentially, the acts involving the non-instrumental elevation of acquired virtue 
turn out to be intrinsically natural acts, as ―actes orientés‖ in Bullet‘s language.138 As a result, 
the acts of a person in the state of grace can be divided into two parts: some disregard the 
teleology of acquired virtues, and others include their perfection. Thus, the theory of Maritain 
suggests an accidental relation to obtain between infused and acquired virtues. The two 
authors, however, differ in other points: For Maritain the instrumental and the non-
instrumental use of acquired virtues imply an involvement of infused virtues, whereas Bullet 
considers a meritorious act of acquired virtue apart from infused virtue possible in special 
cases.
139
  
In more recent times this same idea was suggested by E. Schockenhoff, one of the few 
German speaking theologians who treat the question of acquired and infused virtues at all. He 
notes that an acquired virtue can be subordinated to an infused one, ―insofar as the agent 
himself inserts the end of his moral agency into the orientation [Richtungssinn] of the ‗virtus 
infusa‘ and constitutes a subjective subordination of ends.‖140 The statement implies indirectly 
that graced actions include the natural perfection not necessarily but accidentally. Otherwise a 
possible subordination would be mentioned in vain.
141
 
                                                                                                                                                        
which the proper teleology of acquired virtue is / is not considered, shows that he intends by ―instrumental use‖ 
obviously an exclusion of the proper finality of acquired virtue. 
136
 Maritain, Science and Wisdom, 216. 
137
 Ibid.  
138
 In a footnote (ibid.) Maritain calls non-instrumentally-elevated acts ―intrinsically natural‖ which become 
supernatural only in an external manner, quoad modum finalitatis suae superioris. 
139
 Ramirez suggests a quite similar account. He devotes a special chapter to the question whether supernatural 
acts can acquire natural virtues (Ramirez, De habitibus, 219-299). First, he is clear that elicit acts of infused 
virtues cannot acquire a natural habit because of the different formal object (ibid., 292-295). The same is true for 
commanded acts of infused virtues (ibid., 295-296). However, if an infused virtues commands an act of an 
acquired virtue (or simply the mere natural power), then the natural virtue is confirmed or a certain natural 
disposition becomes developed (ibid., 296-9). The two principles behind: (a) A habit becomes acquired only by 
the same acts, but (b) the infused virtue can command a natural virtue. ―Actus eliciti virtutis infusae augent et 
roborant propriam virtutem a qua eliciuntur; similiter actus imperati supernaturales virtutem infusam imperatam; 
itemque actus imperati naturales virtuem acquisitam imperatam.‖ (Ibid., 297). 
140
 Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum hominis’, 337: ―Die ‗virtus acquisita‘ kann der eingegossenen Tugend unterstehen, 
insofern der Handelnde selbst das Ziel seines sittlichen Tuns dem Richtungssinn der ‗virtus infusa‘ einfügt und 
eine subjektive Subordination der Ziele konstituiert.‖  
141
 Also for B. Kent there is ―no essential connection between the infused virtues and the naturally acquired 
virtues.‖ (Kent, ―Habits and Virtues,‖ 123). But she concedes that people with the virtue of charity ―might 
nonetheless develop the natural virtues and exercise them both for their intrinsic worth and for the sake of God.‖ 
(Ibid., 125). Hence, it is a facultative possibility. If the agent does so, the acts of these naturally acquired virtues 
Chapter 3. Different Theories Concerning the Cooperation of Acquired and Infused Virtues 
 185 
ii) Acts of Infused Virtue as Generating per se a Positive Disposition for 
Acquired Virtue 
 
In the following paragraphs we will discuss a position which goes one step further. It 
supposes not only the potential effects of supernatural acts regarding acquired virtues – 
depending on the agent‘s concrete attention, of course – but even some necessary 
consequences following therefrom. 
The argument procedes as follows. Actions of both kinds of habit are about the same matter, 
namely actions and passions. Being courageous for the sake of the civil common good or for 
the profession of faith are two different acts, but they involve the same human power, namely 
the irascible appetite. Thus, these two operations share a common grounding. Based on this 
―link,‖ the theory which we describe in this paragraph argues that supernatural acts have 
essentially some positive though indirect effects on future natural actions. The previous theory 
claimed such effects only in the case of an actual attention to natural motives. According to 
the present theory, those effects of supernatural actions are given per se in any case. 
But what do these actions produce exactly? Certainly, the effected imprint is not the infused 
virtue itself (quae deus operatur in nobis sine nobis), nor is it simply an acquired virtue due to 
its having a different formal object. The proponents of this theory argue for the acquisition of 
a certain disposition in respect to actions with similar motives, an imprint of a human faculty 
which might be used by any virtue (infused or acquired) without being identical with one of 
both.  
 
We can summarize the main theses of the theory as follows. 
 
a) What does infused virtue (as habit) imply for an act of acquired virtue?  
Because of their different formal objects, an act of infused virtue cannot directly cause 
an acquired virtue. But repeated actions leave a certain imprint in the underlying 
faculty which allows an easy use of that power also for the sake of natural motives. 
 
b) What does an act of infused virtue imply for acquired virtue (as habit)?  
In this regard, the present theory doesn‘t differ from the former. Pure natural acts 
                                                                                                                                                        
would be meritorious, otherwise not. The daily conduct of a Christian can express both his love for natural goods 
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remain possible even for an agent in the state of grace. Repeated supernatural actions 
can facilitate them accidentally by contributing to a natural power‘s more convenient 
disposition to natural virtuous action. 
 
Some Proponents of the Theory 
The present position is clearly expressed by John of St. Thomas. The author emphasizes that 
the act of infused virtue per se confirms only the virtue itself.
142
 To ascribe to a supernatural 
act the production of a formally different habit would contradict the common principle that a 
habit can be produced only by acts similar to itself, as for example the repeated reasoning 
about an apodictic argument is unable to generate a habit of opinion. Analogously, acquired 
virtues cannot be generated apart of natural acts.
143
  
On the other hand, John of St. Thomas mentions the possibility that someone with infused 
virtue can acquire natural dispositions by natural acts, and that such an acquisition can be 
facilitated even by the frequent practice of corresponding supernatural acts. The reason for 
this is the fact that the human mind becomes accustomed to deal with the same matter, and 
consequently it returns easily to similar acts even under a different formal aspect. ―If a matter 
is more frequented . . . then it is easier to deal with even when under other but similar 
motives.‖144 At this point, John of St. Thomas turns around the previously used analogy of the 
scientific habit. The repeated demonstration of an apodictic argument does not generate a 
habit of opinion, but nevertheless it allows an easier acquisition of this habit. In other words, 
it conveniently disposes the power to developing the habit. Hence, there must be something 
that is produced by repeated supernatural actions, though what is produced is not identified 
with acquired virtue itself. 
                                                                                                                                                        
or/and his love for God (see ibid., 126). 
142
 ―Absolute tamen nullum habitum produci per actus virtutum infusarum docet . . . sed tales actus confirmare 
praecedentem habitum, quod utique fieri potest, vel moraliter, id est, meritorie, vel physice disponendo ut deus 
infundat augmentum iuxta dispositionem actus.‖ (Johannes a Sancto Thoma, Cursus theologicus, Disputatio XVI, 
art. VII, no. 1303). 
143
 ―Caeterum dicere quod ex frequentatis actibus demonstrativis generetur habitus probabilis, est omnino 
impossibile: sic ex frequentatis actibus supernaturalibus et infusis impossibile est generari habitum non 
supernaturalem nec infusum, sed acquisitum, quia diversae speciei sunt, habitus autem generatur ex similibus 
actibus, non ex dissimilibus.‖ (Ibid., disputatio XVI, art. VII, no. 1306). 
144
 Ibid., no. 1305: ―Licet enim dubitare non possit quod circa materiam virtutum infusarum etiam theologicarum 
potest generari habitus aliquis acquisitus, qui diverso motivo et sub diversa ratione formali versetur circa illam 
materiam, et ad illum habitum generandum facilitari possit animus ex frequentatione actuum infusorum, 
quatenus si illa materia est magis frequentata, et sic facilius poterit etiam tractari ex alio simili motivo, sicut circa 
materiam, quam saepius demonstrando tractamus, possumus etiam probabilibus rationibus adiuvare, et facilius 
acquire poterit talis habitus probabilis.‖ However John of St. Thomas makes clear that the acquired disposition in 
question is not in itself supernatural (see ibid., no. 1307). 
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Thus, John of St. Thomas makes a clear distinction between acquired virtues on the one hand 
and acquired dispositions of the other hand. Acquired virtues, specified by their natural 
motives of human reason, are acquired by natural acts. They might be commanded by infused 
virtues (as we saw in the previous chapter
145
), but supernatural actions cannot generate them 
immediately.
146
 They leave in the subjective power, however, a certain imprint that facilitates 
the use of the same power even when inspired by different motives. 
 
By the fact that somebody performs and frequents many acts by a supernatural motive and by 
an infused virtue, he remains disposed and facilitated that he can act about the same matter out 
of a natural motive and by acquired virtue, so that he switches easily from one motive to the 
other, and generates an acquired virtue about the same matter.
147
 
 
With this distinction between acquired virtue and mere disposition, John of St. Thomas 
accounts both for the principle that the different formal object of supernatural acts forbids the 
immediate generation of acquired virtues, and also for the empirical fact that supernatural acts 
appear to make the acquisition of natural virtue easier. 
Authors such as Banez,
148
 De Lugo,
149
 Billuart
150
 and Schiffini
151
 share this position. Even 
Bullet suggests this idea at great length. He bases his argument on the observation that infused 
                                                 
145
 See footnote 117; (also ibid.). 
146
 ―Si habitus aliquis acquisitus ex illis actibus generetur [scilicet ex actibus virtutum infusarum], debet esse 
alterius ordinis ab infuso et alterius speciei; ergo alterius motivi et rationis formalis. Unde non ex actibus illis 
infusi gignitur, sed ex aliis circa eamdem materiam procedentibus, sed sub diverso motivo.‖ (Ibid., disputatio 
XVI, art. VII, no. 1308). 
147
 Ibid., disputatio XVI, art. VII, no. 1309: ―Hoc ipso quod aliquis exercet et frequentat plures actus ex motivo 
supernaturali et per virtutem infusam, manet dispositus et facilitatus ut circa eamdem materiam operari possit ex 
motivo naturali et per virtutem acquisitam, ideoque facile ex uno motivo transit ad aliud, et virtutem acquisitam 
circa eamdem materiam generat.‖ And further in no. 1312: ―In virtutibus autem moralibus infusis, si aliquis 
exercetur, facilitatur, ut ex motivo naturali etiam aliquando operetur circa illam materiam, et sic generat virtutem 
acquisitam.‖ 
148
 Banez poses the following objection: ―Sed contra agitur: Voluntas cum caritate efficiente producit actus 
dilectionis, ergo ex frequentatione illorum actuum generabitur aliquis habitus.‖ And he replies himself: 
―Respondetur, concedo consequentiam; sed ille habitus acquisitus non erit virtus, quia non attinget obiectum, 
propterea quod generatur ex exercitio voluntatis, prout naturalis potentia est, quae concurrit simul cum habitu 
caritatis ad actum dilectionis divinae, attingentis deum, ut est ab habitu et Spiritu Sancto. Vide D. Thomam de 
Verit. Q. 17, a. 1, ad 4, ubi docet quod ex actibus caritatis generatur habitus dilectionis acquisitus. Et iste solet 
manere in peccatoribus amissa caritate per peccatum mortale.‖ (Banes, Scholastica commentaria, about ST II-II 
24.6, dubium 1, conclusio 5 ad 4). 
149
 ―Ex . . . actibus supernaturalibus, relinqui in nobis species, quibus eorum actuum recordemur, quae species 
non sint simpliciter et rigorose supernaturales, sed solum praesuppositive et secundum quid . . . Tales ergo sunt 
species relictae ab actibus supernaturalibus, et memoria, qua illorum recordamur: nempe supernaturales solum 
praesuppositive quatenus ad sui existentiam praesupponuntur necessario aliquid supernaturale, sed tamen debitae 
naturae intellectuali ex suppositione, quod sint in nobis actus supernaturales.‖ (Ioannis de Lugo, Disputationes 
scholasticae et morales, vol. 1 (Paris: Ludovicum Vivès, 1868), disputatio IX, sectio 4 no. 79). And further in 
disputatio XVI, sectio 4, no. 77: ―Certe supposito, quod habitus acquisiti, et eorum facilitas sint species bene 
ordinatae, et memoria actuum praecedentium; idem sine inconvenienti concedi potest de actibus supernaturalibus, 
cum experientia constet non minus ab eorum exercitio reddi potentiam faciliorem ad alios actus posteriores, 
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virtues reside in human powers, and consequently their actions imply a simultaneous motion 
of the natural faculty and its respective virtue.
152
 Thus, there is one action which flows from 
the infused habit as well as from the natural faculty.
153
 The infused virtue elevates the faculty 
and inclines it to a higher end, but it does not contradict the power‘s natural teleology. In 
terms of the matter-form-analogy, the supernatural virtue determines as form the underlying 
faculty. Therefore, Bullet concludes: ―All acts of an infused moral virtue suppose a 
simultaneous act of, if not of a corresponding acquired virtue, at least of the natural power.‖154 
This final statement is important. In faithful adherence to John of St. Thomas (to whom he 
refers explicitly several times), Bullet argues that the acts of infused virtues don‘t themselves 
generate acquired virtue, but only a convenient disposition to natural virtue in the underlying 
power.
155
 
Common to all proponents of the accidental-relation theory is the conviction that supernatural 
acts do not necessarily generate acquired virtues. In the next chapter, we will examine the 
scholars who in fact defend this very opinion. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
quam ab exercitio actuum naturalium, et negari non possit, quod relinquant etiam post se species sui, quae 
deserviant et ad memoriam, et ad facilius, et cum minori defatigatione percipienda obiecta, et motiva, quae antea 
nonnisi cum attentione, et labore percipi et examinari debebant.‖ 
150
 Billuart explains in respect to the acts of the theological virtues: ―Potest tamen dici quod [actus supernaturales] 
generent habitum alterum inferioris ordinis non quidem formaliter sed dispositive; quia hoc ipso quo quis iterat 
actus virtutum infusarum, disponitur et facilitator ut circa eamdem materiam operetur ex motivo naturali, sicque 
transeundo de uno motivo in aliud, generatur virtus acquisita circa eamdem materiam.‖ (Billuart, Cursus 
theologiae, dissert. II, art. 3, resp. ad obi. 3). 
151
 ―Ipsum exercitium actuum supernaturalium censeatur esse causa, eaque physice efficiens, eiusmodi facilitates, 
quae in potentia relinquitur. Nam imprimis tale exercitium relinquit in potentia complura sui quasi vestigia, 
exempli gratia, memoriam sui, species bene ordinates; quae quidem vestigia multum facilitant hoc ipsum 
exercitium. . . . Id igitur etiam tribui potest exercitio actuum supernaturalium. . . . Nam haec facilitas, quam in 
modum habitus acquisiti obtineri dicimus frequentatione actuum supernaturalium, non est in substantia 
supernaturalis, sed naturalis; cuius rei manifestum signum illud est, quod ea maneat, etiam quando virtutes 
infusae amittuntur. Neque etiam illud obstat, quod principium supernaturale gignat aliquid naturale. Id enim bene 
fieri potest, quoties principium illud non operatur quatenus supernaturale, nec per se requiritur ad effectum 
supernaturalem.‖ (Schiffini, Tractatus de virtutibus infusis, 53-54). 
152
 Cf. Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 141-143. 
153
 ―La puissance naturelle ne concourt pas partiellement à la production de l‘acte surnaturel pour ce qui serait de 
sa vitalité, et l‘haibtus infus partiellement pour ce qui serait de sa surnatualité; mais l‘acte procède à la fois, tout 
entier, de l’un et de l’autre.‖ (Ibid., 142). 
154
 Ibid., 143: ―Tout acte de la vertu morale infuse suppose un acte simultané, sinon de la vertu acquise 
correspondante, du moins de la puissance naturelle.‖ 
155
 ―Il nous semble donc nécessaire de maintenir que, formellement parlant, l‘acte surnaturel de la vertu infuse ne 
peut engendrer un habitus naturel. Cependant, en tant que cet acte implique exercisce de la puissance naturelle, 
une disposition à l‘acquisition d‘un habitus naturel sera engendrée dans cette puissance par la repetition de ces 
actes, l‘habitus proprement dit étant formellement engender par un acte de la puissance naturelle relative à un 
object formellement naturel.‖ (Ibid., 144). 
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b) Inclusive-Order-Theory 
 
The following version of the connection theory is the extreme opposite of the exclusive-order 
theory. According, the supernatural act is taken to contain per se the natural perfection of its 
corresponding natural act. For example, Christian fasting motivated by divine charity contains 
per se the perfection of a natural temperate act. 
Several consequences flow inevitably from this position. First, the effects of supernatural acts 
are not seen as being limited to the divine merit gained from the augmentation of a natural 
power by infused virtue, as the exclusive-order theory asserts. Further, supernatural actions 
generate natural virtues even without special attention being given to natural reasons, as the 
accidental-relation theory suggests. Rather, it belongs essentially to the supernatural act to 
confer the corresponding natural perfection to the underlying power and to acquire or confirm 
the corresponding natural virtue. 
We shall refer to the present position as the inclusive-order theory. This name does not, 
however, imply that infused virtue per se includes the presence of an acquired virtue as habit. 
It simply denotes that every act of an infused virtue contains the perfection of a corresponding 
natural act, i.e. the supernatural act has to align in a certain way to the measure of reason, 
even if a natural acquired habit is still lacking. 
The authors who ascribe to the inclusive-order theory can be divided into two groups which, 
though they agree on many points, differ fundamentally in principle. The first group holds 
that supernatural acts include the corresponding natural perfections since both kinds of virtue 
are substantially the same. On the basis of this hypothesis, it is easy to claim a an agent‘s 
necessary acquisition of natural virtues by means of supernatural acts. The second group, 
however, defends the formal difference of natural and supernatural acts, but it argues 
nonetheless that the latter include necessarily the natural perfections of the former. 
 
 
i) Supernatural and Natural Acts Are of the Same Substance 
 
Aquinas repeats again and again that infused and acquired virtues are about the same matter, 
but he insists at the same time that they differ regarding their formal object. St. Thomas‘s 
strong focus on this principle led Suarez to the negation of any possible interaction between 
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both sets of virtue (see section 3.3.2). Hence, if someone wants to defend a necessary mutual 
relationship between the two sets sets, then he has to provide a satisfactory explanation for 
that cooperation in spite of the formal difference. 
The easiest solution to this problem is simply to negate the formal difference. If both kinds of 
actions are basically the same, although their mode of acting might differ, it wouldn‘t be 
difficult to argue for the effects of the acts of one virtue necessarily imposing themselves on 
the acts of other. 
 
Some Proponents of the Inclusive-Order Theory 
We shall examine the basic outline of the inclusive-order theory as manifested in the texts of 
the French Jesuit and Cardinal L. Billot (1846–1931), who was perhaps the most prominent 
proponent of this theory.
156
 In his expanded book De virtutibus infusis he claims initially that 
supernatural acts by themselves lead to certain effects in the underlying power: ―It is said that 
by frequent acts of infused virtues an acquired habit is generated, by which the natural power 
of that infused virtue becomes better subjected and more and more disciplined for prompt 
action according itself.‖157 According to Billot neither the removal of contrary impediments 
nor the intensification of a positive inclination to its acts is reserved to a divine intervention 
which can only be merited by those acts. Rather supernatural acts possess by themselves the 
potency to induce a positive tendency for the same supernatural acts.
158
 He argues as follows. 
To erase an inclination necessarily implies the generation of another one. Hence, if 
supernatural acts can account for the diminution of contrary vices, then they will also be able 
to produce an inclination to the oppposing virtue. To illustrate his point, Billot uses the 
following example. A wax imprint can be only destroyed by superimposing a new seal on the 
old one. Likewise, the elimination of a contrary vice implies automatically the acquisition of a 
natural disposition which consequently inclines the power to the same virtuous acts. 
At this point one might make an objection. Supernatural and acquired virtues are specifically 
different. Hence, how should acts of one virtue be able to generate the habit of another? Of 
course, Billot knows that traditional caveat. He himself addresses the objection and quotes 
                                                 
156
 See e.g. the judgment of Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 55-61; Mirkes, ―Aquinas on 
the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 248-255. 
157
 Billot, De virtutibus infusis, 50: ―Dicatur generari per frequentationem actuum virtutes infusae habitus 
acquisitus, quo naturalis potentia eidem infusae virtuti melius subiicitur, et semper magis magisque disciplinatur 
ad prompte operandum secundum ipsam.‖ 
158
 See Ibid.: ―non per meritum operum tantum, sed per efficientiam eorundem.‖ 
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even its principle.
159
 Nevertheless, he simply denies its applicability for the present case. It is 
an obvious fact that repeated supernatural actions acquire a certain facility for performing the 
same actions again in the future. Therefore, one has to provide a theory which accounts for 
this experience.
160
 
To resolve this theoretical difficulty, Billot presents a remodeled vision of the supernatural 
act.
161
 Obviously, actions which are directly concerned with man‘s supernatural final end, 
most of all the vision of God, essentially exceed man‘s natural powers. So far, nothing is 
disputed. Then, however, Billot raises the question whether man could strive for the specific 
supernatural object by means of his pure natural capacities, if given a divine revelation. In 
these cases, so Billot speculates, man would recognize a supernatural end (and the means to it) 
as something good even by his natural intellect. Hence, he would seek the supernatural end 
under the formal notion of a reasonable good. But for those actions he doesn‘t need an 
additional principle. ―Man can perceive and strive by a mere natural act even for eternal life 
itself, without any intrinsic gift which elevates [his] faculties.‖162 To be sure, Billot does not 
assert that by such acts the supernatural end could be effectively attained, but he does argue 
that such natural acts possess at least a tendency which is similar to that of supernatural acts 
themselves. He hypothesizes, therefore, natural ―analogues‖ for theological virtues,163 as well 
as for the infused moral virtues. ―Supernatural acts during life have completely the same 
objective resolution as natural acts have or would have about the same practical objects, and 
consequently, the notion of supernaturality depends only very little from this part.‖164 
Simultaneously, Billot effects a decisive change in the understanding of the internal structure 
of the function of infused virtue itself. According to Billot, the special character of a 
supernatural act is derived neither from the material object (i.e. what is believed, hoped, loved, 
or worked), nor from its formal object (i.e. because of which reasons certain things are 
believed, hoped, loved, or worked), but exclusively from the principle of grace which elevates 
                                                 
159
 See Ibid., 52-53. 
160
 This is not an unfair undervaluation of Billot, but he himself claims that the relation of acquired and infused 
virtues works like this; consequently theories which argue for a specific difference of the formal object of natural 
and supernatural acts complicate things without need and has to be denied. (See Ibid., 53). 
161
 See for the following his extensive discussion in Ibid., 64-94. 
162
 Ibid., 69: ―Homo ipsam vitam aeternam apprehendere et appetere valet actu mere naturali, absque ullo 
intrinseco dono elevante facultates.‖ 
163
 ―Si ergo bonum vitae aeternae attingi potest naturali actu tam cognoscitivo quam appetitivo, etsi inefficaci et 
entitative improportionato, eodem quoque modo attingi poterunt obiecta in ordine huius boni exsistentia, puta 
obiecta fidei et spei et caritatis, supposita caeterquin cognitione divinae revelationis et promissionum quae in ea 
continentur.‖ (Ibid., 69-70). 
164
 Ibid., 71: ―Actus supernaturales viae habent eamdem omnino resolutionem obiectivam quam habent vel 
haberent actus naturales circa eadem obiecta exerciti, et quod ex consequenti, supernaturalitatis ratio minime est 
ex hac parte quaerenda.‖ 
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the operating faculty and supplies the capability to reach the supernatural order – but without 
any change of the formal object.
165
 His argument appear straighforward. For example, 
supernatural faith as well as natural faith trusts in God as first truth and as witness who is 
most trustable.
166
 In short, natural and supernatural acts don‘t differ formally but only 
according to their efficient cause. 
Billot clarifies his thesis by referring to the famous distinction between the substance and the 
mode of an act (see section 2.4). In the context of supernatural acts, theologians normally 
make use of these terms to cover the twofold help of grace: grace which heals and elevates 
nature and allows for supernatural acts quoad substantiam, and grace which leaves the 
conditions of nature untouched but provide a special help for a concrete action that lies above 
the capacities of natural powers (e.g. the miraculous healing of a sick person) and allows for 
supernatural acts quoad modum. Thus, substantial supernatural acts require an intrinsic quality 
that lies above the capacity of nature, whereas supernatural acts according to their mode 
remain intrinsically natural.
167
 Billot, however, explicitly distances himself from this classic 
understanding of the distinction. Accordingly, he defines the substance of an act as follows: 
 
The substance of an act is nothing else than the act considered from a precision by which it is 
yet indifferent to a natural or supernatural determination: for example faith taken precisely 
insofar it is the assent to revealed things because of God‘s authority; in this way – as it was 
said in the precedent point – [the act of faith] can be achieved by grace as well as by nature, at 
least physically.
168
 
 
For Billot, the substance of an act is only, so to speak, the basic orientation of an action 
toward a special object, but without regard for its proper natural or supernatural determination 
(i.e. its formal notion), and also without regard to whether the efficient cause is God or the 
human natural power. Thus, the substance of supernatural acts is identical with the substance 
                                                 
165
 See Ibid., 72-79. 
166
 ―Vere ergo dicendum quod fides divina eodem modo resolvitur ac fides humana in dicentis auctoritatem. Et 
hinc statim consequitur, nihil absolute impedire quominus detur circa veritates de facto a deo revelatas actus 
fidei mere naturalis, conveniens in omnibus quoad tendendi modum cum fide supernaturali. Suppone aliquem 
qui ex signis credibilitatis convinceretur de exsistentia christianae religionis; hoc enim naturaliter contingere 
posse, nemo sane est qui vel minimum dubitabit.‖ (Ibid., 76). 
167
 Thereto: Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, ―Le surnaturel essentiel et le surnaturel modal,‖ Revue Thomiste 21 
(1913): 316-327. 
168
 Billot, De virtutibus infusis, 80: ―Substantia actus nihil est aliud quam actus consideratus sub ea praecisione 
sub qua adhuc est indifferens ad determinationem naturalitatis vel supernaturalitatis: verbi gratia fides praecisive 
accepta secundum quod est assensus in rem revelatam propter dei auctoritatem; sic enim, ut praemissum est in 
puncto praecedenti, tam a gratia quam a natura physice saltem esse potest.‖ 
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of their corresponding natural acts (at least those achieved in this life
169
). In fact, the two 
types of action must be identical since Billot has defined the concept of ―substance‖ of an act 
apart from the issue of its supernatural character. The supernatural quality of an otherwise 
―neutral‖ act is added to it from the outside and confers on the act its specific mode. 
Nevertheless, this modus supernaturalis provides the act an essentially higher perfection, 
albeit not respective of its formal object but only regarding its true efficiency to attain the 
supernatural final end. ―The supernatural mode is the formality which draws the act to the 
entitative perfection by which it is ordered to eternal life.‖170 
Billot concludes his argument as follows. Since acquired and infused virtues coincide in the 
same substance of acts, they are not specified by different objects (―non specificari ab 
obiecto‖). They differ only according to their mode.171 
Of course, based on this idea one can easily assume that an agent necessary acquires natural 
habits through repeated supernatural acts. If the substance of supernatural acts is in itself not 
supernatural, then it follows that their repetition would cause the generation of a 
corresponding natural virtue. That virtue then supplies a tendency to further acts of the same 
neutral substance, to acts which might serve for supernatural acts as well as for natural ones. 
―By repeated supernatural acts the natural power is exercised in wholly the same line as it is 
exercised by the natural acts.‖172  
Therefore, Billot rests his argument thusly: ―It is just a conclusion of the premises that an 
entitative natural habit can be given in respect of the supernatural objects present in this 
life.‖173 
Other scholars who defend a similar view are Molina,
174
 Ripalda,
175
 and Huarte.
176
  
                                                 
169
 Billot explains carefully that supernatural acts in patria would differ from natural acts even substantially (cf. 
Ibid.). 
170
 Ibid.: ―Modus vero supernaturalitatis est formalitas contrahens actum ad eam perfectionem entitativam per 
quam ordinem habet ad vitam aeternam.‖ And further: ―Modus de quo hic sermo, non signat denominationem 
quamdam extrinsecam, sed formalitatem plane intrinsecum actui.‖ (Ibid.). 
171
 ―Actus supernaturalis habet univoce eumdem tendentiae modum quem habuisset actus naturalis possibilis 
circa idem obiectum, quamvis sit ontologice elevatus ad altiorem et superiorem ordinem, utpote elicitus per vires 
novae illius naturae quae est gratia sanctificans.‖ (Ibid., 54). Certainly it is allowed to ask how Billot the act of 
acquired and infused virtue can be formally equal, but belong to two ontological different orders. 
172
 Ibid., 53: ―Per repetitos actus supernaturales potentia naturalis exercetur in eadem omnino linea ac exerceretur 
per naturales.‖ 
173
 Ibid., 82: ―Dari posse habitus entitative naturalis respectu obiectorum supernaturalium viae, sequela est 
praemissorum.‖ 
174
 Long time before Billot, his confrere Luis de Molina (1535-1600) proposed a similar account, though it 
remains more implicit in his work. Molina limits his discussion to the relation of repeated actions of the 
theological virtus and their results in respect to the acquisition of a natural habit of faith, hope and love. Molina 
asserts (as Billot): ―Supernaturales vero habitus fidei, spei et caritatis a solo deo infunduntur neque attinguntur 
efficienter ab actibus fidei, spei et caritatis supernaturalibus etiam quoad ipsorum augmentum. Quia tamen actus 
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illi eminenter continent naturales actus fidei, spei et caritatis, eo quod ad ipsorum productionem concurrant 
causae omnes quae producerent actus illos naturales . . . inde evenit, quod producant naturales habitus fidei, spei 
et caritatis qui remanent in eo qui per lethale peccatum amittit supernaturalem atque etiam in eo qui per 
infidelitatis peccatum amittit etiam fidem.‖ (Ludovicus Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina 
praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia (Typis Collegii Maximi Oniensis, 1953), 
pars III, qu. 14, art. 14, disp. 38, no. 9). 
How does Molina explain this virtually inclusion of the natural perfection in a supernatural act? His solution is 
quite similar to Billot. As he writes some paragraphs prior, supernatural acts as well as natural acts are concerned 
with the same objects. He substantiates his view by the example of faith: the object of faith is the same for man 
in grace (i.e. with the virtue of divine faith) and apart from grace; both accept the same contents for the same 
formal reasons – namely because of the certitude of divine revelation. Hence, both kinds of natural and 
supernatural faith don‘t differ according to the object, but only because of the different efficiency. ―Quare ad 
influxum et causalitatem dei quo actus nostri evehuntur ad esse supernaturale commensuratum fini nostro 
supernaturali ac proinde quo evehuntur ad esse distinctum specie ab esse naturali actuum qui circa eadem obiecta 
a nobis elicerentur recurrendeum sane est non minus in actibus fidei quam spei et caritatis ut distincio eorum 
specifica et commensuration quorundam eorum fini supernaturali et non aliorum explicetur. Inde enim provenit, 
quod certus in se sit supernaturalis assensus peculari certitudine coniuncta cum inevidentia obiecti. Quae quidem 
certitude actus non minus nobis inevidens est in hac vitam quam certitude obiecti inevidentis cui per eum actum 
assentimur. Atque ea de causa tam firmiter ex parte subiecti potest adhaerere Lutheranus articulo Trinitatis per 
actum suum naturalem finique supernaturali minime commensuratum, quam firmiter adhaerent multi catholici 
per suos actus supernaturales fini supernaturali commensuratos.‖ (Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, 
divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia}, no. 6). Important to note that also 
Molina does not negate an essential difference between both kinds of acts. There is an essential difference, since 
only by supernatural actions man can reach his final end. But according to his view this does not hinder that both 
posses a common formal object. 
Hence, although Molina does not use the concepts of substance and the mode of an action in the sense of Billot 
(in this regard he even asserts the classical understanding, see ibid., no. 21), nevertheless there is an intern 
affinity to Billot‘s theory. Not entirely coincidental Billot quote Molina in great length in his writings as 
authority. (See e.g. Billot, De virtutibus infusis, 53-54). 
175
 Ripalda‘s position is totally clear: Acts of infused virtues generate their acquired counterparts. 
―Distinguendum puto. Nam vel actus naturales fiunt a potentia simul cum supernaturalibus circa idem obiectum, 
vel non? Si fiunt simul, existimo habitu naturalem fieri solum ab actibus naturalibus et non supernaturalibus qui 
praesentibus causa univoca, et aequivoca defertur actio causae univocae, vel magis univocae, ut saepius diximus 
in philosophia. Magis autem univoci sunt acuts naturales cum habitu naturali, quam actus supernaturales. Si 
autem non fiunt actus naturales cum supernaturalibus, sed supernaturales duntaxat, mihi persuadeo, habitum 
natrualem fieri ab actibus supernaturalibus, quandoquidem nulla est alia causa, a qua fiant habitus naturalis, qui 
relinquitur in potentia assuetudine operandi actus supernaturales. Potentiam enim agentem continuo actus 
supernaturales etiam sine naturalibus habiliorem et faciliorem reddi quam non agentem, quis non credat. At ea 
maior facilitas revocanda est in habitum acquisitum, nisi velimus evertere totum fundamentum adstruendi 
habitus acquisitos . . . Ergo cum actus supernaturales fiunt sine consorrtio naturalium, virtute ipsorum producitur 
habitus naturalis facilitans potentiam ad actus sequentes.‖ (Ripalda, De ente supernaturali, vol 1, liber III, 
disputatio 53). Also the theoretical fundament of his conception is consistent with Billot: Acquired and infused 
virtues are not specified by two different formal objects; rather the same formal object can be intended by natural 
as well as supernatural acts. ―Potest homo per actum naturale assentiri mysteriis supernaturalibus propter 
testimonium dei. Ergo potest obiectum formale supernatural, quale est terstimonium dei, movere assensum 
naturalem. . . . Actus supternaturales et naturales possunt entitate et specie distingui quamvis utrique in idem 
obiectum formale intrinsece intendant, nempe ex modo tendendi in illud . . . Aliunde nihil prohibet posse 
respectum ad idem obiectum formale esse utrique actui communem, ut prompta explicatione argumentorum 
aperiemus. Ergo absque incommodo statui potest obiectum formale supernaturale actibus naturalibus commune.‖ 
(Ripalda, De ente supernaturali, vol. 1, liber III, disputatio 45, sectio V). The two kinds are different only by the 
mode of their tending. ―Actus naturalis et supernaturalis in genere sic differunt inter se ex modo recipiendi idem 
obiectum, tam naturale, quam supernaturale, ut supernaturale respiciat obiectum modo perfectionis superante 
connexionem naturae, habenteque aliquam connexionem cum gratia iustificante, naturalis vero modo 
perfectionis contentio intra connexionem naturae, act nullam habente connexionem cum gratia iustificante.‖ 
(Ripalda, De ente supernaturali, vol. 1, liber III, disputatio 46, sectio II). 
176
 See Huarte, Synopsis de virtutibus infusis, 54-66. He defends explicitly Billot‘s theory on page 54: ―Virtutes 
supernaturales non distinguuntur a naturalibus necessario et universaliter ratione obiecti formalis, ut non possit 
idem esse obiectum formale virtutis naturalis et supernaturalis.‖ 
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ii) Supernatural Acts Contain Natural Acts In Some Way 
 
The following second interpretation of the inclusive-order theory holds positions similar to 
the first. The repeated practice of a supernatural virtue necessarily causes its natural 
counterpart. Accordingly, an agent in the state of grace is described as never performing 
supernatural acts only. 
Due to their agreements on external matters, scholars often missed the important difference of 
principle lying at the bottom of their theories.
177
 But the gap is serious. In contrast to Billot 
and his adherents, the following theorists remain faithful to the different formality of natural 
and supernatural virtues, but nevertheless confirm an essential connection between the two. 
Their proponents have developed several concepts by which they express their ideas. Some 
explain that a supernatural act virtually contains the natural act, while others make use of the 
matter-form analogy, though in a qualified sense. Still others hold that every supernatural act 
necessarily commands an act of the corresponding acquired virtue. 
 
Supernatural Acts Virtually Contain Their Corresponding Natural Acts  
B.H. Merkelbach holds the theory that every supernatural act virtually contains the perfection 
of a corresponding natural act. Supernatural acts are specified by their special formal object, 
but simultaneously they tend by the very same act to the natural end which is determined by 
the measure of reason. Subsequently, it belongs to the natural perfection of a supernatural act 
to generate an acquired virtue. 
 
Whilst supernatural acts tend to a supernatural end or good and object, they tend 
simultaneously according to another respect to a natural end and a natural good which is 
convenient to reason; not only since simultaneously the natural faculties are exercised, but also 
since the supernatural act and good contains and includes eminently the natural act and the 
natural goodness: But in this way [the supernatural acts] can produce natural habits of the 
same species and its object insofar as natural and conform to reason, and thereby they can 
defeat and remove obstacles of that act and contrary objects in the same way as an acquired 
virtue.
178
 
                                                 
177
 For example Coerver doesn‘t show any misgiving in treating authors as Molina and Billot together with 
Merkelbach, although the latter explicitly holds another position concerning the different formal object of 
acquired and infused virtue. (Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 51-63). 
178
 Merkelbach, Summa theologiae moralis, 487: ―Actus supernaturales, dum tendunt ad finem seu bonum et 
obiectum supernaturale, simul tendunt sub aliquo respectu ad finem naturalem et bonum naturale rationi 
conveniens, tum quia exercentur simul facultates naturales, tum quia actus et bonum supernaturalia eminenter 
continent et includunt actum naturalem et bonitatem naturalem: sic autem possunt producere habitus naturales 
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Although his statement might seem akin to Billot‘s account, it differs in important respects. 
Two points are worth noting. First, Merkelbach mentions explicitly that natural perfection 
corresponds to a different formal object (sub aliquot respectu). Hence, in contrast to Billot, 
Merkelbach describes both kinds of perfection as distinguished by their different formal 
objects.
179
 Secondly, Merkelbach does not speak of two acts – natural and supernatural – but 
only of one ―actus supernaturales‖ that, as one act, tends simultaneously to two different ends.  
Unfortunately, Merkelbach‘s handbook provides no further explanation as to why a 
supernatural act necessarily contains the natural perfection of the corresponding acquired 
virtue in addition to its own proper perfection.
180
 
In this respect, the explanations of Garrigou-Lagrange are more helpful. He notes that by 
mortal sin man turns away not only from his final supernatural end, but he also disturbs in 
some way the order of nature. Based on the fact that even man‘s natural perfection is not 
limited to the mastery of some particular areas of human life (as the purpose of pagan virtues), 
but consists in the order of one‘s whole life in respect to God as the principle of his being, 
Garrigou-Lagrange argues that it is impossible for an agent to violate his supernatural 
adherence to God, constituted by charity, and to remain simultaneously connected to him by 
natural love. Hence, an offence against the divine law includes implicitly always a contrary 
act against natural law, at least indirectly insofar as it belongs to natural reason to obey one‘s 
creator.
181
 And the reverse is also true: supernatural perfection includes the (lower) natural 
perfection. 
Garrigou-Lagrange exemplifies this internal nexus of the natural and supernatural perfection 
by an analogy taken from the sphere of music.
182
 A deep tone contains always the character of 
its octave. It‘s not a contingent fact, but a physical necessity. Who hears the deep tone, hears 
                                                                                                                                                        
eiusdem speciei ac illud obiectum ut est naturale et conforme rationi, et per hoc vincere et removere obstacula 
huic actui et obiecto opposita, eodem modo ac de virtute acquisita.‖ 
179
 Merkelbach himself refers to the specific difference of acquired and infused virtues because of their different 
object on the previous page (see Ibid., 486). 
180
 In the same way Vignon presents the relation of acquired and infused virtues: ―Neque mensura rationalis 
virtutis naturalis virtute supernaturali praetermittitur, et multo minus contradicitur: gratia naturam non tollit, at 
contra, ipsas leges ethicae naturalis maiore auctoritate sancit et imperat, atque ad altiorem finem ordinat. Virtutes 
igitur supernaturales assumunt atque consecrant totum ordinem officiorum naturalium, tanquam ad finem 
supernaturalem ordinabilem.‖ (Vignon, Adnotationes in tractatum de virtutibus infusis, 299). 
181
 See Garrigou-Lagrange, ―L‘instabilité,‖ 259: ―L‘homme par le péché mortel est détourné non seulement de la 
fin dernière surnaturelle, mais aussi de la fin dernière naturelle. En d‘autres termes, il ne peut, dans un tel état, 
aimer efficacement Dieu auteur de sa nature plus que soi et par-dessus tout, comme le demande la loi 
naturelle. . . . Il ne faut pas oublier ici que tout péché mortel qui nous détourne rectement de la fin dernière 
naturelle et est au moins indirectement contraire à la loi naturelle.‖ 
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implicitly the corresponding octave, independently of whether he explicitly pays attention to 
it or not, whether he is aware of that ―richness‖ of the tone or not. Likewise, if somebody 
strikes a deep tone on the piano, immediately the chord of the octave will resonate, even 
without a special intervention on the part of the artist. However, the octave does not simply 
repeat the original tone, but it resonates according to its own reverberation. Analogously, 
supernatural acts have a quasi natural aptitude to elicit a harmonic resonance from man‘s 
natural capacities. 
Garrigou-Lagrange develops a second analogy. As the musical genius of a pianist makes use 
of the physical agility of his fingers, so supernatural acts make use of acquired virtues.
183
 The 
higher motive doesn‘t contradict the lower but makes use of it. The example illustrates very 
well the point of how every practice of a higher habit works implicitly for the formation of the 
lower. Even if by playing piano the artist does not intend the development of his dexterity, 
such playing always serves it. And once this dexterity is acquired, it will be automatically 
involved in every artistic action, although the pianist does not play music according to the 
formal respect of his dexterity. Analogously, a supernatural act essentially hinges on the 
presence of infused virtue and the will‘s conformity to the divine rule. It might be 
accompanied by considerations of natural motives (e.g. the preservation of health), but even if 
those thoughts remain latent, the supernatural act will work implicitly for the acquisition of 
natural virtue.
184
 Hence, the higher set of virtue necessarily includes the lower, but not vice 
versa.
185
 Although Garrigou-Lagrange doesn‘t speak explicitly of this virtual containment one 
within the other, his overall doctrine falls within the inclusive-order theory.
186
 
                                                                                                                                                        
182
 Garrigou-Lagrange uses the example, but he fails to develop the analogy. (See Garrigou-Lagrange, ―Les 
vertus morale,‖ 230). 
183
 ―Chez l‘artiste qui joue de la harpe ou du piano, l‘agilité des doigts, acquise par la répétition des actes, 
favorise l‘exercice de l‘art musical qui est, non pas dans les doigts, mais dans l‘intelligence de l‘artiste. Si, par 
suite de paralysie, il perd toute agilité des doigts, il ne peut plus exercer son art, à cause d‘un obstacle 
extrinsèque. Son art pourtant reste en son intelligence pratique, comme on le voit chez un musicien de génie 
frappé de paralysie. Normalement il doit y avoir deux fonctions subordonnées qui s‘exercent ensemble. Il en est 
de même pour la vertu acquise et la vertu infuse de même nom.‖ (Ibid., 233). Successive scholars often adopted 
Garrigou-Lagrange‘s analogy of the artist (for example Maritain, Science and Wisdom, 210-212, Schockenhoff, 
‘Bonum hominis’, 337). 
184
 ―Chez les chrétiens plus surnaturels, le motif explicite d‘agir qui apparaît le plus est le motif surnaturel, 
chez d‘autres c‘est un motif rationnel et le surnaturel reste un peu latent . . . Les motifs de raison inférieure, 
qui touchent à la santé, sont plus ou moins explicites, suivant qu'on est plus ou moins dégagé de ces 
préoccupations, ou suivant aussi qu‘étant bien portant, on n‘a pas à penser à sa santé.‖ (Garrigou-Lagrange, 
―Les vertus morale,‖ 234). 
185
 ―Ce sont deux objets formels et deux motifs d‘action fort différents. La prudence acquise ignore les motifs 
surnaturels d‘action; la prudence infuse les connaît: procédant, non pas seulement de la raison, mais de la raison 
éclairée par la foi infuse.‖ (Ibid., 231). 
186
 Klubertanz criticizes the thesis that the act of infused virtue contains virtually the perfection of the natural act. 
Although he concedes that an act may contain virtually a perfection, the act of the infused virtue cannot produce 
in the same subject another acquired virtue, since in this case in the soul would exist a certain perfect habit as 
well as its imperfect counterpart. ―Comment deux forms, l‘une parfait, l‘autre imparfait, peuvent-elles coexister 
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Nobel addresses the same issue from a different but interesting point of view, and he reaches 
the same result. He argues: ―If somebody is virtuous, he desires the good with a certain drive 
and for valuable reasons.‖187 Hence, the supernatural motives necessarily respect the natural 
ones. To strive for the supernatural good while excluding natural motives would destroy the 
integrity of supernatural motivation. The fountain of all infused virtues is charity, which 
directs man towards God who is not only the object of supernatural beatitude but is at the 
same time the author of nature. Therefore, it would be contradictory to attain God under one 
exclusive respect but to exclude others.
188
 
 
The Matter-Form Analogy according to the Interpretation of the Inclusive-Order 
Theory 
In recent times, R. Mirkes published a considerable study on the unity of the moral virtues in 
Aquinas‘s thought, in which she presented the relationship of acquired and infused virtue 
using the matter-form schema.
189
 As we have already seen, her general idea was in no way 
novel.
190
 In a previous chapter we have already mentioned the basic idea which underlies this 
theory. An acquired virtue can relate to an infused one as something determinable, as 
                                                                                                                                                        
dans le meme sujet?‖ (Klubertanz, ―Une théorie,‖ 568; a similar objection is raised by Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum 
hominis’, 338-339.  
We agree with Klubertanz‘s general assertion about the impossibility of perfect and imperfect habits (of the 
same species) in one human faculty, but we would deny a description of acquired virtue as the mere imperfect 
state of infused virtue. Acquired virtue implies a true perfection of a power (its ultimum posse) according the rule 
of reason in regard to the human good; hence it should be possible that the natural perfection is virtually included 
in an infused virtue; in respect to its proper end acquired virtue is not imperfect but perfect. Furthermore, even 
Klubertanz concedes that the rule of faith includes – ―est inclus‖ (ibid., 571) – the principle to act in conformity 
to reason. 
187
 Noble, La conscience morale, 273: ―Quand on est vertueux, on veut le bien avec entrain et pour tous les 
motifs valables.‖ Gardeil makes the same assertion in his commentary to the Summa theologiae: Supernatural 
motives ―accept‖ likewise the natural ones (Gardeil, ―Appendice,‖ 371-372). 
188
 See for the whole discussion: Noble, La conscience morale, 270-274, esp. 273-274: ―Le vertueux qui dirige 
sa vie morale dans l‘amour de Dieu, tout en agissant, par ses vertus ‗infuses‘ au nom de motifs surnaturels, 
n‘exclut point dans l‘attention de sa conscience, les motifs naturels qui se lèvent en parallèle avec les motifs 
surnaturels qui principalement le dirigent. Quand on est vertueux, on veut le bien avec entrain et pour tous les 
motifs valables. Par exemple, le tempérant s‘interdit certains excès de senualité non seulement par esprit de 
pénitence, mais encore pour tous les autres motifs naturels de sobriété qu‘il n‘a garde de rejeter et qui sont 
d‘ailleurs très engageants pour une conscience qui vise à la vertu parfaite. Dès lors, cette conscience surnaturelle 
enrichit tous ses désirs vertueux, affermit en tout sens son vouloir moral, par l‘exercice des vertus ‗infuses‘. Si, 
par malheur, elle vient à perdre, dans le péché mortel, la Charité et les vertus ‗infuses‘, elle conserve du moins 
l‘entraînement aux motifs vertueux d‘ordre naturel qui précédemment, dans ses visées, se subordonnaient aux 
motifs surnaturels alors de premier plan. Notre conscience poursuit son oevre dans l‘unité. Nous profitons 
toujours et immédiatement pour notre vie surnaturelle de notre acquis antérieur de vertu.‖ 
189
 See her dissertation: Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖; the most fundamental 
principles are summarized in Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 189-218 and Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of 
Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 589-605. 
190
 See for example Klubertanz who considers the matter-form-relation as solution of the relationship of acquired 
and infused virtue; however, he negates explicitly the inclusive-order-theory (see Klubertanz, ―Une théorie,‖ 
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something in potency to a further actualization. Thus, the infused virtue can relate to its 
acquired counterpart as the determining and perfecting principle.  
For Mirkes, the infused virtue as such is a perfect moral virtue only if it is complemented by 
its corresponding acquired virtue, that is if it resides in a human power together with its 
natural counterpart. The matter-form relation allows two distinct aspects of one unified habit 
to synchronize. Matter and form do not constitute two separate entities, of course, but but they 
do constitute two different aspects of one unified being. Analogously, acquired and infused 
virtue account for two different qualities (formalities) that when unified constitute one perfect 
moral virtue. 
 
A moral virtue, in its absolutely perfect state, is formally speaking supernatural or an infused 
virtue and materially speaking natural or an acquired moral virtue. . . . The formal cause is the 
supernatural perfection that determines the composite virtue to be the kind that it is; the 
material cause is the natural perfection that is in potency to the perfecting formal cause and is 
able to be determined by it, while at the same time exercising its own reciprocal causality.
191
 
 
Such an action, proceeding from one human faculty but specified in a dual way, is caused by 
two complementary principles and consequently contains both supernatural and natural 
perfections.
192
 It is ―directed to one material object under two different but ordered 
formalities.‖193 It corresponds to the divine rule as well as to the measure of natural reason, 
but not unequivocally. The acquired virtue undergoes a change through being informed by 
infused virtue insofar as it receives (as matter) a further determination. However, this 
informing does not erase the proper characteristics of the acquired virtue. Its proper 
significance is elevated but still preserved. This shows why it is fitting to speak of an 
inclusive-order theory. Since the formal cause informs but does not destroy the material part, 
                                                                                                                                                        
570). Similar Schockenhoff who gives an excellent account of the analogy, but finally infused virtues (may) use 
acquired ones only accidentally (Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum hominis’, 334-340, esp. 337). 
191
 Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 204-205. Hence, for Mirkes perfect moral virtue requires both infused and 
acquired virtue: ―In the Christian who also possesses the acquired moral virtues, each acquired virtue and its 
infused counterpart are the material and formal principles, respectively, of the prefect realization of that 
particular moral virtue and constitute a unified virtue that is supernaturally transformed.‖ (Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s 
Doctrine,‖ 191). Mirkes is original in arguing that both kinds constitute together one unified perfect virtue: 
―Moral virtue in the Christian, though composed of acquired and infused moral virtue, is an indivisible but 
composite virtue that is formally an infused moral virtue and materially an acquired moral virtue.‖ (Mirkes, 
―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 601). 
192
 ―An exercise of prudential judgment based on the first principles of synderesis and on the revealed rule of 
faith would result in a single act of supernatural prudence that is caused by two complementary principles. This 
single prudential judgment of the justified person would be an act of divine virtue formally speaking, consisting 
of the perfection of the act based on the light of faith and a human virtue materially speaking, containing the 
perfection of an act arising from the rule of right reason.‖ (Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral 
Virtue,‖ 217). 
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one may attribute to the acts of infused virtue the natural motives of the human faculty.
194
 
Thus, the unified human action contains the formal content of infused virtues as well as of 
acquired ones, but under the form of the former. ―The motive and end of acquired moral 
virtue is included within or the material component of the motive and end of infused moral 
virtue.‖195 
Thus, supernatural acts contain the perfection of natural virtues and work therefore for the 
generation of acquired virtues.
196
 
Thus, Mirkes is only consistent in excluding the possibility of pure supernatural or pure 
natural deeds of an agent in the state of grace. If such an agent possesses acquired virtues, 
they are involved in the supernatural act as material principle. Even in the case of the baptized 
adult still possessing acquired vices from his former life, his supernatural acts would include 
the goodness of natural acts (i.e. the reasonableness). For example, the supernaturally 
temperate man also takes care of his bodily health (although this is not the final end of his 
temperance). Thus, step by step, every supernatural act works for the acquisition of natural 
virtue.
197
  
And the reverse is also true. Mirkes denies the possibility that a person in the state of grace 
could perform purely natural actions. Every moral action depends finally on man‘s volition of 
the ultimate end. Admittedly, not every act includes actual awareness of the final end; but as 
long as man is directed by supernatural charity to his supernatural end all of his actions will 
be performed at least virtually for the sake of that end. Maybe natural reasons are more 
                                                                                                                                                        
193
 Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 212. 
194
 ―Each acquired moral virtue is related to its infused counterpart as a determinable or perfectible principle, that 
is, that which is in potency to the actualization by its infused analogate. Correlatively, each infused moral virtue 
is related to its acquired counterpart as the determining or perfecting principle, that is, that which actualizes the 
potency of its corresponding acquired moral virtue.‖ (Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 
591). 
195
 Ibid., 599; cf. also Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 197-198. 
196
 ―If the act of prudential judgment of the mature baptized person includes a natural act of acquired prudence, 
the repetition of this at will eventually account for the acquisition of the human virtue of prudence.‖ (Mirkes, 
―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 217). 
197
 ―The justified person who possesses the acquired virtues and who performs a supernatural act of prudence, for 
example, also performs an act of acquired prudence. This act of supernatural prudence, informed as it is by 
charity, is an act of virtue in the absolute sense, i.e., it is an act directed to the supernatural Good. . . . Even in the 
case of the person who possesses only the infused virtues, the supernatural act is not solely supernatural since the 
act is exercised through one of the human powers or faculties.‖ (Ibid., 218; see also Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s 
Doctrine,‖ 197-198; Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 599-600). It should be noted that 
this position remains somewhat ambiguous in her dissertation: at this point she is wondering how a formally 
different act can generate a specifically different virtue (see Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral 
Virtue,‖ 191); later on she adopts the solution of Klubertanz that the act of infused virtues may be performed for 
supernatural and natural reasons at once (ibid., 216-217); Mirkes relates to Klubertanz, ―Une théorie,‖ 571-572. 
However, as we have seen, Klubertanz approves the possibility of pure supernatural acts, if the agent does not 
attend natural motives. But on other places Mirkes criticizes the theory of solely supernatural acts (see above). 
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conscious on the psychological surface of some Christians, but formally speaking even those 
acts are supernatural since performed in virtue of charity.
198
 
 
Every Supernatural Act Necessarily Commands an Act of Acquired Virtue 
Recently, Baumann published his dissertation on the supernaturalization of the human act by 
grace according to the doctrine of Aquinas.
199
 Of course, such a work scrutinizes the 
cooperation of infused and acquired virtues. Baumann describes the interplay of both kinds of 
virtue on the level of their specific acts, namely by the complementary terms of command and 
commanded act. We mentioned this relationship above in section 2.4. Bauman describes this 
relationship as follows (emphasis in the original). 
 
Actual grace moves the virtue of charity to pose an act of charity, which itself commands 
an act of another infused moral virtue, which commands for its part a natural act of the 
corresponding acquired virtue, which form altogether one single simultaneous human 
act.  
Analytically we have a cascade of causes which intertwine into one another, the one 
commanded by the previous, itself commanding the following. In that suite of mutually 
dependent causes, the commanding act is the principle cause in rapport with the commanded 
act which itself is the instrumental cause of former, and together they become the principle 
cause regarding the following act and so forth.
200
 
 
This causal chain is not a matter of optional choice. Rather, it belongs to the essence of 
infused virtue to involve a command of the corresponding natural virtue. Baumanns himself 
summarizes the principle of his position as following: ―We think that it is the thought of St. 
Thomas that each act of an infused moral virtue commands an act of an acquired virtue.‖201 
Baumann is not the first to describe the relation between infused and acquired virtue by 
referring to Aquinas‘s doctrine of command and commanded acts. St. Thomas himself makes 
use of this analogy to describe the cooperation of charity, prudence and the moral virtues (as 
infused virtues), though he does not extend the account to the involvement of acquired 
                                                 
198
 ―There is no evidence in Aquinas, then, to support the claim that, in the life of the Christian who also 
possesses the acquired virtues, there is the possibility of performing purely natural acts of acquired virtue. One 
could argue that there might be Christian acts of moral virtue that are performed predominantly from natural 
motives, but . . . even these acts would be formally supernatural.‖ (Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 205; see also 
212; Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 599-600; for a more detailed discussion of the 
present issue, see Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 217-218; 225-229). 
199
 Baumann, ―La surnaturalisation,‖. 
200
 Ibid., 237. 
201
 Ibid., 255. 
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virtue.
202
 Scholars such as Falanga, however, applied the schema also to the relation of 
infused and acquired virtues.
203
 Likewise, Schockenhoff addressed the same idea by using the 
motio-mobilis-analogy.
204
 The application of the command-commanded-relation has the 
advantage of showing the internal cooperation of infused and acquired virtue within a one 
single act human. Their cooperation is such, however, that one should not attribute 50% of the 
action to the one virtue and 50% to the other. On the contrary, the moving principle is wholly 
the supernatural virtue. Hence, the action will be wholly supernatural. Nevertheless, the act is 
also wholly human, and the proper structure of the natural virtue remains internally intact.
205
 
In contrast to the previously mentioned authors, however, Baumann argues not only for a 
possible interaction of both virtues but for a necessary involvement of the corresponding 
acquired virtue in each supernatural act. As often as an infused virtue acts, so often does it 
command simultaneously an act of the corresponding acquired virtue. ―All acts of charity are 
accompanied necessarily, and not only in an accidental way, by a commanded act of an 
acquired virtue through the corresponding infused moral virtue, whether the acquired virtue 
preexists or not [emphasis in the original].‖206 Baumann also says: ―Every human act of a man 
in the state of grace is on the one side necessarily supernatural and on the other side it 
includes a specifically natural act. That natural act is the final link in the chain of acts which 
intertwine into one another.‖207 
Baumann substantiates his thesis by referring to the effects of grace. The infusion of grace is 
not limited to a mere entitative elevation of the manner of the action – first it unfolds naturally, 
then supernaturally – but it includes the healing of nature itself. The proper tendency of nature 
                                                 
202
 Cf. In sent. III 27.2.4C; see section 2.4. 
203
 See Falanga, Charity the Form, 121-125. He summarizes his view as following: ―Grace is the immediate form 
of charity; charity is the immediate form of the acts of the infused habit of prudence; prudence informed by 
charity is he immediate form of the acquired habit of prudence in so far as it is capable of eliciting meritorious 
acts; and hence of all the other moral virtues which demand prudence that they may exist as perfect moral 
virtutes. . . . The acquired virtues share per modum transeuntis, during the time they are being used under the 
immediate direction of some infused virtue, the more remote direction of charity, and the ultimate direction of 
grace.‖ (Ibid., 125). 
204
 See Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum hominis’, 340-346. 
205
 By the example of supernatural prudence Gardeil explains well the internal informing of the acquired virtue 
through the infused one which ―flows‖ into the one supernatural act. ―Le prudent surnaturel ne récuse pas, certes, 
ces motifs naturels; mais il procède surtout de sa raison éclairée par la foi. . . . Il y a donc, chez celui qui vit de la 
charité, et vis-à-vis de ses actions vertueuses, une transfiguration des motifs: l‘acte moral est transformé de fond 
en comble, aussi bien dans sa formule intime que dans son motif spécifique. Ce serait une erreur de croire que la 
conscience surnaturelle, inspriée par la charité, vient seulement ajouter le motif de l‘amour de Dieu à un acte 
vertueux qui ne le serait que par des motifs naturels, comme un surcroît viendrait se superposer à une réalité déjà 
constituée. Non, l‘acte moral, dicté par la conscience surnaturelle, est constitué tout entier par des motifs 
surnaturels; il est tel que, seule, peut le motiver son ordonnance à Dieu par la charité; et cela, tant et si bien qu‘il 
peut se passer de motifs d‘ordre naturel.‖ (Gardeil, ―Appendice,‖ 373). 
206
 Baumann, ―La surnaturalisation,‖ 264. 
207
 Ibid., 305. 
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is not wiped out but elevated and perfected. Grace works the redirection of man by charity 
towards a higher end, but it is a redirection of this very man.
208
 Hence, supernatural action 
cannot abstract from the natural human perfection. It can surpass it and it does surpass it, but 
likewise it must include it.
209
 
In a certain way, a middle-position is held by Labourdette, who affirms, as does Baumann, 
that every act of infused virtue implies a coactivity of the parallel acquired virtue,
210
 but at the 
same time he negates the converse claim defending the possibility of acts of acquired virtue 
being performed apart from the involvement of infused virtue, even for the graced agent. He 
defends this negation in a twofold way. First, a Christian who acts for mere natural reasons 
does not make use of his infused virtues. Those acts are not evil, but also they are not 
perfect.
211
 Secondly, the faithful can also perform those natural acts for the sake of charity. 
Then, according to Labourdette, the acts remain essentially natural but become directed 
extrinsically toward the supernatural end.
212
 
 
In sum, the authors mentioned above share the conviction that the supernatural act includes in 
a certain way its corresponding natural act or its perfection. Although they use different terms 
in taking the position, there is basic consensus among them about the general doctrine.  
However, one difficulty remains. The inclusive-order theories give a good explanation of how 
the cooperation of natural and supernatural virtue could work in theory. But do they really 
explain the concrete cases of our everyday-experience? How can a supernatural act contain or 
command the corresponding natural act, if the concrete realization of the latter clearly differs 
from the former? Obviously, temperance commands either a certain mean of fasting because 
of divine charity, or another mean for bodily health. How can we think that the supernatural 
mean commands or contains the natural one if the concrete realization of both is different? 
                                                 
208
 Cf. Ibid., 355-264. 
209
 Already Garrigou-Lagrange adverted to that confirmative function of infused virtue in respect to the acquired 
one, although without developing it in great detail: ―Dans le juste, la charité commande ou inspire l‘acte de la 
tempérance acquise par l‘intermédiaire de l‘acte simultané de la tempérance infuse. Et même en dehors de 
la production de leurs actes, ces deux vertus s‘unissant dans la même faculté, l‘infuse confirme l‘acquise.‖ 
(Garrigou-Lagrange, ―Les vertus morale,‖ 233-234). 
210
 ―Tout exercice d‘une vertu infuse fait poser en même temps un acte de la vertu acquise correspondante, ou du 
moins un act qui tend à l‘acquérir.‖ (Labourdette, Les principes des actes humains, 165). The reason: the object 
of infused virtue is not disparate in relation to that of acquired virtue, but the former contains the latter (―il le 
contient― – ibid., 165). 
211
 ―Si la vertu infuse ne s‘exerce pas sans que soit posé un acte de la vertu acquise corresponante ou du moins 
un act tendant à l‘acquérir, la réciproque n‘est pas vraie. Même un chrétien en état de grâce peut agir pour des 
motifs d‘honnêteté purement naturelle qui n‘engagent pas ou n‘engagent que faiblement, de façon très virtuelle, 
l‘influence de la vertu infuse. L‘acte n‘est pas mauvais, mais il est loin d‘être ce qu‘il devrait être.‖ (Ibid.). 
212
 See Labourdette, La charité, 63.  
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In the next section we try to give a reasonable answer to this question by referring to an 
analogy which Aquinas himself uses in this context. 
 
 
3.4 Our Own Proposal: Using a Forgotten Analogy of Aquinas 
 
We do not intend here to propose a new theory concerning the cooperation of acquired and 
infused virtues. The relevant texts of Aquinas are well known to the proponents of the 
different positions. However, we would like to suggest that a certain analogy could be used to 
clarify their interaction. This method is not new. For example, Mirkes employed several 
analogies to bolster her claims regarding of the cooperation of acquired and infused virtue.
213
  
However, we want to draw attention to an analogy which Aquinas uses himself in the context 
of the present topic, namely in De virt. in com. 10 ad 1. Although the text is located in the 
very center of the discussion of acquired and infused virtues,
214
 to the best of our knowledge 
the secondary literature never refers to this text to clarify the issue. Admittedly, the text does 
not speak explicitly about the interaction of both sets of virtue, but it argues for the strict 
necessity of infused moral virtues. Nevertheless, the analogy provides a helpful key to 
understand Aquinas‘s general idea of the interface between acquired and infused virtues. 
The first objection of De virt. in com. 10 argues as follows. Everything has the necessary 
means to attain its natural perfection. Hence, a natural virtue (virtus connaturalis) should be 
sufficient for man to attain his proper perfection. Consequently, there is no need for divinely 
infused virtues.  
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 See Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 198-199; Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 600-
601; more extensive in her dissertation: Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 206-214. 
Mirkes tries to justify the application of the matter-form-analogy to the relation of acquired and infused virtues 
by the comparison (a) with the interference of the command and the commanded act (cf. ST I-II 17.4); (b) body 
and soul (cf. ST I 76.7); (c) the Old and the New Law; (d) Christ‘s human and divine activity (cf. ST III 19.1). 
Certainly these examples elucidate how the matter-form-analogy can be applied to different areas. However, all 
these analogies suffer a certain limitation in respect to the present issue. (a) In command and commanded act two 
acts relate as matter and form; (b) the composite of body and soul is a material substance; (c) the Old and New 
Law (at least in its written form) are understood as external principles of action; (d) maybe the best example is 
the interaction of human and divine activity in Christ. However, even here the mutual interference of both orders 
is not a fact of evident experience.  
More adapt seems the analogy to memory and science: Memory can be used by sciences for its own, higher 
motives; it can be considered as matter in respect to form (cf. Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral 
Virtue,‖ 595). Quite similar Klubertanz has used the analogy between imagination and science (see Klubertanz, 
―Une théorie,‖ 570-571). As we will see, Aquinas himself makes a quite similar suggestion. 
214
 Article 10 of the disputed question De virt. in com. (and especially its numerous replies) is certainly one of 
the most important and most quoted key-references for the context of acquired and infused virtues. 
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In his answer, Aquinas refers to the distinction between first and second perfection. The 
perfectio prima signifies a certain potency of a nature, and the perfectio secunda its 
actualization.
215
 Further, in the case of man we can distinguish even a twofold first perfection, 
both of which exist on the natural level. The first primary perfection remains within the limits 
of corporeal beings, sc. the nutritive and sensitive powers, and the second involves those 
powers that exceed the capacity of matter, sc. the intellectual faculties. 
Regarding the perfectio secunda (i.e. the activity), there is an unexpected shift in the argument. 
Certainly one would expect a contraposition of sensitive operations and spiritual activity, sc. 
as two different second perfections. But at this point Aquinas leaves behind the difference 
between corporeal and spiritual powers and switches his focus over to the distinction between 
man‘s natural and supernatural perfection. 
 
By his first perfection man is perfected in two ways: first, in regard to his nutritive and 
sensitive part, whose perfection, of course, does not exceed the capacity of corporeal matter; 
and secondly, in regard to his intellective part, which does exceed the natural and corporeal 
part: and in this part man is absolutely perfect, whereas in the first case he is only perfect 
secundum quid. Hence, also in regard to his final perfection, man can be perfected in two ways: 
first, according to the capacity of his nature, and secondly, according to a certain supernatural 
perfection. And in this way a man is said to be absolutely perfect, but in the first way only 
secundum quid. Hence a twofold virtue is due to man: one which corresponds to the first 
perfection, and this is not complete virtue; and another, which corresponds to his ultimate 
perfection, and this is the true and perfect virtue of man.
216
 
 
What seems at first glance to be a sudden shift in the argument is in fact the application of a 
logically consistent analogy. As the intellect transcends the perfection of the sensitive animal, 
likewise man‘s supernatural perfection transcends his natural perfection. As rational acts 
cannot arise from the senses but require the intellect, i.e. a power of a superior order, likewise 
supernatural acts cannot arise from mere natural dispositions but presuppose some higher 
principle, namely infused virtues. 
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 Cf. e.g. ST III 29.3: ―Duplex est autem rei perfectio, prima et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio in ipsa forma 
rei consistit, ex qua speciem sortitur, secunda vero perfectio consistit in operatione rei, per quam res aliqualiter 
suum finem attingit.‖ 
216
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 1: ―Sicut secundum primam perfectionem homo est perfectus dupliciter; uno modo 
secundum nutritivam et sensitivam, quae quidem perfectio non excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis; alio 
modo secundum partem intellectivam, quae naturalem et corporalem excedit: et secundum hanc simpliciter est 
homo perfectus, primo autem modo secundum quid; ita et quantum ad perfectionem finis, dupliciter homo potest 
esse perfectus: uno modo secundum capacitatem suae naturae, alio modo secundum quamdam supernaturalem 
perfectionem: et sic dicitur homo perfectus esse simpliciter; primo autem modo secundum quid. Unde duplex 
competit virtus homini; una quae respondet primae perfectioni, quae non est completa virtus; alia quae respondet 
suae perfectioni ultimae: et haec est vera et perfecta hominis virtus.‖ 
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So far, Aquinas‘s statement is explicit.217 However, we want to argue that this analogy does 
not only explain the necessity of additional infused virtues for the graced agent, but it can be 
also taken for clarifying the interaction of natural and supernatural virtues: As the natural 
orientation of the sensitive appetite relates to the affective acquired virtues, likewise acquired 
virtue itself relates to infused virtue. 
The analogy could be displayed as following: 
 
             natural orientation of the sensitive appetite              acquired virtue 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––  =  ––––––––––––––– 
         acquired temperance or fortitude          infused virtue 
Figure 4 
 
Explanation of the Analogy 
In the following we investigate first the relationship between the natural orientation of man‘s 
sensitive appetite and temperance as an acquired virtue: how do these two habits cooperate 
together? What does the act of acquired temperance imply for the natural orientation of the 
sensitive appetite? In a second step we transfer the results to the cooperation of acquired and 
infused virtues.  
The sensitive appetite is concerned with sensible goods as its matter. However, even animals 
are not simply inclined to all sensible goods, for their actions follow a certain rule. They seek 
food insofar as it is convenient to their bodily life, and they stop eating if they are sated, even 
if there is further food available.
218
 Thus, the measure of the sensible appetite qua animal is 
the sustaining of its corporeal health, strength, and procreation. Analogously, the human agent 
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 Scheeben proposed a similar analogy: As the animal relates to men, likewise acquired virtue to infused virtue 
(see Matthias Joseph Scheeben, Die Herrlichkeiten der göttlichen Gnade (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1949), 162-
163). However, he didn‘t develop further the analogy. Likewise Gilby who explains: ―The relation of 
supernatural moral virtue, virtus infusa, to natural moral virtue, virtus acquisita, . . . . is as close as that of 
psychology to physiology, or, better, of human psychology to animal psychology, so much so that the higher 
cannot be studied without looking into the conditions of the lower.‖ (Thomas Gilby, ―Introduction,‖ in Summa 
Theologiae: Justice (2a2ae. 57-62), vol. 37 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1975), xiv). 
218
 ST I 80.1 ad 3: ―Unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem 
in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu. Supra quem est appetitus 
animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius 
vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter 
animali.‖  
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as sensitive animal ―desires naturally the pleasures of food and sex according to his corporeal 
nature‖219 – secundum naturam corporalem, as the perfection of his corporeal being.220 
These sensible goods are the matter of the moral virtue of temperance. The sensible appetite, 
once informed by acquired temperance, follows the measure of reason in regard to the human 
good. And as Aquinas notes at many occasions, the human good is not limited to the life of 
the corporeal nature, but consists in a ―spiritual life according to his reason,‖221 an expression 
which refers at this place not to a supernatural communion with God but to the human society 
which transcends the common life of animals.
222
 Thus, temperance informs the human 
sensible appetite so that it is not only inclined to the perfection of the corporeal nature, but ―it 
belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the [sensible] appetite, so that it does not 
tend in that which it desires naturally‖ (namely pleasures of food and sex secundum naturam 
corporalem).
223
  
What does this mean concretely? ST II-II 141.6 asks the question whether temperance is ruled 
by the necessities of the present life. As usual, the article makes a distinction. The necessity of 
the human life can be understood in two ways: things may be necessary either for corporeal 
life or for a convenient human life.
224
 The rule of temperance, however, is taken from the 
second understanding: It is measured ―not only according to the convenience of the body, but 
also according to the convenience of external things, such as wealth and charges, and 
especially according to the convenience of honesty.‖ 225  And elsewhere he explains that 
temperance inclines ―to health and good habits of the body, and decent social intercourse with 
others.‖226 Thus, the temperate man (still on the level of an acquired virtue) has to consider 
two goods at once: physical health and decent social intercourse. Of course, sometimes he 
may renounce food for the sake of physical health, but that‘s not enough. Health is not yet the 
final end of his actions. Rather, the care for health has to be ordered towards the good 
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 ST II-II 166.2: ―Naturaliter homo concupiscit delectationes ciborum et venereorum secundum naturam 
corporalem.‖ 
220
 So the terminology of De virt. in com. 10 ad 1. 
221
 ST II-II 23.1 ad 1: ―Duplex est hominis vita. Una quidem exterior secundum naturam sensibilem et 
corporalem . . . Alia autem est vita hominis spiritualis secundum mentem.‖ 
222
 ST I-II 94.2. 
223
 ST II-II 166.2: ―Ad temperantiam pertinet moderari motum appetitus, ne superflue tendat in id quod 
naturaliter concupiscitur.‖ 
224
 ST II-II 141.6 ad 2. 
225
 ST II-II 141.6 ad 3: The whole reply: ―Temperantia respicit necessitatem quantum ad convenientiam vitae. 
Quae quidem attenditur non solum secundum convenientiam corporis, sed etiam secundum convenientiam 
exteriorum rerum, puta divitiarum et officiorum; et multo magis secundum convenientiam honestatis. Et ideo 
philosophus ibidem subdit quod in delectabilibus quibus temperatus utitur, non solum considerat ut non sint 
impeditiva sanitatis et bonae habitudinis corporalis, sed etiam ut non sint praeter bonum, idest contra 
honestatem.‖ In the reply to the second objection he explains that the measure of temperance is not the necessity 
of physical wellbeing alone but ―pro loco et tempore et congruentia eorum quibus convivit.‖ (ST II-II 141.6 ad 2).  
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common life. Therefore, he may sometimes take less food than the attentive care for health 
would require, e.g. if there is not enough food for all, and at other times he may eat more than 
strictly necessary for his physical life, namely for reasons of social convenience, as for 
example on the occasion of a celebration with friends.
227
 
Of course, we should note that in these situations the natural measure of the sensitive appetite 
does not become obsolete. It would be vicious to eat immoderately out of deference to one‘s 
host and thereby to harm one‘s bodily health.228 Temperance which works for the good human 
life takes into account also, and has to do so, the sustenance of the body. ―It belongs to the 
rule of reason that man takes food insofar it is convenient to the sustenance of [his] nature, 
and to the good condition of man, and the conversation of his fellow-citizen.‖229 Though the 
proper end of temperance is the good life in the human community, it has to consider bodily 
health as integral part of the reasonable human good, for this inferior good is integrated into 
the higher order.
230
 In short, temperance disposes the agent (a) for his life in the human 
society, but (b) by co-considering the needs of his bodily life.  
The issue can be described also by the terminology of final and intermediate end. The good 
human life is the proper end of temperance, while health is its intermediate end. But the 
proper end cannot be attained while disregarding the finality of the intermediate end. ―It is 
impossible that there be the due relation of a thing to its final end outside of the mediated end 
which is due according to its own genus.‖231 Likewise the temperate man has to take into 
account the needs of his body. 
So far, this is the teaching of St. Thomas regarding the relationship between the natural 
orientation of man‘s sensitive appetite and temperance. In the following, however, we want to 
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 In ethic. III 21.5: ―Ad sanitatem et bonam habitudinem corporis et ad decentem conversationem cum aliis.‖ 
227
 Thus, yet on natural level we can distinguish two different rules of the sensible appetite: It follows either the 
rule of corporeal natures, i.e. regarding the mere perfection of the body, or the rule of reason which takes into 
account also non-bodily goods. Though the first aims for a special perfection, it is not yet a moral virtue. (In De 
malo he explains regarding this non-moral perfection: ―Mensura autem ipsius sumptionis cibi sumitur secundum 
regulam naturae corporalis; unde magis potest esse cognita secundum artem medicinae quam secundum rationem 
prudentiae.‖ (De malo 14.1 ad 2: ).  
228
 Cf. ST II-II 141.6 ad 2.  
In the case of fasting Aquinas argues in a similar way: If we were to fast so stringently that it actually harmed 
our natural bodily health, we are fasting inappropriately. (Cf. ST II-II 147.1-2. J. Porter discusses this text in Jean 
Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2005), 390). 
229
 De malo 14.1 ad 1: ―Regula rationis haec est, ut homo sumat cibum secundum quod convenit sustentationi 
naturae, et bonae habitudini hominis, et conversationi eorum cum quibus vivit.‖ 
230
 In German one could use the word ―aufheben‖ in its threefold sense to describe the change on the side of the 
mere affect: (a) the affect is uplifted into a higher order; (b) its own order is superceded (―aufgehoben‖) and (c) 
at the same time retained (―aufgehoben‖). 
231
 In sent. II 38.1.2: ―Nec potest esse debita relatio alicuius rei ad finem ultimum, nisi mediante fine qui suo 
generi debetur.― 
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draw some conclusions regarding the cooperation of two habits of action that are measured by 
different rules. 
 
First, the analogy opens a way to understanding how inferior habits may be acquired by more 
perfect acts. As we have seen, the inferior rule (the regula naturae corporalis) does not aim 
by itself for the good of the higher order (the convenience of human life). On the contrary, 
temperance takes into account simply the lower, that is it considers the maintenance of health. 
Therefore, even if a temperate man, for the sake of human conversation, takes food in a 
particular case beyond the strict needs of his body, i.e. materially besides the regula naturae 
corporalis but never formally against it, the act nonetheless somehow contains the perfection 
of the lower order, since the inferior rule was ―co-considered‖ in the process of decreeing the 
particular act. Hence, although such an act realizes a different mean according to the higher 
measure, it involves in a certain way the perfection of the lower order. And thereby even 
concrete temperate acts which choose actually an option besides the optimum of corporeal 
health develop a positive disposition regarding health.
232
 
 
Secondly, repeated acts of the higher order may acquire only a limited perfection regarding 
the end of the inferior order. Let us imagine an agent who has no special inclination to take 
care of his health, who lacks a corresponding habit, and who is used to neglecting the rule of 
his corporeal nature. If he tries to live temperately for a good life in human society, he would 
respect ipso facto also the lower order of health, at least in its basic functions, namely insofar 
as necessary for a good life in community. This example illustrates that the virtuous temperate 
man does not become step by step a ―health nut,‖ but he shall be able to respect the general 
precautions against catching the flu, even if he may fail to choose the most efficient medicine 
against it. Repeated acts of a higher order develop an agent‘s ability to respect the inferior 
order in things which would make impossible the achievement of the higher end, for example 
the peaceful common life as end of political temperance. Acts of political temperance do not 
make its possessors perfect specialists in healthcare. Thus, the good disposition for health 
which is acquired implicitly by repeated temperate acts may be less perfect than the 
                                                 
232
 We can make a similar argument for the sense power itself: Normally the act of the organ improves its ability 
to act. But even the abnegation of an act – motivated by higher reasons – can develop and refine the sense power, 
as the moderate wine tasting (which includes a temporal renouncement of drinking) does not only provide the 
growth of temperance, but refines also the natural capacity of the taste-power. 
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competence of somebody who seeks health as his primary end. Temperance simply provides 
bodily health, the goal of the lower order, in its basic parameters.  
 
Appling the Analogy to the Cooperation of Acquired and Infused Virtues 
The relation of man‘s perfection as corporeal being and as reasonable agent, of his bodily 
health and his life in community, can – so our thesis affirms – be applied in a strict parallel to 
the interface of infused and acquired virtues. The formal object of both virtues (the divine rule 
and natural reason) is as different as the regula naturae corporalis and the regula rationis. 
And as the reasonable good accounts for the corporeal good (it ―contains‖ the perfection of 
the inferior rule), likewise the divine good ―contains‖ the perfection of the reasonable good. 
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Figure 5 
 
The relation, however, is more complex than it appears at first glance. Does this imply that the 
act of infused virtues, formally supernatural, is simultaneously natural? In this context the 
concepts natural and supernatural are misleading. Activity beyond the power of nature 
cannot be natural at the same time, as for example the reasonable act of temperance cannot 
simultaneously be only affective (i.e. excluding the order of reason). We have to pose the 
question in a different way. Does the act of infused virtue contain the perfection of the natural 
act? Now the issue can be answered affirmatively. Although the supernatural act is ruled by 
the divine law in regard to the supernatural end, it has to take into account the order of reason. 
Thus, the order of natural reason is not simply undetermined first matter in respect to the 
supernatural level. The supernatural judgment has to consider natural good, since they are true 
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human goods, as e.g. bodily health. Therefore, the order of acquired virtues remains in a 
certain way present in the supernatural act, though elevated, redirected, and transformed,
233
 
whilst the formal object of infused and acquired virtue is different, the formal perfection of 
the latter remaining present in the former. Both acts are not as different as e.g. vision and 
listening (distinct because of two independent formal objects), but they relate to each other 
rather as vision and reasonable cognition (distinct but related formal objects). Aquinas often 
emphasizes that acquired and infused virtues are concerned with the same material objects. 
We should remember, too, that the formal object of acquired virtue is inclusively present in 
infused virtue, granted that the object of the natural virtue is elevated to conform to the divine 
rule. 
 
The Advantage of this Analogy 
The analogy of De virt. in com. 10 ad 1 serves as a helpful starting-point for illustrating the 
effects of supernatural acts on the acquired virtues. We can now apply our observations from 
above to the issue at hand. 
 
First, the analogy shows how the act of infused virtue can inclusively enhance its 
corresponding acquired virtue. Imagine a suddenly converted sinner. By infused virtues he 
becomes able to achieve all things necessary for the preservation of divine friendship. For 
example, he renounces food for the chastening of his body and subjecting it to the spirit, 
which is just one aspect in the work of disciplining his fallen nature in terms of his new 
friendship with Christ. Sometimes, however, the external concrete acts of infused temperance 
will differ from the right mean of acquired temperance. Nevertheless, these acts always have 
to take into account the end of the acquired virtue, i.e. right living within a human community 
(including one‘s care for bodily health). Seeking to increase charity by mortifying his body 
while at the same time disregarding the common life or disregarding his own health would not 
be an act of infused temperance. The graced agent cannot neglect completely the 
consideration of the natural human good which remains a true good, although not the highest 
one. Even the Roman martyr who disregards the imperial law to offer sacrifices to the 
                                                 
233
 The preservation of the internal structure of the acquired virtue under the influence of an infused virtue is well 
expressed by Schockenhoff. ―Die ‗virtus acquisita‘ bleibt natürliche, in ihrem Eigenbereich wahre Tugend. Ihre 
‗innere Proportion‘ geht auf das ‗bonum rationis‘ als ihr natürliches Ziel, das seine authentische Geltung auch 
dort bewahrt, wo der gemeinsam hervorgebrachte Akt in der Kraft der ‗virtus infusa‘ auf das letzte ziel der 
liebenden Gemeinschaft mit Gott ausgerichtet ist.‖ (Schockenhoff, ‘Bonum hominis’, 337). 
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emperor, thereby acting ―against‖ the order of the human city, does not simply despise the 
good of human community. He gives preference to the divine friendship as the higher good, 
but recognizing the human city as true but not the highest good. Thus, a believer may fast 
beyond what social convention requires or a physician recommends, but he should always co-
consider these natural goods, even if the concrete act deviates from the natural mean. 
From this perspective, we are able to understand the effects of supernatural actions and 
thereby the cooperation of acquired and infused virtues. Though these acts do not by 
themselves realize the mean of acquired virtue, they may develop in the agent a positive 
disposition regarding the natural good because of their repeated ―taking-into-account‖ of the 
natural measure. And such a disposition would still function as an acquired virtue if the 
infused habit was ever lost by grave sin. Admittedly, in the state of grace, the agent 
acknowledges that this earthly life is not the ultimate end of his supernatural actions. Still, 
each supernatural act contain somehow the perfection of its natural counterpart because of the 
agent‘s co-consideration of the natural order. 
 
Secondly, the analogy clarifies also the specific limitation of acquired natural habits. The 
supernatural act, though measured by the divine rule aiming for divine friendship, has to take 
into account man‘s membership in the human city and thereby avoid acts that would do harm 
to the city. However, the supernatural act will not always realize the absolute best mean 
regarding the progress of the human city. As, for example, in the case of Roman martyrs, the 
graced act may even risk offending the human community if there is no other way to preserve 
divine friendship. Therefore, repeated acts of infused virtue do not necessarily make universal 
expertise in human issues. After all, the human city is not the proper end of supernatural acts, 
but such acts do keep in mind their natural values. And thereby supernatural acts generate a 
certain virtuousness regarding the human good which can be described as acquired virtues, 
but which can know – as was seen in section 2.3 – different degrees of perfection. 
 
Thus, the analogy helps to interpret the textual hints of Aquinas (already cited in section 3.3.1) 
regarding the cooperation of acquired and infused virtues in the following way. 
 
a) Which consequences does an act of infused virtue imply for acquired virtue (as habit)? 
The short remarks of ST I-II 51.4 ad 3 and De virt. in com. 10 ad 19 assert a possible 
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confirmation of a previous habit by repeated supernatural acts. De veritate 17.1 ad sed 
contra 4 even allows for the acquisition of a habit. The increase of the infused virtue 
itself by repeated supernatural acts is beyond dispute (by the way of merit). According 
to our analogy, however, we can say even more: every act of an infused virtue 
contains per se the perfection of its natural counterpart, and therefore the supernatural 
act itself works for the development of a positive disposition for good deeds according 
to the rule of reason. This can be the case although the act in itself is of a higher order 
(sc. supernatural).
234
 
 
b) Which consequences does infused virtue (as habit) imply for the act of acquired virtue? 
Aquinas argues in De virt. in com. 10 ad 4 that acts of acquired virtue become 
meritorious only by mediation of the infused virtues. This text does not touch the issue 
of pure natural acts. According to our analogy, already at the level of nature an agent 
who has acquired temperance would never act only for bodily health and disregard the 
requirements of convenientia vitae. Of course, there might be some acts whose content 
is determined by reference to healthcare (i.e. by the ars medicinae), but the temperate 
agent realizes these means only if prudence judges these goods as convenient to the 
human good. Likewise, in the case of supernatural virtues. Even if an agent who 
possesses infused virtue acts consciously by the motives of the acquired virtues (i.e. 
motivated by natural arguments), his infused moral virtues always will be intrinsically 
involved.
235
 The graced agent is directed to supernatural union with God by charity 
and the infused virtues, and this new orientation becomes the first principle of all of 
his acts. Consequently, if such a person fulfills any virtuous deed that is determined 
superficially by natural standards, it will finally be directed to that supernatural end, 
i.e. it will be always a supernatural act since every moral act is measured in respect to 
the final end. ―In those who have charity there cannot be any virtuous act except 
formed by charity. Since either such an act is directed to the due end – and in those 
who have charity, this cannot be except by charity – or it is not directed to the due end, 
                                                 
234
 One could pose further on the interesting question whether every act against infused virtue would be 
implicitly against a (hypothetical) natural final. John of St. Thomas shows why the issue is to be affirmed. In the 
present status man turns away from God as his supernatural final end only by mortal sin which is also essentially 
opposed to reason, i.e. to the order of nature. ―Difficultas ergo est in hoc statu presenti, in quo non potest quis 
carere gratia et caritate nisi propter peccatum, et consequenter cum aversione ab ultimo fine, quae aversio non 
potest esse ab ultimo fine supernaturali quin sit etiam a fine ultimo naturali, siquidem omne peccatum est contra 
naturam rationalem, quod non esset, si maneret peccator conversus et coniunctus deo fini naturali, qui est finis 
rationalis naturae, ex cuius recto amore maneret rectificatus in ordine naturali.‖ (Johannes a Sancto Thoma, 
Cursus theologicus disputatio 17, art. 2, 465-466). 
Chapter 3. Different Theories Concerning the Cooperation of Acquired and Infused Virtues 
 214 
and then it is not an act of virtue.‖236 Hence, for one who has charity, a purely natural 
virtuous act without any reference to the supernatural end would not be longer a 
virtuous act at all, but would become in fact an evil one since it would negate the final 
end. Aquinas argues: ―In those who have charity, each act is either meritorious or 
blameful.‖237 
 
In summary, in some respect our analogy corresponds to the inclusive-order-theory. Each act 
of an infused virtue contains a consideration ‒ a certain appreciation ‒ of the natural good, at 
least implicitly. When a Christian renounces food by infused temperance for reasons of 
spiritual discipline, he nevertheless has to appreciate food and health as true goods. In this 
way repeated acts cause necessarily a habit regarding these natural goods. They develop an 
acquired virtue which will survive even a loss of the infused virtues. 
Nonetheless, in other ways our analogy does not support unrestrictedly the inclusive-order-
theory but rather the accidental-relation-theory. The acts of an infused virtue aim for divine 
friendship as their final end. Thus, they neither work directly for the earthly common good 
nor do they imply an ultimate perfection in human things. They just allow living the human 
life without losing one‘s supernatural end. Regarding earthly things this requires a less perfect 
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 De virt. in com. 10 ad 4. 
236
 De veritate 14.5 ad 13: ―In habente caritatem non potest esse aliquis actus virtutis nisi a caritate formatus. Aut 
enim actus ille erit in finem debitum ordinatus, et hoc non potest esse nisi per caritatem in habente caritatem; aut 
non est ordinatus in debitum finem, et sic non erit actus virtutis.‖  
E. Gilson explains thereto: even if the infusion of grace does not change human nature and acquired virtues, 
nonetheless every human act will use these natural ―dispositions‖ on a higher (sc. supernatural) level. ―The 
natural virtues remain what they were; it is the one who possesses them who has changed.‖ (Gilson, The 
Christian Philosophy, 347-450, here 347). 
237
 De malo 2.5 ad 7. Aquinas‘s argumentation on this issue is univocal: ―Non omnis actus procedens a voluntate 
informata caritate est meritorius, si voluntas pro potentia accipiatur; alioquin venialia peccata essent meritoria, 
quae committunt interdum etiam caritatem habentes. Sed verum est quod omnis actus qui est ex caritate, est 
meritorius. Hoc autem est simpliciter falsum, quod omnis actus qui non est ex voluntate informata caritate sit 
demeritorius; alioquin illi qui sunt in peccato mortali, in quolibet suo actu peccarent, nec eis esset consulendum 
quod interim quidquid boni possent facerent, nec opera ab eis facta quae sunt de genere bonorum, disponerent 
eos ad gratiam; quae omnia sunt falsa. Tenetur autem quilibet ad conformandum voluntatem suam voluntati 
divinae, quantum ad hoc quod velit quidquid vult deus eum velle, secundum quod dei voluntas innotescit per 
prohibitiones et praecepta; non autem quantum ad hoc quod ex caritate velit, nisi secundum illos qui dicunt quod 
modus caritatis est in praecepto. Quae quidem opinio aliqualiter vera est; alioquin sine caritate posset aliquis 
legem implere, quod est pelagianae impietatis; nec tamen est vera omnino, quia sic aliquis caritatem non habens, 
honorans parentes, peccaret mortaliter ex omissione modi, quod est falsum. Unde modus sub necessitate 
praecepti includitur, secundum quod praeceptum ordinatur ad consecutionem beatitudinis, non autem secundum 
quod ordinatur ad vitandum reatum poenae; unde qui honorat parentes non habens caritatem, non meretur vitam 
aeternam, sed tamen neque demeretur. Ex quo patet quod non omnis humanus actus, etiam in singulari 
consideratus, est meritorius vel demeritorius, licet omnino sit bonus vel malus. Et hoc dico propter eos qui 
caritatem non habent, qui mereri non possunt. Sed habentibus caritatem omnis actus est meritorius vel 
demeritorius, ut obiiciendo probatum est.‖ (Ibid.).  
A good explanation of the impossibility of only-natural-good acts for the graced agent is found in Baumann, ―La 
surnaturalisation,‖ 247-252. 
Chapter 3. Different Theories Concerning the Cooperation of Acquired and Infused Virtues 
 215 
habit than the virtue of a good citizen who works for the human common good as his final 
end.
238
 Therefore, regarding the refined ability to promote the earthly common good, the habit 
which may be acquired by act of infused virtues can fall short to realize the full ratio of 
―ordinary‖ acquired virtues. 
 
 
3.5 Evaluation of the Different Theories Examined 
 
3.5.1 Critique of the Exclusive-Order-Theory 
 
Proponents of the exclusive-order-theory, such as Suarez, negate any positive influence of 
supernatural acts for the acquisition of natural virtues. They deny such a connection because 
of the different formal object of both kinds of virtue. Of course, it is important to maintain the 
two different measures of acquired and infused virtues, even if in certain cases the external act 
of both virtues is the same, e.g. the renunciation of food for religious motives or for health-
reasons. For the exlusive-order theorist, these constitute two wholly different acts. In this 
regard the exclusive-order-theory emphasizes something true and important. 
However, the described analogy clarifies in which way acts of a specific formal determination 
can include the perfection of another formality. The perfection of an inferior order can be 
included by the formal perfection of a higher order. Likewise, an supernatural act infinitely 
transcends an act of acquired virtue, but simultaneously it takes natural reasons into account. 
Consequently, it works for the generation of an acquired virtue.
239
 
At this point we should add a short note about McKay‘s example of the saintly ―whiskey 
priest,‖ taken from G. Green‘s novel The Power and the Glory.240 According to McKay this 
priest possesses a high degree of infused virtue and at the same time the vicious inclination to 
drunkenness. So far there is no problem, if we imagine an occasional fall into grave sin 
followed by a prompt contrition. But McKay continues with the argument that ―an individual 
                                                 
238
 Admittedly, the stability of such natural habits caused by acts of infused virtues may exceed the stability of 
―ordinary‖ acquired virtues since they dwell under the ―protection‖ of the infused virtues and aren‘t, therefore, 
weakened by single vicious acts (as it can happen to ordinary acquired virtues – see ST I-II 63.2 ad 2). As to that, 
scholars as Garrigou-Lagrange, Osborne, and others are right if they claim a higher perfection of acquired virtues 
under the reign of infused virtues. Nonetheless, in some other respect the ordinary acquired virtues may surpass 
the acquired habits which are developed by the acts of infused virtues. 
239
 For a detailed critique of Suarez‘s theory, see Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 240-
248. 
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could diminish in acquired virtue and at the same time be granted an increase in infused 
virtue.‖241 In other words: the whiskey priest can become even more inclined to excessive 
consume of alcohol and simultaneously grow in charity and infused virtues.  
Is this position compatible with the doctrine of Aquinas? Can we think of supernatural acts 
coexisting alongside vicious ones that oppose to the order of reason? Aquinas‘s favorite 
example of infused temperance seems to suggest this possibility. The ideal of infused 
temperance, namely to chastise his body and to bring it into subjection,
242
 appears opposed to 
the reasonable care for his own health, which is the end of acquired temperance. However, 
Aquinas‘s general principles are unambiguous. Meritorious acts can never move against the 
order of nature; ―to sin is nothing else than to decline from the good which is convenient to 
somebody according to his nature.‖243 Though the divine law directs man to an end beyond 
nature, it contains and reaffirms (and elevates) the order of nature.
244
 To act against the 
natural order necessarily implies a violation of the supernatural order.
245
 Consequently, it is 
impossible to think of a person who grows at the same time in infused virtues as well as in 
acquired vices. Every supernatural act containing a natural perfection weakens immediately a 
contrary vice, and likewise every evil act arising from a vicious disposition will either 
diminish the fervor of meritorious acts (by venial sins) or even destroy infused virtues 
altogether (by mortal sins).  
McKay appears to have been misled in this point by an observation which is in itself correct: 
acquired virtue denotes a limited perfection regarding special matters of earthly affairs, first 
of all the conservation of the city; and Aquinas explicitly allows such true virtues to act 
independently of charity.
246
 But it is a different issue whether the actual offense against such 
limited but genuine goods is compatible with infused virtues.
247
 If a supernatural act contains 
its corresponding natural perfection, then each human act against the natural order of reason 
                                                                                                                                                        
240
 McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 117-124. 
241
 Ibid., 85. This means in the case of the whisky priest: ―Even when the priest acts contrary to right reason, as 
he so often does, he does so without ‗damaging what is indispensable for salvation.‘‖ (McKay, ―Infused and 
Acquired Virtues,‖ 119). 
242
 Cf. ST I-II 63.4 – quoting 1 Cor 9.27. 
243
 ST I-II 109.2 ad 2: ―Peccare nihil aliud est quam deficere a bono quod convenit alicui secundum suam 
naturam.‖ Further on: ST I-II 71.6 ad 4 and ad 5; ST I-II 78.3; Super Rom. I 8. Aquinas quotes several times 
affirmatively John Damascene: ―Omne enim peccatum est contra naturam.‖ (Cited for example in ST I-II 82.3 
arg. 1; ST II-II 10.1 arg. 1; both times affirmative). 
244
 Therefore: ―Lege autem divina haec solum prohibita sunt quae rationi adversantur.‖ (ScG III 126). 
245
 And vice versa (see footnote 234). 
246
 See ST II-II 23.7; ST II-II 47.13 ad 3 and 47.14. 
247
 McKay seems to hold the position that only sins from malice are contrary to infused virtues (McKay, 
―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 123-124). 
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destroys implicitly the supernatural one. To return to our recurring example, the voluntary act 
of natural intemperance immediately ruins infused temperance.
248
 
The example shows again how the natural and supernatural orders are different but not 
exclusive. Since the more perfect includes the less perfect, every violation of the latter harms 
even the former. 
 
3.5.2 Some General Remarks about the Connection-Theory  
 
The basic insight of the connection-theory is certainly correct: acquired virtues are open to 
become redirected, transformed, elevated, etc., according to the order of the infused virtues. 
But scholars often skip a sufficient explanation as to why and how such a transformation is 
possible. However, the undetermined assertion of a complementary or essential cooperation is 
misleading.
249
 Natural virtue provides only an external ―completion‖ for infused virtues, sc. a 
facilitas extrinsica. In themselves infused virtues are perfect even without acquired virtues.
250
 
 
 
3.5.3 Evaluation of the Different Kinds of Accidental-Relation-Theories 
 
a) Attention to Natural Reasons as a Condition of Cooperation  
 
According to the first version of an accidental-relation theory, which we considered above, 
the two kinds of virtue are involved in human action if the agent is attentive to both the rule of 
reason and the divine rule. Only in these cases does the act of the infused virtue work for the 
confirmation of acquired virtue 
The analogy of section 3.4, however, shows that this effect must be valid for all acts of 
infused virtue since every supernatural act has to be ruled not only by divine law but likewise 
by reason. It is impossible to think of an act of infused virtue which disregards rational 
                                                 
248
 A slight tendency of similar undervaluation of acquired virtue can be observed in Porter‘s excellent article 
The Subversion of Virtue concluding: ―The infused cardinal virtues exist in persons regardless of their natural 
capacities for attaining and exercising the acquired virtues.‖ (Porter, ―The Subversion of Virtue,‖ 33). It is 
correct that the infusion of supernatural virtues is possible disregarding of natural presuppositions; but 
nevertheless both sets of virtue existing in one person would necessarily interfere in their development.  
249
 Cf. e.g. Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 119; Harvey, ―The Nature of the Infused Moral 
Virtues,‖ 215; see footnote 93 and 94. 
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motives altogether and consequently would not enhance the corresponding acquired virtue. 
For example, although Christian fasting does not aim at bodily health as its first goal, 
nevertheless it must take into account the value of the body‘s health. Finally, a Christian 
might conclude by infused prudence that in a particular case it would be better to choose a 
way of nourishment which is not the best one in respect to his health for some higher, 
supernatural reason. But this act would necessarily contain respect for the natural good, even 
if the agent ultimately gives priority to the higher good.
251
 Consequently, every supernatural 
act works for the confirmation of its corresponding acquired virtue. 
 
The Example of the “Lax Seminarian”  
At this stage we have to mention again the example of the ―lax seminarian,‖ which is used by 
some to suggest that the development of virtue is dependent on the agent‘s actual attention to 
certain motives (see section 3.3.3a-i). Many scholars resolve the issue by asserting that 
infused virtues provide solely the supernatural posse, whereas facility is due to acquired 
virtues. The latter do not grow immediately by the practice of infused virtues, but require a 
special attention to their proper rule. Hence, without a special natural endeavor the lax 
seminarian might progress in infused virtue but remain tepid in natural virtue and actually rest 
inclined to his imperfections.
252
 
How can our analogy illumate the case of the lax seminarian? The example as just explained 
seems to contradict the assertion that every supernatural act includes the perfection of the 
corresponding natural act. However, Aquinas does not claim that every virtuous act works 
equally for the augmentation of virtue. He is well aware that the growth of virtue depends in a 
certain way on the agent‘s attention, but in a way very different from what these scholars 
suggest. According to Thomas, a voluntary agent may use a habit or not,
253
 and virtue is only 
increased if the intensity of an act does not fall short of the possible intensity of the used habit. 
―It can happen that somebody uses a habit by performing an act which is not in proportion to 
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 Cf. De virt. in com. 10 ad 14 and ad 15. 
251
 This is the point which was made rightly by Yearley, although his mode of expression was certainly 
misleading – describing acquired virtues as presupposition of infused ones. But it is clear that he didn‘t argue for 
a necessary first acquisition of natural virtues before the divine infusion. Rather he adverted to the fact that in the 
act of infused virtues a recognition of the natural good is contained. ―If there is to be a real act of supernatural 
fortitude it must presuppose the recognition of the value of goods of the world that is essential to natural 
fortitude.‖ (Yearley, ―The Nature-Grace Question,‖ 574). Thus, the critique of McKay (see footnote 75) does not 
seem to be fully appropriate. 
252
 The example is suggested by Harvey, ―The Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues,‖ 195-197. Similar examples 
can be found in Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis, 33-34; Coerver, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues, 26; 
Klubertanz, ―Une théorie,‖ 572 and others. 
253
 ―Usus habituum in voluntate hominis consistit.‖ (ST I-II 52.3). 
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the intensity of the habit. . . . If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such 
an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a diminution of it.‖254 In the 
case of infused virtues, the situation is especially tricky. Since God is the immediate cause of 
their generation and growth, likewise their diminution would seem to hinge also only on God. 
But it would be strange to ascribe the reduction of virtue to God himself. Therefore, infused 
virtue cannot shrink gradually like acquired virtue, but it can be vanquished by mortal sin.
255
 
Hence, the final statement of the quotation above is not applicable in the case of infused virtue. 
Nevertheless, Aquinas describes unrepented venial sins, the failure to practicing virtue, and 
the tepid exercise of virtue as contributing to a ―disposition to corruption‖ in the agent.256 This 
teaching provides the necessary key for the right understanding of the ―lax seminarian.‖ The 
repeated but tepid performance of supernatural acts might be meritorious up to a certain level. 
As a believer in the state of grace, either he acts meritoriously or he sins.
257
 However, such a 
person wouldn‘t earn by his imperfect supernatural acts an actual increase of charity and 
infused virtue. As Aquinas explains in De virt. in com.: 
 
Charity and the other infused virtues are not actively increased by acts, but only dispositively 
and meritoriously . . . It is, however, not necessary that every perfect act correspond to the 
amount [of one‘s] virtue: for one who has charity need not always act with the whole power of 
charity, since the use of habits is subject to will.
258
 
 
Hence, only the graced agent who strives constantly for spiritual progress, who tries to use the 
divine gift of charity to its full amount, will progress in the development of virtue.
259
 On the 
contrary, although the permissiveness and venial sins of the ―lax seminarian‖ may not harm 
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 ST I-II 52.3: ―Potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non respondentem proportionaliter 
intensioni habitus. Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat; 
quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius . . . Ita etiam, multiplicatis actibus, crescit 
habitus. Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad 
augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius.‖ 
255
 See ST II-II 24.10. 
256
 ―Potest tamen indirecte dici diminutio caritatis dispositio ad corruptionem ipsius, quae fit vel per peccata 
venialia; vel etiam per cessationem ab exercitio operum caritatis.‖ (ST II-II 24.10; see also De malo 7.2). 
Ramirez describes the development of such a disposition as an extrinsic impediment to the exercise of infused 
virtues (cf. Ramirez, De habitibus, 190-192). 
257
 See De malo 2.5 ad 7 (footnote 237).  
258
 De virt. in com. 11 ad 14: ―Caritas et aliae virtutes infusae non augentur active ex actibus, sed tantum 
dispositive et meritorie . . . Nec tamen oportet quod quilibet actus perfectus correspondeat quantitati virtutis: non 
enim oportet quod habens caritatem, semper operetur secundum totum posse caritatis; usus enim habituum 
subiacet voluntati.‖ 
259
 Cf. McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 80-82. Helpful is also Garrigou-Lagrange‘s description of the 
actus remissi (Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian Perfection, 168-169; 189-190; 429-430). 
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his supernatural virtues directly, they certainly hinder their increase. This seminarian‘s moral 
laxity deprives him of the fervor for good acting and disposes him to future sinning.
260
 
Thus, the extermination of vice and the acquisition of virtue do not depend on special 
attention being given to the rule of reason. More important is the perfection of the act itself. 
The exercise of infused virtue to its fullest by attending to God as one‘s supernatural end, but 
without at the same time giving explicit attention to the natural reasons for virtue, contributes 
not only to the increase of that infused virtue but also to the confirmation of the acquired 
virtue. Hence, if the ―lax seminarian‖ does not progress in his spiritual life through his 
supernatural acts, then this is due to the imperfection of these acts. 
But what about acts of acquired virtue performed by a justified agent who disregards the 
supernatural motives of infused virtue? The proponents of the accidental-relation theory speak 
of an extrinsic supernaturalization of an essentially natural act. For some scholars this occurs 
with, and for others it occurs without the involvement of infused virtue.
261
 Do these theories 
correspond to St. Thomas? 
The justified person is joined to God as his supernatural end by the theological virtues. But 
the final end is simultaneously the first principle of all of his actions.
262
 Hence, if a man‘s life 
is ordered to the end of charity, then all acts, even those for his natural good, are virtually 
directed toward his supernatural end. 
 
Man should refer all things to God as to the end, as said the apostle in 1 Cor. 10.31: whether 
your eat, or drink, or whatsoever you do, do all to the glory of God; what is fulfilled if 
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 ―Spiritualiter autem quotidie in nobis aliquid deperditur ex calore concupiscentiae per peccata venialia, quae 
diminuunt fervorem caritatis.‖ (ST III 79.4). And further: ―Peccata venialia, etsi non contrarientur caritati 
quantum ad habitum, contrariantur tamen ei quantum ad fervorem actus.‖ (Ibid. ad 1; see also ad 3). For the 
effects of repeated venial sins on a person in the state of grace, see Thomas C. Donlan, ―The Theology of Venial 
Sin,‖ Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 10 (1955): 74-85; 91-94. 
261
 For a defense of a possible extrinsic supernaturalization of a natural act without interaction of an infused 
virtue, see for example Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 158-163. 
On the other hand, also Garrigou-Lagrange speaks of an extrinsic redirection of natural acts toward the 
supernatural end. However, he is cautious to note that this is an oppositio rationis, sed non rei. ―C‘est ce qui, tout 
en étant naturel par son principe formel et spécificateur, est extrinsèquement ordonné à la fin surnaturelle; par 
exemple, un act de vertu naturelle acquise, comme la tempérance, ordonné par la charié à la vie éternelle. Cet 
acte, de soi naturel, reçoit de la charité un mode accidentel qui en fait un acte méritoir. . . . Il faut remarquer que 
cette division n‘est pas per oppositas res, sed per oppositas rationes. C‘est ainsi qu‘une même chose comme la 
grâce sera en même temps surnaturelle quoad substantiam et surnaturelle quoad modum.‖ (Garrigou-Lagrange, 
―Le surnaturel,‖ 323-324. For a general description of the difference between a supernatural substance and a 
supernatural mode of action, see Roberto Tucci, La specificazione delle virtù infuse secondo San Tommaso 
d'Aquino (Rome, 1961), 154-167. 
262
 Cf. ST I-II 1.4 and 5. 
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somebody orders his life to the service of God; and consequently all things which he does 
because of himself, is virtually ordered towards God.
263 
 
Aquinas teaches explicitly that it is not necessary to direct in each single act to the final end 
with an actual intention. The decision to make a pilgrimage to Rome determines virtually a 
whole batch of particular actions toward this end, even without a continuous consideration of 
the end. Likewise, if the reference to God as final end has been made by an actual intention, it 
provides a fundamental orientation of his whole life toward the supernatural end, including 
the ordering of all acts, except for sins which deny of this ordering.
264
 Therefore, the good 
deeds of a person in the state of grace, performed for natural reasons (e.g. health), don‘t 
remain essentially natural, but they have to become intrinsically supernatural since in the end 
they are not done for purely natural reasons. To be sure, supernatural motives may not play a 
conscious role in his decision making.
265
 The proper determination of the act may stem from 
arguments of reason alone. But if the person‘s whole life is ordered virtually toward the 
supernatural end by means of a previous explicit intention, then this intention will work for 
the actual specification of all his acts.
266
 Hence, a seemingly natural act is in fact supernatural, 
even if the agent acts according to purely natural motives. 
Of course, this does not imply that all virtuous acts are of the same value. The example of the 
lax seminarian shows the important role played by the actual intention. Nevertheless, an act of 
a justified person is intrinsically supernatural even without actually attenting to to the final 
end when acting. 
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 De perf. spirit. vitae 5: ―Homo omnia in deum referat sicut in finem, sicut apostolus dicit I Cor. X, 31: sive 
manducatis sive bibitis vel aliquid aliud facitis, omnia in gloriam dei facite: quod quidem impletur cum aliquis 
vitam suam ad dei servitium ordinat, et per consequens omnia quae propter se ipsum agit, virtualiter ordinantur 
in deum.‖ 
264
 ―Non sufficit omnino habitualis ordinatio actus in deum: quia ex hoc quod est in habitu, nullus meretur, sed 
ex hoc quod actu operatur. Nec tamen oportet quod intentio actualis ordinans in finem ultimum sit semper 
coniuncta cuilibet actioni quae dirigitur in aliquem finem proximum; sed sufficit quod aliquando actualiter 
omnes illi fines in finem ultimum referantur; sicut fit quando aliquis cogitat se totum ad dei dilectionem dirigere: 
tunc enim quidquid ad seipsum ordinat, in deum ordinatum erit. Et si quaeratur quando oporteat actum referre in 
finem ultimum, hoc nihil aliud est quam quaerere quando oportet habitum caritatis exire in actum: quia 
quandocumque habitus caritatis in actum exit, fit ordinatio totius hominis in finem ultimum, et per consequens 
omnium eorum quae in ipsum ordinantur ut bona sibi.‖ (In sent. II 40.1.5 ad 6). 
To act with a permanent actual attention to the final end belongs to the perfect state of man in heaven. But at 
least virtually every Christian in the state of grace acts not only for temporal ends, but implicitly for the final end. 
―Ad interiorem bonam mentis dispositionem pertinet ut nullum bonum opus homo faciat propter quemcumque 
temporalem finem.‖ (ST I-II 108.3 arg. 4 – affirmative). Roey noted correctly that the preservation of a virtual 
intention towards the supernatural end demands as minimum a casual renewal, even required by the praecepta 
caritatis (cf. Roey, De virtute charitatis, 226-238). 
265
 Infused virtues are not necessarily a question of psychological experience. See E. Neveut, ―Les vertus 
morales surnaturelles,‖ Revue Apologétique 59 (1934): 405-406. 
266
 Explicitly different is the interpretation of Bullet: ―Peut-être objectera-t-on que l‘attention actuelle à la règle 
de raison implique nécessairement l‘attention implicite à la règle de foi. Nous ne le pensons pas. Il n‘y a pas 
entre ces deux règles de connexion nécessaire d‘existence.‖ (Bullet, Vertus morales infuses, 153). 
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b) The Per-se-generation of a Positive Disposition for Acquired Virtues  
 
John of St. Thomas, Bullet and others argue for the necessary acquisition of good natural 
dispositions through repeated supernatural acts. For them, such an imprinting of infused virtue 
on the human faculties facilitate further acts of both infused and acquired virtue. The 
disposition created by infused virtue is understood to be the general basis of all virtue, and it 
might be further developed in one direction or another. The mentioned scholars consider this 
―third habit‖ necessary, since the different formal objects of acquired and infused virtue 
hinder a direct mutual interface between the two sets of virtue. 
However, if the formal perfection of the acquired virtue is contained in the act of infused 
virtue, although at a higher level, then it becomes possible to ascribe to the repeated acts of 
infused virtue more than just the causation of a mere disposition in the underlying power. 
Consequently, hypothesizing an intermediary habit becomes superfluous. Then there is no 
reason why the acts of infused virtue should not immediately generate a corresponding 
acquired virtue as perfection in regard to the human life, at least in its basic concerns (as 
described above). 
 
 
3.5.4 Annotations to the Various Inclusive-Order-Theories 
 
We have distinguished two different kinds of inclusive-order-theories which the subsequent 
section shall reconsider based on our reasoning above. 
 
 
a) Natural and Supernatural Acts As Possessing the Same Substance 
 
Billot claims that the equality of substance between natural and supernatural acts helps to 
explain why the exercise of an infused virtue causes the development of its acquired 
counterpart. 
 
Our critique of this position is twofold.  
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First, Billot concedes that natural and supernatural acts are intrinsically different according to 
their ontological status. But at the same time he argues that both kinds of action share a 
common formal object. For example, the act of loving God in both cases consists in the 
adherence of the agent to God because of his infinite goodness. But right there a problem 
emerges. Can the difference between both acts of love be reduced to different efficient causes: 
the human will on the one hand, and God as author of infused charity on the other? Or are not 
the acts in themselves substantially different? Billot negates this conclusion since according to 
both types of action man clings to God because of his divine goodness. However, though the 
latter assertion is true, for St. Thomas man clings to God by acquired and infused charity 
under two different aspects. Through natural love the agent draws near to God as to the 
principle of his being, and through infused charity he draws near to God as to the principle of 
supernatural beatitude.
267
 There might be an external similarity between these two loves, but 
nonetheless both acts are formally different. Analogously, acts of infused moral virtue might 
be externally imitated for mere natural reasons. For example, fasting in Lent is also possible 
for people without infused temperance. Even if in such case, however, this fasting performed 
for ―religious reasons‖ but not for charity‘s sake would be a substantially different act.268 
Hence, the difference between natural and supernatural acts cannot be traced back just to their 
different efficient causes (see section 2.3). Their difference is constituted formally and not just 
efficiently. 
 
Secondly, even if the claim concerning the similarity in substance between natural and 
supernatural acts were correct, the thesis would fail to explain the issue of how supernatural 
acts generate acquired virtues. According to Billot, the substance of an act abstracts from its 
natural or supernatural character. If this were true, then the substance of an action becomes 
unable to cause any natural or supernatural habit. The disposition (i.e. the virtue), developed 
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 ―Diligere deum super omnia, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod bonum divinum est 
principium et finis totius esse naturalis. . . . Alio modo potest aliquis diligere deum super omnia, secundum quod 
deus est obiectum beatitudinis, et secundum quod fit quaedam societas rationalis mentis ad deum quadam 
spirituali unitate; et talis dilectio est actus caritatis, in quem nulla creatura potest sine gratia.‖ (De spe 1.1 ad 9; 
See also In sent. II 28.3 ad 2; In sent. III 23.1.4C ad 1; ST I 61.5 ad 4; I-II 109.3 ad 1; II-II 2.3; De caritate 1.2 ad 
16; In 2Cor 13.4). 
268
 Bernard has shown clearly the importance of the different formal object, even if the acts are externally similar. 
―Entre la vertu infuse et la vertu acquise c‘est le régime de l‘objet qui est tout changé; et l‘on sait que l‘objet est 
ce qui constitue la vertu dans son essence même. . . . Une vertu infuse est ‗informée‘ tout autrement qu‘une vertu 
acquise.‖ (Bernard, ―Appendice,‖ 456). And by the example of the two species of temperance: ―Bien qu‘elles 
cherchent toutes les deux un juste milieu, cependant la tempérance infuse le cherche par une tout autre raison que 
la tempérance acquise.‖ (Bernard, ―Appendice,‖ 457). 
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by Billot‘s neutral substance would be neither natural nor supernatural.269 Hence, the whole of 
Billot‘s argument turns out to be in vain in this respect.270 
 
 
b) Supernatural Acts Contain Virtually Their Natural Perfections 
 
According to Merkelbach and Garrigou-Lagrange, each act of infused virtue contains virtually 
the perfection of its corresponding natural act, even though its formal object transcends that of 
the mere natural act. Garrigou-Lagrange‘s examples of the octave and the pianist correspond 
to Aquinas‘s analogy in De virt. in com. 10 ad 1. Playing the piano is always and 
simultaneously (i.e. by the very same act) an exercise in dexterity, even though the 
development of dexterity is not the formal object of piano playing. Likewise, the act of 
infused virtue implies always and simultaneously a reasonable use of the underlying power, 
although the reasonable good is not the proper formal notion of the infused virtue. 
The theses of Mirkes and Baumann move in the same direction. Though we think that this 
view is correct in many respects, we want to note two things for the sake of clarity.  
First, these two authors do not always restrict the informing task of infused virtue to the acts 
of acquired virtue. Consequently, they allow for the immediate formation of the moral virtues 
themselves by charity. For example, Mirkes claims that in its perfect state moral virtue is just 
acquired virtue which is ―supernaturally transformed‖271 by its being informed by infused 
virtue. Consequently, she defines ―absolutely perfect moral virtue as a virtue that is formally 
an infused virtue and materially an acquired virtue.‖272 But this term of ―perfect moral virtue‖ 
as a combination of acquired and infused virtue risks introducing a new third virtue 
constituted of acquired and infused parts.
273
 Of course, one could argue (even faithfully to 
Aquinas) that infused virtue lacking the support of its acquired counterpart remains imperfect 
                                                 
269
 This interesting objection against Billot was made by Mazzella. ―Ratio illa abstracte considerata, nec naturalis 
nec supernaturalis est, et ab utraque ratione abstrahit; ergo si actus secundum illam praecisam rationem ageret, 
induceret habitum nec naturalem, nec supernaturalem, sed indifferentem, seu abstrahentem, quod in re ipsa 
inveniri, manifeste repugnat.‖ (Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis, 46-47). Hence, negating the formal 
distinctiveness of infused virtue would lead to a general denial of infused virtues (a conclusion consequentially 
drawn for example by Vooght, ―Y a-t-il des vertus morales infuses?,‖ 237-238). 
270
 For a more detailed critique of Billot‘s account, see Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 
255-264; shorter in Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 211-216. 
271
 Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 191; likewise Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 590. 
272
 Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 597. 
273
 See thereto also the critique of Baumann, ―La surnaturalisation,‖ 233-234, footnote 874. 
Significantly the titles of her publications speak of perfect virtue but avoid the concept of infused virtue. 
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insofar as it lacks an extrinsic facility.
274
 However, the formation of an acquired virtue by an 
infused one does not generate a new kind of virtue beyond the species of the infused virtue. It 
is rather just this infused virtue which is the perfect moral virtue. Here, the matter-form 
analogy is both helpful and dangerous at the same time. For example, soul and body are 
constitutive parts of the complete man. Both parts, however, do not combine in man as two 
independent elements. Rather, together they constitute the one substantial reality of man 
under two different aspects (sc. soul as man‘s actuality, body as his potentiality275). Likewise, 
acquired and infused virtues are not two parts of a third perfect moral virtue, but the latter is 
the perfect virtue which (and here the present case differs from the example of body and soul) 
may contain materially the former. 
Secondly, Mirkes describes by the matter-form analogy not only the relationship between 
acquired and infused virtues, but likewise that between acquired prudence and the other 
acquired moral virtues, and further between charity and the other infused virtues (and infused 
prudence and the other infused virtues). 
 
Important for our thesis is the hierarchy of infused virtues in which the superior virtue is 
related as form to the inferior virtue which is its matter. Charity, the greatest of the theological 
virtues, is formal in relation to all other virtues, infused and acquired. Charity perfects . . . the 
infused moral virtues, and charity . . . the infused virtue of prudence, and the respective 
infused moral virtues perfect their acquired counterparts.
276
 
 
Hence, Mirkes asserts the following analogous relationships to obtain among the virtues. 
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 See section 3.4 and section 4.2; cf. also Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 202. 
275
 Indeed, the soul itself cannot be understood apart from its reference to the body. ―Nenne ich die Seele, so 
nenne ich in eins damit auch den Körper; d.h. aber: ich nenne beides, jedoch nicht als Seele und Körper (ich 
nenne ja nur Seele), sondern ich nenne beides (1) als dasselbe und (2) nenne ich das ‗Eine und Selbe‘, das beide 
sind, nicht auf irgendeine Weise, sondern auf die höchste Weise, in der ich beides nenne kann.‖ (Fernando 
Inciarte, ‘Forma Formarum:’ Strukturmomente der thomistischen Seinslehre im Rückgriff auf Aristoteles 
(Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1970), 48). Hence, the compound is not one as something third. ―Die Frage nach 
dem Dritten, nach dem zusammengesetzten Ganzen ist überflüssig geworden; denn das Ganze ist (1) schon in 
einem Glied, in der  enthalten, und (2) ist das Ganze in diesem einen Glied auf die höchstmögliche 
Weise enthalten, nämlich nicht als , aber auch nicht als zusammengesetztes Ganzes, sondern als ‗einiges 
Ganzes‘ und (da ens et unum convertuntur) als seiendes Ganzes in der denkbar höchsten Bedeutung.‖ (Ibid.). See 
also the surprising assertion of Aristotle in DA II, c.1 412b6 that one might not ask whether soul and body ore 
one. 
276
 Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 126. For an outline of the role of prudence as form 
of the acquired moral virtues see the second chapter of her dissertation (ibid., 61-124); for the function of charity 
respective infused virtues (respectively infused prudence to infused moral virtues) see chapter three (ibid., 125-
186). 
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forma caritas virtutes infusae prudentia acquisita 
–––––– = ––––––––––––––– = ––––––––––––––––– = –––––––––––––––––––––– 
materia virtutes infusae virtutes acquisitae virtutes morales acquisitae 
Figure 6 
 
If we refer back to the results of section 2.4, it becomes clear that Mirkes‘s description is at 
least imprecise. Is it possible to argue in an unequivocal sense that charity is the form of 
infused virtue, and that the infused virtue is likewise the form of acquired virtue? The answer 
is clearly negative. In the first relation, matter and form are specified by the same perfection. 
Charity introduces the agent to the supernatural order, and the other infused virtues introduce 
their corresponding faculties to the same divine order in regard to their proper objects. 
Likewise is acquired prudence related to the other acquired virtues. In the second relation, 
however, infused and acquired virtues provide for two essentially different kinds of perfection, 
sc. the divine order regarding a supernatural end and the reasonable order regarding an earthly 
end.
277
 Although one may refer to both relations by the analogy of matter and form, one must 
not ignore the different uses of the analogy. Infused virtues as form provide a truly new 
perfection to acquired virtues as matter, whereas charity and infused virtues (or acquired 
prudence and acquired moral virtues) belong still to the same order as they share the same 
finale end. Mirkes, however, takes just the relation of prudence and the moral virtues as the 
paradigm for the cooperation of infused and acquired virtues and thereby ignores their formal 
difference.
278
  
                                                 
277
 Recently Knobel has rightly mentioned that according to Aquinas it makes no sense to speak of a formatting 
of an acquired virtue (as habit) by an infused one. Such a ‗redirection‘ of a natural virtue would make it ipso 
facto a supernatural virtue, i.e. a virtue which inclines to different means for the sake of a higher end. ―Aquinas 
does not appear to leave any room for a virtue that seeks the same mean as acquired virtue yet is also ‗directed‘ 
to supernatural beatitude.‖ (Angela McKay Knobel, ―Can Aquinas‘s Infused and Acquired Virtues Coexist in the 
Christian Life?,‖ Studies in Christian Ethics 23 (2010): 391). Such a ‗redirection‘ can take place only on the 
level of action. 
278
 ―Aquinas demonstrates that perfect moral virtue is materially an acquired moral virtue and formally a virtue 
of prudence. . . . Perfect moral virtue in the human order, or relatively perfect moral virtue, is a composite virtue 
that is formally a virtue of prudence and materially a virtue of justice, temperance, fortitude, or their allied 
virtues. Furthermore, with the composite nature of relatively perfect moral virtue, a single human virtue 
consisting of ordered components that are in a matter-form relationship, Aquinas sets the precedent for the 
composition of an absolutely perfect moral virtue. That is, through the unifying presence of prudence, Aquinas 
defines the prototype of each species of human virtue . . . Similarly, through the unity of charity, he defines 
absolutely perfect moral virtue as a virtue that is formally an infused virtue and materially an acquired virtue.‖ 
(Mirkes, ―Aquinas‘s Doctrine,‖ 195-196). Similar in Mirkes, ―Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,‖ 
597. 
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We find a similar difficulty in the account of Baumann, who argues that charity ―commands 
an act of another infused moral virtue, which commands for its part a natural act of the 
corresponding acquired virtue.‖279 He further claims: ―All acts of charity are accompanied 
necessarily, and not only in an accidental way, by a commanded act of an acquired virtue 
through the corresponding infused moral virtue [emphasis in the original].‖280  
Of course, each supernatural act has to regard in a certain way the end of acquired virtue. But 
it is at least ambiguous to describe this relationship apodictically as commanding the 
corresponding natural act. Often the mean of acquired virtue will turn out as too little for 
attaining the end of infused virtue. The two ends may even exist in some opposition to each 
other. For example, in Lent infused temperance would hopefully not command simply natural 
acts of fasting according to the measure of acquired continence (namely for the sake of health). 
We would hope, in fact, for infused temperance to command much more. Ultimately, it would 
be sinful if the Catholic diet on Good Friday were determined simply by the rule of health. 
Certainly, supernatural acts contain implicitly the perfection of their corresponding natural 
acts. To be sure, they have to take into account their corresponding natural goods, as is clear 
from our analogy. But they certainly do not command simply and generally the natural act of 
acquired virtues. Hence, the claim that all acts of charity are necessarily accompanied by a 
commanded act of an acquired virtue is at least imprecise. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion: Similarities between the Different Theories 
 
This overview of the various connection theories demonstrates that the exclusive-order theory 
and the inclusive-order theory differ essentally from each other, whereas the accidental-
relation theory can offer a certain middle course between the two. This is certainly true for its 
theoretical principles, but not for its practical conclusions. In regard to practical consequences, 
the exclusive- and inclusive-order theory are closer to each other.  
Significant for the accidental-relation theory is the need to give special attention to the 
reasonable good in order to generate an acquired virtue by means of supernatural acts. On the 
contrary, the exclusive-order theory negates the possibility of a simultaneous attention being 
given to two essentially different rules in one single action. For its part, the inclusive-order 
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 Baumann, ―La surnaturalisation,‖ 237; in the original the quotation in bold. 
280
 Ibid., 264. 
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theory negates the need for giving such special attention since it is already included virtually 
in the attention given to the higher rule. In short, although there are clear differences between 
the exclusive-order and inclusive-order theories, both positions hold in common that the 
natural good in itself does not constitute an end which the agent actually aims for when 
performing supernatural acts.
281
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 This was the very point of criticism of McKay against the ―strong-connection-theories‖ (cf. McKay, ―Infused 
and Acquired Virtues,‖ 190-195). Whilst this assertion is certainly right it does not follow that the perfection of 
acquired virtue could not be inclusively and virtually present in the supernatural act. 
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SECOND PART: A Reconstruction of Infused Justice 
 
Introduction: What Is the Nature of Infused Justice? The Lack of a Definition 
 
After offering our general outline of the acquired and infused virtues and their mutual 
cooperation, we are now prepared to approach the more particular topic of our dissertation, 
namely justice as an infused virtue. 
In ST I-II 63.4, the starting point of our discussion in chapter 2, St. Thomas illustrates the 
difference between acquired and infused virtue by using the example of temperance only.
1
 He 
ends the article with the lapidary statement: ―And the same applies to the other virtues.‖2 
Hence, our question is this: how can the general description of acquired and infused virtue be 
applied in the cases of prudence, justice and fortitude?  
The issue of infused prudence is relatively simple. In ST II-II 47.13, Aquinas describes a 
perfect kind of prudence which is possessed only by graced agents. ―This prudence is true and 
perfect, which takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man‘s 
whole life. And this alone is prudence simpliciter, which cannot be in sinners.‖3 And the 
following article identifies this prudentia vera et perfecta with infused prudence.
4
 
Likewise, clear is the difference between acquired and infused fortitude. The former disposes 
man to face external danger for the good of the temporal city, while the latter enables man to 
endure sufferings in the defense of divine faith. ―Just as civic fortitude strengthens man‘s 
mind in human justice, for whose conserving he sustains the danger of death, so gratuitous 
fortitude strengthens man‘s soul in the good of divine justice.‖5  
Applying Aquinas‘s statement – ―and the same applies to the other virtues‖ – to the case of 
justice, however, proves to be very difficult. Aquinas clearly posits an infused justice as 
characteristic of the graced agent: ―There cannot be a strictly true justice, if the due ordering 
                                                 
1
 Likewise in In sent. III 33.1.2D ad 2 and De virt. in com. 10 ad 8. 
2
 ST I-II 63.4: ―Et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus.‖ 
3
 ST II-II 47.13: ―Prudentia est et vera et perfecta, quae ad bonum finem totius vitae recte consiliatur, iudicat et 
praecipit. Et haec sola dicitur prudentia simpliciter. Quae in peccatoribus esse non potest.‖ 
4
 See ST II-II 47.14. For an extensive discussion of infused prudence in Secunda secundae, see McKay, ―Infused 
and Acquired Virtues,‖ 85-124; esp. 101-110. 
5
 ST II-II 124.2 ad 1: ―Sicut autem fortitudo civilis firmat animum hominis in iustitia humana, propter cuius 
conservationem mortis pericula sustinet; ita etiam fortitudo gratuita firmat animum hominis in bono iustitiae 
dei.‖ A similar example for infused fortitude is given in In sent. III 33.1.2D ad 2: ―Aliquid superfluum secundum 
virtutem civilem est moderatum secundum virtutem infusam, sicut quod homo . . . se voluntarie morti offerat 
propter defensionem fidei.‖ For detailed discussion of fortitude as infused virtue we can point again to McKay, 
―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 125-186. 
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to the end is lacking, which stems from charity.‖ 6  This points to Aquinas‘s distinction 
between acquired and infused justice. In ST I-II 100.12, he states: ―Justice, as the other virtues, 
can be taken either as the acquired or as the infused virtue, as is clear from above [ST I-II 
63.4]. The acquired virtue is caused by operations, but the infused virtue is caused by God 
himself through his grace. And this is true justice.‖7 But these descriptions remain vague. St. 
Thomas is just saying that there is an infused justice, and in contrast to acquired justice it 
must be infused. But what is the substantial difference between the two species of justice? 
Which concrete actions implied by justice are subject to the rule of reason, and which are 
subject to the divine law? In In sent. III 40.3 and De veritate 28.3, Aquinas refers directly to 
the distinction of acquired and infused justice,
8
 but even there he asserts only their differing 
genesis, thus failing to provide a substantial description of what infused justice is like. 
Of course, there are some texts that elicit hope for further clarification on this point, for 
example Aquinas‘s discussion of Macrobius‘s division of virtue into (a) political virtues, (b) 
purifying virtues (virtutes purgativae), (c) virtues of the purified mind (virtutes purgati animi), 
and (d) exemplar virtues.
9
 Though St. Thomas does not use his own technical terms in this 
text, it is clear that the first species corresponds to what Aquinas calls acquired virtue, and the 
second and third ones correspond to his infused virtues, either of the graced agent on earth or 
of the saints in heaven. Thus, given the nature of its discussion, one might reasonably expect 
to find in this text some hints regarding Aquinas‘s understanding of infused justice. 
In fact, ST I-II 61.5 contains an explicit reference to all four cardinal virtues as purifying 
virtues (i.e. as infused virtues in the present life): 
 
                                                 
6
 ST II-II 23.7 ad 2: ―Non potest esse simpliciter vera iustitia . . . si desit ordinatio debita ad finem; quae est per 
caritatem.‖ 
7
 ST I-II 100.12: ―Iustitia autem, sicut et aliae virtutes potest accipi et acquisita et infusa, ut ex supradictis patet. 
Acquisita quidem causatur ex operibus, sed infusa causatur ab ipso deo per eius gratiam. Et haec est vera 
iustitia.‖ 
8
 The first of these texts is In sent. III 40.1.3 (which is the same content as ST I-II 100.12): ―Iustitia autem est 
duplex: quaedam acquisita; quaedam infusa. Iustitia acquisita ex operibus causatur; et per hunc modum lex 
civilis homines iustos facit, inquantum per exercitium operum, habitum iustitiae in observatoribus causat . . . Sed 
de hac iustitia nihil ad praesens. Iustitia autem infusa a solo deo effective est; unde lex per opera eam inducere 
non potest.‖ And De veritate 28.3: ―Ex naturalibus autem homo iustitiam habere potest dupliciter: uno modo ut 
naturalem vel innatam, secundum quod quidam ex ipsa natura sunt proni ad opera iustitiae; alio modo ut 
acquisitam. Iustitiae igitur acquisitae ex operibus similis est iustitia infusa, per quam iustificantur adulti: unde, 
sicut in iustitia politica acquisita requiritur actus voluntatis, quo quis amat iustitiam: ita etiam in adultis 
iustificatio non completur sine usu liberi arbitrii. Iustitia vero infusa, per quam iustificantur parvuli, similis est 
naturali aptitudini ad iustitiam, quae etiam in pueris invenitur; et ad neutram usus liberi arbitrii requiritur.‖ Cf. 
also ad 18. Interesting is also In sent. II 28.1.1 ad 4, where Aquinas makes the distinction between iustitia civilis 
and iustitia infusa: ―Aliquis potest dici iustus dupliciter: vel iustitia civili, vel iustitia infusa. Iustitia autem civili 
potest aliquis iustus effici sine aliqua gratia naturalibus superaddita; non autem iustitia infusa.‖ 
9
 We invoked already in section 2.3.2 this division. We can ignore the forth option which pertains only to God. 
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Prudence, by contemplating divine things, despises all earthly things, and directs all the 
thoughts of the soul to the divine alone; temperance neglects the needs of the body, so far as 
nature allows; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid because of the withdrawal of the 
body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the consent by the whole soul to the 
way thus proposed.
10
 
 
This description of justice is primarily negative, though we will see that there are important 
reasons for this. Justice is presented as supporting the other virtues, as far as possible, in their 
work of assisting the agent to contemplate God and despise earthly things. Similarly, the 
definition provided in De virt. card. 4, given the context of the purifying virtues, is nebulous: 
justice consists simply ―in helping the poor.‖11 Similarly vague are St. Thomas‘s definitions 
of justice as a virtue of the purified soul. By justice, he explains, man becomes ―associated to 
the divine mind by a perpetual covenant, by imitating it.‖12 And in De virt. card. 4 he writes: 
―[It belongs] to justice to have a perpetual covenant with God.‖13 
In short, these assertions do little to clarify Aquinas‘s understanding of infused justice. To the 
contrary, they arouse suspicions that infused justice is something quite different from ordinary 
justice. But what is it exactly? 
It shouldn‘t be surprising that scholars who discuss the differences between the acquired and 
infused virtues usually substantiate their doctrine with the example of temperance, and 
perhaps with prudence and fortitude. They almost never illustrate their teaching with 
examples of justice.
14
 Scholars who refer to the two kinds of justice typically apply the 
general principles of infused moral virtues to the particular case of justice without going into 
detail. The outline of infused justice developed by the Salmanticenes offers us a 
representative example of this exercise in evasion: 
 
If we want proceed to an example, it won‘t be difficult to assign in every matter – beyond the mean 
and honor of the natural order – another [mean] of the supernatural order according to the 
principles already treated. Regarding the matter of justice, the mean consists in equality in 
                                                 
10
 ST I-II 61.5: ―Prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem 
in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; 
fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero 
est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam.‖ 
11
 De virt. card. 4: ―in subveniendo miseris.‖ 
12
 ST I-II 61.5: ―cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando.‖ Discussing the question 
whether moral virtues remain in heaven, Aquinas answers: ―De iustitia vero manifestius est quem actum ibi [sc. 
in caelo] habebit, scilicet esse subditum deo, quia etiam in hac vita ad iustitiam pertinet esse subditum superiori.‖ 
(ST I-II 67.1; cf. also ad 1). 
13
 De virt. card. 4 ad 7: ―Iustitiae [est] perpetuum foedus cum deo habere.― Similar in the body of the article: 
―Iustitiae erit regenti deo subditum esse.‖ 
14
 E.g. Pieper, ―Über das christliche Menschenbild,‖ 112-114. Pieper exemplifies the doctrine by reference to 
prudence and fortitude. 
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operations to the other; hence, it can be considered either as posing equality between men, insofar 
men are citizen of the human city of this universe, gifted by natural life and reason, and obligated 
to conserve the human society and peace. And in this agreement consists the natural mean, the 
object of acquired justice. However, [the matter of justice] can be also considered as posing 
equality between men insofar they are co-citizen of the saints and cohabitants of God, gifted by a 
supernatural light, capable of the eternal beatitude; between those it is necessary to conserve peace 
and community by a higher title in order that there is a quasi deified and heavenly peace and 
community. In this way, however, the mean is supernatural and the object of infused justice.
15
 
 
Similar descriptions have been given in recent times. W. C. Mattison, who defends strongly the 
doctrine of infused moral virtue, describes the special character of infused justice as follows.  
 
As for the cardinal virtue justice, surely a virtuous non-Christian can be willing to lay down 
his life for social justice (i.e., racial or economic equality). But a Christian might do this 
differently. Anyone who has read Martin Luther King Jr.‘s work knows that he was committed 
to racial equality no only for the sake of humanity‘s natural happiness (social justice), but also 
for the sake of his and humanity‘s ultimate union with God. He pursued justice in a manner 
shaped by Christ‘s injunction to love the enemy, and turn the other cheek. Archbishop Oscar 
Romero spoke out for economic justice on behalf of the poor not simply because the 
conditions of his society impeded natural human happiness – which they did – but also 
because they violated the dignity of people created in God‘s image, and particularly the poor, 
for whom God has a special love.
16
 
 
Both of these descriptions affirm the existence of two kinds of justice. Mattison even stresses 
that infused justice achieves the just act by means of a different motivation. Nevertheless, 
these descriptions, and many others like them, leave a number of issues unanswered. Does 
infused justice provide only a different motivation for the acts of natural justice? Or does it 
imply also some new kind of just action in addition to the obligations of acquired justice? Do 
                                                 
15
 Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, vol. 6, tractatus XII (de virtutibus), disp. III, dubium I, § 1, no. 23: ―Si ad 
exempla descendere velimus, non difficile erit assignare in qualibet materia ultra medium et honestatem naturalis 
ordinis, alia ordinis supernaturalis per respectum ad principia tacta. Etenim in materia iustitiae medium est 
aequalitas in operationibus ad alterum: potest ergo considerari vel ut ponit aequalitatem inter homines, qua 
ratione homines sunt cives humanae civitatis huius universi, vita et ratione naturali praeditos, inter quos servari 
debet humana societas et pax. Et hoc pacto est medium naturale, obiectumque iustitiae acquisitae. Potest etiam 
attendi ut ponit aequalitatem inter homines, quatenus sunt cives sanctorum et domestici dei, praeditos 
supernaturali lumine, et capaces beatitudinis aeternae: inter quos altiori titulo debet pax et societas conservari ut 
sit pax et societas quasi deifica et coelestis. Hoc autem modo est medium supernaturale et obiectum iustitiae 
infusae.‖  
16
 Mattison, Introducing Moral Theology: True Happines and the Virtues 326.  
Another example is Irwin who also clearly affirms the difference between acquired and infused justice without 
giving a substantial description of it: ―Even from outside the theological perspective, we can see, in Aquinas‘ 
view, why the infused virtues are perfections of the acquired virtues. If we have the acquired virtues, we can see 
what their perfection would be, but we recognize that we lack it. We ought to be able to see that the degree of 
justice that we are capable of is the most that can be reasonably expected within human limits, but that a more 
complete justice would be preferable; and then we ought to see that the infused virtue of justice is preferable in 
the relevant ways. This is how the person who ‗hungers and thirsts after justice‘ (Matt. 5:6) differs from the 
person who is just within the limits that can ordinarily be expected in a human being.‖ (Irwin, The Development 
of Ethics, vol. 1, 647). 
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some acts become just only because the agent lives in the state of grace? And if so, of which 
kind of just action are such supplementary duties? Or is infused justice concerned with the 
same acts as acquired justice, requiring only a different and elevated motivation, sc. from 
charity? 
Further, infused virtues make the graced agent a good member of the Church. But justice is 
generally concerned with interhuman actions. Hence, does infused justice dispose the graced 
agent for the right relationship to other church-members, or does it transform his contact to 
the earthly community, namely on condition of a simultaneous membership in the Church?  
Moreover, Aquinas portrays justice as a virtue concerned with external actions. But the 
members of the Church are united first of all spiritually. Hence, does infused justice extend to 
internal acts –for example, to benevolence? And vice versa: are hatred and envy, as internal 
acts, already sins against infused justice?  
Further still, in human society the just act is determined by the human law. Analogously, what 
is just for infused justice is defined by the divine law. But the divine law includes the acts of 
all virtues. Hence, is infused justice simply identical with all other virtues?  
And above all, justice perfects the will in regard to right conduct toward one‘s neighbor. But 
the will of the graced agent is already perfected by charity, not only in regard to God but 
likewise in regard to other people. Hence, why the need for an infused justice at all?  
 
The Purpose and the Structure of the Second Part 
As seen above, the issue of infused justice is anything but clear. Thus, the purpose of this 
second part is to determine what infused justice must be in light of the general principles of 
Aquinas‘s doctrine of infused virtues. Because of the lack of an ex professo-text, we must 
reconstruct the concept on the one hand from St. Thomas‘ general descriptions of justice, and 
on the other hand from his treatment of the infused virtues. Therefore, our argumentation will 
proceed in the following three steps. 
A first chapter portrays the general structure of justice according to the understanding of 
Aquinas, while for the moment disregarding the issue of infused virtue (chapter 4). Next, we 
devote a special chapter to the relation of justice and charity, both of which are defined as 
perfections of the will (chapter 5). Since the graced agent certainly has charity, it is important 
that we clarify the more fundamental issue of justice‘s connection with charity, before treating 
the question of infused justice. Only subsequently shall we be able to reconstruct the exact 
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meaning of infused justice according to Aquinas‘s general principles of the infused virtues 
(chapter 6). 
Based on these investigations, we shall then suggest in the third part (chapter 7) that the 
whole of the treatise on justice in the Secunda-secundae treats in fact the infused virtue of 
justice.  
Nota bene: We freely admit that the stringency of your argument in chapter 4 to 7 depends on 
the validity of our claims in chapter 3. The following line of argument is necessary only 
insofar as one admits the results of the first part of this work. 
 
 
4. The General Structure of Justice According to St. Thomas 
 
Aquinas‘s theory of justice is an impressive synthesis of differing inherited doctrines. It 
combines elements of Greek philosophy, the Roman canonical tradition, and last but not least 
the Christian faith. He succeeded in forming from three quite different sources a coherent, 
unified, and rigorous thesis.
17
  
The general use of Aristotle by Aquinas is well known. In the case of justice, however, his 
dependence on the Philosopher is especially obvious. Aquinas commented at great length on 
the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, which treats justice. The imprints of that intensive 
engagement has left obvious effects on his own portrayal of justice in the Secunda secundae, 
though he is – as we will argue in chapter 7 – much more independent from Aristotle than 
scholars usually concede. Nevertheless, the influence of the Stagirite on St. Thomas cannot be 
denied.
18
 
Aquinas‘s dependence on the Roman legal tradition becomes apparent not only by his 
preferred definition of justice inherited from Ulpian, a Roman jurist of Tyrian ancestry (+228 
A.D.), but also by his frequent citations of the Digests, a compilation of various canonical 
                                                 
17
 A good overview about the various traditions which Aquinas works up is given in Stefan Lippert, Recht und 
Gerechtigkeit bei Thomas von Aquin: Eine rationale Rekonstruktion im Kontext der Summa Theologiae 
(Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 2000), 27-73 and Wunibald Brachthäuser, Gemeingut- oder 
Gesetzesgerechtigkeit: Eine geschichtlich-systematische Untersuchung zur Gerechtigkeitslehre des heiligen 
Thomas von Aquin (Köln: Albertus-Magnus-Verlag, 1941), 21-36.  
18
 For studies about justice in Aristotle, see Bien, ―Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles (V),‖ 135-164 and MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 88-123. For an account of justice in the Middle Ages before the introduction 
of Aristotle, see Lottin, Psychologie et morale, 283-299 (the chapter ―Notes sur la vertu de justice et deux 
devoirs connexes‖). 
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collections promulgated by the Byzantine emperor Justinian I in the year 533 A.D. Justinian 
had attempted to systematize over 1,000 years of Roman law and to give order to its various 
traditions of legislation. His Digests forms part of the greater Corpus juris civilis.
19
 Aquinas‘s 
theory of law is noticeably influenced by this Roman tradition. He borrowed concepts such as 
ius civile and ius gentium from this source.
20
 
But we should not underestimate the impact of the Christian tradition on Aquinas‘s general 
theory of justice. The biblical understanding of justice differs in important points from the 
philosophical concept of Aristotle. Justice in Scripture does not first of all refer to a political 
virtue of the earthly citizen, but rather to man‘s righteousness towards God, which produces 
the good citizen of the heavenly city. Not by chance did St. Paul often refer to the individual 
reception of salvation by the term ―divine justification.‖ 21  Moreover, Christian tradition 
describes God‘s providence for all creatures as a kind divine distributive justice.22 Admittedly, 
when St. Thomas discusses justice in a systematic way (especially in In sent., In ethics. and 
ST), the combination of Aristotle and the canonical tradition is much more obvious. One 
might, therefore, easily pass over the theological significance of these texts. Perhaps this is 
why St. Thomas‘s account of justice is constantly read as treating a natural moral virtue. We 
will see in chapter 7, however, that this theological aspect provides the ultimate criterion for 
understanding Aquinas‘s outline of justice. 
 
 
Some Technical Remarks about Our Argument  
The present chapter provides only a general overview of Aquinas‘s understanding of justice 
by placing it in contrast to certain modern theories. As a result, we do not propose to offer any 
novel insights into this matter. Scholars such as Lottin, Pieper, Pinckaers, Porter, etc., have 
                                                 
19
 The four parts of the Corpus juris civilis are (1) the Institutes (a general introduction to the work); (2) the 
Digest or Pandects (intended for practitioners and judges and containing the law in concrete form plus selections 
from various classical jurists such as Gaius, Paulus, Ulpian, Modestinus, and Papinian); (3) the Codex or Code (a 
collection of imperial legislation since the time of Hadrian); and (4) the Novels or Novellae (compilations of later 
imperial legislation). See thereto Herbert F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 2 ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954). 
20
 For a detailed study of the roman canonical tradition and its impact on St. Thomas‘s synthesis see Jean-Marie 
Aubert, Le droit romain dans l’oeuvre de saint Thomas (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955). 
21
 Cf. for example Rom 2.13, 3.20/24/26/28/30, 4.5, 5.1/9, 8.4/33, 1 Cor 6.11, Gal 2.16/17, 3,8, 5.4, Ti 3.7, Heb 
9.1 etc. The references are legion. 
22
 The principle ideas which Aquinas owes to the Christian doctrine for his theory of justice are well portrayed in 
Brachthäuser, Gemeingut- oder Gesetzesgerechtigkeit, 27-28; Gilby, Principality and Polity, 5-22 and (though in 
a more general way) Pinckaers, La justice évangélique, 67-105. However, it is worth noting that the topic of 
infused justice is at best mentioned in those publications. 
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outlined these differences with great clarity.
23
 Nonetheless, the arguments of this chapter will 
become fundamental to our arguments in the subsequent chapters. 
Further, in this second part of our thesis (i.e. chapters 4 to 6) we avoid, as far as possible, 
quotations from the discussion about justice in the Secunda secundae. Why this self-
constraint? According to our principal thesis, ST II-II 57-122 is about justice as an infused 
virtue. In this second part of our work, however, we don‘t want to examine the relevant texts 
in II-II, but instead try to reconstruct the concept of infused justice from the general 
understanding of infused moral virtues as well as the general understanding of justice. Only 
afterwards will we attempt to apply these results to Aquinas‘s discussion in ST II-II. Hence, 
we would undermine our question if we referred too soon to the Secunda secundae as source 
for our thesis.  
 
 
4.1 The Objective Determination of Justice: opus adaequatum alteri 
 
4.1.1 External Operations as Specific Matter of Justice: The medium rei 
 
In the Prima secundae Aquinas presents a general outline of the four cardinal virtues that 
offers his readers a first approach to the structure of justice, namely as a virtue about external 
actions that involve one‘s neighbor. 
ST I-II 60.2 describes the character of justice within the context of whether there is a special 
moral virtue, apart from the affective virtues, for ruling man‘s external operations. Aquinas 
introduces here the important distinction between operations and passions according to the 
effects of their virtues (sicut effectus) and their virtue‘s proper matter (sicut materia circa 
quam). According to the first mode, all moral virtue can (and has to) entail external operations 
as well as passions. By definition, virtue is for producing good works. Consequently, each 
moral virtue should result in good operations as its effect or end.
24
 For example, the control of 
anxious or angry passions, per se an internal process due to fortitude, produces outwardly 
some corresponding action ut effectus, e.g. the anxious soldier continues to stand firm at his 
post. Vice versa, it belongs to virtue that its activity is pleasant to the agent himself, and thus 
                                                 
23
 We shall defer many times to these scholars.  
24
 Cf. ST I-II 55.2. 
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an act of the virtue should be followed by some enjoyable passion.
25
 Accordingly, the 
virtuous employer feels some internal pleasure in recompensing his employees by paying the 
just reward, although per se the payment is just an external act. 
However, if we consider the proper object of a specific virtue – its materia circa quam – then 
some virtues treat internal passions and others external operations. This distinction becomes 
necessary because not all human operations are judged from the same point of reference. In 
some cases, the goodness of an action depends on the agent‘s proper attitude and affection in 
respect to his action, whereas in other cases the moral qualification is evaluated by more 
objective measures. For example, consuming two liters of beer might be temperate for one 
person, yet immoderate for another. The patient toleration of heavy labor might be for one 
person an extraordinary act of self conquest, but for another just a trivial thing. To endure 
courageously some dangers might be an everyday affair for the trained soldier, but a heroic 
act for the common man. In these cases, the point of reference for the evaluation of the 
performed operation is the proper condition of the agent himself. The moral qualification is 
made ―regarding the commensuration to the agent.‖26 The action is judged as good if the 
agent conducts himself rightly when confronted with external objects, such as with beer, labor, 
or danger. Consequently, the good action in these cases consists in the right ordering of the 
internal passions. That is to say, the good action requires virtues of temperance and fortitude 
to shape the sensitive appetite.
27
  
Other operations, however, are considered in abstraction from the subjective condition of the 
agent. They are measured instead with respect to another person – ad alterum. For example, 
the external action of paying an employee the stipulated wages for his completed work is a 
good act. Its moral qualification does not hinge on a special disposition of the agent. Rather, 
the moral quality of the act can be evaluated according to objective aspects, namely in view of 
the other person or group of persons receiving the action.
28
 Hence, the moral quality of 
external operations directed towards other people is determined only in relationship to the 
                                                 
25
 Cf. ST I-II 59.4 ad 1; 59.5; De virt. in com. 1. 
26
 ST I-II 60.2: ―secundum commensurationem ad operantem.‖ 
27
 ST I-II 60.2 ―In quibusdam vero operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum 
commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et malum considerari, secundum quod homo 
bene vel male afficitur circa huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint principaliter circa 
interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis huiusmodi.‖ 
28
 The fittingness or unfittingness of paying wages does not depend on the instantaneous temperament of the 
employer, but on the objective service of the employee. Conversely, whether the fear which the employer might 
feel by paying an adequate wage is good or evil depends primarily on subjective conditions, i.e. on his 
psychological character – though even here external facts might be relevant. For example it makes a difference 
whether he is greedily afraid of losing a high private yield by paying the just wage, or whether he fears 
reasonably the bankruptcy of the company – by a sense of responsibility for his employees.  
Chapter 4. The General Structure of Justice According to St. Thomas 
 238 
other, depending whether such an act is due or undue to the other.
29
 And therefore, the 
perfection of this sort of external activity demands a specific virtue, which we call justice. 
 
In some operations good and evil are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter 
how man may be affected towards them, namely in so far as good and evil in them depend on 
their commensuration with the other. For those operations there should be a virtue which directs 
the operations in themselves, as buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is the 
notion of due or undue to the other. And therefore justice and its parts are properly about 
operations as their proper matter.
30
 
 
Though justice is distinct from fortitude and temperance, however, both types of virtue can 
influence one and the same concrete action. Take the case of someone who, while in a fit of 
rage, damages the property of his neighbor. Let‘s say that his favorite soccer team lost an 
important match. The act is against justice because of its inappropriateness regarding the other, 
i.e. it is undue ―secundum commensurationis ad alterum.‖ Our enraged fan, however, also 
acts against the virtue of mansuetude, which is a subspecies of temperance.
31
) In other words, 
the act of destroying his neighbor‘s property is incommensurate with the agent himself, 
―secundum commensurationem ad operantem.‖32 We can imagine another agent who commits 
the same unjust act but without being affected by anger, or even someone who destroys the 
property while overcome by a just and reasonable anger. In either case, the action would still 
be unjust albeit not intemperate.
33
 
                                                 
29
 Thus, it should be clear that not the externality makes the just act. The raising the own hand is not matter of 
justice. Justice enters the field of action if another person is involved – at least indirectly. In that way, for 
example, environmental pollution would be unjust even if committed privately. ―The primary object of justice is 
precisely other persons; all other objects enter into the field of justice insofar as they are owned or used by 
persons. Thus we could describe justice as the virtue by which the relations among persons are rectified.‖ (David 
M. Gallagher, ―Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas,‖ Acta Philosophica 4 (1995): 65). 
30
 ST I-II 60.2: ―Bonum et malum in quibusdam operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque 
homo afficiatur ad eas, inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum accipitur secundum rationem 
commensurationis ad alterum. Et in talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum secundum seipsas, 
sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad 
alterum. Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa operationes sicut circa propriam materiam.‖ 
31
 Cf. ST II-II 143. 
32
 ST I-II 60.2: ―Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis 
propter inordinatam animi passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris operationis, est 
corruptio iustitiae, inquantum autem corrumpitur commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius 
alterius virtutis. Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia, 
in immoderantia vero irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.‖ 
 
33
 Hence, intersections are possible. For example the case of adultery: regarding the relationship towards the 
partner, adultery is against justice, since it injures the marital rights of the other; insofar it is caused by 
immoderate passions, it is against temperance. But since uncontrolled passions are the usual cause of committing 
adultery the whole actions is formally against temperance, but materially against justice. ―Homicida intendit 
directe nocumentum proximi, fornicator autem qui provocat mulierem, non intendit nocumentum, sed 
delectationem.‖ (ST I-II 73.8 ad 3).  
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This examples illustrates the special character of justice. The act of damaging another‘s 
property can be objectively described as violation of the harmonious relation one should have 
with the other, independent of the internal condition of the agent. This objective 
determinability of justice is a unique feature that distinguishes it from the other virtues.
34
 
Therefore, the operations of all agents can be evaluated according to the object of justice, 
whereas it remains impossible to determine the object of temperance and fortitude in the same 
universal way.
35
 
 
Justice and the medium rei 
The distinct quality of justice also becomes apparent in Aquinas‘s description of the virtuous 
act as a realization of the mean. It belongs to the common property of western ethics to 
determine the virtuous act as a mean between two extremes, between excess and defect.
36
 
This doctrine is not an apologia for moral mediocrity. On the contrary, it implies the ultimum 
posse of the appetitive faculties insofar as their proper acts are realized according to the 
regula rationis.
37
 Reason determines the good to be done, and the appetitive powers attain 
their highest perfection by not deviating from this measure, i.e. their own act is the right mean 
insofar as they could fail to realize the command of reason either by excess or defect. Thus, 
the mean of virtues implies a medium rationis, the good as determined by practical reason, 
realized by the commanded powers.
38
 In this way temperance lies between insensibility and 
intemperance, fortitude between daring and timidity, and generosity between avarice and 
prodigality, etc.  
                                                 
34
 ST II-II 59.2 ad 3 describes the object of justice aptly as ―aliquid exterius constitutum.‖ About the objective 
determinability of the just action see Utz, ―Kommentar,‖ 578-579.  
35
 Cf. ST II-II 59.2 ad 3: ―Obiectum temperantiae non est aliquid exterius constitutum, sicut obiectum iustitiae, 
sed obiectum temperantiae, idest temperatum, accipitur solum in comparatione ad ipsum hominem. Et ideo quod 
est per accidens et praeter intentionem non potest dici temperatum nec materialiter nec formaliter, et similiter 
neque intemperatum. Et quantum ad hoc est dissimile in iustitia et in aliis virtutibus moralibus.‖  
36
 See the detailed study of Rupert Klingseis, ―Das aristotelische Tugendprinzip der richtigen Mitte in der 
Scholastik,‖ Divus Thomas 7 (1920): 33-49; 142-172; 269-288; and in vol. 8 (1921): 1-14; 83-112. A short 
treatment is found in A. D. Sertillanges, La philosophie morale de Saint Thomas D’Aquin (Paris: Librairie Félix 
Alcan, 1922), 201-207; for an account of the Aristotelian sources, see W.F.R. Hardie, ―Aristotle‘s Doctrine that 
Virtue is a ‗Mean‘,‖ in Articles on Aristotle: Ethics and Politics, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcom Schofield, 
and Richard Sorabji (London: Gerald Duckworth & Company, 1977), 33-46. 
37
 See W.D. Hughes, ―Appendix 4: The Mean of Virtue,‖ in Summa Theologiae: Virtue (Ia2ae. 55-67), vol. 23 
(London: Blackfriars, 1969), 249-250. 
38
 See ST I-II 64.1: ―Moralis autem virtus proprie est perfectiva appetitivae partis animae circa aliquam 
determinatam materiam. Mensura autem et regula appetitivi motus circa appetibilia, est ipsa ratio. Bonum autem 
cuiuslibet mensurati et regulati consistit in hoc quod conformetur suae regulae, sicut bonum in artificiatis est ut 
consequantur regulam artis. Malum autem per consequens in huiusmodi est per hoc quod aliquid discordat a sua 
regula vel mensura. Quod quidem contingit vel per hoc quod superexcedit mensuram, vel per hoc quod deficit ab 
ea, sicut manifeste apparet in omnibus regulatis et mensuratis. Et ideo patet quod bonum virtutis moralis consistit 
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This principle is true for all moral virtues, though the determination of the just act poses a 
special case. Of course, even the external act of justice is measured first of all by reason. It 
consists in the realization of a certain mean, between for example paying too little or too 
much. Because the adequacy of an external act depends on objective standards, however, the 
medium rationis of justice (the judgment of practical reason) is not to be determined in respect 
to the appetite of the agent himself but according to a mean existing between external things 
or works measured in relation to the other. Aquinas explains: ―Justice is about operations, 
which are concerned with external things, where the right has to be established simply and in 
itself, as stated above; and therefore the rational mean [medium rationis] in justice is the same 
as the real mean [medium rei], in so far as justice gives to each one his due, neither more nor 
less.‖39 Thus, the result is the same as above: the special character of the mean of justice is its 
objective determinability. Accordingly, the mean of temperance or fortitude differs from 
person to person, and from situation to situation. What constitutes the mean for one individual 
might constitute an excess for another.
40
 The medium rei, however, does not depend on 
subjective conditions but is valid for everybody. 
After this initial outline of the special character of justice, we are prepared to examine 
Aquinas‘s description of ―right‖ as the object of justice. 
 
 
4.1.2 “Right” as opus adaequatum alteri 
 
Aquinas does not begin his long treatise on justice in the ST II-II immediately with an 
exposition of justice as a virtue in itself, but rather with a question de iure,
41
 about the 
―right.‖42 This indirect approach marks a clear exception in the discussion of the cardinal 
                                                                                                                                                        
in adaequatione ad mensuram rationis. Manifestum est autem quod inter excessum et defectum medium est 
aequalitas sive conformitas. Unde manifeste apparet quod virtus moralis in medio consistit.‖ 
39
 ST I-II 64.2: ―Iustitia est circa operationes, quae consistunt in rebus exterioribus, in quibus rectum institui 
debet simpliciter et secundum se, ut supra dictum est, et ideo medium rationis in iustitia est idem cum medio rei, 
inquantum scilicet iustitia dat unicuique quod debet, et non plus nec minus.‖ 
40
 We should add an important note: The affective virtues ignore an objective mean in regard of their proper 
object, namely internal passions. The resulting external acts, however, can be measured objectively as medium 
rei. In this way it is right to speak of the endurance of dangers as courageous deeds. However, the external 
perspective does not allow a decision whether the act was the realization of the proper mean of fortitude as 
affective virtue. 
41
 ST II-II 57. The discussion of justice as virtue starts with qu. 58.  
42
 A remark concerning the translation: We translate the Latin term ―ius‖ (sometimes also ―iustum‖) as ―right.‖ 
We are distinctly aware that the English term does not correspond exactly to the Latin ―ius‖. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of a better alternative we think ―right‖ is the best option. In the following sections the difference 
between the original meaning of ―ius‖ and the contemporary meaning of ―right‖ will become clear.  
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virtues in the Secunda secundae.
43
 However, our foregoing description of the special 
character of justice explains this extraordinary structure. Unlike the case of affective virtues, 
the act of justice can be determined by disregarding subjective conditions of the agent and by 
referring only to the other (ad alterum). Therefore, the just act – i.e. the ―product‖ of justice – 
can be described even independently from the virtue itself. And thus the discussion of justice 
begins with a question about the ―right,‖ since once the object is determined the proper 
meaning of justice arises by itself.
44
 
St. Thomas defines the ―right‖ simply as the object of justice. ―The right [ius] is the object of 
justice.‖45 At first glance, it is a surprising assertion. For Aquinas the ―right‖ in its most 
fundamental and proper sense is not something prior to the just act, something to which the 
just act must correspond or answer. Rather, he identifies the ius (sometimes also iustum) with 
the act of justice itself. ―The right [ius] or the just [iustum] is a certain work which is adequate 
[adaequatum] to another person according to some mode of equality.‖46  
According to a common understanding of today, rights are material or immaterial goods for 
which one has to claim or can claim.
47
 For Aquinas, however, referring to my car as ―my 
right‖ or another‘s car as ―your right‖ is only an analogous way of speaking. The house itself 
is not my ius or the object of justice. Neither is another‘s car ―his right.‖ Rather, ―my right‖ 
consists in the act of the car‘s acquisition from a lawful proprietor, and ―his right‖ consists in 
the acknowledgment that my car belongs to me. In both cases, ―right‖ means a certain action, 
either the act of buying or the act of respecting the present property situation. The same can 
be shown for immaterial goods, such as life, a good reputation, honor, etc. It is especially in 
this context that contemporary usage speaks of ―having rights‖ as justified claims to 
something. For Aquinas, however, it is not life itself, reputation itself, or honor itself that are 
                                                                                                                                                        
―Ius‖ may also be translated as ―law,‖ but since ―law‖ normally is used as equivalent of ―lex,‖ it seems more 
appropriate to translate ―ius‖ as ―right.‖ 
43
 The treatises of prudence, fortitude, and temperance begin immediately with the description of the particular 
virtue itself (ST I-II 47, 123 and 141). Likewise the theological virtues of hope (ST II-II 17) and charity (ST II-II 
23) are treated immediately.  
44
 It is one of St. Thomas‘s fundamental principles that every power is determined by its specific act and the acts 
by its proper object. Sight is determined by the sensible, hearing by the audible. Likewise in the case of virtue: 
prudence is defined by the right judgment and command of human acts, temperance by the act of the passiones 
concupiscibiles according to the right mean. (Cf. Markus Christoph, ―Das thomistische Axiom ‗actus 
specificantur ab objecto‘,‖ Doctor Angelicus 4 (2004): 173-191). However, although every virtue can be 
understood only from its proper act, nevertheless the act can be measured only in reference to the agent. Herein 
lies the particular character of the act of justice. 
45
 ST II-II 57.1 sed contra: ―Ius est obiectum iustitiae.‖ For a detailed description of the ius as object of justice, 
see Brachthäuser, Gemeingut- oder Gesetzesgerechtigkeit, 40-45. 
46
 ST II-II 57.2: ―Ius, sive iustum, est aliquod opus adaequatum alteri secundum aliquem aequalitatis modum.‖ 
47
 Even though Aquinas affords an occasion to this misunderstanding by the identification of iustum and ius (e.g. 
in ST II-II 57.2), it is clear from other texts that the thing should not be understood as right. Cf. ST II-II 58.9 ad 2: 
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rights, but instead ―rights‖ refers to the actions by which these immaterial goods are 
acknowledged, granted, and preserved with respect to other people.
48
 The ―right‖ is a work 
which is qualified by a certain character, namely its appropriateness towards the other. It 
becomes ―right‖ (in the proper sense of ―right‖) with respect to the other. ―In our work 
something is said to be just, what responds to the other by a kind of equality.‖49 Therefore, 
Utz describes the ius as ―order of peace between many separate persons.‖50 It is the act by 
which two different parts attain concordance. The material objects of those acts are called 
―rights‖ only in a derivative sense, insofar as a thing is the matter of a just opus, for example 
to pay a seller $20 for a book. However, even here the iustum in the proper sense is the work 
of paying the demanded price.
51
 
Nevertheless, it might be confusing that Aquinas sometimes determines ius as the ―just thing‖ 
(res iusta).
52
 Here, we must call attention to the scholastic terminology which counts res 
among the transcendental concepts, coextensive and convertible with ens.
53
 Hence, even in 
those texts the res iusta means the opus adaequatum alteri.
54
 Whether Aquinas uses ius or 
iustum, in both cases he intends a work by which two agents attain equality.  
In this way the definition of the ―right‖ in ST II-II 57 corresponds perfectly to the basic 
features of ST I-II 60.2. There Aquinas specified the just act as commensuratus ad alterum, 
whereas in the Secunda secundae he uses the equivalent term of adaequatum alteri. In both 
instances, he emphasizes the objective determinability of ius. ―The right in a work of justice, 
                                                                                                                                                        
―Operationes exteriores mediae sunt quodammodo inter res exteriores, quae sunt materia, et inter passiones 
interiores, quae sunt earum principia.‖  
48
 Kluxen shows that the material thing can become the content of a right only in its relationship to 
reason: ‖Diese ‗res‘, die den Inhalt des Rechts ausmacht, ist nun sicher kein Naturding, das schon vorliegt, und 
die hier gemeinte ‗Sache‘ hat gar nichts mit Ontologie zu tun. So ist etwa bei einem Grundstückskauf nicht das 
Stück Erde als solches, sondern seine Bewertung im wirtschaftliche Austauschverhältnis und zuvor noch die 
Frage des Eigentums die Sache, um die es geht. Das sind Merkmale, die der physischen Natur nicht als solcher, 
sondern erst in einem ‗ordo rationis‘ zukommen, der intersubjektiv besteht.‖ (Wolfgang Kluxen, Moral - 
Vernunft - Natur: Beiträge zur Ethik (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1997), 75). 
49
 ST II-II 57.1: ―Illud enim in opere nostro dicitur esse iustum quod respondet secundum aliquam aequalitatem 
alteri.‖ In ST II-II 61.3 Aquinas introduces further subdivisions of the iustum as opus adaequatum alteri, namely 
operations with regard (a) to persons directly, (b) to their possessed things and (c) to their actions. 
50
 Utz, ―Anmerkungen,‖ 453: ―Friedensordnung zwischen vielen getrennten Personen.― 
51
 Only in this sense Aquinas concedes to call things themselves the matter of justice. ―Materia iustitiae est 
exterior operatio secundum quod ipsa, vel res cuius est usus, debitam proportionem habet ad aliam personam.‖ 
(ST II-II 58.10). 
52
 For example ST II-II 57.1 ad 1: ―Hoc nomen ius primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam rem iustam.‖ 
53
 Cf. De veritate 1.1. See also Josef Pieper, ―Wahrheit der Dinge. Eine Untersuchung zur Anthropologie des 
Hochmittelalters,‖ in Werke in acht Bänden. Schriften zur Philosophischen Anthropologie und Ethik: 
Grundstrukturen menschlicher Existenz, vol. 5, ed. Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1997), 119-
120. 
54
 See also ST II-II 58.8, 10 and 11. 
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besides its relation to the agent, is constituted in comparison to the other.‖55 Aquinas even 
refers to an etymological derivation of the ―just act‖. It is an operation which is adjusted 
[iustari] to the other.
56
 
 
 
4.1.3 The Double Face of Justice: Restitution and Non-Damnification
57
  
 
The just operation establishes equality regarding the other. On the basis of this observation, J. 
Pieper, among others, has emphasized that justice is principally something second.
58
 Justice 
reacts to something prior to it; it is the ―answer‖ to a previous inequality between two agents 
that should be recompensed by the just act. To illustrate his point, Pieper offers the following 
example. A man performs a certain work for another, e.g. he mows the lawn in his garden 
(supposing that he is not obliged to this service by other reasons). Through his work he 
acquires something that is due to him, a reward. Hence, the mowing in itself is not yet an act 
of justice, but it establishes the foundation of a potential act of justice. By paying the reward 
to the worker, the proprietor responds to the lawful claim of the other; he performs an act of 
justice.
59
 Justice in this sense is essentially retributive; it re-tributes something prior received. 
Consequently, the measure for its equality depends on the previous service. Thus Aquinas 
                                                 
55
 ST II-II 57.1: ―Rectum vero quod est in opere iustitiae, etiam praeter comparationem ad agentem, constituitur 
per comparationem ad alium.‖ A parallel assertions is made in ST I-II 60.2 and 3. 
56
 Cf. ST II-II 57.1. See also In ethic. V 10.1: ―Actus autem iustitiae est facere aequale.‖ 
57
 By the technical expression ―non-damnification‖ we refer to the avoidance of inflicting injury or loss on 
another. 
58
 See Josef Pieper, ―Über die Gerechtigkeit,‖ in Werke in acht Bänden: Schriften zur Philosophischen 
Anthropologie und Ethik: Das Menschenbild der Tugendlehre, vol. 4, ed. Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 1996), 48; and Josef Pieper, ―Das Recht des Anderen,‖ in Werke in acht Bänden. Miszellen, vol. 
8/1, ed. Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2005), 268. Certainly there is some truth in this 
assertion; but as we will see later on it does not cover the whole content of justice. For a similar account see 
Steven A. Edwards, Interior Acts: Teleology, Justice, and Friendship in the Religious Ethics of Thomas Aquinas 
(London: University Press of America, 1986), 46: ―Justice is backward-looking, invoking past actions to decide 
future deserts.‖ 
59
 From this viewpoint it becomes clear why Aquinas gives a negative answer to the question whether the 
creation of the universe was an act of divine justice: ―Cum iustitiae actus sit reddere unicuique quod suum est, 
actum iustitiae praecedit actus quo aliquid alicuius suum efficitur.‖ (ScG II 28). Justice as opus adaequatum 
alteri is only possible on the basis of a prior fact which has caused a certain inequality between both agents; this 
imbalance is the very reason for defining the act of recompense as iustum. However, the act which creates this 
imbalance is not an act of justice, but precedes it; it constitutes the basis for subsequent just acts. ―Ille igitur 
actus quo primo aliquid suum alicuius efficitur, non potest esse actus iustitiae.‖ (ScG II 28; cf. also De veritate 
23.6 ad 2). 
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determines act of justice as an act of retribution. ―The act of justice consists in giving back 
what is owed.‖60  
However, this description leaves several questions unanswered: Do all just acts bear the 
character of restitution of a prior received gift? Is justice always a re-action? It does not seem 
so. Respecting the life of an innocent is certainly a just act. Vice versa, killing an innocent 
person is an unjust act, even without having received a prior benefit from the other. It would 
be principally an inadequate operation and therefore unjust. But to what does the concept of 
―convenience‖ or ―inconvenience‖ refer to in these cases? 
 
Justice in Its Proper Sense 
First, we should note that Pieper‘s example of the gratuitous mowing of the lawn as the basis 
of a just restitution can be misleading. If the work was conducted freely, as a ―gratis gift,‖ 
then the second act wouldn‘t be an act of justice strictly speaking. Justice does not require 
compensation in cases of gifts between friends. The same can be said for mutual assistance 
within a family whose members are naturally related.
61
 Justice in its proper sense disregards 
such relations of dependence between two agents. Justice considers instead the other strictly 
as other; it forgets – at least at the time of the just act – all special relations between the 
parties involved.
62
 
The principal idea we are trying to illustrate is the following. Let us imagine two agents who 
are not related by special obligations, like those of friendship or kinship. The two agents are 
linked only by their living together in the same human society; both are free from any mutual 
commitment regarding the other. Such two persons are the model case for just actions in the 
proper sense. Under such conditions, the specific character of just acts becomes apparent, 
namely to re-attain or to preserve the mutual independence of two fellow-citizens in their 
daily interactions. As the two agents were debtless to each other before a potential interaction, 
so they should be again afterwards. Hence, the proper function of justice is not to recompense 
benefits. Justice is not about gifts at all, for it does not receive gifts. Rather, justice is about 
paying. The just man takes nothing without paying and he gives nothing without demanding 
                                                 
60
 Quodl. V 9.1: ―Iustitiae actus est unicuique reddere quod sibi debetur.‖ Likewise in ST II-II 57.4 ad 1: ―Ad 
iustitiam pertinet reddere ius suum unicuique.‖ Cf. ST I-II 109.3 ad 3; II-II 67.4. See especially ST II-II 62, de 
restitutione.  
61
 As we will see later on, Aquinas interprets those relations as potential parts of justice.  
62
 ―Justice is found precisely among those who take one another as other; to the extent that this otherness is 
overcome, to that extent the full ratio iustitiae, the essential structure of justice, is missing.‖ (David M. 
Gallagher, ―Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas,‖ Mediaeval Studies 58 (1996): 25). 
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the corresponding prize. According, to justice properly speaking, a man is inclined to become 
or to remain nobody‘s debtor, to avoid every relationship of lasting obligation, where 
something remains due to another. Of course, this does not mean that a just person does not 
know also other forms of interpersonal relationships. Such relations, however, like those to 
one‘s benefactors, parents, friends or – to use an example of Aquinas – between lord and 
servant, are not the basis for just actions in its proper sense. 
 
Justice . . . can be taken in the proper sense and generally speaking. In the most proper sense, 
as the philosopher says in Ethics V, special justice is only between those who have a certain 
equality insofar they stand in the presence of the regent, in whose presence the one may 
demand from the other what is his own, [and] according to this mode there is no justice 
between lord and servant, nor between father and son, since things of the servant belong to the 
Lord, and things of the sons belong to the father. Generally speaking, however, special justice 
is also attended when the lord gives to the servant what is due to him, and vice versa, and 
likewise in other things.
63
 
 
This example demonstrates the consequence of the foregoing described objectivity of justice. 
Only two citizens ―in the presence of the regent‖ must not take into account prior ―subjective‖ 
obligations towards each other. It is only the thing itself that determines the good or evil of 
the act.
64
 Aquinas usually refers to the examples of buying and selling as acts of proper justice, 
since these transactions take place under the sign of preserving mutual ―debtlessness‖ and 
therefore both parties simply exchange the same value. Buying does not mean to receive first 
a gift, which one has afterwards to reward as a sign of goodwill. Admittedly, in concreto there 
might be a temporal between buying and paying. But the fundamental principle excludes from 
the very beginning the idea of gratuitous benefits. Proper justice takes nothing without equal 
payment.
65
 
Granted, this is a quite rigorous image of justice. Aquinas himself notes that a life ruled only 
by justice would be cruel.
66
 Human life needs more then mere justice. It needs acts of gratuity 
                                                 
63
 In sent. II 44.2.1: ―Iustitia . . . sumitur enim proprie et communiter. Propriissime sumpta specialis iustitia, ut 
dicit philosophus in 5 ethic., est tantum inter eos qui habent aequalitatem quamdam ad hoc quod stent coram 
principe, coram quo unus ab altero possit repetere quod suum est, secundum quem modum nec domini ad 
servum nec patris ad filium iustitia dicitur esse: quia ea quae sunt servi, sunt domini: et ea quae sunt filii, sunt 
patris. Communiter autem iustitia specialis attenditur etiam in hoc quod dominus reddit servo quod suum est, vel 
e converso, et sic de aliis.‖ 
64
 This also makes clear why justice is the most characteristic virtue of the citizen, i.e. as an agent who is not a 
priori indebted to the other. It is the political virtue par excellence. 
65
 Regarding this Kiesling notes rightly: ―Justice is anticipatory and not merely reparatory: it gives others their 
rights and does not merely restore them after they have been lost or usurped or abused.‖ (Christopher Kiesling, 
―Social Justice in Christian Life According to Thomas Aquinas,‖ Spirituality Today 31 (1979): 240). 
66
 Super Mt. V 2: ―Iustitia sine misericordia crudelitas est.‖ L. Ryan explains: ―Justice, from its very nature, has 
as its task to equalize a debt. But the mere equalization of a debt owed to another is not sufficient to restore 
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and friendship (we will discuss the connection between justice and friendship in chapter 5). 
Nevertheless, justice in its proper meaning refers to the pursuit of equality between equals.  
That‘s why it is necessary to distinguish clearly between justice in its strict sense, as just 
described, and justice as a more general virtue that rules external acts of every kind, including 
those interactions between two dependent agents that are not only determined by the thing 
exchanged but also by the different states of the persons. 
Against this background we can resolve the foregoing objection. Why do we qualify murder 
as an unjust action even if the criminal hasn‘t received a previous service from the victim?  
The description of justice as attaining equality has a double face, so to speak. On the one hand, 
it works by positive acts of preserving equality and avoiding the state of debt. In this regard 
justice‘s proper act is indeed restitution.67 On the other hand, justice also prevents the creation 
of new unequal relations by abstaining from certain acts. The just agent renounces acts by 
which he would injure the equilibrium he has towards the other. Both aspects, the positive as 
well as the negative, belong to one and the same virtue since, as St. Thomas explains, ―it 
belongs to the same virtue to pursue one extreme and flee the other.‖68 Thus, in the case of 
justice: ―The parts of justice are to do good and to dismiss evil.‖69 The negative part is the 
more universal one, since it is required in regard to every member of the community; it 
extends ―in regard to all, so that nobody suffers harm‖70 It provides the preservation of an 
existing equality, insofar as it prohibits injuring the present equilibrium. In contrast, justice in 
the positive sense is owed only to particular fellow-citizens, namely those persons who 
interact with us in concrete situations, as for example in business affairs which demand some 
positive recompense Do ut des; I give to you in order that you give to me.
71
 
                                                                                                                                                        
social order in the present state of things. Therefore justice alone is inadequate to perfect the reform needed in 
society. Simple justice requires that men do no injury to one another, that they pay their debts. But it is not 
enough for social order that men do not injure one another; they must help one another. Over and above paying a 
debt, they must as social animals bestow the gift of mutual aid.‖ Louis A. Ryan, ―Charity and the Social Order: 
Part 1,‖ The Thomist 3 (1941): 542. Already Aristotle has argued that only by friendship community become 
livable; cf. Jean-Marie Vernier, ―Sociabilité humaine, justice et droit chez Aristote et saint Thomas d‘Aquin,‖ 
Divus Thomas Piacenza 93 (1990): 66-72. See also Josef Pieper, ―Gerechtigkeit - heute,‖ in Werke in acht 
Bänden. Miszellen, vol. 8/1, ed. Berthold Wald (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2005), 263-265. 
67
 See ST II-II 62. 
68
 ST I-II 113.5 ad 1: ―Ad eandem virtutem pertinet prosequi unum oppositorum, et refugere aliud.‖ 
69
 De duo. praec. 4: ―Iustitiae vero partes sunt facere bonum, et dimittere malum.‖ See also ST II-II 79.1. ―Justice 
is not a purely negative virtue, not merely a matter of refraining from evil toward one's neighbor or from 
violating the neighbor's rights. It requires, on the one hand, a rejection of such evil and, on the other hand, the 
faithful fulfillment of those obligations to which we are bound by various kinds of laws.‖ (Aumann, Spiritual 
Theology, 281). 
70
 ST I-II 100.5: ―quantum ad omnes, ut nulli nocumentum inferatur.‖ 
71
 In describing the act of justice St. Thomas for the most part only invokes the positive act of justice: restitution 
for a received service. This does not mean that he forgets the negative task of justice. But, as he notes in ST II-II 
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In sum, justice constitutes the just equilibrium regarding particular persons by positive actions 
(i.e. exchanges). Justice as prohibiting maleficent actions preserves the already existing 
balance.
72
 Strictly speaking, the negative function of justice is its more fundamental function 
and is presupposed in its positive acts. ―Natural reason immediately dictates to man that he 
should not do harm to anyone, and therefore the precepts which forbid the doing of harm 
extend to all men.‖73 Nevertheless, the positive part, i.e. the re-constitution of equality, is the 
more proper act of justice, since it implies an opus adaequatum and not the prohibition of an 
opus inadaequatum.
74
 Consequently, Aquinas refers in most places only to this positive part 
when describing justice, and he explains why thusly: ―It is adjusting [adaequatio] if one gives 
back to the other what and when it is owed to him.‖75  
The issue appears very clearly in St. Thomas‘s discussions of the second table of the 
Decalogue.
76
 The fourth commandment is interpreted as ―an affirmative precept which is 
about honoring the parents, which also includes that we render to all what is due to them.‖77  
Thus, this one precept contains all positive acts by which the agent works to restablish 
equality where it is absent. The commandments five to ten, however, are ―negative precepts 
by which somebody is hindered to commit evil toward his neighbor.‖78 They contain the 
negative side of justice as a virtue that avoids injuring the other. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
22.1 ad 3, the affirmative obligation to certain acts include implicitly the prohibition of the negative ones. 
Likewise see ST II-II 62.8 ad 1. 
72
 Cf. ST II-II 79.1 where Aquinas describes this double function as the subjective parts of justice: ―Ad iustitiam 
enim pertinet aequalitatem constituere in his quae sunt ad alterum . . . Eiusdem autem est aliquid constituere, et 
constitutum conservare. Constituit autem aliquis aequalitatem iustitiae faciendo bonum, idest reddendo alteri 
quod ei debetur. Conservat autem aequalitatem iustitiae iam constitutae declinando a malo, idest nullum 
nocumentum proximo inferendo.‖ 
73
 ST I-II 100.5 ad 4: ―Statim ratio naturalis homini dictat quod nulli iniuriam faciat, et ideo praecepta 
prohibentia nocumentum, extendunt se ad omnes.‖ However, it would be incorrect to reduce justice to the mere 
negative function of prevention of harm; see thereto Allen Buchanan, ―Justice and Charity,‖ Ethics 97 (1987): 
559-562. 
74
 Cf. ST II-II 79.1 ad 3: ―Facere bonum est actus completivus iustitiae, et quasi pars principalis eius. Declinare 
autem a malo est actus imperfectior, et secundaria pars eius.‖ But nonetheless, Aquinas stresses that even this 
secondary part is essential for the completeness of justice. ―Et ideo est quasi pars materialis, sine qua non potest 
esse pars formalis completive.‖ 
75
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Adaequatio est quando ei redditur quod et quantum ei debitur.‖ 
76
 See for example In sent. III 37.2B, Super Rom. XIII 2, ST I-II 100.5. 
77
 Super Rom. XIII 2: ―Praeceptum affirmativum . . . quod est de honore parentum, in quo etiam intelligitur, ut 
omnibus reddamus quae debemus.‖ 
78
 Super Rom. XIII 2: ―Praecepta negativa, per quae aliquis prohibetur malum proximis inferre.‖ 
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4.2 The Double Measure of the opus adaequatum alteri 
 
Hitherto we considered the principle structure of justice as that virtue which rules man‘s 
external operations characterized as adaequatum alteri, both in the positive sense as rendering 
something adequate and in the negative sense as avoiding inadequate (i.e. maleficent) actions. 
However, we have not yet determined by which standards those actions are measured in 
regard to equality. In the present section we will investigate what grounds the adequacy of 
certain operations. By referring to Aristotle, Aquinas introduces in ST II-II 57.2 the distinction 
of two different kinds of just actions: the ius naturale and the ius positivum.
79
  
 
Now a thing can be adequate to a man in two ways: first by the very nature of the thing [ex 
ipsa natura rei], as when a man gives so much that he may receive the equal value, and this is 
called natural right. In another way a thing is adequate or commensurated to the other by 
agreement or by common consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself satisfied, if he receive 
so much. . . . And this is called positive right.
80
 
 
Based on that distinction we shall investigate the natural right and the positive right in the 
next two sections.  
 
 
                                                 
79
 Aquinas derives the present difference by interpreting two texts of the Nicomachean Ethics. The first key-text 
is NE V 10 1134b18; Aquinas refers to it several times (e.g. ST I-II 99.5; II-II 57.1 and 2). Aristotle distinguishes 
two subspecies of political justice (political justice is understood as a virtue regulating the life of men who live 
together): ―Of political justice part is natural, part legal – natural, that which everywhere has the same force and 
does not exist by people‘s thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been 
laid down, is not indifferent.‖ Hence, the subdivisions of political justice are the () and 
(). Aquinas comments: ―Politicum iustum dividitur in duo: quorum unum est iustum naturale, 
aliud est iustum legale. Est autem haec eadem division cum divisione quam iuristae ponunt, scilicet quod iuris 
aliud est naturale, aliud est positivum. Idem enim nominant ius, quod Aristoteles iustum nominat.‖ (In ethic. V 
12.1). 
To the second text of Aristotle with similar thematic Aquinas quotes in ST II-II 80.1, namely NE VIII 15 
1162b21. It discusses the cause for quarrels in business transactions (to which Aristotle refers as ―friendship 
based on utility‖): ―Now it seems that as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other legal, one kind of 
friendship of utility is moral and the other legal.‖ Hence, the division is into () and 
() corresponds to the previous one. Aquinas comments: ―Duplex est iustum. Unum quidem, 
quod non est scriptum sed rationi inditum, quod supra nominavit iustum naturale. Aliud autem est iustum 
secundum legem scriptam, quod supra in quinto nominavit iustum legale.‖ (In ethic. VIII 13.8). 
80
 ST II-II 57.2: ―Dupliciter autem potest alicui homini aliquid esse adaequatum. Uno quidem modo, ex ipsa 
natura rei, puta cum aliquis tantum dat ut tantundem recipiat. Et hoc vocatur ius naturale. Alio modo aliquid est 
adaequatum vel commensuratum alteri ex condicto, sive ex communi placito, quando scilicet aliquis reputat se 
contentum si tantum accipiat. . . . Et hoc dicitur ius positivum.‖ 
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4.2.1 Human Nature as the Ultimate Measure of the Adequate Act 
 
The ius naturale signifies a work which is adequate to the other ―ex ipsa natura rei.‖ My 
neighbor, who is a car mechanic, repaired my defective car in two hours. Thus, it is just to 
work in his garden likewise for two hours. The act of recompense is measured by the thing 
received. It is a natural right
81
 since giving and receiving correspond in nature.  
Thus, the issue seems clear. But it is only clear indeed for the positive acts of justice that are 
performed to avoid creating an unequal relation. In those cases the nature of the thing 
received can be understood as the measure of the thing to be given. However, what about 
justice in the sense of non-maleficent, as abstaining from certain acts which would cause an 
inequality to arise? For which theoretical reasons can we determine the act of killing as unjust? 
Or stealing? There are many inter-personal actions which are not describable as transactions, 
or as restitution, and therefore which are not preceded by actions which could serve as a 
measure for a just response. Why is telling the truth just and lying unjust? Aquinas would 
answer that in order for an external act to be just it must be ―ex ipsa natura rei‖ adequate to 
the other. But how is the nature of lying adequate or inadequate to the other? What is the 
measure of adequacy for those interhuman actions which do not consist in offering 
recompense?  
For a solution we have to look for the general meaning of the concepts ―adaequatum” and 
―conveniens‖ in Aquinas‘s writings.82 Both concepts play an important role in his general 
theory of goodness and are internally connected with other key-terms, such as bonum, finis, 
appetitus, perfectio, etc. It is impossible and also unnecessary to treat the whole framework of 
these terms at length.
83
 We will thus give only a brief outline of Aquinas‘s general theory of 
goodness, and this only insofar as it is necessary for understanding the definition of ius as 
opus adaequatum alteri.  
 
                                                 
81
 Nota bene: as in the case of the translation of ―ius‖ by ―right,‖ the ―ius naturale‖ of Aquinas does not simply 
correspond to the contemporary meaning of ―natural right‖ (see also footnote 42). 
82
 Usually Aquinas uses the concept of ―conveniens‖; the term ―adaequatum‖ is more seldom. 
83
 See for example Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 34-68 or Lawrence Dewan, ―Wisdom as Foundational Ethical 
Theory in St. Thomas Aquinas,‖ in Wisdom, Law, and Virtue. Essays in Thomistic Ethics (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008), 37-50. 
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Aquinas’s Theory of Goodness 
The central thesis of Aquinas‘s theory of goodness is that the terms being (ens) and good are 
the same in things (in re) but differ in thought (secundum rationem).
84
 What is meant by this 
claim, and what are the reasons for it?  
Let us begin with being. What is actual is what is in being, but everything is what it is by its 
substantial form,
85
 or the organization which gives a thing that set of characteristics which 
places it in its own species. Some of these essential characteristics determine the genus to 
which the thing‘s species belongs, while others differentiate the thing‘s species from other 
species of that nature.
86
 For Aquinas, a thing‘s set of essential characteristics includes certain 
capacities and potentialities, and thereby the substantial form works as the source of some 
specific activity or operation.
87
 Further, a thing becomes perfect to the extent to which that 
potentiality is actualized.
88
 Or to be more exact, a thing is a perfect individual of its kind to 
the extent to which it actualizes the specifying potentiality of its substantial form regarding 
operation.
89
 In this way, being includes not only the bare existence of a thing as a member of 
a kind but also the actualization of the different potentialities specific to the thing‘s species. 
Having treated being, potentiality and perfection, we now turn to goodness. Goodness is what 
all desire, says Aquinas, quoting Aristotle.
90
 And what is desired is good, or at least is 
perceived as good. On Aquinas‘s view, a thing is desirable to the extent to which it is a 
perfect individual of its kind, i.e. a whole, complete exemplar, free from relevant defect,
91
 to 
                                                 
84
 ST I 5.1. Aquinas‘s treatment of the relation between being and goodness is a particularly important stage of a 
long and complicated tradition. See Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, ―Being and Goodness,‖ in Thomas 
Aquinas. Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Brian Davis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
295-323; also Michael Hönes, ‘Ens et bonum convertuntur:’ Eine Deutung des scholastischen Axioms unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Metaphysik und Ethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin (Fribourg, 1968). 
85
 Cf. Lawrence Dewan, Form and Being. Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2006 ), 96-130. 
86
 ST I 5.5; De veritate 21.6. 
87
 ScG III 7.7-8; ST I-II 55.2. For an interesting contemporary counterpart of this view of forms as principle of 
action, cf. Sidney Shoemaker, ―Causality and Propterties,‖ in Time and Cause. Essays Presented to Richard 
Taylor, ed. Peter van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), 109-135. ―The identity of a 
property is completely determined by its potential for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it. 
If I assert that one event caused another, I imply that the constituent objects of the cause event had properties 
which always contribute in certain ways to the causal powers of the things that have them, and that the particular 
episode of causation at hand was an actualization of some of these potentialities.‖ (Shoemaker, ―Causality and 
Propterties,‖ 133). 
88
 ST I-II 49.4, esp. ad 1. 
89
 ST I-II 3.2: ―Unumquodque autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine actu 
imperfecta est. . . . Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a 
philosopho nominatur, in II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans, sicut sciens est in 
potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam 
operationem.‖ 
90
 E.g. ScG I, 37; III 3. The Aristotelian source: NE I 1 1094a1-3. 
91
 The evil is a lack of the bonum debitum: Aquinas is careful to note that not every kind of privation implies an 
evil, but only the lack of a good which should be. ―Malum enim . . . nihil est aliud quam privatio eius quod quis 
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the extent to which it is in being.
92
 As a result, everything resists its own corruption in 
accordance with its nature. Thus, since goodness is what all things aim at or desire, each 
thing‘s goodness is its full actuality.93 
To summarize, on Aquinas‘s view being and goodness both refer to the actualization of a 
thing‘s nature. Thereby the evaluative meaning of perfect is derived from its metaphysical 
sense, and it is explained by the connection that exists between actuality and goodness. For 
anything to be actual is for it to be in being, and thus being and goodness are the same in 
things. Therefore, a thing is a good individual of its kind to the extent to which it is actual.
94
 
Or, putting it in another way, a thing is good or perfect to the extent to which its specifying 
potentiality is actualized, and bad or imperfect to the extent to which its specifying 
potentiality remains unactualized.
95
 
 
Consequences for the Present Issue 
If we want to make use of this general understanding of goodness for our present question – 
namely what serves as the measure for gauging the adequacy or inadequacy of certain 
external actions with respect to the other – we have to refer to the natural inclinations of man 
toward his specific human perfection. ―Each thing acts according to the exigency of its form, 
which is the principle of acting and the rule of operation.‖ 96  If we consider the natural 
perfection of the other as a human being, then external acts which preserve and foster his 
perfection would be characterized as adequate (adaequatum) to him, and consequently as just. 
―The natural right is to what nature inclines man.‖97 Thus, human natural inclination provides 
the foundation for determining certain actions as iustum by their very nature.
98
 And 
                                                                                                                                                        
natus est et debet habere.‖ (ScG III 7.2; cf. also 13.3; In sent. II 35.1 ad 1). More explicit in ST I 48.3: ―Malum 
importat remotionem boni. Non autem quaelibet remotio boni malum dicitur. Potest enim accipi remotio boni et 
privative, et negative. Remotio igitur boni negative accepta, mali rationem non habet, alioquin sequeretur quod 
ea quae nullo modo sunt, mala essent; et iterum quod quaelibet res esset mala, ex hoc quod non habet bonum 
alterius rei, utpote quod homo esset malus, quia non habet velocitatem capreae, vel fortitudinem leonis. Sed 
remotio boni privative accepta, malum dicitur, sicut privatio visus caecitas dicitur.‖ On this question also Enid 
Smith, The Goodness of Being in Thomistic Philosophy and Its Contemporary Significance (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1947), 124-127. 
92
 ST I 5.1 
93
 ScG I 37.4; ST I-II 94.2.  
94
 ScG III 16.1 and 2. 
95
 ST I-II 18.1 
96
 In sent. III 27.1.1: ―Unumquodque autem agit secundum exigentiam suae formae, quae est principium agendi 
et regula operis.‖ And in ST I-II 94.2: ―Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, 
inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et 
per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda.‖ 
97
 In ethic. V 12.4: ―Iustum naturale est ad quod hominem natura inclinat.‖ 
98
 Aquinas discusses the issue in the Summa theologiae in the context of the lex naturalis (ST I-II 92.5 and 94, 
esp. art. 2). We want to quote a text from the Commentary on the Sentences which explicitly uses the term ius 
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consequently, all operations which correspond to those goods possessing the required 
adequacy to man are iustum ex natura.
99
 
In section 2.2, we mentioned Aquinas‘s list of particular goods to which every man is inclined 
by nature.
100
 We thus recall that they are the conservation of his own being according to his 
specific nature, the generation and education of offspring, life in community, and knowledge 
of truth about God. Hence, external acts which foster these human perfections are 
adaequatum alteri. 
By means of this list we can see why Aquinas describes respect for the other‘s life, his 
material property and his good reputation as just acts, as opus adaequatum alteri, even 
without presupposing a previous exchange. It belongs naturally to man‘s perfection to 
preserve his substantial being, and consequently respect for the integrity of the other‘s life is 
generally ―adequate‖ to the other; it is an ius naturale. On the contrary, harming the life of the 
other is inadaequatum alteri since it is against his natural good, and consequently such 
constitutes an unjust action. In the same way, the act of guarantying the other‘s property is a 
just act, for the recognition of the other‘s ownership of certain goods (as private property) 
allows him to provide the necessary things for his life.
101
 Also, here the natural inclination to 
one‘s own life grounds the just act. Finally, since man‘s life in community belongs to the 
natural good of man, but the lack of a good name would hinder amicable community life, the 
preservation of the other‘s reputation has to be judged as a suitable act in relation to the other. 
 
The ius gentium 
Concerning the ius naturale Aquinas introduces a further distinction, the ius gentium.
102
 He 
does not use the term ―the law of nations‖ in the modern sense as referring to legal 
conventions between various nations, but rather he uses it as a philosophical concept. The 
determination of the ius naturale in reference to the adaequatum alteri can be found in all 
                                                                                                                                                        
naturale. First St. Thomas claims for all creatures: ―Omnibus rebus naturaliter insunt quaedam principia quibus 
non solum operationes proprias efficere possunt, sed quibus etiam eas convenientes fini suo reddant; sive sint 
actiones quae consequantur rem aliqua ex natura sui generis, sive consequantur ex natura speciei.‖ (In sent. IV 
33.1). Applying the same structure on mankind, one reaches the ius naturale ―Naturalis conceptio ei indita, qua 
dirigatur ad operandum convenienter lex naturalis vel ius naturale dicitur . . . Omne autem illud quod actionem 
inconvenientem reddit fini quem natura ex opere aliquo intendit, contra legem naturae esse dicitur.‖ 
99
 Since the ius naturale is known by the intellect as something good, therefore the iustum ex natura is identical 
with the lex naturalis. Cf. also In sent. IV 33.1: ―Lex ergo naturalis nihil est aliud quam conceptio homini 
naturaliter indita, qua dirigitur ad convenienter agendum in actionibus propriis, sive competant ei ex natura 
generis, ut generare, comedere, et huiusmodi; sive ex natura speciei, ut ratiocinari, et similia.‖ 
100
 See ST I-II 94.2. 
101
 See ST II-II 66.1 and 2. 
102
 ST I-II 95.4, esp. ad 1; II-II 57.3. See also Aubert, Le droit romain dans l’oeuvre de saint Thomas, 97-105. 
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creatures.
103
 Hence, even sexual intercourse between animals is somehow an ius naturale.
104
 
However, there are some actions which are not immediately ―ex ipsa natura rei‖ appropriate 
to the other, but rather the consequences of these actions are appropriate. Aquinas adduces as 
an example the possession of private property.
105
 The exclusive possession of a thing by one 
individual does not have an immediate adequateness to a certain person. It is not an 
immediate ius naturale. However, since one treats one‘s own things with greater attention 
than that given to the things of others, private property turns out to be very helpful in regard 
to providing all things necessary for one‘s life, and this belongs again to the ius naturale. 
Now, as a rational agent, man can consider the probable consequences of his actions, and 
therefore he can acknowledge some acts as just because of their results. It is the expected 
consequence of the better use of things which grounds private property as an opus 
adaequatum, as something just.
106
 Those relations are called ius gentium, since they are 
accessible to all people by means of rational consideration.  
We thus have established human nature as the basis for the evaluation of an act as an opus 
iustum. As seen in the introduction to section 4.2, however, Aquinas mentions beyond nature 
a second way of grounding justice, namely by convention. 
 
 
4.2.2 The ius positivum as Further Determination of the ius naturale 
 
In the introduction of this chapter we quoted ST II-II 57.2, which mentions the ius positivum. 
Some external acts are adequate regarding the other not by their very nature but because of a 
previous positive determination, either by the way of a special contract or by common 
agreement. For example, the payment of an established price that a worker earns for ten hours 
of hard work may be adaequatum because of a prior contract established between employer 
and employee.
107
 Because of this previous agreement every other kind of compensation would 
be inadequate from the side of the employer.  
St. Thomas distinguishes two ways of determining a positive right:  
                                                 
103
 See footnote 98. 
104
 ST II-II 57.3; In ethic. V 12.4. 
105
 ST II-II 57.3. 
106
 Consequently, for Aquinas the possession of private property can never become an unconditional right (see  
ST II-II 66.2). 
107
 We disregard for the moment the fact that some extreme wage agreements might be unjust despite a previous 
arrangement.  
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First by private agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement between private 
persons. Secondly, by public agreement, namely if the whole community agrees that 
something should be considered as adequate [adaequatum] and commensurate 
[commensuratum] to the other; or if this is decreed by the prince who cares for the people and 
acts in its stead. And this is called positive right.
108
 
 
The ius naturale as Necessary Basis for Every Kind of ius positivum 
What is the relation between the ius naturale and the ius positivum? These are not two 
independent modes of determining the adequacy of an action with respect to the other. 
Between the two there is common ground. Every just act must principally contain the 
character of the ius naturale, for it must be an operation which is by nature adequate to the 
other. Although the ius positivum is iustum only because of a prior special agreement with the 
other, it likewise must correspond to the nature of the other as an ius naturale. ―The legal or 
positive right arises always from the natural one.‖109 This means that to reward an employee 
for his work is just, as iustum naturale, even without any contract. The determination of the 
ius positivum relates only to the agreement regarding the concrete wage. To pay a fitting 
compensation in itself, however, is iustum by nature. Therefore Aquinas also calls the ius 
naturale the ―first iustum‖110 or ―principal iustum.‖111 
In ST I-II 95.2, Aquinas demonstrates a twofold way in which a positive right can relate to a 
natural right.
112
 First, it is possible to draw conclusions from the natural right, ―sicut conclusio 
ex principio.‖ 113  In science every principle contains some consequences that follow by 
necessity from the axiom. Likewise, the ius naturale can be understood as a principle from 
which implied conclusions can be deduced. From the principle ―you shall not harm another 
person‖ it follows necessarily that ―you shall not kill.‖ When such a conclusion of the ius 
naturale is formulated explicitly, it takes on the character of an ius positivum. However, it 
                                                 
108
 ST II-II 57.2: ―Uno modo, per aliquod privatum condictum, sicut quod firmatur aliquo pacto inter privatas 
personas. Alio modo, ex condicto publico, puta cum totus populus consentit quod aliquid habeatur quasi 
adaequatum et commensuratum alteri; vel cum hoc ordinat princeps, qui curam populi habet et eius personam 
gerit. Et hoc dicitur ius positivum.‖ 
109
 In ethic. V 12.8: ―Iustum legale sive positivum oritur semper a naturali.‖ Cf. Quodl. II 4.3: ―Nihil enim est 
aliud ius positivum quam determinatio iuris naturalis.‖ 
110
 In ethic. V 15.8: ―iustum primum;‖ see also Léon J. Elders, Autour de Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Recueil 
d’études sur sa pensée philosophique et théologique; l’agir moral; approches théologiques, vol. 2 (Paris: FAC-
éditions, 1987), 33-34. 
111
 In sent. III 33.3.4E: ―principale iustum.‖ 
112
 For the parallel discussion, see In Ethic. V 12.8. Cf. Thomas S. Hibbs, ―Principles and Prudence: The 
Aristotelianism of Thomas‘s Account of Moral Knowledge,‖ The New Scholasticism 61 (1987): 277-278; 
Kluxen, Moral - Vernunft - Natur, 67-68. We mentioned the distinction already shortly in section 2.2.2a. 
113
 In ethic. V 12. 
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does not receive its primary adequacy from human convention but remains grounded in its 
natural fittingness regarding the other. Hence, the deduced principle is first an ius naturale 
and then, beyond that, an ius positivum. If a legitimate authority formulates such a right, it 
does not thus create a new right. Rather, it formulates and explicates what is just by nature, 
what is a ius naturale
114
 and what, at least theoretically, every agent could acknowledge 
through his own reasonable deliberation. Thus, those rules ―are contained in human law not 
only as positive law, but they have force also from the natural law.‖115 
The second way to derive a positive right from a natural one is by the way of determination, 
―per modum determinationis.‖ We have already given the example that by a positive 
arrangement an established figure becomes the just reward for a certain type of work. 
Conversely, a similar arragement can be set up with a negative consequence: it is just by 
nature to penalize a delinquent. In this case, however, the ius naturale does not provide the 
exact measure of the fine or the duration of imprisonment. Here the legitimate authority 
determines the just punishment, and consequently that penalization will be the adequate 
consequence as the iustum positivum.
116
 In the case of the human law Aquinas speaks of the 
ius civile.
117
 Nevertheless, it should be clear that the determination of the ius positivum has to 
concur with the limits of the natural right, since even in this case the ultimate justification of 
the ius positivum must stem from some natural right. Determining a ius positivum against a 
natural right does not establish any right at all but in fact creates the contrary.
118
 
 
                                                 
114
 Therefore in In ethic. V 12.8 Aquinas explains: The ius which is derived from the natural right ―sicut 
conclusions ex principiis‖ does not belong to the ius positivum, but to the ius naturale. ―Cum iustum naturale sit 
semper et ubique, ut dictum est, hoc non competit iusto legali vel positivo. Et ideo necesse est quod quicquid ex 
iusto naturali sequitur, quasi conclusio, sit iustum naturale.‖ (ibid.). However, simultaneously he affirms in ST I-
II 95.2 – seemingly in contradiction: Human laws which are derived from the natural right as conclusions belong 
to the species of positive laws.  
However, both statements cut across each other only if we neglect the grounding of ius. In itself the conclusions 
belong to the ius naturale, since the acts are already by nature adapted to the other one; this is the issue of In 
ethic. V 12. However, as determined by human conventions, they are adequate even by a second (additional) 
reason; they are equally an ius positivum – although the ultimate ground as right remains even now the ius 
naturale.  
115
 ST I-II 95.2: ―Continentur lege humana non tanquam sint solum lege posita, sed habent etiam aliquid vigoris 
ex lege naturali.‖ 
116
 See also Quodl. II 4.3 ―Nihil enim est aliud ius positivum quam determinatio iuris naturalis: sicut ius naturale 
habet quod malefactor puniatur; sed quod tali poena puniatur, hoc determinatur per ius positivum.‖ 
117
 Cf. ST I-II 95.4; for the relation of ius naturale and ius civile see also Aubert, Le droit romain dans l’oeuvre 
de saint Thomas, 105-109. 
118
 ―Si aliquid de se repugnantiam habeat ad ius naturale, non potest voluntate humana fieri iustum, puta si 
statuatur quod liceat furari vel adulterium committere.‖ (ST II-II 57.2 ad 2; see also 60.5 ad 1; ST I-II 95.2). 
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The Divine Law as Positive Law 
In this context, Aquinas also poses the following question: how does the divine right (ius 
divinum) relate to the ius naturale and ius positivum? It seems that it belongs neither to the 
first since it exceeds nature, nor to the latter since it is not determined by any human 
authority.
119
 St. Thomas resolves the issue by applying the distinction of ST I-II 95.2 between 
positive rights ut conclusiones and ut determinationes. Some actions which are specified as 
iustum by divine precepts are simply just by their very nature. However, for reasons of greater 
clarity, divine providence foresaw the need for their promulgation. Other parts of the ius 
divinum provide a proper new determination, though always as a determination of a ius 
naturale.
120
 To this Aquinas adds the almost nitpicky observation: ―The divine law commands 
certain things because they are good, and forbids others, because they are evil; others, 
however, are good because they are prescribed, and evil because they are forbidden.‖121 
Hence, even in the case of the ius divinum the general principles of natural and positive rights 
remain valid. 
 
Conclusion 
The term ius positivum can be used in two ways. First, in a stricter sense it stands only for 
positive determinations of concrete issues which wouldn‘t be iustum apart of such 
specification. According to this view, there is a clear distinction between natural and positive 
rights. Secondly, the ius positivum can simply signify all written formulation of any law, and 
thus it contains natural rights as well as properly determined ones. 
 
 
                                                 
119
 ST II-II 57.2 arg. 3. 
120
 ST II-II 57.2 ad 3: ―Ius divinum dicitur quod divinitus promulgatur. Et hoc quidem partim est de his quae sunt 
naturaliter iusta, sed tamen eorum iustitia homines latet, partim autem est de his quae fiunt iusta institutione 
divina. Unde etiam ius divinum per haec duo distingui potest, sicut et ius humanum.‖ Gilby notes thereto: 
―Natural right is not confined to a hypothetical state of pure nature, but is present throughout the activities of 
human nature under the reign of grace.― (Gilby, ―Introduction,‖ 8, footnote b). 
121
 ST II-II 57.2 ad 3: ―Sunt enim in lege divina quaedam praecepta quia bona, et prohibita quia mala, quaedam 
vero bona quia praecepta, et mala quia prohibita.‖ 
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4.2.3 Excursus: The Law as ratio iusti 
 
At this point, a short digression to cover the relation of ius and lex seems advisable. ―The 
notion of right [ratio iusti] is law.‖122 When Aquinas speaks about the ius, usually the concept 
of law (lex) is not far off. According to his view, both concepts are linked by an internal 
relationship. If ius is understood as an opus adaequatum alteri, it has to be ruled, as does each 
good act, by human reason. Aquinas compares the opus iustum with a successful piece of art 
that obtains its perfection through conformity with the idea in the mind of the artist. The ratio 
of the statue is present in the mind of the sculptor, and it is the measure of the external work. 
In a parallel fashion, the opus iustum as an external operation follows a rule which is 
contained in human reason, namely the ratio iusti found in the practical intellect of man. 
―There pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work which reason 
determines as a kind of rule of prudence.‖123 Every just act has to be guided and formed by 
the practical intellect, and thus just acts must correspond to the ratio iusti. 
What does this imply for the concept of law? According to Aquinas, the ratio iuris is identical 
with lex. The law is not immediately the right itself, but it is its ratio cognoscendi: ―The law is 
not the same as right, but it is somehow the notion of right [ratio iuris].‖124 If the ratio iusti, 
which is known and determined by the practical reason, is then set down in writing, a law is 
formulated: ―And if this rule be expressed in writing, it is called a law.‖125  
Hence, the relationship between ius and lex is clear. As the crafted object stands to art, 
likewise the ius as the right opus relates to law: ―As artificial works are related to art, so are 
works of justice related to the law with which they concord.‖126 
 
 
                                                 
122
 ST II-II 57.4 arg. 2 (affirmative): ―Ratio iusti est lex.‖ 
123
 ST II-II 57.1 ad 2: ―Illius operis iusti quod ratio determinat quaedam ratio praeexistit in mente, quasi quaedam 
prudentiae regula.‖ See also ST I 21.2: ―Sicut autem se habent artificiata ad artem, ita se habent opera iusta ad 
legem cui concordant.‖ 
124
 ST II-II 57.1 ad 2: ―Lex non est ipsum ius, proprie loquendo, sed aliqualis ratio iuris.‖ 
125
 ST II-II 57.1 ad 2: ―Et hoc si in scriptum redigatur, vocatur lex.‖ Bourke trenchantly notes: ―What they [men] 
know about this sort of moral relation [between several men] is a ius; what men say about such a relation is a 
lex.‖ (Bourke, ―Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?,‖ 65). 
126
 ST I 21.2: ―Sicut autem se habent artificiata ad artem, ita se habent opera iusta ad legem cui concordant.‖ This 
seems to require some modification of J. Finnis‘s claim according to which Aquinas did not make any distinction 
between ius and lex; see John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 134. The position might be held in reference to In sent. IV 33.1, whereas in ST II-II 57 
Aquinas clearly distinguishes between ius and lex. 
Chapter 4. The General Structure of Justice According to St. Thomas 
 258 
4.3 The Grounding of the Obligation to Render the Other’s Due  
 
So far we have considered only the ―objective measure‖ of the just act, or how a certain act 
becomes adaequatum alteri. St. Thomas answers the question by distinguishing between the 
ius naturale and the ius positivum. However, we have not yet addressed the issue of why there 
is an obligation on the side of an agent to achieve the opus adaequatum alteri. Indeed, the 
question is somewhat puzzling. To respect the other‘s life, to compensate the other‘s labor, to 
teach him truth, and to bestow a gift upon him are all four acts suited to the good of another 
person, but only in the first two cases does a proper obligation exist. Though teaching truth is 
surely an adequate act (man is naturally inclined to know truth), it wouldn‘t be unjust to 
refrain from giving a lecture to everyone we meet. Obviously not every adequate work is 
likewise obligatory. But what makes the the two different? How does an adequate work 
become a necessary work, or a debitum in respect to the other? 
Let us not forget that in section 4.1.3 we highlighted the distinction between justice in its 
proper sense and a more general sense of justice. The first kind of justice governs actions 
between two equals, i.e. between two agents who are not linked by special bonds (as are 
benefactors, family members, etc.) This distinction is important since some relationships 
imply ipso facto a special kind of obligation. For example, the long-term care of parents for 
their children demands reciprocal assistance. A similar reciprocity exists in one‘s relationship 
with benefactors. In these cases, the obligation for certain acts is grounded in the specific 
dependency of the agent himself on the other.
127
 Thus, there is no need to explain such an 
obligation. However, what is the foundation of the obligation to render something to a person 
who is not tied to us by special bonds, i.e. who relates to us properly speaking simply as other? 
 
 
4.3.1 The Common Good as Foundation of Interpersonal Obligations 
 
First, we must determine, apart of the issue of justice, the principal meaning of debitum. A 
duty implies a good which is not yet realized, which remains potential, but which ought to be 
realized. Hence, it implies the concept of an end as something that should be possessed. ―The 
                                                 
127
 ST I-II 60.3: ―Debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, 
aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto. Et secundum has diversas rationes 
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due in every affair is that which is the end, because it has per se the character of a good.‖128 
But the end and the good of everything is its perfection. Therefore, ―what is required for the 
perfection of a thing is due to it.‖129 But each thing‘s perfection is determined by its nature. ―It 
is the due of every natural thing that it has what is required by its nature.‖130 Hence, the 
connection between ius as described above and debitum is obvious. If the natural ius of a 
thing consists in goods which are adequate according to its perfection, then debitum is 
principally identical with ius though focused on one different aspect of ius. Whereas ius refers 
to the adequacy of a work, debitum addresses a certain action in its ought-to-be-ness, or its 
necessity, in respect to the attainment of an end. ―In the name ‗debt,‘ therefore, is implied a 
certain exigency or necessity of the thing to which it is directed.‖131 And again: ―The due 
implies that every natural thing has that which its nature requires.‖132  
But it seems that nothing is gained thereby for the grounding of an obligation to perform just 
acts toward the other. Consider any relationship between two persons. Human nature implies 
a debitum on the side of each agent to pursue his own perfection. But how does the operation 
which is due to himself become a due for the other? That‘s exactly the question that justice 
answers. The just action, the ius, is adequate to the other; it is what is due to the other. 
Therefore, the other will naturally pursue the ius for his own perfection. But why should the 
perfection of the other touch me as an agent? How does the debitum on the side of the other 
becomes my own debt? 
In order to understand the reciprocal interference of the two debts in the act of justice, we 
have to determine the general relationship between human agents. The connection between 
two men always hinges on the kind of community to which they belong. What is due to 
another member of a community depends on the community in question. For the present state 
of our study, it is enough to investigate the most basic community, the nexus between two 
persons by the mere living together in human society. Even without special relationships, the 
mere fact of sharing life together makes inevitable a certain communion, namely the human 
city. And as part of that community one‘s own good depends on the realization of the good of 
                                                                                                                                                        
debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes. Puta religio est per quam redditur debitum deo; pietas est per quam redditur 
debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.‖ 
128
 ST II-II 44.1: ―Debitum est in unoquoque negotio id quod est finis, quia habet rationem per se boni.‖ 
129
 ScG I 93.6: ―Quod autem ad perfectionem alicuius requiritur, est debitum unicuique.‖ Similarly in ST I 21.1 
ad 3: ―Unicuique debetur quod suum est. Dicitur autem esse suum alicuius, quod ad ipsum ordinatur.‖  
130
 De veritate 23.6 ad 3: ―Debitum enim est unicuique rei naturali ut habeat ea quae exigit sua natura.‖ 
131
 ST I 21.1 ad 3: ―In nomine ergo debiti, importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius ad quod 
ordinatur.‖ 
132
 De veritate 23.6 ad 3: ―Debitum enim est unicuique rei naturali ut habeat ea quae exigit sua natura.‖ 
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the whole, i.e. the common good.
133
 The individual member cannot realize his full perfection 
apart from the perfection of the whole. For example, as the good of a single organ depends on 
the perfection of the whole body.
134
 Thus, the common good of the human community 
becomes the end of every individual member. It quasi becomes, almost paradoxically, each 
man‘s own good. ―The common good is the end of [each] single person who lives in a 
community, as the good of the whole is the end of every part.‖135 St. Thomas explains further: 
―As part and whole are the same in a certain respect, so too that which belongs to the whole 
belongs in a certain respect to the part.‖136 D. Gallagher states succinctly: ―If we consider the 
citizen precisely as citizen, then the common good is not distinct from his good, but rather is 
his good. As a part of the whole, his good is to be found in the good which perfects the 
whole.‖137 Therefore, the human agent finds his own good outside of yet not prerescinding 
from his own perfection, namely in the realization of the common good. 
Because of this internal connection between the perfection of the part and the good of the 
whole, all single members stand implicitly in a general mutual relation. The proper perfection 
of Paul is a part of the common good, but likewise Peter cannot attain his own perfection 
apart from the realization of the common good since even he strives for the common good as 
                                                 
133
 The literature about the bonum commune in ample; see for example Richard A. Crofts, ―The Common Good 
in the Political Theory of Thomas Aquinas,‖ The Thomist 37 (1973): 155-173; Alfred Verdross, ―Begriff und 
Bedeutung des ‗bonum commune‘,‖ in San Tommaso e la filosofia del diritto oggi, ed. Giovanni Ambrosetti 
(Rome: Città nuova editrice, 1975), 239-257. 
134
 Even more: As Aquinas shows in In ethic. VI 7.12, the proper good of the individual hinges on the common 
good of all communities in which he participates. ―Proprium bonum uniuscuiusque singularis personae non 
potest esse sine oeconomia, id est recta dispensatione domus, neque sine urbanitate, id est recta dispensatione 
civitatis, sicut nec bonum partis potest esse sine bono totius. Unde patet quod politici et oeconomici non 
intendunt circa aliquid superfluum, sed circa id quod ad seipsos pertinet.‖ 
135
 ST II-II 58.9 ad 3: ―Bonum commune est finis singularum personarum in communitate existentium, sicut 
bonum totius finis est cuiuslibet partium.‖  
136
 ST II-II 61.2 ad 2: ―Sicut pars et totum quodammodo sunt idem, ita id quod est totius quodammodo est 
partis.‖ 
137
 Gallagher, ―Desire for Beatitude ...‖ 34-38, here 34. See for his point also ST II-II 47.10 ad 2. 
Hence, N. Dias errs by describing the thomistic understanding of the common good as a ―set of conditions which 
enables the members of a community to attain for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have 
reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a community.‖ (Noel Dias, ―The Concept 
of Justice in St. Thomas Aquinas,‖ Aquinas Journal 10 (1997): 6-10, here 9). On the contrary, for St. Thomas, 
the bonum commune is to be understood neither as the sum of the particular goods nor as the result of particular 
good nor as realty sui generis, independent of the good of the particulars. Cf. Suzanne Michel, La notion 
thomiste du bien commun (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-40. Rather there is an internal 
harmony between the common good and the particular good (ibid., 50-63). ―Le Bien commun c‘est le Bien de 
tous, qui appartient à tous, en bloc, mais qui appartient aussi à chacun en particulier, en tant que membres de la 
communauté.‖ (Michel, La notion thomiste du bien commun, 18). Devettere explains the same from the 
perspective of the individual agent: ―‗My‘ good is also an interpersonal and political good – the good of the 
others and the good of the community. Although the good I desire is always my good, it will be often good for 
me to seek the good of others and the good of the community.‖ (Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 25). 
See also Jean Tonneau, ―Devoir et morale,‖ Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 38 (1954): 236-
242; or more recently Michael S. Sherwin, ―St. Thomas and the Common Good: The Theological Perspective; 
An Invitation to Dialogue,‖ Angelicum 70 (1993): 307-328. 
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his own end.
138
 Thus, the perfection of Paul, which is initially only due to himself, becomes to 
a certain extent due to Peter since it is natural for Peter to aim also for the common good as 
for his own perfection. J. Porter expresses the issue very clearly: ―Correctly understood, the 
well-being of individual and community are interrelated in such a way that what promotes one 
promotes the other, and what harms one harms the other as well.‖139 Consequently Aquinas 
asserts the universal principle: ―To render the other his due has the notion of good.‖140 Thus, 
the common good is the term which connects the perfection of one individual to the other; and 
only on that basis can we understand the concept of debitum in the case of justice
141
 and 
ultimately justice itself.
142
 
Thus, the obligation to fulfill a debt to another person presupposes two points. First, both 
persons must relate to each other as parts of a common society. ―Justice consists in 
communication.‖143 If two individuals simply lack any kind of commonality, the good of the 
one would never become the other‘s concern.144 Secondly, the agent has to be equipped with 
reason, for the acknowledgment of the other‘s good as my own good requires intellectual 
                                                 
138
 Concretely, the flourishing of an individual who lives in a community requires not only a certain perfection 
on his part, but also a certain perfection of those with whom he lives. If Paul lacks a certain good, by means of 
the common good his defect touches also Peter‘s good since the common good belongs also to Peter‘s good. 
139
 Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 125-128, here 127. The issue is more elaborated in the chapter Self-Love, 
Neighbor-Love, and the Norms of Justice in Porter, Nature as Reason, 203-220, where she shows the relation of 
self-love to love of neighbor through the connection of the common good. A similar chapter is found in (Finnis, 
Aquinas, 111-117 where the author clarifies the connection between egoism, self-fulfillment, and the common 
good. Also interesting is Jean Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 180-188. In these pages Porter describes a somewhat ambivalent character of justice: On the one 
hand it takes its measure by the relationship to the other (ad alterum), on the other hand the just act itself is 
ultimately grounded in one‘s own inclination towards the good. 
140
 ST II-II 81.2: ―Reddere debitum alicui habet rationem boni.‖ 
141
 This description shows that the concept of debitum is not limited to the range of justice; rather it is present in 
all moral virtues insofar as every good act corresponds to a debt of a natural inclination towards a certain 
perfection. ―Virtutes perficiunt nos ad prosequendum debito modo inclinationes naturales.‖ (ST II-II 108.2.) 
However – as Aquinas notes – ―ratio debiti in aliis virtutibus est magis latens quam in iustitia.‖ (ST I-II 100.3 ad 
3). And the explanation: ―Ratio debiti . . . apparet in iustitia, quae est ad alterum, quia in his quae spectant ad 
seipsum, videtur primo aspectui quod homo sit sui dominus, et quod liceat ei facere quodlibet; sed in his quae 
sunt ad alterum, manifeste apparet quod homo est alteri obligatus ad reddendum ei quod debet.‖ (ST II-II 122.1). 
142
 See for this the description of iustitia in De virt. card. 1: ―Rectitudo actus per comparationem ad aliquid 
extrinsecum, habet quidem rationem boni et laudabilis etiam in his quae pertinent ad unum secundum seipsum, 
sed maxime laudatur in his quae sunt ad alterum; quando scilicet homo actum suum rectificat non solum in his 
quae ad ipsum pertinent, sed etiam in his in quibus cum aliis communicat. . . . Iustitia, per quam ordinamur ad 
alterum . . . est . . . circa operationes quibus communicamus cum aliis.‖ 
143
 In ethic. VIII 9.2: ―Iustitia consistit in communicatione.‖ See also De veritate 28.1: ―Iustitia qua homo 
dirigitur in his quae veniunt in communicationem vitae.‖ And De virt. in com. 6: ―Iustitia facit inclinationem in 
bonum quod est aequalitas pertinentium ad communicationem vitae.‖ Likewise in In sent. III 9.1D. 
144
 Aquinas gives a good example: ―Si inter imperantem et imperatum nihil sit commune, puta cum imperans 
suum proprium bonum intendit; neque amicitia inter eos esse poterit, sicut neque iustitia est inter eos, inquantum 
scilicet imperans usurpat sibi totum bonum, quod debetur imperato.‖ (In ethic. VIII 11.11). This is true at least 
for a natural kind of relationship. The order of grace which combines all men by charity has to be considered as a 
special case (see In sent. III 29.6). We will return to the issue in section 5.2. 
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knowledge. Hence, reciprocal obligations between members of a community constitute the 
matter of human society.
145
 
 
We should make the following two annotations. 
First, we should note that Aquinas‘s understanding of the debitum has nothing in common 
with a kind of ―Hobbesian justice,‖ i.e. the reduction of every human act to self-interest as its 
ultimate motivation.
146
 For St. Thomas, the perfection of the other is never a mere means for 
attaining one‘s own perfection, a mean that could be, since only a mean, even sacrificed for 
the sake of one‘s own good.147 On the contrary, the perfection of the other is intended not as 
an instrument an for attaining one‘s own good but precisely as one‘s own good. Or as D. 
Gallagher notes: ―Paradoxically, it is the good of the other as other that I take to be mine.‖148 
The good of the other person has become part of proper good of the agent. ―The part loves the 
good of the whole, insofar as appropriate to it, not however so as to refer the good of the 
whole to itself, but rather it refers itself to the good of the whole.‖149 
This long investigation was important in order to clarify the proper motivation necessary to 
achieve the opus adaeqatum alterum. However, there is still need for a further specification. 
The perfection of the other is in a certain respect part of one‘s own good, and consequently 
the natural inclination and obligation to seek one‘s own perfection in some way includes 
striving after the other‘s good. Nevertheless, there are different degrees of obligation, even 
                                                 
145
 In the realm of animals we can speak of ―justice‖ only analogously. Certainly the conduct of animals 
sometimes bears an external similarity to the acts of justice; however, it never follows a rational recognition of 
the others perfection, but is regulated by instinct. 
146
 For a portrayal of Hobbesian justice, see Andrew Levine, Engaging Political Philosophy: From Hobbes to 
Rawls (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 36-43. 
147
 Something analogous is true for the relationship between the common good and the good of the other: 
―Nullus autem debet alicui nocere iniuste ut bonum commune promoveat.‖ (ST II-II 68.3). 
148
 Gallagher, ―Desire for Beatitude ...‖ 27. 
149
 ST II-II 26.3 ad 2: ―Bonum totius diligit quidem pars secundum quod est sibi conveniens, non autem ita quod 
bonum totius ad se referat, sed potius ita quod seipsam refert in bonum totius.‖ 
Aquinas describes the relation between love for the other and the striving for the others perfection as a good for 
the lover himself by the distinction of amor amititiae and amor concupiscibilis: ―The person is loving the other‘s 
good as his own with a love of concupiscence but is loving that good as good for the other person. In other words, 
the person is taking as his own good a good that inheres or belongs to another person precisely as belonging to 
that other person. What occurs here is that the lover takes the loved as somehow one with himself – as another 
self (alter se / alter ipse).‖ (David M. Gallagher, ―Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as the Basis for Love of 
Others,‖ Acta Philosophica 8 (1999): 29-35, here 31). In this way the constitutive foundation for achieving the 
common good of a society is the mutual love between its members as ―subsisting good things‖, i.e. as persons 
who have to be loved propter seipsas (helpful for this relationship is Lawrence Dewan, ―St. Thomas, the 
Common Good, and the Love of Persons,‖ in Wisdom, Law, and Virtue. Essays in Thomistic Ethics (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), 271-278; likewise the chapter Egoism, Self-Fulfillment, and Common Good in 
Finnis, Aquinas, 111-117). 
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between two fellow-citizens. To keep back the reward that the other has earned by his labor is 
a different kind of injustice than to withhold truth or to behave in a miserly manner.  
Moreover, we are left to ask: is there only an obligation which arises from the interior of man? 
From one‘s own inclination? Or is there also an ―imposed‖ obligation from the outside? 
Aquinas distinguishes between debitum morale and debitum legale. Hence, in the next section 
we shall determine the different kinds and different degrees of obligation to render the other 
his due.  
 
 
4.3.2 Legal and Moral Due in the Summa theologiae. An Inconsistency? 
 
In the foregoing section we investigated the subjective motives for rendering everyone his due. 
Aquinas refers to this kind of obligation, which arises from the inclination of the agent 
himself, as a debitum morale. St. Thomas recognizes a further obligation which is imposed on 
the agent from the outside by precepts, principally independent of the agent‘s own inclination. 
This is the debitum legale. 
The Summa theologiae distinguishes in several places these two kinds of debts. The first 
reference is found in ST I-II 99.5, and several additional references, unsurprisingly, may be 
found in the treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae.
150
 Scholars have noted, however, that 
the two concepts possess a different meaning in the latter texts.
151
 First, we will outline the 
distinction as found in both ST I-II 99.5 and the subsequent texts, and then we will suggest a 
reason for the seeming inconsistency. 
 
The Moral Due and Its Two Grades 
The specific character of the moral due is its foundation in the agent himself. It is an 
obligation which arises from reason, ―since reason dictates that something must be done.‖152 
If an agent acknowledges some actions as owed to the other – as iustum, the resulting 
                                                 
150
 Other places are e.g. ST II-II 80.1; 102.2 ad 2; 106.1 ad 2; 114.2; 117.5 ad 1; 118.3 ad 2. 
151
 T.C. O‘Brien, ―Appendix 1: Legal Debt, Moral Debt,‖ in Summa Theologiae: Virtues of Justice in the Human 
Community, vol. 41 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 316-320; for an article which refers only to 
the legal and moral due in the Secunda secundae and disregards Aquinas‘s description in ST I-II 99.5, see 
Stephen Theron, ―Justice: Legal and Moral Debt in Aquinas,‖ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 
(2004): 559-571. Vice versa Kossel focuses only on the relation portrayed in ST I-II 99.5: Kossel, ―Natural Law 
and Human Law,‖ 181. 
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obligation to perform the act constitutes the debitum morale ‒ it is a ―self-obligation‖ from 
within. The agent is obliged, by his own reason, to act according to moral duty. Moral honesty 
demands that he abide by to his practical judgment. Therefore, sometimes the moral due also 
called ―debitum ex honestate.‖153 
Aquinas introduces a further distinction regarding the moral due. Some obligations secundum 
regulam rationis are either strictly necessary or prohibited for the sake of preserving the 
moral order, for example the prohibition of murder and thievery. In committing these acts, the 
agent would be the direct cause of injury to the other. These acts are incompatible with a 
peaceful life together, and therefore they are evil. However, there are also moral obligations in 
the wider sense which do not immediately imply avoiding injury or loss for the other, but 
instead promote the other‘s perfection beyond what is strictly required by the common life.154 
Those acts are fitting and useful (utile) with respect to the flourishing of the common life and 
one‘s own virtue. They possess, one could say, an ―inviting character‖ but without a strict 
binding force: ―Not precisely owed, but because of the better mode [proper melius].‖155 It is 
more virtuous to fulfill this analogous debt, but it is not evil to fail to do so. This kind of debt 
is characteristic of the relationship between friends,
156
 since signs and demonstrations of 
friendship are never strictly speaking owed to the other but indicate instead special moral 
excellence.
157
 
Thus, the moral due knows two degrees. Some actions, those without which moral honesty 
would be lost, are strictly required. In the following pages we will refer to such actions as the 
strict moral due. Other actions are recommendable though not strictly necessary; we will 
name these the moral due of friends.  
                                                                                                                                                        
152
 ST I-II 99.5: ―dicat enim ratio aliquid faciendum.‖ 
153
 E.g. In sent. III 33.3.4A. 
154
 ―Quia debitum necessitatem importat, ideo tale debitum habet duplicem gradum. Quoddam enim est sic 
necessarium ut sine eo honestas morum conservari non possit, et hoc habet plus de ratione debiti. . . . Aliud vero 
debitum est necessarium sicut conferens ad maiorem honestatem, sine quo tamen honestas conservari potest.‖ 
(ST I-II 99.5).  
Observing that there are some moral duties which are not demanded of us as legally due, Theron resolves the 
issue by relying on God to constitute the moral order as a legal obligation: ―God (legally) obliges us to be 
moral.‖ (Theron, ―Justice: Legal and Moral Debt in Aquinas,‖ 561). However, although it is true that God 
imposed a legal obligation upon us, the debitum legale (as principle from the outside) never becomes directly the 
fountain of the debitum morale which is a principle within. 
155
 ST I-II 99.5: ―non quasi praecise debita, sed propter melius.‖ About these debts Aquinas explains: 
―Inductionem habent et persuasionem.‖ (Ibid.). 
156
 See for example ST II-II 23.3 ad 1; 78.2 ad 2. 
157
 Acts of this kind are called also ―supererogatory.‖ For a further discussion see Michael Konrad, ―Atti 
supererogatori: un problema di prospettiva,‖ in La Sequela Christi. Dimensione morale e spirituale 
dell’esperienza cristiana, ed. Livio Melina - Olivier Bonnewijn (Rome: Lateran University Press, 2003), 323-
334. 
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In some places Aquinas distinguishes both subspecies of the moral due from their 
complementary point of reference. The strict moral due is measured from the perspective of 
the receiver, ex parte recipientis. It takes into account what is due to him. For example, the 
paying back of a promissory note returns what belongs to the receiver, and therefore is a strict 
moral due. In the case of a due of friends the obligation hinges on the side of the agent, ex 
parte dantis. The given thing does not really belong to the other; it is not a matter of 
restitution but a free gift from the agent‘s side. ―Something is fitting for the giver to give, 
which is not a debt from the side of receiver.‖158 
However, as moral due, both kinds depend on the agent‘s subjective virtuousness. Even the 
strict moral due hinges entirely on his goodwill. It cannot be demanded of him from the 
outside, at least under normal circumstances. This brings us immediately to the subject of the 
next section. 
 
The Legal Due 
The debitum legale is an obligation to perform certain acts that are prescribed by some 
positive legal determination. In other words, it is a duty ―according to the rule of a 
determining law‖159 and ―from the determination of the law.‖160 In the case of the debitum 
legale, therefore, the foundation of the obligation to act does not lie in the agent‘s own 
inclination towards the good. Rather, it is externally enforced, independent of the subjective 
state of the agent (his knowledge, his willingness to work for the other‘s good, his 
virtuousness etc.). The legal due is grounded in a written determination of the legitimate 
authority, who possesses the power to enforce the laws it promulgates, even by physical force 
if necessary. Aquinas mentions the judicial and ceremonial precepts of the Old Testament as 
an example of the debitum legale, i.e. positive determinations of the ius naturale that are 
obligatory only in virtue of their promulgation by the legitimate legal authority. 
 
                                                 
158
 In sent. IV 15.13D. The whole context: ―Iustitia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo proprie, quae scilicet respicit 
debitum ex parte recipientis; alio modo quasi similitudinarie, quae respicit debitum ex parte dantis. Aliquid enim 
decet dantem dare, quod tamen non habet recipiens debitum recipiendi.‖ See also ST II-II 31.3 ad 3: ―Duplex est 
debitum. Unum quidem quod non est numerandum in bonis eius qui debet, sed potius in bonis eius cui debetur. 
Puta si aliquis habet pecuniam aut rem aliam alterius vel furto sublatam vel mutuo acceptam sive depositam, vel 
aliquo alio simili modo, quantum ad hoc plus debet homo reddere debitum quam ex eo benefacere coniunctis. . . . 
Aliud autem est debitum quod computatur in bonis eius qui debet, et non eius cui debetur, puta si debeatur non 
ex necessitate iustitiae, sed ex quadam morali aequitate, ut contingit in beneficiis gratis susceptis.‖  
159
 ST I-II 99.5: ―secundum regulam legis determinantis.‖  
160
 Ibid., ―ex determinatione legis.‖ 
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The Conjunction of Moral and Legal Due 
The debitum morale and the debitum legale denote two clearly distinguished grounds of 
obligation, but according to their content they remain partly related. The moral obligation of 
an agent is not confined to acts which are indebted by nature, i.e. which belong to the ius 
naturale. It includes likewise all positive determinations (formulations as well as 
determinations, see above), since human reason acknowledges the ius naturale as well as the 
ius positivum as due to the other.
161
 Consequently, there are some actions which are 
obligatory in a double sense. If a positive law merely re-formulates something already right 
by nature, then the corresponding act is naturally due, for the agent is able to acknowledge by 
reason that this action should be done. It becomes due legally in a second moment in light of 
its legal determination by the legitimate authority. The act acquires what Aquinas calls it 
elsewhere a civil obligation.
162
 In this way even the moral due becomes commandable by 
public authority.
163
 On the other hand, if the lawgiver abolished the corresponding law thereby 
removing all legal obligation, the act would lose its character as a civil obligation, but 
nevertheless there remains a moral due.
164
 
Moreover, not every moral due is determinable as a legal due. The public authority can 
determine as positive law what belongs to the strict moral due (e.g. the prohibition of murder), 
but it cannot by law command all respective actions. Most notable in this regard, what we 
owe to our friends (the moral due of friends) is generally not a matter of legal obligation. 
 
                                                 
161
 Aquinas implicitly makes this assertion by saying that the lex humana obliges man in foro conscientiae (see 
ST I-II 96.4). But the domain of conscience belongs clearly to the moral debt; hence the debitum morale includes 
the fulfillment of the debitum legale. Kossel described this interconnection of both kinds of debt: ―Thomas 
makes no distinction between legal and moral obligation; law is part of the moral order. If a law does not bind 
morally, it does not bind legally. Law, or a legal system, is not some entity separate from the moral order with 
completely independent rules.‖ (Kossel, ―Natural Law and Human Law,‖ 181); see also Horst Seidl, ―Recht ohne 
Moral?,‖ Die Tagespost, 10.3.2007, 19. 
162
 Cf. ST II-II 88.3 ad 1. Mennessier comments rightly: ―La morale thomiste est une morale des vertus plus 
qu‘une morale de la loi. Mais cela n‘empêche que la loi elle-même soit principe d‘une obligation spéciale qui lui 
revient en propre: c‘est obligatoire non seulement parce que cela est raisonnable, mais parce que c‘est commandé. 
Cela fait un motif spécial d‘agir et donc suppose un habitus spécial disposant à bien accomplir ce qu‘exige la 
loi.― (I Mennessier, ―Appendice I: Notes explicatives,‖ in Somme théologique: La religion; Tome premier 2a-2ae, 
questions 80-87 (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1932), 230). 
163
 Certainly, moral debts which are necessary for virtuousness oblige the agent in his conscience even apart 
from a legal determination, but without a positive (legal) formulation these moral debts cannot be demanded by 
the other. As Gemmel has noted rightly, the essential function of the debitum legale is to allow an objective 
claim of certain actions disregarding the attitude of the other; see Jakob Gemmel, ―Die ‗iustitia‘ in der Lehre des 
hl. Thomas,‖ Scholastik 12 (1937): 218. 
164
 Aquinas mentions the case of the abolished ceremonial laws of the Old Testament which expressed something 
right by nature: ―Caeremonialia proprie erant in signum futuri, et ideo ad praesentiam veritatis significatae 
cessaverunt. Oblatio autem primitiarum fuit in signum praeteriti beneficii, ex quo etiam debitum recognitionis 
causatur secundum dictamen rationis naturalis. Et ideo in generali huiusmodi obligatio manet.‖ (ST II-II 86.4 ad 
1). 
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We can summarize the distinction made in ST I-II 99.5 as follows 
1. due according to the rule of reason  ................................. = moral due 
a) as necessary for the order of virtue  ..................... = strict moral due 
b) as useful for the better preserving  
of the order of virtue ........................................... = moral due of friends 
2. due from legal determination  .......................................... = legal due 
 
The debitum legale / morale in the Treatise on Justice in the Secunda secundae 
Despite our general intention to avoid quotations from the treatise on justice in this second 
part of our work,
165
 in the present case some references are indispensable. O‘Brien, who wrote 
on the moral and legal due in Aquinas, noted a significant change in the later questions of the 
Summa theologiae:
166
 Whereas Aquinas‘s discussion of the debitum morale in ST I-II 99.5 
includes both a strong sense
167
 (1a) as well as the weaker sense of a due between friends (1b), 
in ST II-II 80.1 debitum morale seems to be used exclusively in the restricted sense of moral 
due of friends (1b). In the subsequent section of the Secunda secundae (qq. 101-118) we find 
again another difference. Here the moral due stands for the moral due of friends as well as for 
actions which are indispensable for the moral order, but which are not determinable by an 
exact measure, as for example acts of piety towards one‘s parents.168  
O‘Brien also notes an important change in the case of the legal due. Whereas in ST I-II 99.5 
the legal due is strictly limited to legal determination, in ST II-II 80.1 and its subsequent 
questions it is used generally as a constitutive principle for acts of justice. ―The legal due is 
that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is properly the 
concern of justice, which is the principal virtue.‖ 169  Thus, whereas in ST I-II 99.5 the 
distinction between the moral due and the legal due reveals two different foundations of 
obligation, ST II-II 80.1 uses this distinction only ―as a principle of classification or 
systematization . . . purely formal or organizational,‖170 which is to say for distinguishing acts 
                                                 
165
 Cf. the explanation for that at the beginning of chapter 4. 
166
 O‘Brien, ―Appendix 1: Legal Debt, Moral Debt,‖ 316-320.  
167
 Ibid., 317. 
168
 See Ibid., 318-320. 
169
 ST II-II 80.1: ―Debitum quidem legale est ad quod reddendum aliquis lege adstringitur, et tale debitum 
proprie attendit iustitia quae est principalis virtus.‖ Note that in this article Aquinas is not describing justice as 
―the principal virtue‖ with respect to the other cardinal virtues, but rather with respect to those other virtues 
which are the potential parts of justice; cf. e.g. ST I-II 61.2 ad 1. We discuss the potential parts of justice below 
in section 4.5 
170
 O‘Brien, ―Appendix 1: Legal Debt, Moral Debt,‖ 318. 
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of proper justice from less obligatory acts. Subsequently, in an even stricter sense, the 
distinction becomes a ―principle of judgment about the moral order in its realities.‖171 
Admittedly, these three meanings are somehow interrelated, but the repeated change in 
meaning within one work is surprising. 
However, we want to argue that Aquinas does not use the comparison with different meanings, 
which would indeed be strange since he wrote both parts in quite a brief period of time.
172
 
Rather, it is the different perspective of ST I-II 99.5 and the Secunda secundae that lead to the 
seemingly different accounts. Thus, we will take a moment to investigate the proper context 
of q. 99.5, and thereby clarify the coherent meaning of the later texts.. 
ST I-II 99.5 asks whether the Old Testament contains only moral, judicial, and ceremonial 
precepts. By introducing the distinction between the moral and the legal due, Aquinas clarifies 
why certain precepts belong to the divine law.
173
 Thus, the general focus of the article is a 
written law, namely the divine law, a debitum legale. But not all divine precepts are 
commanded for the same reasons, and it is the proper purpose of the article to discuss this 
issue.  
Against this background the description of the legal due in q. 99.5 takes on a fairly qualified 
meaning that fits in exactly with what the text is actually saying. We will summarize the 
argument in our own words. 
(a) Some precepts belong to the written precepts of the Old Testament because they demand a 
strict moral due;  
(b) by contrast, the moral dues of friends do not fall under the command of written precepts; 
(c) but there are also some acts that are in themselves irrelevant for the order of virtue, but 
because of a positive determination they also belong to the divine law, or the divine legal 
due. 
Thus, the reference to debitum legale is used here in the very qualified sense as a 
determination of an ius positivum.
174
 As a result, Aquinas only gives the judicial and 
ceremonial precepts of the Old Testament as examples. However, these legal dues are only a 
small part of the legal due of the whole divine law, which is the proper topic of the article. 
                                                 
171
 Ibid. . 
172
 Aquinas wrote ST I-II in 1271 and ST II-II in 1271-1272; see Jean P. Torrell, Magister Thomas. Leben und 
Werk des Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg: Herder, 1995), 348. 
173
 That the context is of the divine law is irrelevant.  
174
 Cf. the Aristotelian description of the iustum legale, quoted in ST II-II 57.2 ad 2 ―Legale iustum est quod ex 
principio quidem nihil differt sic vel aliter, quando autem ponitur, differt.‖ 
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Aquinas carefully chooses for this example of the strict moral due the precept against murder 
and thievery, i.e. a legal due, noting that both are ―precisely commanded or prohibited by 
law.‖175 
Hence, the nature of the legal due in ST I-II 99.5 is somewhat ambivalent. According to its 
proper definition it is contrasted with the moral due, both the strict due and the due of friends. 
Simultaneously, however, the legal due is opposed exclusively to the moral due of friends 
since the strict moral due as well as the legal due belong to the divine law, but not so the 
moral due in its weaker sense (proper melius). This is the conclusion Aquinas draws at the 
end of the article: ―From this it is clear that all the precepts of the law are either moral [i.e. a 
strict moral due], ceremonial, or judicial [i.e. a legal due].‖ 176  Thus, we can visualize 
Aquinas‘s distinctions as follows. 
 
acts… moral due 
parts of the divine 
precepts as legal due 
…necessary for maintaining the 
order of virtue 
strict moral due 
moral precepts 
(insofar determinable) 
…useful for maintaining the 
order of virtue to a higher degree 
moral due of friends (–)177 
…by themselves irrelevant for the 
order of virtue 
no moral due 
unless determined by law 
but then: strict moral due 
judicial and ceremonial 
precepts 
Figure 7 
 
If we read the moral-legal distinction of ST I-II 99.5 in this way, it fits perfectly with 
Aquinas‘s doctrine throughout the Secunda secundae. Only the perspective changes. In 99.5 
he focuses on the written divine law of the Old Testament and identifies the reasons why 
certain actions belong to it, either because of a strict moral due or because of some legal 
determination. In the Secunda secundae the legal due is always taken in this more general 
sense, either as a strict moral due or as a legal due (either 1a or 2), since for the determination 
of the just act it makes no difference whether a law is a moral precept or a positive 
                                                 
175
 ST I-II 99.5. 
176
 ST I-II 99.5: ―Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod omnia legis praecepta continentur sub moralibus, 
caeremonialibus et iudicialibus.‖ 
177
 In the Old Testament the moral due of friends is not commanded by precepts but ―recommended‖ by 
―mandata, quia quandam introductionem habent et persuasionem.‖ (ST I-II 99.5). 
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determination. Thus, law as a whole (the legal due) is compared with those moral obligations 
that are not determinable by law, which might be either, as Aquinas notes in ST II-II 80.1, 
recommended propter melius (the moral due of friends), or which are necessary for 
maintaining virtue but indeterminable by law.
178
 Thus, the comparison is effectively the very 
same as ST I-II 99.5. Likewise in qq. 101 to 118 the distinction focuses on legal 
determinations as the matter of justice, and on moral dues as either strict but undeterminable 
obligations or as the due of friends. 
To conclude, there is no need to claim any insurmountable inconsistency between the moral 
and the legal due in the Summa theologiae. 
 
 
4.3.3 Aquinas’s “Legalistic” Account of the Matter of Justice Proper 
 
Having distinguished the two different kinds of obligation – the moral due as a duty rising up 
from within the agent, and the legal due imposed upon him by an external authority – we have 
yet to clarify their relation to justice as a virtue. Which is the proper object of justice? Is it the 
strict moral due or the legal due? 
 
St. Thomas‘s position is surprising but unequivocal. Throughout his oeuvre he describes the 
legal due as the specific matter of justice. Proper acts of justice are derived ―from the 
necessity of law‖ or ―from the obligation of law.‖179 ―Justice is about operations done in 
                                                 
178
 Focusing on the restricted sense of the moral due in ST II-II 80.1, O‘Brien obviously ignores that Aquinas 
mentions even here a moral due which ―est sic necessarium ut sine eo honestas morum conservari non possit.‖ 
Thus, it is incorrect to read the moral due of ST II-II 80.1 principally as ―diminished form of indebtedness.‖ 
(O‘Brien, ―Appendix 1: Legal Debt, Moral Debt,‖ 318). Rather Aquinas asserts: ―Debitum autem morale est 
quod aliquis debet ex honestate virtutis.‖ (ST II-II 80.1). 
Also Labourdette‘s interpretation of the debitum morale as ―devoirs mineurs― and the debitum legale as ―devoirs 
forts― (M.-Michel Labourdette, Cours de théologie morale: La justice (IIa-IIae, 80-120), vol. 2 (Toulouse, 1960), 
431) is only possible if one takes an isolated view of the Secunda secundae. Actually the legal debt surpasses the 
moral debt not necessarily in terms of obligation (since there are also some strict moral debts), but rather with 
respect to its objective measurability – and consequently regarding the possibility to claim for it (see section 
4.3.3). 
179
 Indirect In sent. III 33.3.4A. Thomas describes here the potential parts of justice but refers to proper justice in 
an indirect way by describing it ―ex necessitate legis― or ―ex obligatione legis.‖ Similarly in In sent. III 33.3.4C. 
In the treatise on justice Aquinas asserts several times the essential rule of the law for the act of justice. For 
example, the judgment (as actus iustitiae) has to be passed ―ex regulis iuris‖ (ST II-II 60.1 ad 1). In ST II-II 60.5 
he explicitly poses the question whether one has to judge always according to the written law (affirmative). See 
also ST II-II 79.1 where Aquinas asserts that justice is concerned about ―debitum in ordine ad legem divinam vel 
humanam.‖ 
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respect to another person under the notion of a legal due.‖180 ―The legal due is that which one 
is constrained by law to render; and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the 
principal virtue.‖181 ―[An action] belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a 
legal due.‖182 Aquinas makes similar statements in many others places.183  
These assertions raise an important question. In section 4.2 we mentioned the distinction 
between ius naturale and ius legale. Both comprise the proper matter of just acts. Now, 
however, Aquinas seems to claim that only the legal right belongs to justice. ―Justice is about 
operations done in respect of another person under the notion of a legal due.‖ Does Aquinas 
really hold such a legalistic account of justice? Is murder only qualified as unjust if prohibited 
by law? 
For a solution to this question we have to deepen once again the understanding of the 
objective character of justice. In section 4.1 we examined the independent determination of 
the just act from the subjective state of the agent. We recall from that discussion that the right 
mean of temperance and fortitude hinges on the affective conditions of the particular subject, 
whereas the right mean of justice disregards individual variables.  
This objectivity of justice implies a consequence which we have not yet mentioned. The 
justice of an operation can be determined not only without reference to the affective state of 
the agent, but also apart from the agent‘s own insight into the just quality of a particular 
action, which in turn leaves aside also the agent‘s felt obligation to render the other his due. 
Nevertheless, even without the agent‘s recognition of the act as just, the act itself will remain 
objectively appropriate, just, and required, and may even be acknowledged by observers as 
just.  
For these reasons, the object of justice is to be determined not by referring to the moral due, 
which hinges by definition on the agent‘s personal insight into his obligation to perform the 
just act, but by invoking the legal due. As long as a certain external relationship (the 
adaequatum alteri) is not defined objectively by a positive law – positive in the wider sense 
as written law – it is left solely to the subjective honesty or attention of the individual to 
                                                 
180
 ST II-II, 23.3 ad 1: ―Iustitia est circa operationes quae sunt ad alium sub ratione debiti legalis.‖ 
181
 ST II-II 80.1: ―Debitum quidem legale est ad quod reddendum aliquis lege adstringitur, et tale debitum 
proprie attendit iustitia quae est principalis virtus.‖ 
182
 ST II-II 106.5: ―Ad iustitiam quidem pertinet quando recompensatio habet rationem debiti legalis.‖ 
183
 ScG II 28.11: ―Iustitia autem proprie dicta debitum necessitatis requirit: quod enim ex iustitia alicui redditur, 
ex necessitate iuris ei debetur.‖ Or ST I-II 100.9 ad 1: ―Modus faciendi actum iustitiae qui cadit sub praecepto, 
est ut fiat aliquid secundum ordinem iuris.‖ Further ST II-II 118.3 ad 2: ―Iustitia proprie statuit mensuram in 
acceptionibus et conservationibus divitiarum secundum rationem debiti legalis, ut scilicet homo nec accipiat nec 
retineat alienum.‖ Furthermore ST II-II 78.2 ad 2; 88.3 ad 1; 106.1 ad 2; 106.4 ad 1109.3; 117.5 ad 1.  
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acknowledge the ius as a debt or not.
184
 Only the legal determination – either of an ius 
naturale or an ius positivum in the proper sense – provides the necessary basis for an 
objective claim of certain duties.
185
 Admittedly, the obligation to fulfill the strict moral due as 
well as the invitation to render the moral due of friends remain completely valid, even apart 
from any legal determination. But without a legal formulation even the most fundamental 
moral debts couldn‘t be demanded by the other. Aquinas clarifies the issue with the example 
of promise keeping: ―A man should keep any promise he makes to another man according to 
his honesty, and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man to be under a civil 
obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are required.‖186 
And in the case of paying a just reward for work he explains: 
 
A reward may be due to a worker in a double way. In one way from a debt of legal justice. 
Such a debt is the one resulting from the compact made between a workman and his employer, 
whereby the workman can compel the other for his wages. In another way from a debt of 
friendly justice [ex debito iustitiae amicabilis]. For, when one man does a service to another in 
a friendly way, it is due that the other repays him in his way, although he cannot compel him 
by a lawsuit.
187
 
 
In both cases the reward is morally due to the other, but only the first case, determined as a 
legal due (or at least: determinable), is an act of proper justice. Thus, if St. Thomas refers to 
the debitum legale as a constitutive principle of the proper act of justice, this in no way 
depreciates the strict obligation imposed on an agent by the debitum morale.
188
 But the latter 
                                                 
184
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Debitum ex honestate.‖ Even clearer is ST II-II 106.4 ad 1: ―Debitum morale dependet 
ex honestate debentis.‖ 
185
 Sertillanges correctly explains: ―In Thomism, morals strictly speaking have no obligation or sanction. Let us 
not be misunderstood. We mean that the good is not imposed on the human act from without, like a decree which 
deprives a man of his own spontaneity of action or of choosing from the objects which surround him.‖ (A. D. 
Sertillanges, Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy (London: Sands, 1931), 248). 
186
 ST II-II 88.3 ad 1: ―Secundum honestatem ex qualibet promissione homo homini obligatur, et haec est 
obligatio iuris naturalis. Sed ad hoc quod aliquis obligetur ex aliqua promissione obligatione civili, quaedam alia 
requiruntur.‖ 
187
 Contra imp. 2.6 ad 27: ―Merces autem alicui operanti debetur dupliciter. Uno modo ex debito legalis iustitiae: 
sicut quando pactum intervenit inter operantem et eum cui operatur, ita quod operarius potest compellere alium 
ad solvendum. Alio modo ex debito iustitiae amicabilis: sicut quando aliquis amicabiliter alteri de suo labore 
servit, debitum est ut alter ei suo modo vicem rependat, quamvis non posset eum per iudicium compellere.‖ 
188
 This is the necessary conclusion of O‘Brien‘s account of the moral-legal dichotomy in the Secunda secundae: 
On the one side is the moral due as due between friends, on the other side is the legal due as the proper matter of 
justice. According to our view, however, the legal determination contains likewise a strict moral due. 
MacGuigan correctly explains: ―Legal obligation, then, depends upon both intrinsic and extrinsic causes, but in 
different ways. The intrinsic cause, the natural law, is the primary and general cause of legal obligation, whereas 
the extrinsic cause, legislative authority, is the particular cause which determines the general cause to a specific 
effect. There is no conflict between the two causes because each is restricted in its efficacy to the area in which it 
coalesces with the other.‖ (Mark R. MacGuigan, ―St. Thomas and Legal Obligation,‖ The New Scholasticism 35 
(1961): 307-308). 
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fails to provide a civil obligation, an objective ―demandability‖ of a certain action as 
something which is due. Therefore Aquinas determines the object of justice in reference to the 
legal due which ―coincides with a civil obligation, involving a kind of necessity.‖189 Only on 
the basis of a legal due is ―the laborer able to sue the other for his wages.‖190 Only in the case 
of debitum legale is man ―compelled by law to make restitution.‖191 
In summary, since the act of justice has to be determinable in an objective way, only the 
debitum legale constitutes the just act in the proper sense. 
So far, so good. From the foregoing it seems that Aquinas takes a quite legalistic view of 
justice. Our investigation into the issue, however, is far from over. Up to now we have 
discussed at length the object of justice, but mentioned only briefly justice as a virtue. We 
shall turn to this topic in the following section.  
 
 
4.4 The Subjective Character of Justice as a Virtue 
 
Hitherto we focused on the exterior act of justice. The just act is determined by its adequacy 
to the other, either as retribution or as non-violation (section 4.1). Some acts are adequate to 
the other by nature (ius naturale), others by legal determination (ius positivum) (section 4.2). 
The agent is obliged to perform a just act on account of a moral or legal due (section 4.3). 
However, we have not yet examined justice as a virtue. Arriving so late at our our proper 
topic should not be too surprising. Having had first to establish the objective determinability 
of the just act we could neglect justice as a virtue until now.  
 
                                                 
189
 ST II-II 78.2 ad 2: ―Recompensatio alicuius beneficii dupliciter fieri potest. Uno quidem modo, ex debito 
iustitiae, ad quod aliquis ex certo pacto obligari potest. Et hoc debitum attenditur secundum quantitatem beneficii 
quod quis accepit. Et ideo ille qui accipit mutuum pecuniae, vel cuiuscumque similis rei cuius usus est eius 
consumptio, non tenetur ad plus recompensandum quam mutuo acceperit. Unde contra iustitiam est si ad plus 
reddendum obligetur. Alio modo tenetur aliquis ad recompensandum beneficium ex debito amicitiae, in quo 
magis consideratur affectus ex quo aliquis beneficium contulit quam etiam quantitas eius quod fecit. Et tali 
debito non competit civilis obligatio, per quam inducitur quaedam necessitas, ut non spontanea recompensatio 
fiat.‖  
Regarding the interpretation of the function of the legal due for the act of proper justice I follow Gemmel, ―Die 
‗iustitia‘ in der Lehre des hl. Thomas,‖ 218. 
190
 Contra imp. 2.6 ad 27: ―Quando pactum intervenit inter operantem et eum cui operatur, . . . operarius potest 
compellere alium ad solvendum.‖ 
191
 ST II-II 102.2 ad 2: ―debitum . . . legale, ad quod reddendum homo lege compellitur.‖ 
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Virtue is defined as a habitus operativus. Thomas repeats again and again the definition of 
Aristotle: ―Virtue is that which makes its possessor good and his work good.‖192 Virtue makes 
the man good as an agent of action. Accordingly, virtue resides in one of his operative powers 
and disposes it for performing good work. Thus, justice disposes man to perform the just act, 
i.e. to render to everyone what is due to him, the ius understood as opus adaequatum alteri.  
Thomas uses two definitions for describing justice as a virtue. Sometimes he uses the 
Aristotelian definition of justice as a ―habit by which someone who is just is said to be doing 
the just thing.‖193 This account, however, leaves unclear which human power is perfected by 
justice. Therefore, St. Thomas more often quotes a definition from the tradition of Roman 
jurisprudence, ascribed to Ulpian (+228) and passed down by Justinian‘s Digest: ―Justice is 
the constant and permanent will to render everyone his right.‖194 External actions are, if they 
are human acts, effects of the working of some internal principles. For example, the virtue 
which rules external actions is not situated in human limbs. The extremities, to be sure, have 
to be moved by an internal principle, which itself has to be perfected by a special virtue,
195
 
namely justice which resides in the will and rules external actions as its proper matter. Hence, 
though acts of justice excel by their objective determination (since they are specified by 
external categories), nevertheless the virtue of justice works internally to perfect of an internal 
faculty.  
These few lines are already enough to understand the essential features of justice as a virtue. It 
is not necessary for our research to present a more detailed discussion of these two definitions. 
Regarding this we can point the reader toward the secondary literature.
196
  
It is important to consider one point which shows the immense difference between Aquinas‘s 
account of justice as a moral virtue and the modern understanding of justice. It will also help 
to clarify later the issue of infused justice.  
                                                 
192
 ST I-II 55.3 sed contra: ―Virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit.‖ Cf. NE II 6 
1106a15. 
193
 In ethic. V 10.3: ―Habitus, secundum quem ille qui est iustus, dicitur esse operativus iusti.‖ Cf. ST II-II 58.1. 
194
 See Justinian Digest I 1.1, leg. 10, (published in 522; for a new English edition, see Justinian, The Digest of 
Justinian, ed. Alan Watson (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998)). St. Thomas quotes the 
definition for example in De veritate 1.5 ad 13 and ST II-II 58.1: ―Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas 
unicuique ius suum tribuens.‖ 
195
 Cf. ST I-II 17.9; see also Aquinas‘s discussion of the various subjects of virtues (e.g. ST I-II 50 and 56, De 
virt. in com. 2-7).  
196
 Cf. for justice as a virtuous habit: Dias, ―The Concept of Justice,‖ 1-2; Aubert, Le droit romain dans l’oeuvre 
de saint Thomas, 88-91; Porter, ―The Virtue of Justice,‖ 273-277. For justice in the Middle Ages see: Matthias 
Lutz-Bachmann, ―The Discovery of a Normative Theory of Justice in Medieval Philosophy,‖ Medieval 
Philosophy and Theology 9 (2000): 1-14; Kent, Virtues of the Will. 
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For St. Thomas justice is a virtue, i.e. the internal disposition of an agent to render everyone 
his due constantly, readily, and with pleasure. Continuity, readiness and joyfulness in human 
actions are general features of every moral virtue.
197
 Hence, once equipped with justice, it is 
of interest to an agent himself to render everyone his due and to avoid any act which might 
harm another. Justice disposes the agent for just actions. Hence, it becomes a desire of the 
agent himself, an active and efficient desire, to give everybody what he deserves, namely his 
iustum, not because of any external coercion (e.g. by the public authority), not because of the 
obtrusive claim of the other, but simply because of his own inclination towards interpersonal 
equality.
198
 
In contrast, the contemporary view does not understand the iustum (i.e. the ―right‖) as 
virtuous operations of the agent himself by which he equates himself to the other, but vice 
versa as legitimate interests of a subject who is entitled to demand certain acts and things 
from the other. ―Rights‖ are what the other has to do for me. It no longer describes my 
operation by which I desire to achieve equality between the other and myself, but instead 
refers to my right to something that the other has to satisfy. Let us quote one example of a 
scholar who describes the issue of rights as following: ―To have a right is to have a rationally 
justifiable claim to something (e.g., an object, a mode of treatment) on the part of other.‖199 In 
this way, justice is reduced to governing mere external exchanges of duties and claims. For 
Aquinas, however, justice as a moral virtue implies a subjective disposition for a certain mode 
of acting. 
Finnis describes this original understanding of justice very well:  
 
To be concerned about justice is to be concerned about treating other people in the way they 
are entitled to. Requirements of justice are identified not by reflecting on one‘s own character 
but by considering what will establish or preserve a reasonable relationship of proportionate 
                                                 
197
 Cf. De virt. in com. 1.  
198
 Pinckaers explains about this personal inclination to render everybody his due: ―A constant will means a 
personal attitude, open and firm, leading us to recognize what we owe to the other and to give it to him. . . . To 
suffer injustice is indeed painful in the extreme, but if we truly love justice, we shall see it as a greater 
misfortune to lose our love of this virtue than to suffer some material or physical loss.‖ (Pinckaers, The Pursuit 
of Happiness, 95-101, here100-101).  
199
 Steven M. Duncan, A Primer of Modern Virtue Ethics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 95. 
Cf. Almond who clearly reduces the issue of rights to a mere question of claims (Brenda Almond, ―Rights,‖ in A 
Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 259-269, esp. 262). Quite 
different is the view of St. Thomas: ―Aquinas does not use the word ius to refer to any subjective claim or 
demand.‖ (Robert Goodwin, ―Aquinas‘ Justice: An Interpretation,‖ New Scholasticism 63 (1989): 285). 
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equality between us, in relation to some act, forbearance, arrangement, or other subject-matter 
which is external, other-regarding (other-affecting).
200
 
 
Hence, comparing Aquinas‘s vision and the modern accounts of justice we observe a 
―reversal‖ which turned around the original virtuous disposition of the agent to render 
everyone his due to the order of legitimate claims regarding the other. Pinckaers outlined the 
historical development as follows:  
 
At the end of the Middle Ages a subjective concept of rights was elaborated and widely 
imposed. Rights, together with justice, were now chiefly understood as those things to which I 
had a right, and which I could demand from others and from society for myself or for the 
group with which I identified. Henceforth a right signified that which was strictly due me in 
justice, as we say. The essential orientation of justice was thus reversed. Formerly it had been 
directed from me to others and consisted in giving. Now it was directed principally from 
others to me in the form of a demand I could make of them, and consisted rather in taking. 
Deprived of its personal content, justice became harsh. It was now a part of the human 
struggle for the satisfaction of human needs, in any area where contrary freedoms stood in 
confrontation. It became rigid. Popular usage bears witness to this in the common expression, 
―unyielding as justice.‖201 
 
Because of this reversal, the modern position views justice as cold and impersonal. Today, 
justice is understood usually as a matter of legal affairs. However, it originally was a question 
of internal righteousness.
202
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 Finnis, Aquinas, 187-188. See also Utz, ―Kommentar,‖ 579-580. Utz emphasizes that – though justice is 
determined objectively – nevertheless the virtuous act cannot be reduced to an external operation, but includes 
also interior elements. 
201
 Pinckaers, The Pursuit of Happiness, 101. The same argument is made by Pieper, ―Gerechtigkeit - heute,‖ 
262. For the biblical sources of this medieval understanding of justice, see Pinckaers, La justice évangélique, 69-
79. 
A good description of the historical evolution of the term ―ius‖ is also found in John R.T. Lamont, ―Conscience, 
Freedom, Rights: Idols of the Enlightenment Religion,‖ The Thomist 73 (2009): 198-235. J. Lamont refers to the 
medieval understanding of ius as ―objective right,‖ and confronts it with the ―subjective right‖ of modern times.  
202
 As a consequence, contemporary social ethics are more concerned about concrete rights than about justice as 
personal virtue; if they mention justice as a virtue at all, it is often as a quality of human society (cf. Porter, ―The 
Virtue of Justice,‖ 277). For example, at the beginning of A theory of Justice, J. Rawls asserts that justice is ―the 
first virtue of social institutions.‖ (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1971), 3). Again Pinckaers: ―In our liberal societies justice results from a rational 
organization that aims at establishing equality between the rights of individuals, that is, the right of each person 
to satisfy his needs. We are dealing here with a basically self-centered concept of man. We could call it ‗rational 
egoism‘ and ‗solipsism.‘ Justice becomes the art of organizing society, viewed as ‗a collection of egoisms,‘ by 
dint of laws that will avoid violent confrontation, favor collaboration, and contribute to the well-being of the 
majority. To assure their rational and scientific character, these theories will, moreover, abstract from what 
pertains to affectivity and personal factors which do not lend themselves to generalization.‖ (Pinckaers, ―The 
Role of Virtue in Moral Theology,‖ 295). 
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How did such a fundamental turn become possible? We want to argue that it was not by 
chance that such a principal change occurred precisely to the virtue of justice. Rather, justice 
possesses, quasi by essence, an interior tendency to be reduced to external claims and legal 
determinations, and thereby it stands in constant risk of losing its consideration as a moral 
virtue. 
As seen only in the case of justice, it is possible and even necessary to determine the virtuous 
act by external criteria, as an opus adaequatum alteri, independent of the interior principles 
located within the agent. ―The right in a work of justice is constituted in comparison to the 
other, even besides its relation to the agent.‖203 Moreover, just acts are not only objectively 
judged, disregarding the agent‘s subjective conditions, but the agent can even perform just 
acts without intending them and without attending to their adequacy to the other. Certainly, 
acts which lack a corresponding intention or attention are not counted as moral acts of the 
agent, even though the exterior action remains adaequatum alteri. Though it wouldn‘t be a 
just act formaliter, nevertheless it would be just materialiter. This is possible since the end of 
the just act is not the good of the agent, but the good of the other.
204
 To use Finnis‘s 
expression, the aim of justice is not the clean hands and clean heart of the agent himself, but 
the accomplishment of the ―right‖ towards the other.205 If the due of the other is achieved, a 
just act is realized, regardless of the moral conditions or intentions of the agent. Or as Aquinas 
puts it, a man who performs a just act out of ignorance wouldn‘t be himself iustus, but his 
deed is certainly an iustum.
206
  
Quite different is the case of the affective virtues. Every act of fortitude and temperance is 
measured in relation to the agent himself, since it implies the realization of a certain work in 
reference to a concrete affective status. Hence, forming an objective determination of 
courageous or temperate deeds that disregards the individual agent and his actual attention to 
the concrete case is impossible. A soldier who behaves as usual while not noticing a 
dangerous situation and thus feeling no fear does not act courageously. Similarly, somebody 
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 ST II-II 57.1: ―Rectum vero quod est in opere iustitiae, etiam praeter comparationem ad agentem, constituitur 
per comparationem ad alium.‖ And further: ―Sic igitur iustum dicitur aliquid, quasi habens rectitudinem iustitiae, 
ad quod terminatur actio iustitiae, etiam non considerato qualiter ab agente fiat.‖ 
204
 In more detail: ST II-II 59.3. 
205
 Cf. Finnis, Aquinas, 138: ―The good of justice {bonum iustitiae} is not the ‗clean hands‘ (better: clean heart) 
of those who are to do justice but rather – what Aquinas puts at the head of his treatise on justice – justice‘s very 
object: the right(s) of the human person entitled to the equal treatment we call justice.‖ 
206
 ―Quidam operantur iusta, et tamen non dicimus esse iustos: sicut cum aliqui operantur ea quae sunt statuta 
legibus vel inviti, vel propter ignorantiam, aut propter aliquam aliam causam, puta propter lucrum, et non propter 
amorem ipsorum operum iustitiae: et tales inquam non dicuntur iusti, quamvis operentur ea quae oportet eos 
facere, et etiam ea quae oportet facere bonum virum.‖ (In ethics. VI 10.15). See also De veritate 24.12 ad 20: 
―Carens iustitia potest facere actum iustitiae imperfectum, qui est iusta agere: et hoc propter principia naturalis 
iuris rationi indita; non autem potest facere actum iustitiae perfectum, qui est facere iusta iuste.‖ 
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who is economical with food because of meanness is not temperate. Such acts might possess 
an external similarity with courageous and temperate deeds, and those agents might even 
perform external acts that are usually signs of fortitude and temperance, but these acts cannot 
be formally courageous or temperate since they are not ruled by right reason.
207
 
Therefore, Aquinas concludes: ―In a special way justice has its own proper object over and 
above the other virtues, and this object is called the iustum.‖208 The just act is always a just act, 
at least materially, since its character does not depend on the relation to the agent but to the 
other. 
This examination of the objective determination of the just act may provide a reasonable 
explanation for the modern reversal of justice. The emphasis on the objective determinability 
of the just act risks underestimating the character of justice as a moral perfection of the agent 
himself. For Aquinas both aspects of justice – its objective determinability and its ability to 
perfect the subject – belong essentially to its nature as a virtue.209 
 
The foregoing investigation brings to light an important issue for our project. Though the 
topic of our thesis is justice as an infused virtue, we have to compensate for the fact that focus 
is quite rarely given to justice as a virtue. The majority of the thesis, therefore, is concerned 
with how one determines the just quality of various actions, especially the specific acts of 
infused justice. To this end, we have been obliged to distinguish the objective and subjective 
approaches to evaluating just acts. Admittedly, in describing virtue Aquinas always follows 
the maxim that habits are specified by their proper acts, and acts by their proper objects.
210
 
However, because of the special character of the just act, this common principle bears 
particular importance in the case of justice. Though one cannot grasp the full significance of 
justice without tacking into account the subjective grounding of the just act in a virtuous habit 
of the agent, it remains true that the description of the content of the just act is independent of 
that virtue 
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 See once again ST II-II 59.2 ad 3: ―Obiectum temperantiae non est aliquid exterius constitutum, sicut 
obiectum iustitiae, sed obiectum temperantiae, idest temperatum, accipitur solum in comparatione ad ipsum 
hominem. Et ideo quod est per accidens et praeter intentionem non potest dici temperatum nec materialiter nec 
formaliter, et similiter neque intemperatum. Et quantum ad hoc est dissimile in iustitia et in aliis virtutibus 
moralibus.‖ 
208
 ST II-II 57.1: ―Specialiter iustitiae prae aliis virtutibus determinatur secundum se obiectum, quod vocatur 
iustum.‖ 
209
 This twofold quality of justice – its objective determination and subjective inclination – is well described in 
Lippert, Recht und Gerechtigkeit, 77-82. 
210
 Cf. footnote 44.  
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This issue may become clearer by looking briefly at the structure of Aquinas‘s discussion of 
justice in ST II-II. In Question 58 St. Thomas begins to follow the common method of 
examinging justice as a virtue, but after Question 59 the whole discussion focuses on just and 
unjust actions.
211
 This shift in emphasis away from habits and toward actions does not 
undermine the general importance justice as a virtue, however. The shift is simply a 
consequence of the special structure of the just act. Simultaneously, this shift in emphasis 
justifies the method of our thesis, which focuses similarly on the determination of the specific 
act of infused justice. 
 
 
4.5 Different Meanings of Justice and Its Various Parts  
 
In section 4.1.3, we distinguished justice in a general sense as a virtue which rules all 
interpersonal actions from justice in its proper sense as a special virtue. This twofold 
distinction, however, is not exhaustive. In his discussion of the various cardinal virtues, 
Aquinas divides each of them into various parts. His treatment of justice emerges as a 
complex, for St. Thomas adopts several additional understandings of justice from Aristotle. 
Thus, P. Geach is not totally wrong in noting that ―justice is an immensely problematic 
concept: there are, in old jargon, many parts of justice – there are many strands plaited 
together, and each strand carries many knotty problems.‖212 In the following section we want 
to give a summary overview of the various meanings and parts of justice.  
When Aquinas introduces the cardinal virtues for the first time (ST I-II 61),
213
 he distinguishes 
two meanings which these virtues can adopt: 
First, the cardinal virtues may be understood simply as the common and formal characters 
which are found in every moral virtue.
214
 In this sense, every moral virtue can be called 
prudence insofar it accords to right reason; each can be called justice, since it achieves what is 
right and due; each can adopt the name of temperance, since it governs passions; and finally 
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 This approach is unique in Aquinas‘s portrayal of the cardinal virtues in the Secunda secundae; the treatise on 
prudence, fortitude and temperance begin with a special question on that virtue in particular (see ST II-II 47, 123 
and 141). 
212
 Geach, The Virtues, 110. 
213
 The same distinction is made in De virt. card. 1 ad 5; for a general outline of this ―system‖ of the cardinal 
virtues, cf. Mieth, Die neuen Tugenden, 25-28. 
214
 ―Secundum communes rationes formales . . . quasi generales ad omnes virtutes.‖ (ST I-II 61.3). As Aquinas 
explains in ST I-II 61.4, the cardinal virtues describe in this sense just ―generales conditiones humani animi.‖ See 
also De virt. card. 1 ad 1 and In ethic. II 8. 
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each is fortitude insofar it provides firmness against the uncontrolled fervor of the affect.
215
 
Hence, in this first and general sense justice signifies simply ―a certain rectitude of the mind 
by which man acts as he should do in every matter.‖216 For our present project, this most 
general understanding of justice is of no interest. 
Besides this first meaning, the cardinal virtues can stand for more specific virtues, distinct 
from each other. This happens again in a twofold way. First, a cardinal virtue can signify the 
perfection of a certain area of man‘s practical life: prudence perfects right practical reasoning, 
justice governs voluntary external operations, fortitude regulates the passions of the irascible 
appetite, and temperance those of the concupiscible appetite.
217
 Accordingly, St. Thomas says 
of justice: ―All moral virtues, which concern themselves with operations, come together in a 
certain general notion of justice, which is concerned with the due of the other.‖218 This is the 
sense of justice with which we introduced our discussion of the just act in section 4.1.  
Secondly, a cardinal virtue can be taken in an even more special way. Accordingly, its 
definition does not cover the whole of its potential practical matter (i.e. all external actions, all 
passions, etc.), but only ―what is most principal in each matter.‖219 Thus, the virtue perfects 
the agent with respect to ―special matters.‖220 In the case of justice, the special matter of the 
whole range of voluntary external operations are actions ―according to the ratio of right and 
debt, which is found first of all in exchanges or distributions which relate to the other with 
equality.‖221 This describes the proper sense of justice. 
Thus, we have summarized the various senses of justice as a cardinal virtue. However, 
Aquinas makes a further threefold distinction in terms of each cardinal virtue‘s various parts: 
its integral parts, its subjective parts, and its potential parts. The importance of these various 
parts is explained and exemplified most clearly at the beginning of the treatise on prudence in 
the Secunda secundae: 
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 Cf. ST I-II 61.3: ―Omnis virtus quae facit bonum in consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis 
virtus quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et 
deprimit, dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur 
fortitudo.‖ 
216
 ST I-II 61.4: ―Quaedam rectitudo animi, per quam homo operatur quod debet in quacumque materia.‖ In ST I-
II 65.1 Aquinas describes virtues as modus generalis virtutum even yet briefer merely as rectitude. 
217
 Cf. ST I-II 61.2. 
218
 ST I-II 60.3: ―Omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, conveniunt in quadam generali ratione 
iustitiae, quae attenditur secundum debitum ad alterum.‖ See also ST I-II 59.5. 
219
 ST I-II 61.3: ―quod est praecipuum in unaquaquae materia.‖ 
220
 ST I-II 61.4: ―ad materias speciales.‖ 
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Parts are of three kinds, namely integral, as walls, roof, and the foundation are parts of a house; 
subjective, as ox and lion are parts of animal; and potential, as the nutritive and sensitive 
powers are parts of the soul. Hence, in three ways parts can be assigned to a virtue. First, in 
likeness to integral parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, 
are called the parts of that virtue. . . . The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. . . . 
The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain 
secondary acts or matters, not having the whole power of the principal virtue.
222
 
 
We will see in section 7 that the treatise on justice in ST II-II also follows this division. 
Therefore, a short overview of the various parts of justice could be helpful. For a description 
of the integral parts of justice we can refer again to section 4.1.3, where we noticed the 
virtue‘s ―double face.‖ On the one hand, justice puts forward a positive face, which describes 
the act of restitution in exchange for a received service. On the other hand, justice can also put 
forward a negative fact, which describes the non-activity of abstaining from any injurious act 
regarding the other.
223
 Both characteristics are essential for justice as a particular virtue. 
Justice wouldn‘t be justice if it lacked either of these parts. Therefore, St. Thomas portrays 
both of them as integral parts of justice. 
In the next sections we will press on and describe the subjective and potential parts of justice 
(sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). Afterwards, we will treat briefly special understanding of of legal 
justice (section 4.5.3) and metaphorical justice (section 4.5.4) that St. Thomas adopts from 
Aristotle. 
 
 
4.5.1 Commutative and Distributive Justice as Subjective Parts 
 
Aquinas treats justice as a particular virtue in various writings.
224
 In this sense justice, is about 
operations ―according to the ratio of right and debt . . . which relate to the other with 
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 ST I-II 61.3: ―secundum rationem recti et debiti, principaliter invenitur in commutationibus vel 
distributionibus quae sunt ad alterum cum aequalitate.‖ The same article continues to characterize justice as 
special virtue which is concerned ―circa actiones debitas inter aequales.‖ 
222
 ST II-II 48.1: ―Triplex est pars, scilicet integralis, ut paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt partes domus; 
subiectiva, sicut bos et leo sunt partes animalis; et potentialis, sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae. 
Tribus ergo modis possunt assignari partes alicui virtuti. Uno modo, ad similitudinem partium integralium, ut 
scilicet illa dicantur esse partes virtutis alicuius quae necesse est concurrere ad perfectum actum virtutis illius. . . . 
Partes autem subiectivae virtutis dicuntur species eius diversae. . . . Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis 
dicuntur virtutes adiunctae quae ordinantur ad aliquos secundarios actus vel materias, quasi non habentes totam 
potentiam principalis virtutis.‖ 
223
 Cf. most clearly in ST I-II 100.5. 
224
 At great length in In sent. III 33.3.4; and ST II-II 58.8-11; 62-78. Some short remarks are spread over the 
whole work. 
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equality.‖225 In the Commentary on the Sentences, he mentions three conditions which are 
required for justice in its specific sense. The just act attains an ―adequation which contains 
three things, . . . namely that it is ordered with respect to the other, that it is due to the 
other . . . and that the other is given as much as is due.‖226 
 
(a) Equality of the Two Involved Parties 
Justice rules interpersonal relations. Not all persons stand on equal footing, however. Some 
are relationships are shaped, for example, by inferiority and superiority, such as the relations 
between children and parents, and between teachers and students. Proper justice, however, 
presupposes an equality between both persons involved. Otherwise, the the exchanges 
between persons can only be described as similar to justice. ―Justice is simply between those 
who are simply equal; but if there is no absolute equality between them, neither is there 
absolute justice, but there may be a certain mode of justice, as we speak of a father‘s or a 
master‘s right.‖227 This first condition is of special importance, since only between two equals 
is the owed action determined by the thing itself. As soon as there is a certain kind of 
dependency of one person on the other, the adequacy of an action would not depend 
exclusively on the res ipsa, but would be co-determined by that dependence. Since this kind 
of equality is implies the relation of two free citizens, its act is also called iustum politicum.
228
 
 
(b) The Strict Obligation to Perform an Operation 
As previously seen in section 4.3, Aquinas distinguishes between the strict obligation to 
perform certain acts (either because of a strict moral due or a legal due) and the moral due of 
friends. Justice as a particular virtue is concerned only with a debt in the first strict sense. 
―Justice in its proper sense is a special virtue which attends the perfect ratio of debt.‖229  
                                                 
225
 ST I-II 61.3: ―Secundum rationem recti et debiti . . . quae sunt ad alterum cum aequalitate.‖  
226
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Ista autem adaequatio tria complectitur, . . . scilicet ut sit ordinatum ad alterum; ut sit ei 
debitum . . .; et ut tantum reddatur quantum debetur.‖ 
227
 ST I-II 114.1: ―Simpliciter est iustitia inter eos quorum est simpliciter aequalitas, eorum vero quorum non est 
simpliciter aequalitas, non est simpliciter iustitia, sed quidam iustitiae modus potest esse, sicut dicitur quoddam 
ius paternum vel dominativum.‖ 
228
 Therefore, Aquinas (who here repeats Aristotle) also talks about civil or political justice. See ST III 85.3: 
―Dupliciter dicitur iustum, scilicet simpliciter, et secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem iustum est inter aequales, 
eo quod iustitia est aequalitas quaedam. Quod ipse vocat iustum politicum vel civile, eo quod omnes cives 
aequales sunt, quantum ad hoc quod immediate sunt sub principe, sicut liberi existentes. Iustum autem secundum 
quid dicitur quod est inter illos quorum unus est sub potestate alterius, sicut servus sub domino, filius sub patre, 
uxor sub viro.‖ Cf. likewise In ethic. V 11.5: ―Consistit autem iustum politicum in personis aequalibus, scilicet 
quarum una non subditur alteri naturali ordine vel civili.‖ 
229
 ST I-II 60.3 ad 1: ―Iustitia proprie dicta est una specialis virtus, quae attendit perfectam rationem debiti.‖ 
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(c) The Possibility of Complete Restitution 
The foregoing point requires further precision. There exist some strict obligations that exceed 
man‘s capacity for offering restitution. For example, the debt of honor and gratitude to one‘s 
own parents always surpasses the possibility of full restitution, though the obligation is a strict 
one.
230
 Justice as a particular virtue, however, demands a complete restitution. ―It is an 
adequation if the other is given what and as much as he is owed, and this adequation is the 
proper mode of justice. Hence, wherever such an adequation is found completely, there is 
justice as a special virtue, and all virtues in which [this ratio] is realized are subjective parts of 
justice.‖231 
On the basis of these three conditions, Aquinas identifies two subspecies of justice, which are 
commutative justice and distributive justice: ―distributive and commutative [justice] . . . are 
subjective parts of special justice.‖232 Each subspecies realizes the full notion of justice as a 
particular virtue. We will briefly describe these two kinds of justice in the following 
paragraphs.
233
 
 
Commutative Justice 
Commutative justice regulates interpersonal actions, for example the signing of contracts and 
buying and selling.
234
 For Aquinas, the expression ―in emptione et venditione‖ is almost a 
synonym for commutative justice.
235
 The principle idea is this, that in buying and selling two 
agents who are otherwise debtless with respect to each other interact in a special way so that 
afterwards no obligation remains. One gives under the condition of receiving something of the 
same value, while the other takes under the condition that he will pay the full amount for it. 
There is equality before, after, and even in the transaction. 
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 We already referred to this in the discussion of the first condition of the child-parents relation as inappropriate 
matter of justice (see section 4.1.3 above). There, however, this inequality is temporal; the child stands in his 
youth in inferiority to his parents and, therefore, there are not just relations in the strict sense. When, however, 
the child became adult, this kind of inequality is gone. Nevertheless, the impossibility of complete restitution for 
all received benefits will remain throughout the whole life. 
231
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Adaequatio est quando ei redditur quod et quantum ei debetur; et haec adaequatio 
proprius modus iustitiae est. Unde ubicumque invenitur ista adaequatio complete, est iustitia quae est virtus 
specialis; et omnes virtutes in quibus salvatur, sunt partes subiectivae iustitiae.‖ 
232
 In sent. III 33.3.4E: ―Distributiva, et commutativa, quae sunt partes subiectivae iustitiae specialis.‖ 
233
 At many places Aquinas refers to commutative and distributive justice as two species of particular justice. Cf. 
In sent. II 27.; 3; III 18.2; 33.1.3B; 33.3.4B; In ethic. V 6. 
234
 A detailed portrayal of commutative justice in Aquinas and its proper acts is found in Lippert, Recht und 
Gerechtigkeit, 87-97. 
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The equality of justice between different people is constituted in so far as one has to receive 
from the other because the other has already received from him; thus, there is commutative 
justice. And since he has to receive from the other according to that quantity which he has 
previously given to him, then in this species of justice the mean is preserved according to an 
arithmetical proportion, in which the same quantity is preserved, as three is the mean between 
four and two.
236
 
 
Thus we have explained the positive meaning of commutative justice. According to our 
findings in section 4.1.3, however, beyond justice‘s restitutive function it works also to keep 
inequality from arising during exchanges, and thus it guards against either person committing 
injury to the other. This does not imply the commission of positive acts but rather the 
omission of negative acts. This negative aspect of also belongs to the task of commutative 
justice in its proper sense. ―To decline from evil is an operation of justice.‖237 This will 
especially become important for our interpretation of the treatise on justice found in the 
Secunda secundae. 
 
Distributive Justice 
The second species of particular justice is distributive justice, i.e. the virtue which provides 
the just distribution of the common goods to individuals, ―either honors, or money, or 
something else which pertains to external goods, or even to hardships, as labor, expenses and 
similar things.‖238 Given distributive justice‘s nature and goal, the question naturally arises: 
how is the equality it seeks to establish between the two involved parties realized? Are not the 
individual citizen and the custodian of the common goods (the prince, the government, etc.) 
quite unequal antagonists? Aquinas gives the following explanation:  
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 ―Philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus secundum quod sunt circa res humanas, puta iustitia circa emptiones et 
venditiones.‖ (ST I-II 61.5 ad 1). Likewise see ST I-II 60.2 or In sent. II 27.3. 
236
 In sent. III 33.1.3B: ―Constituitur aequalitas iustitiae inter aliquos, inquantum unus debet recipere ab alio 
propter hoc quod ille prius recipit ab isto: et ad hoc est iustitia commutativa. Et quia tantum debet secundum 
quantitatem aliquis ab altero recipere quantum ei tribuit, ideo in hac specie iustitiae salvatur medium secundum 
proportionem arithmeticam, in qua salvatur eadem quantitas; sicut tria est medium inter quatuor et duo.‖ Quite 
detailed also in In ethic. V 4.2-5. 
An interesting confrontation of justice as a particular virtue in Aquinas and Aristotle is given in Bien, 
―Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles (V),‖ 145-154. Bien argues that according to Aristotle justice primarily works for 
the reparation of an inequality that has arisen; therefore he usually mentions reparative justice (NE V 8 1132b32); 
for Aquinas, however, justice rules principally interpersonal transactions; hence, he speaks of commutative 
justice (see esp. ibid., 150-152). 
237
 De veritate 24.12 arg. 20 (affirmative): ―Declinare a malo est operatio iustitiae.‖ 
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Between other [parties] . . . equality can be constituted . . . insofar both receive something; and 
thereby distributive justice constitutes equality, which does not give both the equal in quantity, 
but in proportion, since it gives both as much as is due to them; and therefore the mean of 
distributive justice is according to a geometrical proportionability, in which the same 
proportion is safeguarded, but not the same quantity, as six is the mean between four and nine, 
since the same proportion in which six relates to four . . . nine has to six, although nine excels 
six in three, and six excels four in two.
239
 
 
Hence, even in the case of distributive justice the involved parties stand on the same level. 
Since the one responsible for the common good distributes equally to every citizen, among 
the receivers of the due there is a necessary equality. It is important to remember, however, 
that the equality achieved by distributive justice is geometrical and proportional, and not 
quantitative. Thus, each receives according according to his need and dignity.
240
 Despite this 
shift in the nature of the equality sought, even conditions (b) and (c) of justice (see above) are 
realized: the distribution of the due portion of the common goods is a strict debt which is 
owed to every member of the community, and it is achievable to its full amount.
241
 
Thus, if Aquinas speaks about ―iustitia proprie dicta‖ or ―iustitia specialis‖ he intends either 
commutative justice with its chief act being restitution,
242
 or distributive justice which is 
measured according to a proportional mean. 
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 In ethic. V 4.1: ―Sive sit honor, sive sit pecunia, vel quicquid aliud ad bona exteriora pertinens, vel etiam ad 
mala; sicut labor, expensae et similia.‖ 
239
 In sent. III 33.1.3B: ―Inter aliquos . . . potest constitui aequalitas . . . secundum quod utrisque aliquid 
reddendum est; et in hoc constituit ei aequalitatem iustitia distributiva, quae non dat aequale utrique secundum 
quantitatem, sed secundum proportionem, quia utrique dat quantum sibi debetur; et ideo medium in iustitia 
distributiva dicitur esse secundum proportionabilitatem geometricam, in qua salvatur eadem proportio, sed non 
eadem quantitas; sicut sex est medium inter quatuor et novem: quia in qua proportione se habet ad quatuor, 
scilicet in sesquialtera, in ipsa se habet novem ad ipsum; quamvis novem excedant sex in tribus, et sex quatuor in 
duobus.‖ For the distinction between the arithmetical and geometrical mean see also In ethic. V 5. Aquinas refers 
to distributive justice also in the context of divine justice; see for example In sent. IV 46.1.1A; De div. nom. 8.4; 
ST I 21.1. 
240
 In ethic. V 4.10: ―Iustum consistit in quadam proportionalitate. Sic enim aliquid dicitur esse iustum in 
distributionibus in quantum unicuique datur secundum dignitatem, id est prout cuique dignum est dari, in quo 
designatur proportionalitas quaedam, ut scilicet ita hoc sit dignum uni sicut aliud est dignum alteri.‖ 
241
 For a more detailed account, see Lippert, Recht und Gerechtigkeit, 85-87. A comprehensive justification of 
the attribution of distributive justice as a species of proper justice is given in Paul-Dominique Dognin, ―La 
notion thomiste de justice face aux exigences modernes,‖ Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 45 
(1961): 601-640; Paul-Dominique Dognin, ―La justice particulière comporte-t-elle deux espèces? Commentaire 
de ‗Somme Théologique,‘ IIa-IIae, q. 61, a. 1,‖ Revue Thomiste 65 (1965): 398-425. 
242
 The special connection of commutative justice and the act of restitution is explained well by Gilby in a 
footnote: ―Restitution [involves] giving back something to its owner and/or making reparation for a loss or injury 
inflicted, so restoring the balance, aequalitas, of commutative justice. The putting right of other relationships, 
e.g., of charity, friendship, religion, or even of general justice and distributive justice is not directly a matter of 
restitution in the strict sense of the term, but of paying what is owed or of offering satisfaction or making a 
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4.5.2 The Potential Parts of Justice  
 
In the foregoing section we mentioned three conditions for justice as a particular virtue in its 
proper sense. If a virtue is about external actions but fails to fulfill one of these conditions, 
Aquinas describes it as a potential part of justice. ―Where . . . the adequation is not 
safeguarded to its full amount, but only somewhat, [the virtue] belongs to justice as a 
potential part insofar as it participates in it in some way.‖243 The nearness of such a virtue to 
justice in its proper sense depends on the level of obligation to realize certain acts. Different 
kinds of obligation can arise either because of an inequality between the parties, or because of 
a special kind of previous interaction (e.g. debts arising from promises, or from gifts, etc.).
244
 
Consequently, there are several possibile potential parts of justice. 
In his Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas classifies the potential pars of justice in three 
groups. 
 
Potential Parts of the First Degree: Justice in Regard to Debts Which Cannot Be Repaid 
Some virtues fall short of the notion of proper justice on account of the debt towards the other 
being too big for complete restitution ever to be given. Even supposing the best will of the 
debtor, there will always remain a certain inequality between the parties.
245
 Thus, these 
virtues employed in these types of exchanges fail to achieve the full notion of justice. 
Examples of such potential parts of justice include religion with respect to man‘s relationship 
to God, and piety as ruling man‘s attitude regarding his parents. 
 
There are some virtues by which one renders to the other what is due by the necessity of law, 
but not completely, since it is impossible – as in honors which are due to God, what is the task 
of religion; and [in honors] which are to the parents and the homeland, what is due to piety. 
                                                                                                                                                        
proper apology. The obligation is no less, but is not rendered in terms of commutative justice as narrowly 
defined.― (Gilby, ―Introduction,‖ 104-105, footnote a). 
243
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Ubi . . . adaequatio non secundum totum salvatur, sed secundum aliquid, reducitur ad 
iustitiam ut pars potentialis, aliquid de modo eius participans.‖ In ST I-II 60.3 ad 1 he explains: ―Dicitur tamen et 
ampliato nomine iustitia, secundum quamcumque debiti redditionem.‖ 
244
 In ST I-II 60.3 Aquinas exemplifies the potential variety of debts. ―Debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, 
aliter enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex 
beneficio suscepto. Et secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes, puta religio est per 
quam redditur debitum deo; pietas est per quam redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam 
redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.‖ 
245
 Aquinas makes an interesting note regarding these cases: Though the potential parts of justice do not attain 
equality, they do not lose their character of virtue, presupposing one condition: ―Laus virtutis in voluntate 
consistit, non autem in potestate. Et ideo deficere ab aequalitate, quae est medium iustitiae, propter defectum 
potestatis, non diminuit laudem virtutis, si non fuerit defectus ex parte voluntatis.‖ (ST II-II 81.6 ad 1). 
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Thus, these virtues fall short of justice and are potential parts of it, and are very close to 
justice.
246
 
 
The kinship of these virtues to proper justice is determined by the following principle: the 
greater the difference between both parties or the greater the received benefit, the less the 
character of true justice is realized.
247
 
 
Potential Parts of the Second Degree: Justice about Acts Which Better Preserve the 
Order of Virtue 
Another way to fall short of the full notion of justice is the less strict obligation to achieve a 
certain deed. As seen in section 4.3.2 above Aquinas distinguishes between acts that are 
absolutely required for the agent‘s virtuousness (the strict moral due and the legal due) and 
acts which are recommended propter melius (the moral due of friends). Thus, gratitude for 
received gifts is the fitting response towards one‘s benefactor; it supports conviviality and 
develops one‘s own honesty. Such a response of gratitude, however, is not determined or 
required by written laws. The fulfillment of those acts depends on the agent himself, and is 
thus matter of the debitum morale in its less strict sense.  
 
In the Commentary on the Sentences (and only there) Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of this 
less strict obligation: 
 
There are some [virtues] by which what is rendered to the other is not due from legal necessity 
but from a certain honesty, e.g. as the philosopher says in Ethics 8, gratitude which is a 
retribution for benefits, and according to Tullius, mercy and things like this: and these virtues 
are somewhat more distant from true justice.
248
 
 
                                                 
246
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Sunt autem quaedam virtutes quibus redditur alteri quod debetur ex necessitate legis, 
non tamen tantum, quia impossibile est; sicut in honore qui est ad deum, quod facit religio; et qui ad parentes et 
ad patriam, quod facit pietas. Unde istae virtutes deficiunt quidem a iustitia, et sunt partes eius potentiales, et 
propinquissime se habent ad ipsam.‖ And later on, in the same article: ―Religio autem quae est ad deum, et pietas 
quae est ad parentes et coniunctos sanguine vel patria, sunt partes potentiales, sed propinquae: quia reddunt quod 
debent, et ex obligatione legis, sed non quantum; quia impossibile est.‖ 
247
 ―Je höher jener steht, dem man etwas schuldet, und je unerschwinglicher das Gut ist, das man ihm verdankt, 
desto mehr nimmt die Möglichkeit vollendeten Gerechtseins im Schuldner ab, d.h. desto weniger wird der 
Schuldner befähigt sein, einen vollständigen Ausgleich zu schaffen.‖ (Utz, ―Kommentar,‖ 580). 
248
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Quaedam vero sunt quibus redditur alteri quod debetur non ex necessitate legis, sed 
quadam honestate, sicut philosophus dicit in 8 ethic.: sicut gratia quae est retributio beneficiorum, secundum 
tullium, misericordia, et huiusmodi: et hae virtutes aliquantulum magis distant a vera iustitia.‖ 
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As examples of these potential parts of justice Aquinas mentions memory and reciprocity for 
received benefits, i.e. gratitude, truthfulness, and honesty in speech and deeds.
249
 Although it 
is possible to render full retribution in the cases of these virtues, their corresponding acts are 
more distant from proper justice because of the lack of strict obligation. They comprise the 
second degree of the potential parts of justice. And since these virtues are not strictly 
necessary for the preservation of the human city, but rather embellish civil life, scholars 
fittingly have called them ―virtues of civility.‖250 
Even more distant from proper justice are those external acts which are performed freely and 
spontaneously without any previously received gift. ―There are some virtues whose principal 
object is ordered to the other, but not by the notion of due, e.g. liberality, and these [virtues] 
are even more distant from true justice.‖251 With proper justice they have in common only 
their direction ad alterum. Consequently their mean is determined by external standards, and 
in this way they bear a remote resemblance to justice though they lack any kind of obligation. 
 
 
4.5.3 Legal Justice as a General Virtue  
 
Up till now we have considered justice as a virtue which rules man‘s external actions with 
respect to another. The goal of the virtue is to give everyone his due. Because of various 
degrees of due there are several justice-like virtues, but all share in common the ordering of 
man with respect to another individual. However, human acts might also be immediately 
directed to the common good.
252
 And this includes not only the readiness of the citizen to pay 
justly his commanded taxes,
253
 but all actions that may serve the preservation of the common 
good. Consequently all deeds insofar as they are prescribed by law fall generally into the 
category of justice, of general justice which perfects man in regard to the common good. 
                                                 
249
 ―Gratia autem et veritas reddunt quod debent ex quadam honestate, qua fit ut homo gratiam beneficio 
impendat (quamvis non possit ad id in iudicio cogi), et quod talem se in dictis et factis exhibeat qualis est, quod 
ad veritatem pertinet: de qua philosophus etiam determinat in 4 ethic. Est enim gratia in qua amicitiarum et 
obsequiorum alterius memoria, et remunerandi voluntas continentur.‖ (In sent. III 33.3.4A). 
250
 Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 147-148; Labourdette speaks of ―vertus de civilité― (Labourdette, 
La justice (IIa-IIae, 80-120), 430). 
251
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Quaedam autem virtutes sunt quibus hoc circa quod principaliter est virtus, ordinatur ad 
alterum, non tamen secundum rationem debiti, sicut liberalitas; et hae adhuc magis distant a vera iustitia.‖ 
252
 Since the good of the whole is more than the sum of all particular goods, consequently a special virtue is 
required; see ST II-II 58.7 ad 2; for a discussion see Guy de Broglie, ―‗Justice social‘ et ‗Bien commun‘,‖ Doctor 
Communis 25 (1972): 279-288. 
253
 Ultimately Aquinas attributes the readiness to pay taxes to piety towards the leader of the community (see 
especially De duo. prae. 6). 
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Aquinas sometimes calls this justice legal justice, sometimes even general justice. Laws are 
given for the sake of the common good,
254
 and in fact they are only true laws if they promote 
the common good.
255
 Consequently, the corresponding virtue, by which the citizen is enabled 
to act according to the law, is called iustitia legalis. ―What we do according to the law, we do 
justly.‖256 Sometimes he refers to the same virtue as general justice insofar it commands – by 
itself working for the common good – the acts of all other virtues for its own end.  
 
Justice which intends the common good is different from justice which is ordered to the 
private good of another. . . . Justice which orders man to the common good is general by 
command, since it orders all acts of [all] virtues to its end, namely to the common good. A 
virtue, however, when commanded by such justice, adopts also the name of justice. And in 
this way the virtue does not differ from legal justice except by reason, as the virtue, which acts 
by itself, and the virtue, which acts by the command of another, differ only by reason.
257
 
 
Hence, strictly speaking Aquinas does not assert that legal justice directs the other virtues as 
virtues to the common good. Each particular virtue remains determined by its proper object 
and its specific end, but legal justice can command the acts of all virtues for its own proper 
end, i.e. the common good. Or to be even more precise, legal justice directs the external 
operations of the various acts to is own end. But in spite of this universal character of general 
justice, it is by itself a true and particular species of justice, specified by its proper object, the 
common good.
258
 
At the beginning of chapter 4 we mentioned the distinction between the proper matter of each 
moral virtue and its possible resulting external acts. Even the affective virtues can cause 
                                                 
254
 Cf. ST I-II 90.2. 
255
 Cf. ST I-II 96.4. 
256
 ST I 21.1 ad 2: ―Quod secundum legem facimus, iuste facimus.‖ Legal justice might be also understood as 
―obedientia legis― (cf. Hyacinthus M. Hering, De iustitia legali (Fribourg: Typis Consociationis Sancti Pauli, 
1944), 56-61).  
257
 ST I-II 60.3 ad 2: ― Iustitia quae intendit bonum commune, est alia virtus a iustitia quae ordinatur ad bonum 
privatum alicuius. . . . Iustitia ordinans hominem ad bonum commune, est generalis per imperium, quia omnes 
actus virtutum ordinat ad finem suum, scilicet ad bonum commune. Virtus autem secundum quod a tali iustitia 
imperatur, etiam iustitiae nomen accipit. Et sic virtus a iustitia legali non differt nisi ratione, sicut sola ratione 
differt virtus operans secundum seipsam, et virtus operans ad imperium alterius.‖ Gemmel distinguishes between 
an immediate legal justice (iustitia legalis essentialis) and a mediate legal justice (iustitia legalis generalis); the 
former stands for elicited acts of legal justice for the common good, the other for commanded acts of other 
virtues (Gemmel, ―Die ‗iustitia‘ in der Lehre des hl. Thomas,‖ 217-220).  
258
 ―La justice légale est un vraie justice, sans aucun recours à la métaphore . . . elle fait face à un droit objectif, 
celui de la communauté, dont l‘exigence n‘est pas moins rigoureuse que celle des droits personnels les plus 
obvies. C‘est dire aussi qu‘elle peut et doit s‘ajuster à ce droit ‗ad aequalitatem‘.‖ (Labourdette, La justice (IIa-
IIae, 57-79), 47). Labourdette notes a certain development in Aquinas‘s thought on that score (to speak of an 
inconsistency would be too strong). Whereas In sent. and De veritate simply identifies legal justice with all 
virtues (cf. In sent. III 9.1.1B; 33.1.1C ad 3; 33.3.3A; De veritate 28.1), the later works as In ethic. and ST 
describe legal justice as a special virtue (cf. In ethic. V 2; ST I-II 60.3 ad 2; II-II 58.5-6).  
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exterior acts, 
259
 and these external acts – of themselves pertaining to other virtues – can be 
directed by general justice towards the preservation of the common good.  
 
Some [virtues] order to the other that about which a virtue is, not principally but secondarily; 
for example when fortitude orders the external act which is only its secondary concern, 
towards the other as the good of gratitude, and in this way it in some way adopts the form of 
justice; and in this way each virtue can be traced back to justice; and therefore legal justice is 
identical with every virtue.
260
 
 
Let us not forget that this account of legal justice fits exactly with our description in section 
2.3 of justice as a proper virtue of man as a citizen, who always acts for the sake of the 
common good, not only with respect to the proper matter of particular justice but also with 
respect to his affective virtues, at least regarding their external effects. 
 
 
4.5.4 Justice in a Metaphorical Sense 
 
Hitherto, the various meanings of justice were determined either by different kinds of debts 
(proper justice and its potential parts) or by its relationship to another individual or to the 
common good (legal justice). Despite all differences, these forms of justice have in common 
that they dispose man in regard to operations ad alterum, which foster a frictionless and 
harmonious living together in community. 
However, in the final paragraph of Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle raises the 
question whether there is also justice in regard to the agent himself. The problem comes up in 
the context of his evaluation of suicide. Though Aristotle gives a negative answer to the 
question – since noone can simultaneously cause and suffer injustice; thus, suicide is not 
against justice in its proper sense – he introduces in this context the idea of metaphorical 
justice, understood as the right order of various human powers within the same individual. If 
                                                 
259
 See ST I-II 60.2. 
260
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Quaedam [virtutes] vero hoc, circa quod est virtus, non principaliter, sed secundario, 
ordinant ad alterum; sicut quando fortitudo actum exteriorem, circa quem secundario est, ordinat ad alterum ut 
ad bonum gratiae, et sic induit quodammodo formam iustitiae; et sic omnis virtus potest reduci ad iustitiam; unde 
iustitia legalis est idem quod omnis virtus.‖ And some paragraphs later: ―Divisio philosophi complectitur omnia 
ad quae vera iustitia habet se extendere; et ideo ponit iustitiam . . . legalem, quae ordinat ad alterum etiam circa 
id quod non principaliter est virtus [iustitiae], si illud sit ordinatum a lege.‖ (In sent. III 33.3.4E). See also In sent. 
IV 15.1.1B ad 2: ―Quamvis iustitia sit principaliter circa operationes, tamen etiam ex consequenti est circa 
passiones, inquantum sunt operationum causae.‖ 
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the sensitive appetite is formed and ruled by reason, if both principles are to cooperate in 
harmony, then it is possible to describe this relationship in an analogous sense as right and 
just. 
 
In regard to the passions, however, . . . there is nothing of the mode of justice, since by 
passions man is not immediately ordered to something else except to himself; nonetheless by a 
certain similarity there is a certain form of justice, insofar as various powers are considered as 
various persons; thus, in this way there is a metaphorical justice.
261
 
 
 
4.6 Summary: Justice as Chief-Virtue ad alterum. But What About Charity? 
 
In this chapter we have investigated the general meaning of justice in Aquinas‘s work. We 
started with a description of its general structure as an objective determinable virtue about 
external operations (section 4.1), and then we distinguished the different ways the just act, as 
a opus adaequatum alteri, might be determined (section 4.2), wherefrom the obligation arises 
to render each one his due (section 4.3). Next, we devoted a special section to examining 
justice as a moral virtue, that is as a disposition of the human will to be inclined from within 
towards just actions (section 4.4). And last but not least, we listed the multiple meanings of 
the term justice found in Aquinas‘s writings (section 4.5). 
Hence, it became clear that St. Thomas portrays justice as the chief moral virtue to perfect the 
agent in his relations ad alterum, both with respect to the other as individual and to the 
common good. These findings, however, have important consequences for our project of 
reconstructing justice as an infused virtue. By definition, infused virtues can be possessed 
only in the state of grace, i.e. by an agent who also has charity and whose relationship to God 
and neighbor is formed by supernatural love. But what place does charity hold within a moral 
doctrine that ascribes to justice the general function of ruling all interpersonal actions? Or 
conversely, what is the proper place of justice within the reign of charity? 
Hence, before we examine the specific meaning of justice as an infused virtue, we must first 
determine the general relationship between justice and love. Though the two virtues are very 
                                                 
261
 In sent. III 33.3.4A: ―Quantum ad passiones autem, circa quas principaliter sunt illae virtutes, nihil possunt 
habere de modo iustitiae, eo quod per passiones immediate homo non ordinatur nisi ad seipsum; tamen per 
quamdam similitudinem est ibi quaedam forma iustitiae, secundum quod diversae vires computantur ut diversae 
personae; unde sic est iustitia metaphorica.‖ Cf. also ST I-II 100.2 ad 2; II-II 58.2; In ethic. V 17.16. 
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different in important respects, each is concerned with governing and perfecting interpersonal 
actions. 
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5. Charity and Justice 
 
In the previous chapter we examined the general features of justice in Aquinas‘s writings. 
Before we try to reconstruct the concept of infused justice in chapter 6 and verify this account 
by reading through the Secunda secundae in chapter 7, we must first compare charity and 
justice as two virtues concerned with operations ad alterum. This investigation is of special 
importance since infused justice works by definition under the reign of charity. Hence, if 
someone has infused justice he has necessarily charity prior to it (―prior‖ not necessarily in a 
temporal but in the logical sense). The issue is somewhat tricky. In the case of prudence, 
fortitude, and temperance the need for additional infused virtues is much more evident. Each 
human power (practical intellect, will, irascible and concupiscent appetites) has to be 
perfected in regard to the new final end constituted by charity. But charity resides in the 
human will, as does justice. Hence, if the will of the graced person is yet perfected by charity, 
by which the agent loves God as well as all of his neighbors, whereto a reduplicative second 
virtue called justice? Wouldn‘t it be more reasonable to argue for a replacement of justice by 
charity?  
Thus, determining the exact relation of charity and justice turns out to be highly important for 
our research.  
In fact, the relationship between justice and charity is a much disputed issue among scholars. 
Different theologians have suggested all possible kinds of relationship, from simple 
identification downwards to contradictory opposition.
1
  
As an example of a total equation we can refer to Fletcher, who claims: ―Love and justice are 
the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else.‖2 And again more succinctly: ―Love is 
justice, justice is love.‖3 Fletcher identifies justice and love since he interprets the former as 
distributive justice. Every agent is confronted by more than one neighbor and has to consider 
their various needs. Hence ―each of the claimants must be heard in relation to the others,‖4 
without ―selective blindness.‖5 In this ways justice turns out to be nothing else than ―the 
                                                 
1
 For an elaborate overview about different theories regarding relationships of charity and justice, see Gene 
Outka, Agape. An Ethical Analysis (New Haven - London: Yale University Press, 1972), 75-92. 
2
 Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 4 ed. (London: SCM Press LTD, 1976), 87. Fletcher 
substantiates his position in the chapter Love and Justice are the same (87-102). 
3
 Ibid., 89. 
4
 Ibid., 90. 
5
 Ibid. 
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many-sidedness of love.‖6  Fletcher concludes that ―justice is love coping with situations 
where distribution is called for.‖7 
A. Nygren defends exactly the opposite position: justice and Christian love are mutually 
exclusive. ―Where spontaneous love and generosity are found, the order of justice is obsolete 
and invalidated.‖ 8  According to Nygren, charity‘s principal character consists in being 
―unmotivated‖ love. This means it establishes fellowship between two persons for no other 
reason except out of love itself. On the contrary, justice is essentially connected with the idea 
of worthiness, merit, and obligation, and therefore it is inapplicable to an interpersonal 
relationship formed by true love.
9
 Therefore, charity as free and unselfish love for God and 
neighbor is only possible if justice and its obligation are overcome.
10
 Quite similar is the 
teaching of Rawls, who claims: ―Among an association of saints . . . the disputes about justice 
could hardly occur; for they would all work selflessly together for one end, the glory of God 
as defined by their common religion, and reference to this end would settle every question of 
right.‖11 
More often charity and justice are not directly opposed but rather distinguished. R. Niebhur, 
for example, argues for the continued existence of justice under the reign of charity. His 
reasoning is simple: even virtuous agents retain a certain amount of self-interest. Thus, it is 
the purpose of justice to tackle the legitimate claims of self and reach an equilibrium relating 
to the other. 
 
The effort to substitute the law of love for the spirit of justice . . . is derived from the failure to 
measure the power and persistence of self-interest. It is because self-interest is not easily 
overcome in even the life of the ‗redeemed‘ that most of the harmonies of life are not the 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 89. 
7
 Ibid., 95. Likewise A. Buchanan holds the distinction between charity and justice for redundant; see Buchanan, 
―Justice and Charity,‖ 558-575. 
8
 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: Westminster Press, 1953), 90. And further: ―To those who still wish 
to maintain the legal order, goodness itself becomes a cause for offence.‖ (Ibid.). 
9
 ―The point is directed against the thought of worthiness and merit, against every attempt to regulate fellowship 
with God by the principle of justice.‖ (Ibid., 86). And further: ―The principle of justice itself is [to be] eliminated 
as inapplicable to the religious relationship.‖ (Ibid., 89). 
10
 ―Man can live for God in the deepest sense only when he is absolutely free from the rule of the law.‖ (Ibid., 
728); and elsewhere: ―To those who still wish to maintain the legal order, goodness itself becomes a cause for 
offence.‖ (Ibid., 90). 
11
 John Rawls, ―Justice as Fairness,‖ in Collected Papers, ed. John Rawls (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 56-57. And Rawls continues: ―The justice of practices does not come up until there are several 
different parties (whether we think of these as individuals, associations, or nations and so on, is irrelevant) who 
do press their claims on one another, and who do regard themselves as representatives of interests which deserve 
to be considered.‖ 
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perfect harmonies of fully co-ordinated wills but the tolerable harmonies of balanced interests 
and mutually recognized claims.
12
 
 
According to Niebhur it is due to justice to provide the right balance between various claims, 
inclusive of one‘s own.13 On the other hand, there is need for a certain counterweight against 
justice, namely love understood as inclination for the good of the other, for otherwise self-
interest would get out of control. Hence, Niebhur asserts: ―In so far as justice admits the 
claims of the self, it is something less than love. Yet it cannot exist without love and remain 
justice. For without the ‗grace‘ of love, justice always degenerates into something less than 
justice.‖14  In short, justice is understood as the legitimate provision of one‘s own good, 
whereas love – the better part – is other-centered. The necessary coexistence of both virtues is 
rather a result of the imperfection of the present life than the proper ideal. 
A different relationship is suggested by Kiesling. In reference to St. Thomas, he argues that 
charity does not imply a particular virtue but rather a special mode of acting. ―In line with 
Thomas, we can say that charity does not designate an act so much as an aspect of an act, the 
act precisely as it promotes the welfare of the loved one in God.‖15 Thus, charity may be 
combined with justice in the following manner: ―Justice designates an aspect of an act toward 
neighbor; another aspect of that act precisely as Christian is its quality of love.‖16 The content 
of an action is determined by justice, its form stems from charity. ―Justice gives structure, or 
shape, to love.‖17 Thus, in the graced agent justice and charity work for the same acts.18 
This short overview shows that the relationship between charity and justice is all but clear. 
We shall proceed in the present chapter as follows. Aquinas understands charity as friendship. 
Thus, we will investigate in a first step the relationship between justice and friendship in 
general (section 5.1). Subsequently, we will apply these results to supernatural friendship, i.e. 
to charity. It will become clear that Aquinas distinguishes between many kinds of friendship 
that are co-considered by charity and its relative justice (section 5.2). Thus, compared with the 
infused affective virtues, justice is indeed a special case. The reasons for this particularity are 
                                                 
12
 Reinhold Niebuhr, Love and Justice. Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. D.B. 
Robertson (Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992), 25-26. 
13
 ―Justice requires that the interests of the self be entertained. It also requires that they be resisted.‖ (Ibid., 28). 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Kiesling, ―Social Justice,‖ 237. 
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Ibid. 
18
 ―As directed toward neighbor, Christian love is fundamentally willing and doing what is just to him or here. 
Even as directed to God, that love is realized in rendering the worship due to God. Although we can describe 
Christian life as consisting in love of God and neighbor, we can also describe it as doing justice to God and 
neighbor in love for them.‖ (Ibid.). 
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outlined in section 5.3. A further section will clarify the cooperation of charity and justice in 
the concrete act (section 5.4). Finally, in a concluding section (5.5) we will sketch out the 
basic lines for a reconstruction of infused justice, which will be the topic of chapter 6. 
 
 
5.1 Justice and Friendship: ad aequalitatem – ex aequalitate 
 
We begin by examining the different structures of justice and charity, or to be more precise, 
of justice and friendship. Given this early stage of our argument, we may put aside for a 
moment the question of whether love works for a supernatural end or not, and whether love is 
charity or any other kind of friendship. Likewise, we will not take justice in its specific sense 
of a virtue between two men as equal citizens, but more generally as rendering everyone their 
due, to the fellow-citizen as well as to one‘s parents, or benefactors, etc. We will focus on the 
reverse orientation of justice and friendship in general insofar as both are concerned with 
external acts regarding another person, but in each case from a different point of view.
19
 
Let us consider three exemplary interpersonal actions: paying the monthly rent to one‘s 
landlord, caring for one‘s parents, and giving a birthday present to a friend. The first is an act 
of commutative justice, the second an act of piety as a potential part of justice, and the last act 
of friendship. All three deeds share a common character. In some way or other they work for 
the good of the other; the rent, the generous care, and the gift all promote the another‘s 
wellbeing. Still, there are things that distinguish the three acts. For instance, the starting 
position of the first two cases differs from that of the third. The just act aims for the 
attainment of equality between two agents, for it either overcomes a certain debt or it avoids 
creating a debt. The tenant pays the due rent for a prior received service (the apartment), and 
the adult son cares for his parents as compensation (as far as possible)
20
 for the countless 
benefits he has received from them. In both cases a certain indebtedness to the other is the 
act‘s point of departure, and further this same indedtedness provides the very reason for the 
act pursued as an act of justice. The same would be true if the acts possessed a negative 
character, as in non-malevolent acts that seek to avoid indebtedness. 
                                                 
19
 For a general outline of Aquinas‘s understanding of friendship, see for example Gallagher, ―Person and 
Ethics,‖ 55-62. 
20
 As seen in section 4.5, in regard to one‘s parents there remains always certain indebtedness. 
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Things are different, however, in the case of friendship. Here, the starting situation is not an 
unequal relationship, nor an imminent inequality, that would result in some obligation. Rather, 
friendship presupposes already freedom from any debt. Gifts are exchanged between friends 
neither for paying debts nor for avoiding inequality. If a present were given under such 
circumstances, it wouldn‘t be an act of friendship but rather an act of justice. The exchanging 
of gifts presupposes a relationship of ―not-mutual-obligation,‖ of ―not-debt‖ which allows the 
bestowal of a good beyond the requirements of justice. It is according to this line of thinking 
that Aquinas differentiates the structures of just acts and amicable acts. They differ, he 
teaches, in their relations to equality as understood as freedom from any debt: ―It pertains to 
friendship to use an equality already established in any way, but it pertains to justice to reduce 
unequal things to equality. When equality exists the work of justice is done. For that reason 
equality is the goal of justice and the starting point of friendship.‖21 Or put in another way, by 
justice the agent pays back to the other what actually belongs to the other, what is of the other 
in the strict sense – the rent, gratitude for received benefits, etc. By friendship the agent gives 
to the other what belongs actually to himself, what is his, what he can give freely and 
gratuitously as a gift. 
 
The Common Motivation for Just and Amicable Actions 
In the previous chapter we investigated the motivational structure of the just act (section 4.3), 
which is based on the recognition that something is due to the other, to whom I am connected 
by the common life in the human society. Thus, though justice considers the other as other, it 
does not imply disconnectedness. The ―other‖ is not an object of disinterest.22 The reference 
to the otherness serves only as criterion for determining what is due to him since it is his own, 
whereas the negation of bestowing to the other what is mine is no matter of justice.  
According to Aquinas, friendship follows principally the same motivational direction as 
justice; it seeks the good of the other because of certain union that binds the agent of recipient. 
                                                 
21
 In ethic. VIII 7.8: ―Ad amicitiam pertinet aequalitate iam constituta ea aliqualiter uti; sed ad iustitiam pertinet 
inaequalia ad aequalitatem reducere. Aequalitate autem existente cessat iustitiae opus. Et ideo aequalitas est 
ultimum in iustitia, sed primum in amicitia.‖ About this reverse direction of justice and friendship, see Alexander 
Horváth, Eigentumsrecht nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin (Graz: Ulr. Moser‘s Verlag, 1929), 46. 
We should annotate that for the negative part of justice – its character of being non-maleficent – equality is the 
starting point (as in the case of friendship). However, the intentional structure is further on the preservation of 
equality. 
22
 On that score the interpretation of justice as virtue ―ad alterum‖ is often incorrect. For example Brachthäuser 
argues that ―die Gerechtigkeit den anderen als solchen, d.h. als einen vollkommenen fremden Menschen 
betrachtet, sein Gut als ein fremdes Gut.― (Brachthäuser, Gemeingut- oder Gesetzesgerechtigkeit, 53). 
Brachthäuser continues that only love seeks the good of the other whereas justice intends to avoid any personal 
involvement (ibid., 53-54). This, however, certainly does not correspond to Aquinas‘s understanding of justice. 
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In the article where Aquinas asks whether the act of love is identical with benevolence, he 
argues that friendship includes an affective unity between lover and beloved: ―Love . . . 
implies a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the 
lover judges the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends 
towards him.‖23 This unity in which one considers the other as ―second self‖ provides the 
motivation for acts of friendship, not in a sense of an extended egoism but as seeking the good 
of the other as one‘s own good.24  
Hence, justice as well as friendship seeks the good of the other. As such, they are not opposed 
habits; they work into the same direction. ―Justice and friendship are about the same things.‖25 
Nonetheless they differ not only in their different relation to equality (ad aequalitatem – ex 
aequalitate), but they also look upon the other from different perspectives. Justice regards the 
other as other and gives him what he deserves on his own account. Friendship, however, 
regards the other as oneself and gives to him what is mine beyond that which is due to him. 
―Justice orders a person to someone else, insofar he is made equal to the other in regard to 
things with which justice is concerned. But charity orders a person to someone else by uniting 
him to the other in affection.‖26 
 
Justice as “Foundation” and Integral Part of Friendship 
The different perspectives of justice and friendship may suggest two rival options. The 
relationship between two agents may be marked either by friendship or by justice. The 
stronger one is, the weaker the other; the greater the friendship, the less important is justice. 
Actually, Aristotle asserts in the Nicomachean Ethics something similar: ―Where there is 
                                                 
23
 ST II-II 27.2: ―Amor . . . importat enim quandam unionem secundum affectus amantis ad amatum, inquantum 
scilicet amans aestimat amatum quodammodo ut unum sibi, vel ad se pertinens, et sic movetur in ipsum.‖ 
24
 See Christopher Toner, ―Was Aquinas an Egoist?,‖ The Thomist 71 (2007): 577-608; Gallagher, ―Desire for 
Beatitude ...‖ 1-47; Gallagher, ―Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love ...‖ 23-44 
25
 In ethic. VIII 9.2: ―Circa eadem est iustitia et amicitia.‖ And later: ―Quod autem simul augetur amicitia et 
iustum, procedit ex hoc, quod in eisdem existunt, et utrumque pertinet ad quamdam aequalitatem 
communicationis.‖ (In ethic. VIII 9.8; likewise in VIII 11.1). 
26
 In sent. III 29.1 ad 4: ―Iustitia vero ordinat ad alium, secundum quod aequatur ei quantum ad res circa quas est 
iustitia; sed caritas ordinat ad alium secundum quod unit per affectum quantum ad ipsum.‖ Pinckaers annotates 
rightly: ―Justice, even when simply human, works towards the same goal as charity, but the latter carries us 
farther.‖ (Pinckaers, The Pursuit of Happiness, 103). Similar in Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A 
Synthesis of Thomistic Thought (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book, 1950), 332-333: ―Justice, further, though it is 
the instrument of charity, differs from it notably. Justice gives to each fellow man his right and due. Charity 
gives each not only his rights, but the privileges of a child of God and a brother of Jesus Christ. Justice, says St. 
Thomas, looks on our neighbor as another person with his own personal rights, whereas charity looks on him as 
another self.‖ 
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friendship, justice is no longer necessary.‖27 But what does he mean by this statement? As 
usual, St. Thomas accepts Aristotle‘s statement,28 but adds, that justice ―conserves and repairs 
friendship.‖29 Thus, to Aquinas‘s mind, friendship does not simply substitute for justice. He 
drives this point home in him Commentary on the Sentences when he says: ―Mercy [as act of 
friendship] which abandons justice has to be named rather foolishness than virtue.‖30 Hence, 
there is for St. Thomas a mutual connection of between friendship and justice. But of what 
kind? 
We can reconstruct his position from his discussion of liberality as an expression of friendship, 
which is likewise described as potential part of justice. St. Thomas explains: 
 
The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice [fundetur super actum iustitiae], 
for a man is not liberal in giving unless he gives of his own . . . Hence there could be no 
liberality apart from justice which discerns between suum and non-suum. Justice, however, 
can be without liberality. Hence, justice is simply greater than liberality as being more 
universal and as being its foundation [fundamentum ipsius], while liberality is greater 
relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.
31
 
 
This quotation makes clear that friendship never abandons justice. Both work in the same 
direction whereby the act of friendship (here: liberality) somehow presupposes the act of 
justice as its integral part, as foundation. And the converse is also true: justice remains 
contained within friendship. To bestow a gift on someone presupposes the rendering to the 
other his due. In this way, friendship has to contain justice as essential element. Pinckaers 
notes: ―If the virtue of justice is understood as the generous and spontaneous will to render to 
each his due, and is thus oriented to the other, it finds a place within the concept of love. It 
is . . . the very foundation of this virtue.‖32 Before one bestows gifts to a friend, one has to pay 
                                                 
27
 NE VIII 1 1155a26. To the following see: Daniel Schwartz-Porzecanski, ―Friendship and the Circumstances of 
Justice according to Aquinas,‖ The Review of Politics 66 (2004): 41-47. 
28
 See In ethic. VIII 1.6: ―Si aliqui sint amici, in nullo indigerent iustitia proprie dicta, quia haberent omnia quasi 
communia, cum amicus sit alter ipse; non est autem iustitia ad seipsum. Sed si sint iusti, nihilominus indigent 
amicitia adinvicem.‖ 
29
 In ethic. VIII 1.6: ―Illud quod est maxime iustum videtur esse conservativum et reparativum amicitiae.‖ And 
to the ninth book he comments: ―In amicitiis aequalium manifestum est, quod amicitia conservatur per hoc quod 
aequivalens redditur.‖ (In ethic. IX 1.2). 
30
 In sent. III 1.1.2 ad 4: ―Misericordia enim quae iustitiam tollit, magis stultitia quam virtus dici debet.‖ 
31
 ST I-II 66.4 ad 1: ―Actus liberalitatis oportet quod fundetur super actum iustitiae, non enim esset liberalis datio, 
si non de proprio daret. . . . Unde liberalitas sine iustitia esse non posset, quae secernit suum a non suo. Iustitia 
autem potest esse sine liberalitate. Unde iustitia simpliciter est maior liberalitate, tanquam communior, et 
fundamentum ipsius, liberalitas autem est secundum quid maior, cum sit quidam ornatus iustitiae, et 
complementum eius.‖ See also ST II-II 58.12 ad 1. 
32
 Pinckaers, The Pursuit of Happiness, 102. Interesting on that score is also the article Stephen J. Pope, ―The 
Convergence of Forgiveness and Justice: Lessons from El Salvador,‖ Theological Studies 64 (2003): 812-835; 
Pope portrays various possible ways to relate justice and forgiveness (as a sign of friendship), namely (a) 
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to him his due; not by the title of friendship, not as a gift, but as something that belongs to the 
other in terms of justice, quasi disregarding the mutual union of friendship. Aquinas argues 
the point thusly: ―One has to pay what is due before conferring gratuitous gifts.‖33 And again: 
―A man should first give back the borrowed before making a present to a friend.‖ 34 
Furthermore, he states: ―Prior is to realize what justice requires than what arises from piety.‖35 
Following St. Thomas‘s argument, it becomes clear that to render something as gift what is 
due to the other as his right would be unjust. From this perspective justice appears more basic 
than friendship. It is the ―hard nucleus‖ of every sound interpersonal relation. Even if an act 
of friendship is by itself more perfect and delightful, it may never ignore the more basic level 
of justice. Friendship may be called the ―ideal level‖ of human relations, but it is based on the 
―minimum level‖ of justice.36 In the words of P. Kreeft, justice ―is only a minimum, not a 
maximum; it is only a beginning, not the end, the foundation not the house.‖37 Justice is 
therefore an integral part of friendship.
38
 
Thus, the relationship between justice and friendship is an asymmetric one. Justice might be 
without special acts of friendship, but never vice versa.
39
 
At this point we want to refer once again to the doctrine of the right mean of justice as 
medium rei in order to clarify the present issue. As seen in section 4.1, the right mean of 
justice is determined in view of the object itself which is due to the other. It is between two 
extremes, it is missed by giving too much or too little. So far, this is the definition we reached 
in the prior chapter. However, justice is not only a special case because its mean is a medium 
rei. What‘s more, in contrast to the other virtues, the excess of the just mean does not imply 
                                                                                                                                                        
forgiveness renounces justice, (b) justice must trump forgiveness, and (c) forgiveness retains justice (ibid., 817-
826). 
33
 ST II-II 31.3 arg. 3 (affirmative): ―Prius sunt debita restituenda quam gratuita beneficia impendenda.‖ See In 
ethic. IX 2.5: ―Quod debitum sit reddendum magis quam gratis dandum, est universaliter observandum.‖  
34
 In ethic. IX 2.3: ―Magis debet reddi mutuum quam gratis dari amico.‖ 
35
 Super Mt. X 1: ―Primo fieri debet quod iustitia exigit, quam quod ex misericordia provenit.‖ 
36
 See the chapter Amicizia e gustizia in Michael Konrad, Dalla felicità all'amicizia. Percorso di etica filosofica 
(Rome: Lateran University Press, 2007), 228-231, here 230: ―livello minimale . . . livello ideale.‖ Similar 
Gilleman who states: Justice ―assures the minimum of charitable relations necessary to safeguard further 
progress in love,‖ (Gilleman, The Primacy of Charity, 334). 
37
 Peter Kreeft, ―Christ‘s Concept of Happiness vs The World‘s,‖ 
http://www.peterkreeft.com/audio/06_happiness.htm (accessed March 15, 2010). 
38
 The account of Aquinas concords with the position which Outka who argues: ―Charity exceeds but never 
abrogates what justice requires.‖ (Outka, Agape ... 80). And further: ―Love has justice as its ‗pre-condition;‘ love 
can never neglect justice and loving actions are never performed at the expense of justice but only ‗beyond and 
through‘ it.‖ (Ibid., 81). In the same way the Synod of Bishops has expressed the relationship between justice 
and love: ―Christian love of neighbour and justice cannot be separated. For love implies an absolute demand for 
justice, namely a recognition of the dignity and rights of one‘s neighbor. Justice attains its inner fullness only in 
love.‖ Synod of Bishops, ―Justice in the World,‖ in The Gospel of Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teaching 
Since Pope John, ed. Joseph Gremillion (New York: Orbis Books, 1976), 520. 
39
 This is not to say that justice is possible without any kind of friendship.  
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principally an evil character. Justice is not the mean between two vices. As notes MacIntyre, 
injustice is a ―single-minded vice.‖40 Only its defect – paying less – is considered a vice, 
whereas its excess – giving more or retaining less than is due to the other depending on the 
circumstances – is not an evil act though it exceeds the proper mean of justice.  
 
Justice is a mean between too much and too little, but it is not a mean between two vices as the 
other virtues, as is said in Ethics V. But that someone is excessive in taking or keeping beyond 
the obligation of justice is a kind of malice and pertains to avarice; however that someone 
have less than is his due i.e. has too little, is not to do what is unjust.
41
 
 
From this perspective the interface of justice and friendship becomes yet clearer. The act of 
friendship does not realize the proper object of justice, nor does it attain the right mean of 
what is due to the other since it gives beyond the right mean of justice. Still, the perfection of 
justice is not destroyed thereby, but rather perfected. Thus it becomes clear how the obligation 
to render the other‘s due is prior to the act of friendship but simultaneously ―contained‖ in 
friendship. The latter is not something wholly alien to the act of justice. The ―excess‖ of the 
friendly act passes through the medium, i.e. the object of justice, which is the ―fundamentum 
ipsius.‖42 We can apply here Aquinas‘s axiom ―the lesser is included in the greater.‖43 The 
bestowal of proper signs of friendship – the greater – implies principally the willing 
achievement of justice – the lesser. ―The lesser is understood to be contained in that what is 
greater, but not conversely; whoever obliges himself to give something little is not considered 
guilty if he gives more.‖44 
                                                 
40
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 204. 
41
 De malo 13.1 ad 4: ―Iustitia enim medium quid est inter superfluum et diminutum; sed non est medium inter 
duas malitias, sicut aliae virtutes, ut dicitur in V ethic. Sed quod aliquid superabundet in accipiendo vel retinendo 
ultra debitum iustitiae, malitia quaedam est, et ad avaritiam pertinet. Quod autem aliquis minus habeat quam sibi 
debeatur, hoc non est iniustum facere.‖ For the same argument see also In sent. III 33.1.3A ad 5 and In ethic. V 
10.2. 
42
 ST I-II 66.4 ad 1; see footnote 31. 
43
 ST II-II 189.9 ad 3: ―In maiori includitur minus.‖ See likewise ST II-II 101.1 ad 1; 106.1 and 109.4. 
44
 De perf. spirit. vitae 25: ―In maiori enim intelligitur esse etiam id quod est minus, sed non e converso: et qui 
obligat se ad aliquid minus dandum, non reputatur reus si dederit maius.‖ 
The relation of justice and love is well described by Pinckaers: ―La justice s‘associe ainsi étroitement à l‘amour. 
Elle ne se confond toutefois pas avec lui, car la justice met l‘accent sur l‘idée de rectitude et de droiture et 
constitue une règle de la conduite et du coeur qui s‘exprime dans les commandements, tandis que l‘amour 
désigne plutôt la spontanéité . . . En fait, justice et amour sont les deux faces d‘une même réalité. Elles sont 
nécessaires l‘une à l‘autre car l‘amour s‘égare et se corrompt s‘il n‘est droit et juste, tandis que la justice sans 
l‘amour deviendrait dure.‖ (Pinckaers, La justice évangélique, 76). And further: ―Ainsi la justice et l‘amour 
allaient-ils dans le même sens, vers autrui. La justice était, en somme, la forme première et fondamentale de la 
générosité, de l‘amour, car, si on les aime, ils convient de commencer par rendre aux autres ce qui leur revient, 
avec une bonne mesure et de bonne grâce. La justice ainsi entendue pouvait se fixer comme fin de créer l‘amitié 
entre les hommes.‖ (Ibid., 77). ―Justice et amour sont bien les deux faces nécessaires d‘une unique réalité 
intérieure, l‘une indiquant la rectitude et l‘autre la générosité du coeur.‖ (Ibid., 78). 
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From this point of view, we can look back to the discussion of the debitum morale, which 
should now appear in a new light.
45
 Aquinas distinguishes a strict moral due and a moral due 
of friends. The first is indispensable for the maintaining of virtue. For that reason it is 
commanded sometimes by precepts and thereby becomes a legal due. The moral due of 
friends is recognized as a sign of higher virtuousness. The distinction between these two 
degrees of moral obligation attaches itself perfectly to the distinction of of justice and 
friendship: the strict due corresponds to justice, and the moral due of friends, of course, to 
friendship.
46
 Accordingly, Aquinas argues: ―Justice is about works done in respect of another 
person under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly 
and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor.‖47  
 
justice friendship 
 
equality 
 
attains / preserves equality presupposes equality 
renders everybody his due / inflicts no harm seeks the other‘s good as the own good 
strict moral due (or even legal due) moral due of friends 
Figure 8 
 
Some Examples 
It is worth sifting through the treatise on charity in the Secunda secundae in search of this 
distinction. If our analysis of the general relation of justice and friendship is correct up to now, 
it should be possible to find in these questions at least some hints that confirm our thesis. ST 
II-II 31 to 33 treats beneficence, almsgiving, and fraternal correction as external acts of 
charity performed by friends. Though Aquinas does not dedicate a special article to the 
distinction of friendship and justice, he often compares the acts of both virtues in exactly the 
way which we have carved out. 
                                                 
45
 See section 4.2; in Aquinas: first of all ST I-II 99.5. 
46
 ST I-II 99.5 distinguishes between precepts as strict moral obligations, the matter of justice, and commands in 
regard of acts of friendship. ―In praeceptis est iustitia, in mandatis vero caritas.‖ 
47
 ST II-II 23.3 ad 1: ―Iustitia est circa operationes quae sunt ad alium sub ratione debiti legalis, amicitia autem 
sub ratione cuiusdam debiti amicabilis et moralis, vel magis sub ratione beneficii gratuiti.‖ Our attribution of 
legal due to the strict moral due and moral due to the moral due of friends is justified in section 4.3.2. See 
thereto also Contra imp. 2.6 ad 27 (quoted in section 4.3.3, footnote 187) where Aquinas distinguishes very 
clearly between debitum legalis iustitiae and debitum iustitiae amicabilis. 
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ST II-II 33.1 considers fraternal correction from two sides. On one side, every sin injures the 
wrongdoer himself. Thus, the sinner can be corrected for the sake of his own improvement, i.e. 
for his own good. The correction is therefore an act of friendship, for it emerges from an 
affective union with the other person. However, sin infects also the social coexistence of 
people. Hence, if the legitimate authority corrects the wrongdoer in order to protect and 
promote the common good, it is an act of justice since the superiors have charge of the 
common good. In the first case, the correction is a gratis gift, while in the second it renders 
what is due to the other, i.e. the community. ―The correction . . . which applies a remedy to 
the sin of the wrongdoer insofar as it is evil to others, and especially as hurtful to the common 
good . . . is an act of justice, whose concern it is the conservation of the rectitude of justice 
between one man and another.‖48 
We find a similar argument in question 32, which treats almsgiving. Properly speaking, the 
bestowal of alms is a free act of friendship; it arises ―ex compassione‖ for the other.49 
However, if the other is in extreme need – if, for example, he is starving to death and someone 
has the ability to nourish him – then this act of mercy becomes an act of justice. Why? ―In the 
case of extreme necessity all things are common.‖50 This means that to help the poor under 
such circumstances is not a giving of mine, but only the concession of that what belongs to 
the other already, what is due to him, which is the definition of the just act. The support is 
necessary to preserve a relationship of equality and not of friendship.
51
 
Last but not least, the look to of beneficence (q. 31). To desire a good for someone is 
generally an act of friendship; it originates from an affective union. However, Aquinas notes: 
―If the good which one agent does to another is considered under some special aspect of good, 
then beneficence assumes a special character and will belong to some special virtue.‖52 And 
the third reply specifies this assertion for the case of justice: if the intended good is owed to 
the other, then the act of beneficence belongs to justice. ―Just as friendship or charity relates 
                                                 
48
 ST II-II 33.1: ―Correctio . . . quae adhibet remedium peccati delinquentis secundum quod est in malum aliorum, 
et etiam praecipue in nocumentum communis boni . . . est actus iustitiae, cuius est conservare rectitudinem 
iustitiae unius ad alium.‖ Likewise in art. 3. The same distinction is made in De correct. frat. 1. Admittedly, it is 
an act of distributive justice (see Eleonore Stump, ―Aquinas on Justice,‖ Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosphical Association 71 (1997): 64-67). 
49
 ST II-II 32.1. 
50
 ST II-II 32.7 ad 3: ―In casu extremae necessitatis omnia sunt communia.‖ 
51
 Therefore, as Aquinas asserts, the support of an indigent in the case of necessity falls under the command of 
precept. Likewise the bestowal of alms from the own abundance. ―Dare eleemosynam de superfluo est in 
praecepto; et dare eleemosynam ei qui est in extrema necessitate.‖ (ST II-II 32.5; see likewise art. 6 and 2 ad 3). 
52
 ST II-II 31.1: ―Si autem bonum quod quis facit alteri accipiatur sub aliqua speciali ratione boni, sic 
beneficentia accipiet specialem rationem, et pertinebit ad aliquam specialem virtutem.‖  
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in the benefit bestowed to the general aspect of good, so does justice relate therein to the 
aspect of debt.‖53 
 
 
5.2 Various Friendships, Various Justices: The Ambiguous Distinction of 
“Charity and Justice” 
 
In this section we will focus on the relationship between justice and charity as theological 
virtues. Aquinas portrays charity as a kind of friendship with God, ―insofar he communicates 
his beatitude to us.‖54 Thus, charity is seen in terms analogous to human friendship, but 
nevertheless it is friendship in its literal sense.
55
 
This friendship with God extends – as to secondary objects56 – to all rational beings insofar 
they are of participating in the same divine beatitude. Thereby the graced person is united 
with all men on basis of that divine communication.
57
 Loving one‘s neighbor by charity 
means to wish ―that he may be in God,‖58 ―as a companion in the participation of beatitude.‖59 
 
 
5.2.1 Charity and Justice  
 
We can now apply the findings of the previous section to the relationship of charity and 
justice. Friendship contains justice as an integral part by which one renders to the other what 
is strictly due to him. Justice is therefore the precondition and basis which makes gratis gifts 
as signs of friendship possible. Aquinas speaks of justice as ―praevia ad dilectionem.‖60 And 
in fact, when he discusses the perfection of charity as a theological virtue he mentions as sine-
                                                 
53
 ST II-II 31.1 ad 3: ―Sicut amicitia seu caritas respicit in beneficio collato communem rationem boni, ita iustitia 
respicit ibi rationem debiti.‖ 
54
 ST II-II 23.1: ―Secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat.‖ 
55
 See thereto Leo M. Bond, ―A Comparison Between Human and Divine Friendship,‖ The Thomist 3 (1941): 
54-94. In the first chapter the author describes a double similarity between man and God as prerequisite of 
friendship, namely man‘s intellectual nature as natural similarity and his elevation by grace as supernatural 
similarity (57-69). Further, there is a true communication between God and man, as e.g. by prayer (69-77). And 
the relationship realizes the three essential notes of friendship: (a) mutual benevolence; (b) mutual knowledge; 
and (c) a common honest good (77-93). 
56
 See De caritate 4 ad 5 
57
 ST II-II 25.6.  
58
 ST II-II 25.1: ―Hoc enim debemus in proximo diligere, ut in deo sit.‖ 
59
 De caritate 7:– ―ut socium in participatione beatitudinis.‖ 
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qua-non for divine friendship the ―minimum‖ of justice.61 This minimum perfection is ―the 
removal from man‘s affections from all things which are contrary to charity, such as mortal 
sin.‖62 Charity requires, ―that nothing is thought or willed what is contrary to divine love.‖63 It 
is the proper task of the divine precepts to provide this lower limit. ―The commandments are 
directed to the removal of things contrary to charity, things which are incompatible with 
charity.‖64 Again and again, St. Thomas quotes St. Paul, who describes charity as the end of 
all precepts (1 Tim 1.5).
65
 Thus, the parallel fits exactly. Precepts oblige the agent to certain 
actions and determine thereby the matter of justice. The observance of the divine precepts 
corresponds to infused justice, which is presupposed for any act of charity.
66
 And vice versa, 
every transgression of a divine precept, i.e. every sin, is to be judged as act of injustice. 
―Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a mind which is not subject to God, can be 
called injustice [and] contrary to the aforesaid justice, according to 1 Jn 3, who commits sin, 
commits also iniquity, and sin is iniquity.‖67 
One might object that even acts of charity are commanded by divine precepts. Aquinas 
devotes a whole question on the discussion of praecepta caritatis.
68
 Man owes God 
abstinence from any act contrary to the order of grace, but he is also obliged to love him. 
Hence, does friendship become in this special theological case simply a matter of justice? 
The very essence of justice consists in paying back what belongs to the other. Thus, a servant 
performs just acts in rendering service to his lord. A citizen becomes just in rendering equal 
compensation as a strict moral due or even a legal due. But Christ invited his disciples to be 
his friends who, being one with him, participate in his life.
69
 In this way, charity does not pay 
                                                                                                                                                        
60
 Super Mt. XIX 1. 
61
 E.g. In sent. IV 15.2.1D sed contra 2; ST I-II 99.5; II-II 44.6; 184.2 and 3; De perf. spirit. vitae 5. 
62
 ST II-II 184.2: ―Perfectio . . . inquantum ab affectu hominis excluditur omne illud quod caritati contrariatur, 
sicut est peccatum mortale. Et sine tali perfectione caritas esse non potest.‖ Similar in art. 3, esp. ad 2. 
63
 ST II-II 24.8: ―Quod nihil cogitet vel velit quod sit divinae dilectioni contrarium.‖ 
64
 ST II-II 184.3: ―Praecepta . . . ordinantur ad removendum ea quae sunt caritati contraria, cum quibus scilicet 
caritas esse non potest.‖ Likewise in In sent. IV 15.2.1D sed contra 2: ―Illud sine quo caritas esse non potest, 
cadit sub praecepto.‖ Prohibited are acts against charity, portrayed as sins ex genere suo (see In sent. II 42.1.4; 
De malo 7.1).  
65
 ―Finis praecepti caritas est.‖ As far as we see Aquinas quotes throughout his work this sentence 34 (!) times 
with explicit reference to the Apostle and further three times without naming the epistle as source of the 
quotation. 
66
 In this sense J. Porter notes: ―Infused justice serves as the guardian and check on the special relations 
generation by charity.‖ (Porter, ―‗De ordine caritatis‘,‖ 212). 
67
 ST I-II 113.1 ad 1: ―Omne peccatum, secundum quod importat quandam inordinationem mentis non subditae 
deo, iniustitia potest dici praedictae iustitiae contraria; secundum illud I Ioan. III, omnis qui facit peccatum, et 
iniquitatem facit, et peccatum est iniquitas.‖ See also: ST II-II 33.1 ad 1. Likewise Super Rom. I 8 ―Sicut enim 
omnis virtus, inquantum exequitur praeceptum legis, habet rationem iustitiae, ita etiam omne peccatum, 
inquantum a regula legis divinae discordat, habet rationem iniquitatis.‖ In the treatise on justice: ST II-II 58.5 ad 
3; 59.3 ad 2; 79.2 (esp. ad 1); 102.1 ad 3 (indirecte). 
68
 ST II-II 44. 
69
 Jn 15.4 and 15. 
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back what is due to God as other, as an act of justice in its proper sense. Rather, the act of 
charity is a free gift given to God. Admittedly, we are able to offer this gift only because of 
his infinite generosity, i.e. divine grace. Nevertheless, there obtains a certain obligation. It is 
not an obligation of justice, however, that arises as from a relationship with another as other. 
Rather, it is – quoting a fitting expression of Ricoeur – ―a poetic usage of the imperative,‖70 or 
a moral obligation specific to friendship that hinges on the honestas agentis. This obligation 
cannot be externally imposed, for its corresponding act is an as expression of our union with 
the beloved. As relating to the moral due of friends,
71
 the command of charity is an 
affirmative precept that ―obliges always but not for all times, but at certain determined 
times.‖ 72  And consequently, thought charity falls under a precept, its acts are achieved 
―according to place . . . and time . . . according to the due circumstances.‖73 In an allusion to 
the Old Law, Aquinas distinguishes between strict precepts as the matter of justice and 
commandments as belonging to charity: ―In precepts [in praeceptis] is justice, but in 
commandments [in mandatis] charity.‖74 Thus, the fact that there exists a certain obligation 
toward charity does not subvert the principal distinction between charity and justice. 
 
Some Problems of the Solution 
At the first glance, the relationship between charity and justice may appear clarified. Charity 
functions in a supernatural friendship in which one gives gratuitously from his own as in the 
moral due of friends, at the same time it contains justice as its foundation which seeks to 
render the other his due as a strict moral or legal due. Thus, there is a clear distinction 
between charity and justice. 
However, in the writings of St. Thomas there are some ―little details‖ which are hard to 
integrate into that this distinction. 
                                                 
70
 Paul Ricoeur, Liebe und Gerechtigkeit: Amour et Justice (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1990), 14-21, here 20: ―un 
usage poétique de l‘impératif.‖ 
71
 Aquinas speaks even of a debitum amicabile. Cf. ST II-II 23.3 ad 1. In ST II-II 107.1 ad 3 he mentions a duty 
―ex debito amoris.‖ An example would be the moral obligation (debitum) of a friend to correct another friend (in 
Aquinas‘s terms: the correction fraternal). See thereto also McKay, ―Ethique et vertus morales infuses,‖ 136. 
72
 In sent. II 35.3 ad 3: ―Praeceptum autem affirmativum obligat semper, sed non ad semper, sed ad aliquod 
tempus determinatum.― And the text continues: ―Et ideo in illo tempore tantum ad quod praeceptum 
affirmativum obligat aliquis reus omissionis tenetur.‖ 
73
 ST II-II 31.3: ―pro loco . . . et tempore . . . secundum debitas circumstantias.‖ 
74
 ST I-II 99.5: ―In praeceptis est iustitia, in mandatis vero caritas.‖ 
From another point of view the difference between the obligation of precepts and the commandment of charity is 
expressed in In sent. III 40.3 ad 1: ―Observatio mandatorum legis necessaria est ad vitam aeternam 
consequendam, quia sine ea ad vitam aeternam intrare non potest . . . non tamen observatio mandatorum legis ad 
vitam consequendam sufficiebat, nisi modus caritatis adiungeretur; quam lex nullo modo causare poterat.‖ 
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First, let us assume that the moral due of friends is the proper task of charity as friendship. 
Why then does Aquinas treat some virtues which correspond to a moral due as potential parts 
of justice, instead of seeing them, as we should expect, as proper acts of charity? For example, 
in the systematic outline of justice in the Commentary on the Sentences (III 33.3.4) St. 
Thomas discusses liberality, gratitude, beneficence, friendship, concord, benignity, etc., as 
potential parts of justice.
75
 According to our argument above, however, those virtues that 
correspond to a moral due of friends should be discussed rather within the context of charity, 
namely as proper acts of charity.
76
 In the Secunda secundae, the problem is even more 
striking. Some virtues which correspond to a moral due of friends are presented as proper acts 
of charity,
77
 whereas some other virtues are annexed to justice as its potential parts.
78
 Beyond 
that, question 114 takes up the topic of amicitia and discusses it explicitly as a potential part 
of justice. What is the reason for this double discussion of friendship – once as involving 
charity, and again as a part of justice? 
Secondly, the understanding of justice as a prerequisite for charity also seems problematic. 
The justice that is required as the foundation of supernatural friendship with God differs in an 
important way from justice as usually described by Aquinas. Justice for charity is not limited 
to exterior actions but extends to all practical matters insofar as they are relevant to divine 
friendship, which is first of all a spiritual union.
79
 Thus, sins such as hatred, sloth, envy, etc., 
are discussed in the treatise on charity as contrary vices,
80
 and therefore strictly prohibited by 
the divine law. It is not only a matter of a moral due of friends to renounce each act of hatred 
for the sake of divine friendship, but it is also strictly commanded by law as a matter of 
―justice,‖ but obviously of a profoundly transformed justice – a divine justice81 that is much 
                                                 
75
 See esp. In sent. III 33.3.4 A, B, C, D and F. 
76
 In sent. III 33.27-31. 
77
 ST II-II 27-33. 
78
 ST II-II 102-119. 
79
 ―Regnum dei in interioribus actibus principaliter consistit: sed ex consequenti etiam ad regnum dei pertinent 
omnia illa sine quibus interiores actus esse non possunt. . . . Regnum dei est interior iustitia et pax et gaudium 
spirituale.‖ (ST I-II 108.1 ad 1). See also ST I-II 100.2. 
80
 ST II-II 34-43. In ST I-II 100.9 Aquinas notes that the divine law measures (in contrast to the human law) also 
internal acts. 
81
 In fact, Aquinas uses sometimes the term of ―iustitia divina‖ for denoting this kind of justice (e.g. ST II-II 59.1 
ad 1; 81.8 ad 1; 124.2 ad 1). We will investigate those texts in chapter 7 in more detail. S.A. Edwards notes 
thereto: ―In Aquinas‘s theory, the modification of ‗iustitia‘ by ‗divina‘ turned justice outside-in: instead of being 
related to an external other through the media of external acts and objects, the individual was related to an 
internal other through the media of actus interiores and spiritual goods. With the introversion of the relationship 
came an introversion of justice.‖ (Edwards, Interior Acts: Teleology, Justice, and Friendship in the Religious 
Ethics of Thomas Aquinas, 46-53, here 49; emphasis in the original). Edwards, however, focuses in his study on 
the question of divine justice only from the side of God (as analog distributive justice) who ―dat unicuique 
secundum suam dignitatem.‖ (ST I 21.1). 
Chapter 5. Charity and Justice 
 308 
more challenging than natural justice. Nonetheless, since the matter of divine justice is 
defined by the divine law as a strict obligation, we can rightly call it justice, though it is 
clearly a different kind of justice. 
Hence, are there different kinds of friendship? And different kinds of justice?
82
 
 
 
5.2.2 Various Kinds of Friendships – Various Kinds of Justice  
 
Aquinas distinguishes several kinds of friendship, and consequently he recognizes as 
corresponding to each type of friendship something like a special species of justice. What is 
more, all these different species of amicitia are not superseded by charity but ―survive‖ under 
the reign of grace according to their own measure. Ultimately, we will see that they contribute 
various additional features to the order of charity. Thus, justice is not simply a univocal 
complement to charity. Rather, it relates to each special type of friendship in a particular way.  
Admittedly, St. Thomas does not thematize these distinctions in a particular question, but 
based on various assertions he makes a reliable reconstruction of his view is possible.  
Every friendship is based on a communication of a certain common possessed good. For 
example, charity-friendship is grounded in the communication of divine life and beatitude, 
while friendship between two citizens is based on their common civil live. Familial friendship 
rests on relatives‘ common natural origin. Aquinas identifies further types of friendship on the 
basis of the common household, shared voyages, the art of sailing, military exercises, 
common studies, etc. St. Thomas adopted this view from Aristotle, as is clear from his 
commentaries.
83
 However, it also appears in Summa theologiae: ―The reason why we love our 
neighbor is God . . . Yet there are other friendships [aliae amicitiae], distinct from charity, in 
respect of to other reasons for which men are loved.‖84 Elsewhere, he adds: ―In human things 
there are many other mutual communications besides those of consanguinity and citizenship, 
                                                 
82
 Cf. Jeremiah Newman, Foundations of Justice: A Historico-Critical Study in Thomism (Dublin: Cork 
University Press, 1954), 67-69. Newman is one of few scholars who compare charity and justice; he 
distinguishes likewise natural and supernatural love. However, in the end he fails to draw any conclusions from 
this right observation (see esp. 69). 
83
 See for example In ethic. VIII 9.3: ―Homines enim consueverunt appellare amicos eos, qui secundum aliquam 
communicationem sibi communicant; puta connavigatores qui communicant in navigando, et commilitones qui 
communicant in militia.‖ Even more examples are given in In ethic. VIII 12. 
84
 ST II-II 103.3 ad 2: ―Ratio diligendi proximum deus est, non enim diligimus per caritatem in proximo nisi 
deum, et ideo eadem caritas est qua diligitur deus, et proximus. Sunt tamen aliae amicitiae, differentes a caritate, 
secundum alias rationes quibus homines amantur.‖ 
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as the Philosopher says in Ethic. VIII, and on each of them is founded a certain kind of 
friendship.‖85 St. Thomas teaches likewise in various other articles.86 
Furthermore, each of these friendships requires certain indispensable actions that are strictly 
owed to the other in accord with the specific nature of the fellowship. These acts render to the 
other what is due to him on the basis of their communication. Thus, they belong to justice in a 
general sense. For example, to respect nighttime peace after 11:00 pm in a shared apartment is 
not a free sign of friendship – a moral due of friendship – but is owed to the other housemates 
as a strict moral duty, even if it is not laid down in written form. It is the indispensable 
foundation for any friendship in a household, and only on this basis does it become possible 
for the housemates to achieve proper acts of friendship within their community. 
Something analogous is true for any other kind of friendship. Within a family, some actions 
between parents and children are strictly owed as matter of justice (again, understood in its 
wider sense), and only on this basis does familial friendship with gratuitous signs of affection 
become possible. Similarly the military community necessarily requires as a minimum of 
justice the submission of lower ranking soldiers to the discipline of their leaders.
87
 Even 
friendship between two citizens, which is grounded on the common social life (Aquinas 
speaks of amicitia politica,
88
 dilectio socialis,
89
 or amicitia civilis
90
), requires a certain 
minimum of justice in its proper sense. And only on this after this justice is established can 
proper acts of political friendship such as liberality, affability, etc. (i.e. the potential parts of 
justice in its second degree), become possible.
91
 
                                                 
85
 ST II-II 101.1 arg. 3 (affirmative): ―Multae sunt aliae in humanis rebus communicationes praeter 
consanguinitatem et concivium communicationem, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII ethic., et super quamlibet 
earum aliqua amicitia fundatur.‖ 
86
 A very clear reference to different kinds of friendship is found in ST II-II 26.8: ―Diversorum dilectio est 
mensuranda secundum diversam rationem coniunctionis, ut scilicet unusquisque diligatur magis in eo quod 
pertinet ad illam coniunctionem secundum quam diligitur. Et ulterius comparanda est dilectio dilectioni 
secundum comparationem coniunctionis ad coniunctionem. Sic igitur dicendum est quod amicitia 
consanguineorum fundatur in coniunctione naturalis originis; amicitia autem concivium in communicatione civili; 
et amicitia commilitantium in communicatione bellica. . . . Si autem comparemus coniunctionem ad 
coniunctionem, constat quod coniunctio naturalis originis est prior et immobilior, quia est secundum id quod 
pertinet ad substantiam; aliae autem coniunctiones sunt supervenientes, et removeri possunt. Et ideo amicitia 
consanguineorum est stabilior. Sed aliae amicitiae possunt esse potiores secundum illud quod est proprium 
unicuique amicitiae.‖ Similar in ST II-II 26.2; 82.2 ad 2; 106.5 etc. 
87
 Cf. ST II-II 44.6: ―Non . . . contra disciplinam militarem agit.‖ 
88
 E.g. ST II-II 26.2. Contra imp. 2.6. Similar In sent. III 29.6 ad 3: ―Amicitia politica fundamentum habet 
communicationem in honestis operibus in quibus simul aliqui conversantur.‖ 
89
 De caritate 9. For Aquinas it is a common way of expression to describe the civile community as amicitia 
politica. For further examples see In sent. III 28.1.5; De caritate 7; In ethic. IX 6.7. 
90
 In sent. II 40.1.5; De perf. spirit. vitae 14. 
91
 Subsequent to Aristotle, Aquinas describes political friendship as concord which consists in an agreement of 
things to be done. ―Ad amicos pertinet, quod eadem eligant, in quo consistit ratio concordiae.‖ (In ethic. IX 6.1; 
see also IX 6.7 and IX 12.12). And elsewhere: ―Amicitia quantum ad unionem affectuum, et concordia quantum 
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In his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Aquinas explains:  
 
Justice is differentiated according to different types of communication. The same kind of 
iustum is not found in every communication, but a different one. Thus it is obvious that not the 
same right exists between fathers and sons, as between brother and brother. Likewise, there is 
a different justice between etairos, i.e., people of the same age and rearing than between 
citizens, because they bestow different things on one another as mutually due. And in the same 
way in other kinds of friendship. So it is clear that different types of justice exist between the 
individuals just mentioned.
92
 
 
The quotation makes clear that different kinds of friendship imply different kinds of justice in 
its wider sense. In each kind of friendship, one can distinguish between acts of justice and the 
acts of friendship proper to it. In other words, one can identify what is indispensable for the 
maintenance the specific kind of friendship, or what belongs to the other as his own because 
of that particular fellowship, which falls under a strict due, as strictly required for the 
continuation of that specific friendship.
93
 In some cases these obligations are even legally 
determined (e.g. civil laws govern political friendships, house rules guide friendship between 
members of the same household, etc.).
94
 On the other side, the proper acts of any of these 
friendships correspond to a due of friends.  
This perspective explains perfectly the double treatment of the virtues of friendship and 
justice in the Secunda secundae. When in the treatise on charity (qq. 23-46) Aquinas makes 
the distinction between proper acts of friendship (charity) and acts of justice (which are 
strictly required for divine friendship), both receive their measures from the goal of 
maintaining divine friendship. On the other hand, the virtues of friendship that are annexed to 
proper justice as potential parts (liberality, affability etc., discussed within the treatise on 
justice) are signs of friendship but not of charity but of political friendship based on justice in 
                                                                                                                                                        
ad consensum in agendis‖ (In sent. IV 49.4.5A ad 5; see also ST II-II 29.1). The object of political friendship is 
the good of the human city. ―In amicitia autem politica obiectum est bonum civitatis.‖ (De caritate 7). 
92
 In ethic. VIII 9.6: ―Iustitia diversificatur secundum diversas communicationes. Non enim idem est iustum in 
qualibet communicatione, sed differens: sicut patet quod non idem est iustum inter patres et filios et inter fratres 
adinvicem. Et similiter aliud est iustum inter etairos, idest coaetaneos et connutritos, et inter cives, quia alia sibi 
mutuo tamquam debita exhibent. Et eadem ratio est in aliis amicitiis. Et sic patet, quod altera iusta sunt inter 
singulos praedictorum.‖ 
93
 The ―strict due‖ is taken here in relation to a particular communication. It is not always a strict moral 
obligation. If, for example, there is no moral obligation to make a journey, then the particular member of a 
traveler-group is not morally obliged to respect the basic rules of this group; he can simply quite the community. 
But if he wants to partake in this special friendship, he has to respect the general rules. 
94
 See In sent. IV 27.1.1C: ―Omnis communicatio aliqua lege ordinatur; ideo ponitur ordinativum istius 
communionis [sc. domesticae], scilicet ius divinum et humanum: aliae enim communicationes, ut negotiatorum 
et commilitantium, solo iure humano institutae sunt.‖ 
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its proper sense.
95
 Thus, the structures of the treatises on charity and justice in the Secunda 
secundae appears as follows: 
 
charity (ST II-II 23-46) justice (ST II-II 57-122) 
strict due 
divine justice 
moral due of friends 
proper charity 
strict due 
proper justice 
moral due of friends 
potential parts of jus. 
Figure 9 
 
 
5.2.3 The Interface of Various Types of Friendship and Justice 
 
We have to clarify how these different types of friendship and justice relate to each other. A 
good point of departure in answering this question is In sent. III 29.6. Here, Aquinas lists the 
most basic communities in which every human being participates. In this text, contrary to 
what Aquinas says elsewhere, friendships based on military service and academice study fall 
out of consideration, for the simple reason that no one is obliged to become a soldier or a 
student. 
 
The Philosopher distinguishes different friendships according to different forms of 
communication. For there is a natural communication, according to which some people share a 
natural origin; and upon this communication the friendship between father and son and other 
blood relatives is based. Another communication is economic, according to which men share 
domestic duties with each other. Still another communication is political, according to which 
men share their things in common with their fellow citizen. A fourth communication is divine, 
according to which all men share in the one body of the Church, either actually or potentially; 
and this is the friendship of charity.
96
 
 
                                                 
95
 It is important to note this specific meaning of amicitia in the context of the potential parts of justice: Aquinas 
notes sometimes in those question that virtues as affability and liberality do not imply a mutual affective union 
between people, and therefore they don‘t realize the perfect ratio of friendship in the sense of charity (see ST II-
II 114.1 ad 1; similar in In ethic. IV 14.6 and ST II-II 17.5 ad 3). Thereof, however, does not follow that these 
virtues are not expressions of political friendship which consists merely – as Aquinas notes explicitly – in the 
pleasant social life (ST II-II 114.1 corp., ad 2, art. 2 corp., ad 1), without requiring a special personal affection: 
―Est enim amicitia politica circa utilia et circa ea quae conveniant ad vitam humanam.‖ (In ethic. IX 6.7). 
96
 In sent. III 29.6: ―Secundum diversas communicationes, diversas amicitias philosophus distinguit. Est enim 
communicatio alia quidem naturalis, secundum quod in naturali origine aliqui communicant; et in ista 
communicatione fundatur amicitia patris et filii, et aliorum consanguineorum. Alia vero communicatio est 
oeconomica, secundum quam homines sibi in domesticis officiis communicant. Alia vero communicatio est 
politica, secundum quam homines ad concives suos communicant. Quarta communicatio est divina, secundum 
quam omnes homines communicant in uno corpore ecclesiae vel actu vel potentia; et haec est amicitia caritatis.‖ 
Chapter 5. Charity and Justice 
 312 
The comparison shows that different friendships are determined by different shared goods that 
the friends owe to each other because of their friendship, and that are not due to persons who 
do not partake in that friendship. Admittedly, Aquinas mentions in this text only the various 
kinds of friendship and does not refer to the issue of justice. But as was shown above, ―the 
lesser is included in the greater.‖ Thus, each friendship requires intrinsically a corresponding 
kind of justice as its integral part. This is especially clear in the case of communicatio politica, 
which apparently requires not only the potential parts of justice, but first of all justice in its 
proper sense.  
It is important to point out several features of the friendships that develop between blood 
relatives, residents, and citizens.  
First, if we claim different kinds of justice in regard to different types of friendship, then 
justice is taken in analogous ways, relating to the various species of amicitia. What we owe to 
our parents in the strict sense may be irrelevant in comparison to other cohabitants. Likewise, 
what is strictly due to a roommate might be a free sign of affection in civil friendship. 
Aquinas discusses these analogous kinds of justice as its potential parts of the first degree, e.g. 
piety as justice regarding one‘s parents (see section 4.5.2). 
Secondly, on the natural level political friendship is the most general type of friendship. It 
denotes the living together of all citizens insofar they are not related by any other special bond 
(for example, by a common household, a mutual engagement, etc.). Consequently, the justice 
that is contained in amicitia politica is the most basic type of justice since it must be restored 
to everybody without exception. ―Every friendship consists in a certain communication, but 
every communication is reduced to the political one.‖97 And therefore ―all communications 
can be traced back [reducuntur] to the political communication,‖98 for they are ―contained in 
politica.‖99 This argument accords fully with the division of different parts of justice that we 
discussed in section 4.5. There, we determined justice in its most proper sense as a virtue 
between any citizen, whereas its potential parts of the first degree (i.e. strict obligation but 
impossible recompensation) were limited to special relations, as in regard to parents, relatives, 
benefactors, etc. Thus, our present interpretation of several species of justice fits perfectly to 
the common outline in chapter 4. 
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 In ethic. VIII 9.1: ―Omnis amicitia in communicatione quadam consistit; omnis autem communicatio reducitur 
ad politicam. Ergo omnes amicitiae species secundum politicas communicationes sunt accipiendae.‖ 
98
 In ethic. VIII 9.9: ―Omnes communicationes ad politicam communicationem reducuntur.‖ 
99
 In ethic. VIII 9.13: ―sub politica continentur.‖ 
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Thirdly, although political friendship is the most basic form of friendship – familial bonds, 
fore example, create narrower and more challenging ties – the requirements of political justice 
are not superseded by higher forms of friendship. Rather, every special friendship is only 
possible on the basis of citizens living together politially. Hence, to pay the arranged price for 
a performed task and to avoid any kind of injury (the basics of commutative justice) is 
required for the full flourishing of familial friendships, though the corresponding justice of 
piety (reverent gratitude for benefits received from parents) demands much more. 
What does this imply for friendship as charity and its corresponding divine justice? Charity is 
based on a divine communication that desires for the other the highest good and perfection. 
However, and this is decisive, to want the perfect good for the other includes also the 
intention not to do harm in inferior things. In other words, in charity one must always render 
what is due according to any kind of relationship. In this way divine friendship demands 
respect for every inferior kind of friendship. Aquinas explains the matter as follows. 
 
Since charity implies benevolence, which desires good things for friends and does good things 
to them, therefore in the aforesaid friendships, friends are to be loved on the basis of the good 
which pertains to the communication upon which the friendship is based. Hence, to our father 
and blood relatives we have to conduct ourselves amicably in things which pertain to the 
preservation of nature; to members of the household in things which pertain to things in a 
household; to fellow citizens in things which belong to the civil life, such as conversing and 
assisting in civic works; and to all men [we have to conduct ourselves rightly] in things which 
regard God, so that we desire eternal life for all and work for their salvation as we can.
100
 
 
Hence, though the proper object of charity is simply the divine communication, which is 
shared (at least potentially) with all rational beings, charity does not disregard other existing 
relations among men but rather include them. Thereby, charity demands of someone different 
things in relation to their different friends. St. Thomas explains succinclty: ―Love of charity 
comprehends in itself all human loves.‖ 101  In regard to one‘s parents, for example, the 
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 In sent. III 29.6: ―Quia ergo caritas benevolentiam importat, quae amicis bona optat, et operatur bonum ad 
ipsos; ideo secundum unamquamque praedictarum amicitiarum amandi sunt amici quantum ad bona pertinentia 
ad communicationem illam super quam amicitia fundatur; unde ad patrem et consanguineos amicabiliter nos 
habere debemus in eis quae ad conservationem naturae pertinent; et ad domesticos in his quae ad dispensationem 
domus pertinent; ad concives in his quae ad civilem vitam spectant, sicut est simul conversari, et morari in 
operibus civilibus; ad omnes autem homines in his quae ad deum spectant, ut omnibus optemus vitam aeternam, 
et operemur ad salutem ipsorum secundum modum nostrum.‖  
101
 De caritate 7. The whole text: ‖Cum omnia bona humana ordinentur in beatitudinem aeternam sicut in 
ultimum finem, dilectio caritatis sub se comprehendit omnes dilectiones humanas . . . Unde quod aliqui 
consanguinei diligant se invicem, vel aliqui concives, vel simul peregrinantes, vel quicumque tales, potest esse 
meritorium et ex caritate.‖ And short in De caritate 8: ―Omnes aliae licitae dilectiones sub caritate 
comprehenduntur.‖ In accordance with this view, Kreeft asserts conversely that ―all kinds of natural human loves 
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requirements of charity cannot be reduced to wish them to live in God. If children limit the 
benevolence for their parents to the divine good and disregard familial friendship with its 
corresponding obligations, they would act against benevolentia, and thus they would sin 
against charity.
102
 
At this point we reach the key to the right understanding of the relationship between charity 
and justice, or between different kinds of friendship and different kinds of justice. Charity as 
friendship is determined by a specific communication – namely the divine union – and 
therefore ex parte obiecti charity can be characterized as an equal regard given to everyone, 
i.e. it wants the same good, divine beatitude, for everyone.
103
 However, insofar as the graced 
agent is united otherwise with his neighbor under other aspects, and as each of these bonds 
includes somestrict debts, charity as the most fundamental friendship takes charge of these 
obligations.
104
 Or we may say, conversely, that to neglect an obligation that arises from 
another kind of friendship is ipso facto non-benevolent, injuring, contrary and destructive to 
charity. Therefore, all obligations which arise from the various kinds of friendship fall under 
divine justice, which itself provides the basis of charity. 
In short, divine friendship is not to be understood as a mere supplement to natural 
relationships. Rather, various friendships combine to build a hierarchical structure of human 
relations, atop which sits charity-friendship. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
are training for divine love.‖ (Peter Kreeft, Prayer: The Great Conversation. Straight Answers to Tough 
Questions about Prayer (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1991), 73). 
102
 ―Sins against justice – in both deeds and words – are sins against love precisely because they violate justice.‖ 
(Martin Rhonheimer, ―Sins Against Justice (IIa IIae, qq. 59-78),‖ in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 298). 
103
 ST II-II 26.6 ad 1: ―Omnes homines aeque diligimus ex caritate, quia omnibus optamus bonum idem in genere, 
scilicet beatitudinem aeternam.‖ This understanding differs fundamentally from Outka‘s position of charity as 
equal regard (see Outka, Agape ... 9-24). For Outka equal regard means disregard of all natural relations and 
obligations. ―One ought to be committed to the other‘s wellbeing independently and unalterably; and to view the 
other as irreducibly valuable prior to his doing anything in particular.‖ (Ibid., 10). ―Agape enjoins an equal 
consideration that is independent of changes in the particular states of the other.‖ (Ibid., 10-11). ―Agape . . . is 
altogether separate from the question of reciprocity.‖ (Ibid., 18). 
104
 Delos notes correctly: ―La charité qui nous fait aimer le bien d‘autrui, nous fait-elle vouloir le respect de son 
droit: car le respect de son droit est son premier bien. Il ne peut donc y avoir de charité là où il n‘y a pas volonté 
de justice.‖ (J.Th. Delos, ―Appendice I: Notes explicatives,‖ in Somme théologique: La justice; Tome premier; 
2
a
-2
ae
, questions 57-62 (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1932), 200). 
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―residential justice‖ 
friendship in the common household 
 
―familial justice‖ 
familial friendship 
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Figure 10
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As is evident, visualizing the relationship of justice and charity is quite tricky. But why? 
Looking back to the fairly simple examples of infused temperance or fortitude, one may be 
surprised that justice raises such complications. Understanding such complexity in the case of 
infused justice is the topic of the next section. 
 
 
5.3 The Special Features of Justice as an Infused Moral Virtue 
 
Aquinas defines the virtuous act as right mean between two extremes. In the case of 
temperance and fortitude, virtue is determined in respect to the emotional status of the agent 
himself and is therefore something subjective. In the case of justice in its general sense as 
regarding acts ad alterum, it is described objectively as the medium rei. These are the 
precisions we reached in section 4.1. 
We shall argue that the difference between temperance and fortitide on the one hand and 
justice on the other is highly relevant for the defining infused justice. One indication of its 
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 Noteworthy: If we refer to justice as presupposition of charity, we speak on the level of actions. Before 
bestowing acts of friendship, we have to pay the due. On the level of virtues, however, charity precedes justice.  
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importance may be the fact that Aquinas usually distinguishes the acquired and infused 
virtues with examples of temperance and fortitude but never justice.
106
 We want to suggest 
that the neglect of the peculiarity of justice is one of the reasons why scholars regard so often 
the difference of infused and acquired virtues as superfluous or obscure. 
In the following, we shall first give a short account of the different means of the acquired and 
infused affective virtues, and then compare the results with the special case of justice. 
 
The Different Means of Acquired and Infused Affective Virtues 
The affective virtues perfect the sensible appetite in order that the agent might be able to 
achieve his proper good not only by means of the will but with all of his powers. Thus, 
different species of temperance and fortitude are required depending on the various goods 
proper to man. In the agent considered simply as an individual (ut homo), temperance 
measures concupiscence in regard to health, and fortitude measures the same in regard to fears 
and dangers that threaten his good. In the agent considered in his social context, as a citizen 
(ut civis), a higher form of temperance is necessary since the sensible appetite has to seek 
what is due to the agent as member of a community, and fortitude now endures dangers for 
the sake of the city.
107
 And finally, in the agent subject to the reign of grace (ut membrum 
ecclesiae), the sensible appetites must be measured by a yet higher rule, namely infused 
temperance for the full submission of the body to the spirit
108
 and infused fortitude for 
readiness to suffer martyrdom: ―Just as civic fortitude strengthens a man‘s soul in human 
justice, for whose conservation he endures the danger of death, so gratuitous fortitude 
strengthens man‘s soul in the good of the justice of God.‖109 
All of these various species of affective virtues share the same matter: pleasures and fears. 
But each kind – the affective virtue of the individual, of the citizen, and of the graced agent – 
works for a different good, namely the good of the individual, the common good of the city, 
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 In sent. III 33.1.2D; ST I-II 63.4; De virt. in com. 10 ad 4, ad 5; ad 8; ad 10; ad 11; ad 14. 
107
 The clearest account of that relation is found in De virt. in com. 10 ad 4: ―Virtus ordinata in finem inferiorem 
non facit actus ordinatum ad finem superiorem, nisi mediante virtute superiori; sicut fortitudo, quae est virtus 
hominis qua homo, non ordinat actum suum ad bonum politicum, nisi mediante fortitudine quae est virtus 
hominis in quantum est civis.‖ 
108
 See ST I-II 63.4: ―In sumptione ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini corporis, 
nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem regulam legis divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, 
et in servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum huiusmodi.‖ 
109
 ST II-II 124.2 ad 1: ―Sicut autem fortitudo civilis firmat animum hominis in iustitia humana, propter cuius 
conservationem mortis pericula sustinet; ita etiam fortitudo gratuita firmat animum hominis in bono iustitiae 
dei.‖ (From the context it is clear that iustitia dei does not mean here God‘s justice, but a kind of divine justice of 
man; see Inglis, ―Aquinas‘s Replication,‖ 17). 
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the community of saints (i.e. the Church).
110
 And consequently, each species determines a 
different right mean among the very same pleasures and fears. Temperate and courageous acts 
of the virtuous citizen are more ambitious than those of the virtuous individual, and the 
virtues of the saint demand again more than those of the good citizen. The higher the good for 
which the virtue acts, the more challenging is the attainment of its mean. Thus, the right mean 
of one type of virtue might be judged as defective or excessive by a higher virtue. For 
example, keeping calm in private affairs might be sufficient for simple fortitude, but it fails to 
make a courageous citizen.
111
 Also, the right mean of infused temperance might consist in 
abstinence and fasting which would be unreasonable from the mere viewpoint of bodily health.  
Applying now the results of our investigations in section 5.2, we can describe this hierarchy 
on the basis of the various types of friendship available to human agents. The concupisible 
passions of a solitary individual are ordered only toward conserving his own health, while the 
temperance of a citizen will also guarantee the achievement of his political (i.e. social) duties 
and thus allow for political friendship. Infused temperance will work for the preservation of 
divine friendship. 
Thus, in a certain way infused virtues require something superfluous in comparison to 
acquired virtues.  
 
By an acquired virtue the circumstances are measured in proportion to the civil good, but by 
an infused virtue in proportion to the good of eternal glory; therefore, what is superfluous 
according to a civil virtue, may be moderated according to infused virtue, as when a man 
starves and exposes himself voluntarily to the danger of death because of the defense of 
faith.
112
  
 
The following chart compares the right means of both types of virtue.
113
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 By the example of fortitude Aquinas makes the distinction between the good which is to be achieved by the 
virtue, and its proper act: ―In actu fortitudinis duo sunt consideranda. Quorum unum est bonum in quo fortis 
firmatur, et hoc est fortitudinis finis. Aliud est ipsa firmitas, qua quis non cedit contrariis prohibentibus ab illo 
bono, et in hoc consistit essentia fortitudinis.‖ 
111
 ―Patet quod aliud est bonum hominis in quantum et homo, et aliud in quantum civis. Et manifestum est quod 
aliquae operationes possent esse convenientes homini in quantum est homo, quae non essent convenientes ei 
secundum quod est civis.‖ (De virt. in com. 10). 
112
 In sent. III 33.1.2D ad 2: ―Per virtutem acquisitam collimitantur circumstantiae secundum proportionem ad 
bonum civile, sed per virtutem infusam secundum proportionem ad bonum aeternae gloriae: unde etiam aliquid 
superfluum secundum virtutem civilem est moderatum secundum virtutem infusam, sicut quod homo ieiunet, et 
se voluntarie morti offerat propter defensionem fidei.‖ 
113
 The example is, of course, misleading: in the case of the affective virtues a universally valid measure is 
impossible (section 4.1). What is the right mean for Peter might be an excess for Paul.  
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The sensible appetite of the agent 
inclines to… 
acquired temperance infused temperance 
…nothing; it ignores sens. pleasure excess excess 
…to renounce regularly to drink excess right mean 
…to drink usually to hilarity right mean defect 
…always more sensible pleasures defect defect 
Figure 11 
 
Hence, considering the right mean of infused temperance from the perspective of its acquired 
counterpart, it misses the medium virtutis, for it aims for the ―excess‖ of abstinence. B. Kent 
notices rightly: ―What would be prudent for a Christian might thus appear, and even be, 
imprudent for a non-Christian.‖114 Here the findings of chapter 3 again become important. 
The present characterization of the right mean of infused temperance as imprudent does not 
argue for its irrationality. Grace does not oppose nature; enlightened reason contains actually 
the formal perfection of natural reason. Nevertheless, the particular reasonable passion 
regarding the supernatural end (in its concrete realization) might be judged as excessive or 
defective in comparison to the good earthly life. The formal principles of reason and of 
enlightened reason are different but not opposed. Therefore, the perfection of the lower 
virtues is formally contained in the perfection of the higher, though the higher might demand 
contrary concrete material acts. 
We should be very clear about this point since it will be the very basis for the right 
understanding of the particularity of acquired and infused justice. Infused temperance perfects 
man‘s sensible appetite not only for some additional occasions or in regard to special persons 
– for example, to easily keep abstinence on prescribed days, or to calm bodily passions during 
prayer, or to keep one‘s reserve in conversations with certain persons – whereas during other 
daily affairs the sensible appetite remains unchanged. To the contrary, the infused habit 
transforms the whole underlying power and each passion, even if some affections arise during 
the daily activities of political life, and even if a subsequent external action (moved by such 
an affection) might be identical with external results of acquired temperance. Nevertheless, 
the formal content of both affections will be principally different. Again, the comparison with 
different friendships is helpful. If the graced agent has infused temperance, which perfects 
man‘s affections for the preservation of divine friendship, then there won‘t be a single passion 
– not one! – which might be ruled only by reference to the good of the human city. Even on 
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occasions in which a graced agent could drink more without threatening political friendship, 
he would attend to the measure of infused temperance in every situation. Thus, the only valid 
measure for affective life of the graced agent is his friendship with God.
115
 Every excess and 
defect in relation to this measure are to be characterized as vicious.
116
  
 
The Different Situation of Justice: The Special Character of the iustum as Right Mean 
When we attempt to apply the ordinary way of determining the right mean of acquired and 
infused virtues to the case of justice, we observe a fundamental change. 
In the case of the affective virtues, the new and more restricted mean of infused temperance 
requalifies the mean of acquired temperance as defective. Quite different is the case of virtues 
regarding external acts ad alterum, not only under the reign of charity but even at the mere 
natural level. Interactions between two citizens demand political justice. If, however, the two 
citizens are members of the same family, aliquid superfluum ‒ something additional ‒ beyond 
the mean of political justice becomes due. In the case of the affective virtues, the higher 
measure determines the right mean, so that all other alternatives are either defective or 
excessive. In the case of justice, however, additional friendships do not change the original 
iustum. The right mean of every kind of justice remains obligatory in all circumstances. The 
iustum survives materially, and the new due is just added on. For example, if two citizens are 
connected by familial bonds, the aliquid superfluum of familial justice does not transform the 
duty of the good citizen – as it does in the case of temperance – but the something more is 
simply subjoined to the prior obligations.
117
 
Thus, the right means of the various types of friendship relate to each other as follows. 
                                                                                                                                                        
114
 Kent, ―Habits and Virtues,‖ 125. 
115
 ―Le rapport à la fin ultime surnaturelle ne demeure point extrinsèque à la vertu morale; il affecte la 
détermination du juste milieu vertueux en le surélevant pour le proportionner aux exigences de cette fin objet de 
la charité.‖ (Parent, ―Les vertus morales infuses dans la vie chrétienne,‖ 209). 
116
 This does not mean that for example the consideration of health is not relevant for infused temperance; but 
the ultimate criterion for the particular act is in any case divine friendship (see section 3.4). 
117
 Aquinas does not pick up the issue explicitly. However, in ST II-II 79.1 ad 1 he notes incidentally: ―Aliae 
virtutes morales [sc. temperantia et fortitudo] consistunt circa passiones, in quibus bonum facere est venire ad 
medium, quod est declinare ab extremis quasi a malis, et sic in idem redit quantum ad alias virtutes, facere 
bonum et declinare a malo. Sed iustitia consistit circa operationes et res exteriores, in quibus aliud est facere 
aequalitatem, et aliud est factam non corrumpere.‖ 
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The virtuous agent inclined to… 
towards his 
fellow citizens 
towards his 
co-habitants 
towards family 
members 
…give gratis all things 
excess 
(but not vicious) 
excess 
(but not vicious) 
excess 
…support the other in sustenance 
right mean …respect nighttime peace 
right mean 
…pay the just price right mean 
…cause any kind of unjust harm defect defect defect 
 ↓ ↓ ↓ 
 justice between 
fellow citizen 
―justice‖ in a 
household 
―justice‖ in a 
family 
Figure 12 
 
Thus, regarding the determination of the right mean we can note a double difference between 
the affective virtues and justice. 
First, there is a difference in respect to calculating excess. In the previous chart, the right 
mean was situated between to vicious extremes. For virtues regarding external acts, however, 
the excess, i.e. to give more than required, does not imply malice (section 4.1). Consequently, 
the more demanding mean of a higher form of justice – familial justice, for example – is 
principally compatible with political justice. It implies something superfluous from the 
perspective of mere political justice, but it is not against the measure of political justice. Thus, 
membership in an additional community entails for the agent simply a material addition of 
some further requirements. 
Secondly, determining the mean of justice differs from determing that of the affective virtues 
in respect to calculating its defect. The right mean of political justice comes to be regarded as 
defect when measured against the mean of familial justice, but this defect works nevertheless 
as material part of the mean of familial justice. He who cares for his parents is thereby not 
dispensed to pay the just price if he buys something from them. The right mean of familial 
justice includes the mean of political justice, which would be a defect if considered merely by 
itself. Quite different is the case of temperance, where the right mean of the lower species 
turns out to be a negative defect in comparison to the higher.  
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Implications for Justice under the Reign of Charity  
Based on this reflection we are able to understand the special situation of justice within the 
order of grace. The supernatural friendship of God and man – and consequently between man 
and man – implies a special kind of justice that renders everyone what is due to them 
according to their divine bond. This special mean of divine justice demands aliquid 
superfluum in comparison to any natural relationship. However, in contrast to the affective 
virtues, it adopts and contains the right mean of all natural communities. The mean of divine 
justice is, at least in regard to external acts, a composition of the all means of all virtues that 
are concerned with interpersonal actions. It is the sum of (a) the mean of political justice in 
regard to all fellow-citizen, of (b) the mean of ―residential‖ justice in regard to all cohabitants, 
and of (c) the mean of familial justice in regard to the relatives, etc., plus something special – 
that which is due to the other only because of the divine bond. This final plus is characteristic 
of divine friendship, but it does not invalidate any of the prior means of justice. Conversely, 
from the perspective of natural relationships, the plus required by divine justice is not judged 
as vicious excess but rather as a sign of extraordinary liberality, though it is in fact, according 
to the divine rule, the right mean of divine justice.
118
 
Therefore, the special character of the medium rei permits the ―survival‖ of ordinary human 
justice within the order of grace. In contrast to the affective virtues, the right mean of divine 
justice does not invalidate the right mean of natural relationships between fellow-citizens, 
cohabitants, etc., but contains their right mean integrally. Consequently, political justice, 
familial justice, etc., play further roles in the moral life and remain specific virtues in the reign 
of grace. 
One might ask whether these fine differences bear any real importance. Why it should matter 
whether certain acts are required because of the order of charity, or because of a natural 
friendship (of the family, household, or city) and also by charity? Is there a difference 
between acts required by divine justice alone and those required by political justice together 
with divine justice? At least for Aquinas, the difference is huge. We shall investigate the issue 
in the next section. 
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 Thus, in the special case of infused justice Kent‘s assertion ―what would be prudent for a Christian might thus 
appear, and even be, imprudent for a non-Christian‖ (Kent, ―Habits and Virtues,‖ 125) is only partly correct: The 
mean of infused temperance might seem foolish for a non-Christian; but the more of infused justice (at least in 
its external part) would be interpreted by a non-Christian as liberality. 
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5.4 Charitable Acts of Justice, or Just Acts of Charity? Which Commands the 
Other? 
 
The previous chapter has shown in which way the various types of natural friendship and their 
relative species of justice (political justice, familial justice etc.) are presupposed for the right 
exercise of charity. Hitherto, however, it remained unclear how concrete actions of those 
kinds of justice depend on charity. Has the graced person to achieve these acts of justice 
because of charity? And if so, would this not actually destroy the proper meaning of justice 
not as giving something of mine (as a moral due of friendship) but paying back what belongs 
the other and therefore is strictly due him? This is questioned in the first subsection below. 
But we have to inquire also into the converse question. Are the various kinds of justice only 
preconditions of charity and leave untouched the order of charity? As has already been seen, 
the proper act of charity responds to an amicable due; it is not restitution but a free gift. 
Nevertheless, for Aquinas even these acts have to follow somehow the order of justice. This 
will be the issue of the second subsection below. 
 
 
5.4.1 Charitable Acts of Justice: ex affectu – ad aequalitatem 
 
How does charity relate to the various kinds of justice? Without question charity can 
command the act of any kind of justice. Since charity relates to the ultimate end, there is by 
definition no good and no act of any virtue that does not fall under the command of charity. 
Caritas est motor virtutum.
119
 Justice, however, is a special case since charity not only can 
command its acts but rather must command all of its acts. The omission of a temperate act 
would not infect charity immediately as long as nothing intemperate is achieved. But to deny 
something that is due to the other would ipso facto destroy charity. ―Render fully all debts to 
                                                 
119
 See In sent. III 27.2.4C: ―Ipsum bonum, quod est obiectum caritatis sub ratione finis, est finis virtutum. In 
omnibus autem potentiis vel artibus ordinatis ita accidit, quod ars vel potentia quae est circa finem, ordinat 
aliarum actus ad finem proprium; sicut militaris, quae est propter victoriam, ad quam omne officium bellicum 
ordinatur, ordinat equestrem et navalem et omnia huiusmodi in suum finem; et ideo dicitur caritas mater aliarum 
virtutum, inquantum earum actus producit ex conceptione finis, inquantum ipse finis habet se per modum 
seminis, cum sit principium in operabilibus, ut dicit philosophus: et secundum hoc dicitur imperare actus 
inferiorum virtutum, secundum quod facit eas operari propter finem suum; et secundum hoc movet alias artes 
inferiores ad finem suum; unde caritas etiam omnes alias virtutes ad suum finem movet, et secundum hoc dicitur 
actus earum imperare. Hoc enim interest inter elicere actum et imperare, quod habitus vel potentia elicit illum 
actum quem producit circa obiectum nullo mediante: sed imperat actum qui producitur mediante potentia vel 
habitu inferiori circa obiectum illius potentiae. Sic ergo caritas est motor aliarum virtutum.‖ 
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all, so that nothing remains what you have to solve . . . because in delaying restitution sin is 
committed, since man unjustly retains the other‘s thing.‖120 
But how must we understand a concrete act of justice commanded by charity? Does it give 
something that belongs to the other (justice) or something of mine (charity)? In section 2.4 we 
discussed the cooperation of virtues. Two habits can work together in one common act if one 
relates to the other as mover to the moved, so that the act belongs materially to one habit, but 
formally to the other.
121
 Courageous deeds performed out of love are formally acts of charity 
but materially acts of fortitude.
122
 The moved virtue retains its own specific form. Fortitude 
does not become charity, even if it works for the end of charity.
123
 However, what about act 
that combine charity and justice? The case is more complicated since both arise from the same 
power, namely the will. When discussing the cooperation of the virtues, Aquinas usually 
clarifies the question by referring to the cooperation of two different powers, where the 
double formation of an act (of charity and fortitude, for example) is easily observed. But what 
happens to the just act if commanded by charity, where both acts originate in the will? 
The key for solving this question is distinguishing precisely acts elicited by charity from acts 
commanded by charity. Though Aquinas claims that both types of act are formally charity, the 
charitable act of justice does not lose its proper character as just act. As commanded by 
charity it remains an elicited act of justice, and in this way it is in a certain manner also 
formally justice. St. Thomas explains: ―Charity does not produce acts of the other virtues by 
eliciting them, but only by commanding them. For, a virtue elicits only those acts which are 
according to the notion of the proper form, as justice acts rightly or temperance acts 
temperately.‖ 124  Hence, the commanded act of charity contains quasi a double formal 
determination. ―Each virtue has a special form from its proper end and its proper object, by 
which it becomes this virtue. But it has from charity a certain common form, by which it can 
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 Super Rom. XIII 2: ―Plene omnibus omnia debita persolvatis, ut nihil remaneat, quod solvere debeatis . . . 
quia in ipsa mora reddendi peccatum committitur, dum homo iniuste detinet rem alienam.‖ Interesting on that 
regard is the whole commentary to chapter 12 and 13: Super Rom. XII 2 and 3 contains a discussion of the elicit 
acts of charity. The commentary to chapter 13 describes justice as requisite of charity: the first lecture treats 
justice in regard to superiors, the second lection in regard to all people. In both cases justice is portrayed as 
necessary condition for the preservation of charity. D. Mongillo thus labels Super Rom. XII and XIII as a short 
institutio moralis (Dalmazio Mongillo, La dimensione etico-teologica nella Summa Theologiae di Tommaso 
d’Aquino (Rome: Angelicum University Press, 2006), 55-72). 
121
 Cf. ST I-II 17.4 where St. Thomas discusses the issue of two cooperating powers. 
122
 Cf. ST I-II 13.1; ST II-II 124.2 ad 2; likewise De virt. in com. 10 ad 10: ―Actus temperantiae vel fortitudinis 
imperantur a caritate ordinante eos in ultimum finem; ipsi quidem actus formaliter speciem sortiuntur: nam 
formaliter loquendo fiunt actus caritatis.‖ 
123
 De virt. in com. 10 ad 10.  
124
 De caritate 5 ad 3: ―Caritas non producit actus aliarum virtutum elicitive, sed imperative tantum. Elicit enim 
virtus illos actus tantum qui sunt secundum rationem propriae formae, sicut iustitia recte facere, et temperantia 
temperanter.‖ 
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merit eternal life.‖125 The command of charity provides the principle qualification as virtuous 
act (―charity . . . gives each virtue the common species of virtue‖126), but since the act is 
elicited by its own virtue it retains likewise its own character as a ―very special species‖ 
(species specialissima).
127
  
Applying this principle to the case of a just act moved by charity, it follows that the graced 
person pays the monthly rent to his landlord for two reasons. He pays the rent because it is 
due to the other by a prior arrangement, and because he is united to the other by charity in a 
divine bond. He performs an act for attaining equality (justice – ad aequalitatem) 
simultaneously out of an affective inclination towards the divine friendship (charity – ex 
affectu). When paying his rent, the agent performs an act that is specified in a twofold manner. 
Both aspects are essential and constitutive, and neither of them may be lacking. It would be 
against the proper notion of justice if the act of paying the rent were accomplished as sign of 
friendship, as an elicited act of charity, or as free gift given out of what is mine. And vice 
versa, it would be against charity if the agent paid the rent to his lessor only because it is 
required for their living together well, i.e. considering him as mere business-partner 
independent of their supernatural mutual union in God by charity.
128
 Both aspects are 
connected and unified in the one charitable just act. ―Charity works through justice – it is not 
an alternative to it.―129  
Hence, whereas the elicited act of charity contains only the aspect of friendship, the 
commanded just act of charity retains a twofold character. Thus, the description of the latter 
as a just act performed because of God is equivocal, since the ―because of‖ can bear a double 
meaning: 
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 De caritate 3 ad 9: ―A proprio fine et a proprio obiecto quaelibet virtus habet formam specialem, per quam est 
haec virtus; sed a caritate habet quamdam formam communem, secundum quam est meritoria vitae aeternae.‖  
126
 De caritate 3 ad 1. 
127
 De caritate 3 ad 5: ―Caritas, cum sit communis forma virtutum, trahit quidem virtutes in unam speciem 
communem, non autem in unam speciem propriam, quae dicitur species specialissima.― See also ST II-II 104.2 
ad 1: ―Nihil prohibet duas speciales rationes, ad quas duae speciales virtutes respiciunt, in uno et eodem materiali 
obiecto concurrere.‖ 
128
 Of course, it is neither necessary nor possible (in this life) to achieve all act by an actual attention to the 
object of charity. Necessary is the virtual direction of all human acts to divine friendship by the habit of charity. 
In this sense Aquinas distinguishes between the factual observance of divine precepts and their fulfillment by the 
mode of charity which is not required all times (see ST I-II 100.10, corp. art. and ad 2; similar In sent. III 36.6). 
Based on these premises we can understand the quite rigorous assertion of Aquinas: ―Iustitia consistit in 
redditione debiti . . . Sed quod aliquid debeat sibi et proximo, hoc est propter deum. . . . Nam si reddas tibi vel 
proximo quod debes, et hoc non facis propter deum, magis es perversus quam iustus, cum ponas finem in 
homine.‖ (Super Gal. III 3). 
129
 Stephen J. Pope, ―Aquinas on Almsgiving, Justice and Charity: An Interpretation and Reassessment,‖ 
Heythrop Journal 32 (1991): 186. 
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Charity in loving the neighbor has God as the formal notion of the object, and not only as the 
final end . . . but the other virtues have God not as the formal notion of the object but also as 
their final end. Thus, when it is said that charity loves the neighbor because of God, the 
because of denotes not only the material cause, but quasi the formal cause. But if it is said of 
the other virtues that they operate because of God, the because of denotes only the final 
cause.
130
 
 
Hence, in achieving an act of justice ―because of God,‖ the specific determination of the act 
does not stem from charity. It is performed because of a certain due that depends on this-
worldly obligations, on interhuman relations, and on the specific kind of natural friendship 
that obtains in a certain interaction. Charity, however, provides that the graced person renders 
these debts as sign of friendship with God and with others who are united to God.
131
 Hence, 
justice under the reign of charity retains its proper structure, but it works as ―the instrument of 
charity‖132 and ―an outward expression of charity.‖133 
In the introduction to this chapter, we mentioned the thesis of A. Nygren, which claims that 
justice is substituted by charity. Aquinas would robably reply this assertion by distinguishing 
the elicited and the commanded acts of charity. In elicited acts, charity and justice are indeed 
exclusive alternatives. What is due to the other, since it belongs to him, might not be given to 
him as an act of charity (as actus elicitus). Simultaneously, all acts of the graced person have 
to be inspired by charity. But it does not follow therefrom that justice is replaced by charity. 
The solution to this dilemma is the distinction between elicited acts of charity and proper acts 
of justice commanded by charity. These latter retain their proper notion as acts of justice, but 
which are moved by charity towards God as final end 
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 De caritate 5 ad 2: ―Caritas in diligendo proximum habet deum ut rationem formalem obiecti, et non solum ut 
finem ultimum, . . . sed aliae virtutes habent deum non ut rationem formalem obiecti, sed ut ultimum finem. Et 
ideo, cum dicitur quod caritas diligit proximum propter deum, illud propter denotat non solum causam 
materialem, sed quodammodo formalem. Cum autem dicitur de aliis virtutibus quod operantur propter deum, 
illud propter denotat causam finalem tantum.‖ See also many replies in De caritate 3. 
131
 Gilson distinguishes fittingly the elicited acts of the theological virtues as acting with God and in God, the 
acts of the various virtues commanded by charity as acting for God (cf. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy, 338). 
132
 Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, 332. 
133
 Pope, ―Aquinas on Almsgiving,‖ 170. The whole quotation: ―Justice . . . is an outward expression of 
charity. . . . Rather than undermining justice, charity is its Christian inspiration and inner form. . . . The 
command to love God and our neighbour . . . , the general prohibition on harming others . . . , and the Golden 
Rule . . . are both precepts of justice . . . and proper channels of charity.‖ In De caritate Aquinas brings a quite 
rigorous example for the cooperation of justice and charity: ―Licite potest ille ad quem ex officio pertinet, 
malefactores punire, vel etiam occidere, eos ex caritate diligendo. . . Possumus enim illis quod ex caritate 
diligimus, velle aut inferre aliquod malum temporale.‖ (De caritate 8 ad 10). 
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5.4.2 Just Acts of Charity: Justice as Co-Measure of the ordo caritatis 
 
At first glance, the question whether justice can command elicited acts of charity seems 
absurd. Someone might accomplish a courageous deed out of charity, but it would be silly to 
perform charitable acts for the sake of fortitude. Analogously, friendship requires the 
fulfillment of all debts regarding the other, i.e. the fulfillment of justice. Hence, charity 
commands justice. But it seems contradictory to demand proper acts of friendship because of 
justice. The order of justice is to be respected for the sake of friendship, of course, but we do 
not make friends in order to act justly.
134
 
As seen in section 5.2 even the divine command to love God and neighbor is not an exception. 
Affirmative commandments oblige semper but not ad semper. In other words, they require 
acting under certain circumstances and at determined times. Therefore, charity is commanded 
as a moral due of friends and not as an obligation that has to be achieved immediately and on 
any occasion
135
 
Thus, the issue appears perfectly clarified. However, there are some texts of St. Thomas that 
do not fit into this general schema. Texts which argue for the possibility of committing 
injustice in regard to elicited acts of charity. In ST II-II 44.8, we read: ―Whoever transgresses 
a precept commits injustice. But if somebody loves some other as much as he ought, and 
loves another one more, he commits to nobody injustice.‖136 To love someone more than one 
owes to him seems rather a sign of virtue than of vice. But the quotation is taken from an 
objection; it is explicitly not Aquinas‘s position. On the contrary, he responds: ―If somebody 
loved less one whom he ought to love more, he wants to satisfy more one whom he ought to 
satisfy less. And thereby he would commit injustice to the one he ought to love more.‖137 
Aquinas makes similar claim in De caritate: ―Whenever we love one whom we ought to love, 
it does not seem to be a sin to love another even more.‖138 This is the objection, to which St. 
                                                 
134
 On that score Massaro is unclear. He argues: ―Rather than being in any way opposed to charity, the virtue of 
justice moves us to engage in efforts to make love practical and effective.‖ (Thomas Massaro, ―Don‘t Forget 
Justice,‖ America, 13.3.2006, 19). Though it is right that justice and charity are not opposed, the former does not 
make the latter practical or effective; on the contrary, it is due to charity to move justice. 
135
 See ST II-II 106.4 ad 1. 
136
 ST II-II 44.8 arg. 1: ―Quicumque enim transgreditur praeceptum iniuriam facit. Sed si aliquis diligat aliquem 
quantum debet, et alterum quemcumque plus diligat, nulli facit iniuriam.‖ 
137
 ST II-II 44.8 ad 1: ―Si minus diligeret aliquis eum quem plus debet diligere, plus vellet satisfacere illi cui 
minus satisfacere debet. Et sic fieret iniuria illi quem plus debet diligere.‖ 
138
 De caritate 9 arg. 11: ―Dummodo aliquem diligamus quem debemus, non videmur peccare, si alium 
quemcumque diligamus plus.‖ 
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Thomas replies: ―We are not giving to a person that love which we ought to give if we love 
more another one whom we ought to love less.‖139 
The two quotations show that for Aquinas even the elicited acts of charity follow a certain 
order, so that it would be an injury (iniuria) to deprive a person of certain proper acts of 
charity and affection.
140
 At different places St. Thomas mentions three different criteria for 
the determination of the ordo caritatis.
141
 First, the immediate criterion of charity is that we 
are more united by charity (i.e. in divine communication) with persons who live themselves 
closer to God, men of extraordinary virtue and the saints. Thus, ―we should wish a greater 
good to one who is nearer to God.‖142 Secondly, the criterion of natural relationships states 
that by natural bonds we are united more closely to some people than to others, namely our 
relatives, cohabitants, and benefactors, etc. ―Man loves those who are more closely united to 
him, with more intense affection.‖143 Thus, certain persons deserve more benefits than others 
according to their more intimate connectedness. Generally, the kind of natural friendship 
determines the kind of benefits that are due to the other by charity. For example, friends of the 
same household are to be prefered in relation to things belonging to the common life.
144
 And 
thirdly, there is the criterion of greater neediness, which states that the person in more urgent 
need deserves our support. ―Where is the greater necessity, there one has rather to help 
according to the order of charity‘s duty.‖145 
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 De caritate 9 ad 11: ―Non potest esse quod alicui impendamus de dilectione quod debemus, si alium quem 
minus diligere debemus, amplius diligamus.‖ And Aquinas continues: ―Potest enim contingere quod in 
necessitatis articulo amplius subveniatur alteri, in derogationem eius quem plus amare debemus.‖ 
140
 Already Aristotle has noted that injustice against people who are closer related is worse (NE VIII 11 1160a2-
4). Aquinas comments: ―Magis amico bene facere quidem est iustius, nocere autem iniustius; sicut quod aliquis 
privet pecuniis per furtum aut rapinam hominem sibi familiarem et connutritum est durius et iniustius quam si 
privaret civem, et similiter si subtrahat auxilium fratri quam si subtraheret extraneo; et si percutiat patrem, quam 
si percutiat quemcumque alium.‖ (In ethic. VIII 9.7). Hence, the account of St. Thomas differs in an important 
respect of Outka‘s understanding of charity as ―equal regard‖ (see the quotations in footnote 103); for a critique 
of Outka‘s position, see Porter, ―‗De ordine caritatis‘,‖ 197-214. 
141
 Scholars usually mention only the first two conditions. But St. Thomas clearly knows all three. See Stephen J. 
Pope, The Evolution of Altruism and the Ordering of Love (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1994), 58-65. 
For an overview of the medieval background of Thomas‘s position, it may be helpful to consult the chapter La 
nature du devoir de l’aumône chez les prédécesseurs de saint Thomas d’Aquin in Lottin, Psychologie et morale, 
299-313. 
142
 ST II-II 26.7: ―Ei qui est deo propinquior maius bonum ex caritate velimus.‖ 
143
 ST II-II 26.7: ―Illos qui sunt sibi propinquiores intensiori affectu diligi.― Hence, the both criteria are either the 
other‘s good of grace or their natural gifts and relation to us. ―Amor autem debetur proximo secundum id quod a 
deo habet, idest secundum naturam et gratiam.‖ (ST II-II 34.3). 
144
 See ST II-II 31.3. For rules how to decide in the case of overlapping duties, see ad 1; also De caritate 9 ad 12 
―Non semper meliores magis amantur, sed attenditur etiam ratio propinquitatis, ut ex utroque coniunctim 
sumatur ratio maioris dilectionis.‖ Further, the obligations may differ also in relation to the agent depending on 
his proper state (e.g. as religious). See ST II-II 187.4; thereto Pope, ―Aquinas on Almsgiving,‖ 172. 
145
 In sent. IV. 12.3.2B, arg. 1 (affirmative): ―Ubi est maior necessitas, ibi secundum ordinem debitum caritatis 
est magis subveniendum.‖ 
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For our present project, this short portrayal of the ordo caritatis may be sufficient for showing 
that justice is not only an integral part of charity. Beyond that, justice has a say even in the 
determination of the order of charity itself. Admittedly, if there is legal due, only an act of 
proper justice resolves the debt. But in addition to is general function, justice provides 
likewise the measure for proper acts of charity. In ST II-II 31.3 ad 3, Aquinas describes this 
double function of justice:  
 
A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which should be counted, not among the goods 
of the debtor, but rather as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may 
have money or something of another, either because he has stolen them, or because he has 
received them on loan or in deposit or in some other way. . . . The other kind of due is one 
which is counted among the goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing 
may be due, not because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity, as in the 
case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a benefit equal to that which a man 
receives from his parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give the first 
place to our parents before all others, unless, on the other side, there be such weightier motives, 
as need or some other circumstance . . . In other cases we must take into account the 
connection and the benefit received; and here again no general rule can laid down.
146
 
 
The first kind of obligation is due to justice, while the second belongs to proper acts of charity. 
But thought the latter responds only to a moral due of friends, it respects (and has to respect) 
the order of justice. In other words, charitable acts are to be performed first of all towards 
one‘s parents since one stands in greatest debt of gratitude towards them; it is an obligation 
that arises from prior received benefits. As Ricoeur notes in his booklet on charity and justice: 
―Since it was given to you, give on your part.‖147 In this way, the natural order of various 
friendships renders a ―co-norm‖ for the determination of supernatural acts of charity.148 
 
 
                                                 
146
 ST II-II 31.3 ad 3: ―Duplex est debitum. Unum quidem quod non est numerandum in bonis eius qui debet, sed 
potius in bonis eius cui debetur. Puta si aliquis habet pecuniam aut rem aliam alterius vel furto sublatam vel 
mutuo acceptam sive depositam, vel aliquo alio simili modo . . . Aliud autem est debitum quod computatur in 
bonis eius qui debet, et non eius cui debetur, puta si debeatur non ex necessitate iustitiae, sed ex quadam morali 
aequitate, ut contingit in beneficiis gratis susceptis. Nullius autem benefactoris beneficium est tantum sicut 
parentum, et ideo parentes in recompensandis beneficiis sunt omnibus aliis praeferendi; nisi necessitas ex alia 
parte praeponderaret, vel aliqua alia conditio . . . In aliis autem est aestimatio habenda et coniunctionis et 
beneficii suscepti.‖ 
147
 Ricoeur, Liebe und Gerechtigkeit, 48: ―Puisqu‘il t‘a été donné, donne à ton tour.‖ 
148
 For a more extended outline of the ramification of natural relationships on the ordo caritatis, see Ryan, 
―Charity and the Social Order: Part 1,‖ 554-560; Stephen J. Pope, ―The Order of Love and Recent Catholic 
Ethics: A Constructive Proposal,‖ Theological Studies 52 (1991): 262-265; Pope, ―Aquinas on Almsgiving,‖ 
172-176. 
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5.5 Several Difficulties in Reconstructing Justice as Infused Virtue 
 
After examining the general framework of justice under the reign of charity, we want to turn 
now to the special question of justice as an infused virtue. What should it be described? In the 
final section of this chapter we shall indicate the general direction in which a definition of 
infused justice could unfold. We can hint already that, a propos of many of St. Thomas‘s 
definitions, the reconstruction could be developed into two directions. Then, in chapter 6 we 
provide a summary of these results, and in chapter 7 we verify our thesis by reading through 
the treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae. 
 
 
5.5.1 Two Rival Accounts: Divine Justice or Infused Human Justice? 
 
As the previous paragraphs have already suggested, the term ―justice‖ can adopt different 
meanings under the reign of charity. On the one side, there should be a kind of divine justice 
that corresponds to charity and provides the minimum for maintaining divine friendship by 
observing all divine precepts. We might refer to this divine justice as divine legal justice. On 
the other side, there should be a justice that retains its original sense as a human virtue 
concerned with perfecting external actions. Or, more specifically, justice that takes on the 
character of a particular virtue, such as political justice between citizens and familial justice 
between relatives. In what follows, we want to refer to the second meaning when we use the 
term infused human justice.  
Thus, we turn to our main question: How does Aquinas describe infused justice? As infused 
divine justice (justice according to divine friendship), or as infused human justice (justice 
according to the various types of natural friendship but presupposing the state of grace)? 
Based on the general criteria of ST I-II 63.4 for determing the specific end of the infused 
moral virtues, both interpretations seem to be plausible and consistent. The reconstruction of 
infused justice, therefore, can unfold in the following two directions. 
First, as a strict parallel to the concept of infused prudence/fortitude/temperance, one could 
argue that the acquired virtues perfect the agent regarding the political community and the 
infused virtues perfect him in respect to divine friendship. As acquired fortitude enables a 
man to endure fears and dangers for the good of the city, and infused fortitude enables him to 
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to preserve divine friendship,
149
 likewise acquired justice perfects man in affairs of the human 
city and allows for political friendship, whereas infused justice enables him to renders to 
everyone his due according to the requirements of divine friendship. Accordingly, teaches St. 
Thomas, ―men behave well in order to be ‗fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the 
household of God,‘‖150 the result being that every believer becomes a ―virtuous member of the 
Church.‖151 In this way, infused justice assumes the sense of what above we called divine 
justice. 
However, although infused justice is envisioned thereby in an exact parallel fashion to the 
other moral virtues, the resulting image differs in one important point. In the case of prudence, 
fortitude, and temperance the new formal principle (the regula divina) and the different final 
end (divine friendship) do not change the proper matter that is ruled. Just like their acquired 
counterparts, infused prudence/fortitude/temperance continue to shape practical decisions 
prompted by movements of the irascible and concupiscible passions. Infused justice as divine 
justice, however, has to deal with a widely enlarged range of action. Whereas acquired justice 
strictly understood rules only external actions between two fellow-citizens, infused justice as 
divine justice involves every possible practical matter insofar as it is required for the 
maintenance of divine friendship.
152
 Hence, it seems that infused justice as divine justice 
remains incomparable with the other species of infused virtue. 
Secondly, the term of infused justice can also be developed in a quite a different direction. 
Based on the fact that acquired and infused virtue treat the same respective matter, the task of 
infused justice may be limited from the very beginning to regulating of external acts only, 
namely actions between two equal citizens (as proper justice), or between family members (as 
―familial‖ justice), or between cohabitants (as ―residential‖ justice), etc., but now according to 
the divine rule. Following this line of thought, infused justice is understood to parallel the 
function of infused fortitude and infused temperance, that is to say it measures principally the 
same practical matter as acquired political justice, which includes all external acts performed 
within the human society. Consequently, infused justice ends up being something like infused 
human justice. 
At first glance, the second way of understanding infused justice may appear more plausible. 
However, the appeal of the argument hides in an important point. Infused fortitude and 
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 See ST II-II 124.2 ad 1. 
150
 ST I-II 63.4: ―per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici dei.‖ 
151
 In sent. III 33.1.2D: ―virtuosus est membrum ecclesiae.‖ 
152
 See thereto ST II-II 44.1 where Aquinas mentions ordered passions, just external acts and even true faith as 
prerequisite of charity and therefore commanded by divine precepts. 
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infused temperance rule human passions not in regard to the good of the city but for the sake 
of divine friendship. As Aquinas notes in ST II-II 124.2 ad 1, acquired fortitude works for the 
good of the human city, but its infused species aims for the divine good, which can include 
martyrdom.
153
 And generally for all infused virtues Aquinas summarizes this point when 
stating about infused virtue in general: ―Acquired virtues perfect man in regard to the civic 
life, the infused ones in regard to the spiritual life which is from grace, according to which the 
virtuous man is a member of the Church.‖154 Thus, according to this description of infused 
virtue it seems rather unfitting to describe infused justice as if its immediate concern is not 
divine friendship but the good of the political sphere in general, or more particularly of the 
family or the household. 
Are we now faced with an insoluble dilemma? In a certain way, both arguments seem to 
develop consistently the general principles of Aquinas‘s doctrine on the infused moral virtues, 
but at the end they seem to result in a contradiction. Is there a way to save our project?  
In fact, both options have their defenders. Scholars such as Labourdette and Cessario describe 
infused justice according to the first way, as divine justice. Both Dominican Thomists 
underline that justice as an infused virtue, in contrast to the other cardinal virtues, deals with a 
different matter than acquired justice.
155
 On the other side, Gilleman who distinguishes 
explicitly between natural and Christian justice, understands the latter clearly as a perfection 
aimed specifically at the exigencies of human society, as Christian but still human justice.
156
 
We are left to ask, therefore, which of the two arguments is the right one? 
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 See footnote 109. 
154
 In sent. III 33.1.2D: ―In alia vita hominem perficiunt, acquisitae quidem in vita civili, infusae in vita spirituali, 
quae est ex gratia, secundum quam homo virtuosus est membrum ecclesiae.‖ 
155
 Labourdette speaks of ―une matière beaucoup plus vaste‖ in the case of infused justice (Labourdette, La 
justice (IIa-IIae, 57-79), 46). Likewise Cessario who contrasts the special case of infused justice with infused 
temperance and fortitude as follwoing: ―Aquinas contends that even the ‗physical‘ stuff with which infused 
justice deals undergoes a kind of transformation which renders it different from the created stuff of political 
justice. In other terms, the infused virtues of justice differ also ‗materialiter‘ from the acquired, ‗political‘ virtues 
of justice.‖ (Cessario, Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 114-115). He repeats his position in Cessario, 
Introduction to Moral Theology, 202: ―For justice and its allied virtues, a new formal object even changes the 
very stuff which justice transforms.― Elsewhere he describes the evangelical law as infused justice in a 
metaphorical way (Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 132-3). Recently Key argued similarly for a 
special status of justice as infused virtue (see Keys, Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good, 
234-35). 
156
 Cf. Gilleman, The Primacy of Charity, 330-341. 
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5.5.2 Different Suggestions of Scholars 
 
a) Infused Justice as Remedy of Naturally Self-Centered Justice 
 
In The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology, G. Gilleman takes up a clearly affirmative 
position for infused human justice. He discusses the relationship between charity and justice 
in a special chapter
157
 and argues in favor of the ―vital role of the infused virtue of justice.‖158 
It is worth summarizing in few lines his principal argument. Charity and justice are 
specifically different virtues. The former seeks union, while the latter may be called the virtue 
of ―otherness.‖ 159  According to Gilleman, justice is necessary because of man‘s general 
egocentric orientation towards his own good and his inclination to neglect the other. Thus, 
justice ―bears on the claims and defense of self by putting others on the same level as self and 
by seeking revenge.‖160 In this way, ―justice tends toward the division of ‗mine‘ and ‗thine,‘ 
toward strict equality between what is owed and what is paid, toward objectification, 
distinctness of situations, the determination of a minimum threshold below which one cannot 
fall without provoking the react of self-defense, that is, the claims of the other.‖ 161  For 
Gilleman, therefore, justice is principally vindictive and egocentric.
162
  
Or to speak more precisely, justice is self-centered as natural justice. Consequently, Gilleman 
opposes this inferior kind of justice to a properly ―Christian justice.‖ 163  The specific 
characteristic of the latter is its inspiration by charity. Thus infused, justice no longer treats 
the other as other, but moved by charity it seeks the other‘s good as one‘s own good. ―No 
longer content with respecting the rights of others, Christian justice positively tends to 
promote them.‖164 He differentiates the two types of justice by the following impressive 
example:  
 
An industrialist, remarking the insufficiency of his workers‘ wages and the social risks they 
run in his factory, spontaneously raises their wages and insures them against these risks, 
because his conscience tells him that in justice he must respect the rights of these men who are 
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 See footnote 156. For a commenting summary of the thesis of Gilleman, see Outka, Agape ... 82-85. 
158
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bound to him by personal ties and, therefore, have a special title to his love in charity. Such a 
Christian attitude – in the ideal hypothesis that it were to become general – would permit and 
even compel the workers to adopt a similar disposition. A second attitude is that of workers 
and employers alike vindicating their rights by every means in their power, especially by the 
economic constraint of lockouts and strikes. Such is the attitude of instinctive justice . . . it 
opposes two groups who are thinking primarily of themselves. . . . In the first, ‗other-centered‘ 
attitude, each party says, ‗I render you your right because it is yours.‘ In the second, ‗self-
centered‘ attitude, each party says, ‗I claim my right because it is mine.‘165 
 
Drawing upon what we have learned in previous chapters, we observe in the thesis of 
Gilleman a twofold deviation from the doctrine of St. Thomas.
166
 
First, for Aquinas it belongs to the very essence of justice not to be self-centered but to seek 
the good of the other by giving him his due. Even the purpose of ―pagan‖ justice is not the 
attainment of an equilibrium between rival claims of several persons, but the habitual will to 
render everyone his due. Thus, an infused virtue is not necessary to overcome self-
centeredness. Rather, this is the proper task of any kind of natural justice. 
Secondly, Gilleman‘s account of Christian justice does not correspond to Aquinas‘s. 
According to the Jesuit scholar, the employer in the state of grace recognizes that his workers 
―have a special title to his love in charity.‖ Apparently, he understands expressing charity as a 
matter of justice. We might wonder, however, does justice command charity? Of course, the 
order of justice has some impact on the order of charity (section 5.4.2), but thereby charity 
does not become a proper matter of justice, nor does justice become a proper act of charity. 
Furthermore, it would be unjust in regard to the worker if an industrialist paid him a just wage 
according ―a special title to his love in charity,‖ for the worker merit his reward reward not as 
sign of friendship but as something strictly owed. 
Therefore, even if Gilleman argues for the existence of infused justice, it is clear that he does 
so for reasons apart from Aquinas‘s. To achieve the ends of his infused justice, one would 
need to possess only acquired justice and charity.
167
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b) Acquired Justice as Sufficient Co-Principle of Charity  
 
This position is taken up by several scholars. As an example, we can refer to the works of 
Guy de Broglie, who has argued explicitly for the preservation of justice according to its own 
structure under the reign of charity, videlicet understood as acquired virtue.
168
 Broglie 
emphasizes generally that charity does not substitute for the moral virtues but requires them 
for perfecting the agent in regard to all moral matters. 
 
If Christian morality can be rightly understood as a ‗morality of charity‘ . . . then it would be 
inexact, and even wholly ruinous, to conclude that our comportment in regard to human 
persons could be ruled by considering only benevolence which emerges from our heart, 
disregarding the proper exigencies of the multiple moral virtues which prescribe the respect of 
this or that characteristic genre of value or finality.
169
 
 
Consequently, interpersonal relations cannot determined solely by charity, for these relations 
still involve other‘s duties and rights. To be sure, justice measured by mundane considerations 
remains necessary even in the reign of charity. So far, we are in agreement with Broglie‘s 
thesis. However, because he supports an autonomous determination of justice in reference to 
the other as citizen (apart from the order of charity), Broglie continues arguing that all men, 
even those outside of the order of grace, can aquire justice in the same exact manner. 
According to Broglie, whether the agent is united with God and neighbor by charity is 
irrelevant his acquisition of justice. Even apart from charity anyone can acquire justice and act 
through it. ―Those of our human brethren who remain deprived of the light and force which 
charity would award have not less the power and the duty to conform their actions to the 
requests of the different virtues.‖170 In an analogous way, several scholars describe infused 
justice as the cooperation of charity and acquired justice.
171
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 See Broglie, ―‗Justice social‘ et ‗Bien commun‘,‖ 257-292. 
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 ―Si en effet la morale chrétienne peut légitimement se résumer en une ‗morale de la charité‘ . . . il serait 
inexact, et même tout à fait ruineux, d‘en conclure que notre comportement envers les personnes humaines 
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 Ibid., 260: ―Ceux de nos frères humains qui restent dépourvus des lumières et des forces que la charité leur 
apporterait n‘en ont pas moins le pouvoir et le devoir de conformer leur actions aux requêtes de ces différentes 
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 So, for example, Gillet who refers to charity as infused virtue which cooperates with acquired justice (M.S. 
Gillet, ―Justice et charité,‖ Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 18 (1929): 5-22, esp. 8, and 
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This thesis, however, contradicts Aquinas‘s general teaching regarding the necessity of the 
infused moral virtues. Thus, we are left still searching for a properly Thomistic understanding 
of infused justice. 
 
 
5.5.3 Infused Justice as Human Virtue Regarding the Church 
 
In the following we want to argue that the proper reconstruction of infused justice according 
to the principles of St. Thomas implies something like an infused human justice. At the same 
time, we do not want to negate the presence within the infused virtue of divine justice, as 
described above (i.e. as foundation of charity). Therefore, it is our thesis that the ordinary 
reconstruction of infused justice as cardinal virtue according to the standards of ST I-II 63.4 
and In sent. III 33.1.2C and D has to result in an infused habit of justice whose proper purpose 
is man‘s perfection in regard to human society, but that simultaneously presupposes an 
ordering towards God. 
The authentic reconstruction of justice as infused cardinal virtue depends on the precise 
understanding of Aquinas‘s repeated axiom, that infused virtues perfect man as member of the 
Church and the civitas sanctorum. The Church is characterized by spiritual life (vita 
spiritualis), which finds its proper contrast in the civic life (vita civilis) of the human city.
172
 
As we have seen, it is easier to describe and define the infused affective virtues, for their 
proper matter is more clearly delimited. In their cases, the sensible appetite is ruled in 
                                                                                                                                                        
further on 15-22). Similar Th. Deman, ―La charité fraternelle comme forme des vertus,‖ La Vie Spirituelle 74 
(1946): 391-404, esp. 393-394. According to Deman it is due to charity to facilitate and confirm the acts of 
justice. ―Ne serons-nous pas plus facilement justes et ne le serons-nous pas mieux si nous aimons ce prochain de 
qui la justice a charge de sauvegarder les droits?‖ (Ibid., 394). Wadell describes justice as immanent part of 
charity but apparently understood as natural virtue; cf. the chapter Friendship with God and a Commitment to 
Justice in Paul J. Wadell, Becoming Friends: Worship, Justice, and the Practice of Christian Friendship (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2002), 139-158; see also Wadell, The Primacy of Love, 126-136. Interesting on that 
score is also the article Charles M. Murphy, ―Action for Justice as Constitutive of the Preaching of the Gospel: 
What Did the 1971 Synod Mean?,‖ Theological Studies 44 (1983): 298-311 who discusses the meaning of justice 
for preaching the gospel. Murphy distinguishes on the one side justice as human virtue which is nonetheless part 
of the gospel (he uses concepts as ―constitutive,‖ ―essential,‖ ―indispensable,‖ ―integral‖ parts of the Christian 
teaching), and on the other side justice in the biblical sense which is much closer to charity. ―The heart of the 
ambiguity about the meaning of constitutive . . . seems to reside in differing conceptions of what kind of justice 
is being referred to. If justice is conceived exclusively on the plane of the natural, human virtue of justice as 
explained in classical philosophical treatises, then such justice can only be conceived as an integral but 
nonessential part of the preaching of the gospel. But if justice is conceived in the biblical sense of God‘s 
liberating action which demands a necessary human response – a concept of justice which is far closer to agape 
than to justice in the classical philosophical sense – then justice must be defined as of the essence of the gospel 
itself.‖ (Ibid., 308). However, Murphy does not put the question whether in the case of a Christian even justice in 
the first sense is something supernatural; rather he seems to intend simply ―pagan‖ justice. 
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reference to the goods of the spiritual life. In the case of justice, however, because of its 
reference to the life of the Church, scholars regularly grant to it an extended activity when 
infused by charity.
173
 
We grant that is necessary to postulate an infused divine justice, which enables the graced 
agent to observe the divine law in all practical matters. It is justice as a general virtue (virtus 
generalis) which commands all other virtues. At the same time, we must not forget that the 
reconstruction of infused justice, as one of the four cardinal virtues, must follow the general 
principle that acquired and infused virtues focus on perfecting the same matter. In the case of 
justice as particular virtue, therefore, considered as both acquired and infused, the matter is 
human interpersonal relations and the external actions of everyday life.  
We can point to several remarks in Aquinas to justify our thesis. In De virt. card., St. Thomas 
asserts: ―The cardinal virtues, insofar they are gratuitous and infused, . . . perfect man in the 
present life in order to the heavenly glory.‖174 Thus, the infused virtues – and St. Thomas 
speaks here generally about all four cardinal virtues – do not touch directly the life of the 
heavenly community. Rather, they perfect man in his earthly life in view of attaining his final 
end. We find a similar expression in the Summa theologiae: ―The theological virtues direct us 
sufficiently to the supernatural end . . . But it is necessary that the soul be perfected by other 
infused virtues in regard to other things, but while ordered to God.‖175 Those aliae res are 
nothing else than all of the movements of man‘s interior and exterior life, which circumscribe 
the whole of his political life and supply the matter for all four cardinal virtues. Gardeil 
summarized this teaching quite well: ―The ‗infused‘ moral virtues . . . enable us to adapt the 
activities of our human and earthly life to the supernatural end of the life with God. . . . The 
‗infused‘ moral virtues permit us to achieve all obligations of our human life in regard to and 
in function of that lived friendship with God [emphasis added].‖176  
Thus, according to this reading infused justice is that virtue which disposes the graced agent 
to direct all external human interaction within society to the preservation of divine friendship. 
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 De virt. card. 4: ―Virtutes cardinales, secundum quod sunt gratuitae et infusae, . . . perficiunt hominem in vita 
praesenti in ordine ad caelestem gloriam.‖ 
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 ST I-II 63.3 ad 2: ―Virtutes theologicae sufficienter nos ordinant in finem supernaturalem, secundum 
quandam inchoationem, quantum scilicet ad ipsum deum immediate. Sed oportet quod per alias virtutes infusas 
perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen ad deum.‖ 
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 Gardeil, ―Appendice,‖ 370: ―Les vertus morales ‗infuses‘ . . . nous donnent capacité d‘adapter nos activités de 
vie humaine et terrestre à la fin surnaturelle de la vie avec Dieu. . . . Les vertus morales ‗infuses‘ nous permettent 
de réussir toutes les obligations de notre vie humaine en regard et en fonction de cette amitié vécue avec Dieu.‖ 
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At this point, the reader may raise an objection. Doesn‘t our account of infused justice 
contradict Aquinas‘s definition of infused virtue as being related to the communion of saints, 
or at least to the communion of the Church? As this objection suggests, the crux of the whole 
issue appears in the exact understanding we should have of the concept ―Church‖ (ecclesia) in 
this context. 
 
Church and State According to Aquinas 
Modern thinkers are now used to consider the Church and the political state as two distinct 
entities. For them, the Church subsists no longer in the public sqare but in its own niche. It is 
possible, of course, for citizens to belong to both communities, the political and the ecclesial, 
and in some matters there public cooperation between the two is possible, like in the areas of 
education and health care. To modern thinking, however, this interface of Church and State 
remains accidental. In themselves, Church and State are two separate bodies possessing their 
own independent duties and rights. As a result, public neutrality in religious matters is taken 
to be the ideal stance of the good state.  
The contrary was true for Aquinas.
177
 He acknowledged, of course, that the Church exceeds 
the human city by also including among its members the saints in heaven.
178
 In this life, 
however, the Church is not to be understood as an accidental community lying outside of the 
political community. To the contrary, the ecclesial community on earth is realized through 
and within human society, within various nations that populate the world. We could say with 
St. Thomas that the Church is the earthly human community as christianized. It is ―the 
community or res publica of men under God.‖179 ―The Church on earth [secundum statum 
viae] is the congregation of faithful.‖180 ―The Church resembles the political congregation, 
since the Church itself is called populus.‖181  This does not imply that the Church is to 
identified simply with the State. Both remain distinct in light of their different ends. On the 
one hand, the State works to support and organize man‘s civic life on earth, while on the other 
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hand the Church guides and leads believers toward the perfection of the spiritual life.
182
 Given 
their distinct ends, the proper competence of the civil and ecclesiastical power also remains 
distinct. Aquinas allows for their cooperation, however, and he describes their working 
together by the analogy of body and soul. ―The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even 
as the body is subject to the soul.‖ 183  Nonetheless, both entities constitute neither two 
different human societies, nor two separate parts of the human life, but both focus on the 
singular human community on earth, albeit under different aspects. One dedicates itself to the 
earthly flourishing of political friendship, while the other provides for growth in spiritual 
wealth according to divine friendship. Though the Church has its distinct spiritual end, by 
itself it is not a mere spiritual community. Rather, it is the human community as having a 
spiritual finality. In the words of Aquinas, it is the res publica hominum sub deo.
184
  
Thus, ecclesiastical and secular authority rule the same community but for different ends. The 
secular state retains thereby a certain autonomy. Even for St. Thomas there exists not a 
general priority of the ecclesiastical authority over the secular ruler. Each retains its own 
competence within its proper sphere of action. ―In things which pertain to the salvation of 
soul . . . one has to obey more the spiritual power than the secular. In things, however, which 
pertain to the civil good, one has to obey rather the secular power than the spiritual.‖185  
The double ―more‖ indicates already that there may be some relation between the two powers. 
Though the soul is composed differently than the body, it is also the body‘s form. And as the 
body is for the soul, so the soul is in charge of the needs of the body. Extending the analogy 
of body and soul to human society, we can say that the proper and proximate end of the civil 
government is the human common good, granted that public life should also promote citizens‘ 
striving towards eternal beatitude. Hence, the remote end of the human laws, and 
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 ST II-II 60.6 ad 3: ―Potestas saecularis subditur spirituali sicut corpus animae. Et ideo non est usurpatum 
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 Cf. ST I-II 100.5, quoted in footnote 179. Figgis describes the medieval relationship of Church and state as 
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have instead the two official hierarchies, the two departments if you will: the Court and the Curia, the King‘ 
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 In sent. II 44.2.3, exposition textus ad 4: ―Potestas spiritualis et saecularis, utraque deducitur a potestate 
divina; et ideo intantum saecularis potestas est sub spirituali, inquantum est ei a deo supposita, scilicet in his 
quae ad salutem animae pertinent; et ideo in his magis est obediendum potestati spirituali quam saeculari. In his 
autem quae ad bonum civile pertinent, est magis obediendum potestati saeculari quam spirituali, secundum illud 
Matth. 22, 21: reddite quae sunt caesaris caesari. Nisi forte potestati spirituali etiam saecularis potestas 
coniungatur, sicut in Papa, qui utriusque potestatis apicem tenet, scilicet spiritualis et saecularis.‖ 
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consequently the indirect measure of the lawgiver, is divine friendship.
186
 Therefore, the 
spiritual welfare of the citizen is also relevant a relevant concern of the human city.
187
 The 
reverse is also true. Though the proper end of ecclesiastical law is the spiritual life of the 
faithful, they may touch in particular cases on various earthly affairs, though only when 
necessary for the salvation of souls.
188
 
 
Human Infused Justice within the Church  
It would exceed our purposes here to deepen our inquirty into the relationship between 
Church and State according to Aquinas, or to enter into concrete problems surrounding this 
question.
189
 We have said only enough to show in which direction a reconstruction of infused 
justice as a cardinal virtue will run. Though the Church is constituted by a spiritual principle, 
that of divine friendship, this grace is realized within the human community already 
constituted on earth. In grace, human society becomes the res publica sub deo, and infused 
human justice is given to its members for the perfecting of all human interactions that occur in 
this heavenly community on earth, which is the Church.
190
 
Hence, infused human justice is not a virtue that perfects man in every respect regarding his 
membership in the Church. Neither is it concerned with ruling his passions, governing his 
internal acts of charity, or prompting his avoidance of feelings of hatred. These tasks belong 
either to other particular virtues or to divine justice. Furthermore, infused justice is not limited 
to right actions within the Church, understood as either right behavior in church (on occasions 
of divine worship) or as the respectful social intercourse of people working in church 
institutions (infused justice understood as virtue for promoting a good ―working atmosphere‖ 
within the parish). For Aquinas, infused justice includes less than the former but much more 
than latter. Since the Church on earth is the human society ruled in regard to divine friendship, 
infused cardinal justice must be portrayed as infused human justice for the good life in a 
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 See thereto Sabra, Thomas Aquinas’ Vision of the Church: Fundamentals of an Ecumenical Ecclesiology. 
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Christian society, first of all for living together as faithful fellow citizens, but in a context 
wider than one‘s own family or household. Thus, the matter of infused justice and its 
subspecies is indeed the very same stuff as of acquired justice, though it aims for something 
higher than the earthly good. Its proper end is divine friendship, but as realized in the human 
community on earth.
191
 
Helpful for a correctly reconstructing justice as an infused human virtue is St. Thomas‘s reply 
to the fifth objection in De virt. card. 4, where he explains the twofold understanding of the 
object of an infused virtue. The object is either its final end, to which all actions have to be 
ordered, namely God himself, or the objects is the virtue‘s immediate subject-matter, such as 
judgments (for prudence), dangers (for fortitude), and pleasures (for temperance), and 
external actions (for justice). However – and this is decisive – infused virtues are not given for 
the perfect possession of or perfect attachment of the agent to these objects, as if he were to 
rest permanently in considering of doubtful decisions or enjoying sense pleasures. To the 
contrary, the infused habits perfect man to treat their proper matter without losing the right 
ordering by grace toward his supernatural end.  
 
In a double way something may be the object of a virtue. In one way, as the end of a virtue, as 
the highest good is the object of charity, and the eternal beatitude the object of hope. In 
another way as matter which is handled, for tending from there to something else; and in this 
way the pleasures of sexual intercourse are the object of temperance, since temperance does 
not intend to inhere in these pleasures but in controlling [compescendo] these pleasures to tend 
towards the good of reason. Likewise, by overcoming dangers fortitude does not intend to 
dwell in dangers but to follow the good of reason. The same is true for prudence respectively 
toward doubts, and about justice in regard to the necessities of this life.
192
 
 
Although St. Thomas treats infused justice very generally, his meaning is clear enough. 
Infused justice deals with the same everyday actions as its acquired counterpart, no more, no 
less. But the human common good is not simply the intended end of infused justice. Its proper 
matter is human society sub deo, under the condition of divine friendship. Thus, Aquinas 
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 Thus, Cessario explains rightly: ―Infused justice possesses as its distinctive concern the well-being of the 
Christian community, that is, the Church.‖ (Cessario, Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 114). 
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 De virt. card. 4 ad 5: ―Aliquid dicitur esse obiectum virtutum dupliciter. Uno modo sicut illud ad quod virtus 
ordinatur sicut ad finem; sicut summum bonum est obiectum caritatis, et beatitudo aeterna obiectum spei. Alio 
modo sicut materia circa quam operatur, ut ab ea in aliud tendens; et hoc modo delectationes coitus sunt 
obiectum temperantiae, non enim temperantia intendit huiusmodi delectationibus inhaerere, sed istas 
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conludes: ―And therefore, the farer [these virtues] move away from those things according to 
the progress of the spiritual life, the more perfect are the acts of those virtues, since the 
meaning of these virtues is taken more from their terminus a quo than their terminus ad quem, 
which gives the species.‖193  
If we apply this general assertion to justice, the special function of its infused species 
becomes clear. Acquired justice works for the good of the human community as its terminus 
ad quem, its proper end. Infused human justice is also concerned with the human common 
good but as its terminus a quo, a starting-point from which it pursues something higher, 
namely divine friendship. Therefore, its proper object is the communitas humana sub deo.
194
 
Both virtues are concerned with the same external acts, but their acts are performed under 
different formal respects.
195
 
At the beginning of section 5.5, we noted the problem that while the infused affective virtues 
perfect man directly in regard to divine friendship, infused justice and its concern for external 
activity seems to work primarily for the human city. Now, however, we can more easily relate 
infused justice and the infused affective virtues. As infused temperance rules human passions 
in respect to divine friendship, likewise infused justice rules an agent‘s interpersonal activity 
within the human city but in light of his divine friendship. Infused justice is concerned with 
activity within the human city without considering the flourishing of the city as its final end. 
That the activities of acquired justice and infused justice resemble each other externally is due 
to the special character of the medium rei of justice (cf. section 5.3).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
superando pericula, sed consequi bonum rationis; et idem est de prudentia respectu dubitationum, et de iustitia 
respectu necessitatum huius vitae.‖ 
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the status of supernature. The specific character and the essential conditions of those moral relations remain 
unchanged.‖ (Gerald B. Phelan, ―Justice and Friendship,‖ The Thomist 5 (1943): 162-165, here 163). 
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Figure 13 
 
Our investigation shows that the reconstruction of infused justice does not lead necessarily to 
an account of divine justice, for there remains a need of infused justice as particular cardinal 
virtue. Offering a detailed account of the content and significance of infused human justice 
shall be our concern in chapter 6: In what ways do infused commutative justice and infused 
distributive justice differ from their acquired counterparts? And is there an infused legal 
justice in regard to the human community on earth? 
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6. The Reconstruction of Justice as an Infused Virtue  
 
After having investigated the relation (and cooperation) of charity and justice in general, we 
shall reconstruct now in chapter 6 the various meanings of justice which we found in chapter 
4 as infused species: justice in its proper sense as commutative and distributive justice, its 
potential parts, legal justice as general virtue, and last but not least metaphorical justice. What 
does each type of justice – infused commutative justice, infused distributive justice, etc. ‒ 
imply?  
Considering the manifold meanings of justice in Aquinas‘s writings, Garrigou-Lagrange 
asserts: 
 
All these divisions reappear in higher form in infused justice, which increases tenfold the 
energies of the will, imprinting upon it a full Christian character that dominates even man‘s 
physical temperament. If acquired virtue pours natural rectitude down into our will and sense 
appetites, infused virtue, from an immeasurably higher source, pours into those same faculties 
the supernatural rectitude of faith and grace.
1
 
 
Therefore, we investigate in a first section metaphorical justice as an infused ―status‖ of the 
graced agent (section 6.1). Subsequently, we reconstruct the exact meaning of infused divine 
justice (cf. section 5.5), i.e., the general virtue that provides the full observance of the divine 
law for the sake of divine friendship (section 6.2). This kind of infused justice, however, is 
not yet justice in its proper sense – justice that rules the relationship between two equals. As 
seen at the end of chapter 5, there must be a special kind of infused human justice. Thus, in a 
third section, we try to reconstruct the general structure of this supernatural human justice 
(section 6.3.1-2) and of its various species: human legal justice, commutative and distributive 
justice, and its potential parts – each one as infused virtue (section 6.3.3a-d).  
Based on these results we will be able to turn in the final chapter to Aquinas‘s treatise on 
justice in the Secunda secundae in order to verify our reconstruction. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, 332. 
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6.1 Infused Metaphorical Justice as status rectitudinis 
 
As seen at the end of chapter 4, Aristotle uses the term ―justice‖ not only as moral virtue, but 
also in a figurative sense for the internal balance of the virtuous agent; as the right order of the 
various powers within the agent, e.g. the submission of the sensitive appetite to the guidance 
of reason (by the affective moral virtues). Aquinas adopts the expression of metaphorical 
justice and uses it several times in the same way as Aristotle. We are brought thus far by the 
results of section 4.5.4.
2
 Beyond this, however, St. Thomas transferred the figurative sense to 
a theological context for describing the effect of divine justification, though with important 
accommodations. 
Aquinas introduces the issue of the divine justification of the sinner repeatedly with the 
distinction of a threefold meaning of iustitia:
3
 First, justice in its most proper sense is the 
particular virtue (iustitia particularis); secondly, as legal justice it is a general virtue; thirdly, 
in a metaphorical sense it denotes a status rectitudinis in homine. This third meaning is now 
of interest: 
 
In another way we speak of justice insofar as it implies a certain rectitude of order in the interior 
disposition of a man, insofar as the highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the 
soul are subject to the superior, i.e., to the reason; and this disposition the Philosopher calls justice 
metaphorically speaking.
4
 
 
Though Aquinas quotes the Nicomachean Ethics V (as is typical when he refers to the concept 
of metaphorical justice), at this place he does not simply repeat Aristotle but reads him in his 
own way. Aristotle introduces metaphorical justice on occasion of the question whether 
somebody can commit injustice against himself. He specifies the issue and describes 
metaphorical justice as the ordered relationship of various powers within the agent: 
 
Metaphorically and in virtue of a certain similarity there is something just [], not 
indeed between man and himself, but between certain parts of him; however, not in the sense 
of a just thing [] but that of master and servant or that of husband and wife. For in this 
way the reasonable parts of the soul relate to the unreasonable ones. And because of the 
                                                 
2
 In sent. III 28.1.6 ad 4; III 33.3.1A; ST I-II 46.7 ad 2. 
3
 See In sent. IV 17.1.1A; De veritate 28.1; ST I 113.1 
4
 ST I-II 113.1: ―Alio modo dicitur iustitia prout importat rectitudinem quandam ordinis in ipsa interiori 
dispositione hominis, prout scilicet supremum hominis subditur deo, et inferiores vires animae subduntur 
supremae, scilicet rationi. Et hanc etiam dispositionem vocat philosophus, in V ethic., iustitiam metaphorice 
dictam.‖ 
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consideration of these parts people also think that a man can be unjust to himself, because 
these parts are liable to suffer something contrary to their desires; thus, as there is something 
just [] between ruler and ruled, likewise between these parts.5 
 
Aristotle notes carefully that this understanding of justice is figurative not only because there 
is no independent second subject (proper justice is ad alterum), but also because the two 
involved powers are not equal (as e.g. two citizen) but resemble the relation of master and 
servant. Aquinas comments on the citation faithfully: ―By a kind of metaphor and likeness it 
is possible to have, not justice or injustice of the whole man towards himself, but a certain 
species of justice among the parts of man. However, between these [parts] there is not justice 
in the full sense but only the justice of a master or an administrator.‖6  
No disparity thus far. In the case of divine justification, however, Aquinas has to enlarge this 
meaning of metaphorical justice; he uses an Aristotelian concept but goes beyond its original 
meaning. Now it not only signifies the order of man‘s internal powers, but likewise man‘s 
subordination to God, ―insofar, namely, as any part of the soul is subordinate to the higher, 
either to other parts or to God himself.‖7 It is the restoration of this final relation – man to 
God –, which is the primary effect of divine justification. By the Fall man lost his status 
rectitudinis regarding his Creator. Consequently, only the Creator himself can rectify this 
―imbalance;‖ and it is the divine act of justification which reestablishes the sinner‘s state of 
rectitude in regard to God.  
One might question whether thereby the original sense of metaphorical justice is not 
abandoned, as justice again denotes the relation between different agents (God and man), and 
therefore seems to be a matter of justice in its proper sense (and not something metaphorical). 
However, though divine justification draws in a certain way nearer to proper justice because 
of the two involved agents, it is certainly not justice in its strict sense; between both parts, 
there is an essential inequality. It resembles rather the relation of servant and master, which 
likewise falls short of proper justice. For this reason, man‘s rectitude towards God can be 
described only as metaphorical justice, though its Aristotelian sense is profoundly 
transformed. 
                                                 
5
 NE V 10.15 1138b6-10. 
6
 In ethic. V 17.16: ―Secundum quamdam metaphoram et similitudinem contingit, non quidem quod sit iustum 
vel iniustum totius hominis ad seipsum, sed quod sit quaedam species iusti inter aliquas partes hominis 
adinvicem. Non tamen inter eas est omne iustum, sed solum iustum dominativum vel dispensativum.‖ 
7
 In sent. IV 17.1.1A: ―Prout scilicet aliqua pars animae suo superiori subditur, sive alii parti, sive ipsi deo.‖ 
Similar in ST I-II 113.1: ―Prout scilicet supremum hominis subditur deo.‖ Likewise De veritate 28.1; indirect in 
De malo 5.1; Super Rom. V 3.  
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Moreover, when Aquinas describes the reestablishment of man‘s right relation to God as 
metaphorical justice, it includes simultaneously the right order towards his fellow men, since 
the right order to the Creator implies the right order towards all creatures, including man‘s 
own internal order. ―In the third way justice designates that proper state [of man] in which he 
stands in due order towards God, to [his] neighbor, and to himself, insofar his inferior powers 
are subordinate to the superior.‖8 Hence, the Aristotelian concept is not so much changed as 
expanded; it concludes man‘s right order in every respect (though the foundation of the whole 
order is man‘s orientation toward God as final end 9). Consequently, Aquinas concludes 
elsewhere that the rectitude of metaphorical justice is incompatible with any kind of sin: sins 
against the neighbor and the agent himself as well as sins against God. In each case also the 
right order towards God is implicitly destroyed.
10
  
If we confront the Aristotelian metaphorical justice and its meaning in the case of divine 
justification, it becomes clear why the first kind can be acquired by man‘s own resources, 
whereas the latter has to be infused. In the first sense, metaphorical justice is understood as 
the internal equilibrium of human powers, which is a result of one‘s own acting. In the second 
sense the rectitude exceeds man himself; it demands divine interaction; it is an infused habit.  
Moreover, both kinds of justice denote a certain status of the agent rather than a virtue as the 
principle of action. Admittedly, sometimes Aquinas refers to metaphorical justice even as 
―general justice,‖11 a term which is usually reserved for legal justice; but the context of those 
quotations shows that it is about a certain status not about ordinary virtue.
12
 
In the introduction to chapter 4, we mentioned three texts of Aquinas that refer explicitly to 
the difference between acquired and infused justice without indicating their exact function 
                                                 
8
 De veritate 28.1: ―Tertio modo iustitia nominat quemdam statum proprium, secundum quem homo se habet in 
debito ordine ad deum, ad proximum et ad seipsum, ut scilicet in eo inferiores vires superiori subdantur.‖ Hence, 
iustification is understood as partial restoration of man‘s original iustice in the Paradise, but limited to his 
interior rectitude. ―Quae quidem iustitia [sc. originalis] erat quaedam rectitudo, ut mens hominis esset sub deo, et 
inferiores vires essent sub mente, et corpus sub anima, et omnia exteriora sub homine: ita scilicet, quod quamdiu 
mens hominis deo subderetur, vires inferiores subderentur rationi, et corpus animae, indeficienter ab ea vitam 
recipiens, et exteriora homini, ut scilicet omnia servirent, et nullum ex eis nocumentum sentiret.‖ (Super Rom. V 
3). 
9
 See De potentia 6.1 ad 3: ―Iustitia autem hominis consistit principaliter in debito ordine hominis ad deum.― 
10
 In sent. IV 17.1.1A: ―Haec autem rectitudo [sc. iustuitiae metaphoricae] per quodlibet peccatum tollitur.― For 
the same statement about metaphorical justice, see ST I-II 113.1 ad 1. 
11
 See for example De veritate 28.1 and 4 ad 11.  
12
 Cessario describes this metaphorical justice fittingly as evangelical justice (Cessario, The Virtues, or the 
Examined Life, 132-133). 
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with respect to particular acts.
13
 Now the cause of this ―imprecision‖ is clear: The texts are not 
about justice as virtue but as a status rectitudinis.  
In the next step, we will reconstruct legal justice as a supernatural virtue. How are we to 
describe infused justice as legal justice? 
 
 
6.2 Infused Justice as Divine Legal Justice as Complement of Charity 
 
Every friendship is founded on a special kind of communication between two persons, and 
each type of communication demands a special kind of justice which renders the other his due 
according to that specific communication. ―Justice is differentiated according to different 
types of communication. The same kind of iustum is not found in every communication, but a 
different one.‖14 Therefore, as concluded in the fifth chapter, there must be something like 
divine justice, a kind of justice which works as integral part of divine friendship, and which 
achieves all actions commanded by the divine law as the ―minimum‖ for maintaining divine 
friendship, in short: legal justice in regard to all divine laws. However, is it possible to 
reconstruct this divine justice, which is the basis of divine friendship, as infused legal justice? 
Indeed, Aquinas speaks sometimes about general justice regarding the divine law. ―Justice is a 
general virtue, when it obeys the divine law.‖15 In addition, as seen in section 4.5, Aquinas 
uses the term of iustitia generalis in the sense of iustitia legalis. However, simultaneously 
there are quotations suggesting the opposite: ―God‘s justice is more perfect than legal 
justice.‖16 From the context it is clear that Thomas doesn‘t speak about the justice of God (as 
quasi distributive justice regarding all creatures) but about the justice of the graced faithful in 
regard to the divine laws, i.e. about divine justice. Thus, in which direction must a 
reconstruction of infused justice as legal justice regarding the divine law proceed?  
We shall develop our interpretation in two steps. First, we will show how the concept of a 
divine legal justice transforms the original meaning of a legal justice in the Aristotelian sense. 
                                                 
13
 The texts are In sent. III 40.3; De veritate 28.3; ST I-II 100.12. All texts compare a kind of acquired and 
infused justice, but always in the context of justification, understood as status rectitudinis.  
14
 In ethic. VIII 9.6: ―Iustitia diversificatur secundum diversas communicationes. Non enim idem est iustum in 
qualibet communicatione, sed differens.‖ 
15
 Super Hebr. XI 7: ―Iustitia est virtus generalis, quando scilicet obedit legi divinae.‖ 
16
 Super Rom. X 1: ―Iustitia dei sit perfectior quam iustitia legalis.‖  
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In a second step, we will discuss the fact that Aquinas often confronts legal justice with divine 
justice. So it would seem that legal justice could not be identical to divine justice. 
 
 
6.2.1 The Expansion of Legal Justice as Divine Justice 
 
Justice in its original sense is based on the living together of men in one city; thus, the proper 
matter of proper justice consists in external actions (which are ruled primarily by the human 
law). The foundation of justice differs in the case of divine friendship, which consists in a 
spiritual communication. Consequently, the corresponding divine law first of all governs 
internal acts, and only subsequently extends to external operations, namely, insofar as the 
latter result from the former.  
 
The divine law poses precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered in their 
relations to God. But man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is the image of 
God. Therefore the divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human 
reason is well ordered. But this happens by acts of all the virtues, since the intellectual virtues 
set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves; the moral virtues set in good order the 
acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions.
17
 
 
Aquinas mentions different areas whose order is relevant for maintaining divine friendship: 
acts of the intellectual virtues (sc. faith, prudence), and acts of the moral virtues regarding 
internal passions and external acts. In short, divine friendship implies the whole scope of 
human actions. However, not all virtuous actions are required in a strict way for the 
preservation of divine justice, and consequently not all acts are commanded by precept. St. 
Thomas continues: 
 
The divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that some 
[acts], without which the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot exist, fall under 
                                                 
17
 ST I-II 100.2: ―Lex divina praecepta proponit de omnibus illis per quae homines bene ordinentur ad 
communicationem cum deo. Homo autem deo coniungitur ratione, sive mente, in qua est dei imago. Et ideo lex 
divina praecepta proponit de omnibus illis per quae ratio hominis est bene ordinata. Hoc autem contingit per 
actus omnium virtutum, nam virtutes intellectuales ordinant bene actus rationis in seipsis; virtutes autem morales 
ordinant bene actus rationis circa interiores passiones et exteriores operationes.‖ 
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the obligation of precept; while others, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, fall 
under an admonition of counsel.
18
 
 
It is precisely here that we find the basis for the reconstruction of divine justice as infused 
legal justice: Acts that are a condition sine qua non of divine friendship, fall under divine 
precept, are legally commanded, and are a legal due; those acts what arise ―ex necessitate 
legis‖ or ―ex obligatione legis‖ belong to the realm of justice (see section 4.3.319). Therefore, 
divine precepts given for the maintenance of divine friendship demand for a kind of divine 
legal justice.  
Admittedly, the notion of that justice differs from ordinary legal justice in an important 
respect: St. Thomas himself argues in the second objection of ST I-II 100.2 that something 
can be a matter of precept only if it bears the character of a duty. However, debts exist only 
between two agents, not in the case of affective virtues. Thus, it would seem that the divine 
law could only concern external acts of justice. However, the reply to the objection shows that 
in some way every virtue responds to a due, without, however, thereby becoming justice in its 
strict sense: ―Justice in its proper sense regards the debt of one man to the other: but all the 
other virtues regard the debt of the lower powers to reason. And according to the notion of 
this debt, the Philosopher designates in Ethic. V a kind of metaphorical justice.‖20  
The first objection is also noteworthy: the observance of the Old Law was called justification, 
which means the execution of justice. Consequently, the divine precepts should be about 
justice, i.e. about external actions. Aquinas replies: ―The fulfillment of the commandments of 
the law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character of 
justification, inasmuch as it is iustum that man obeys God. Or also inasmuch as it is iustum 
that all that belongs to man should be subject to reason.‖21 
Someone might object that the passages are taken from the context of the Old Law. However, 
disregarding the fact that the New Law as well as the Old Law is directed towards divine 
friendship as one common end,
22
 Aquinas makes the same assertion in ST II-II 44, the 
                                                 
18
 ST I-II 100.2: ―Lex divina convenienter proponit praecepta de actibus omnium virtutum, ita tamen quod 
quaedam, sine quibus ordo virtutis, qui est ordo rationis, observari non potest, cadunt sub obligatione praecepti; 
quaedam vero, quae pertinent ad bene esse virtutis perfectae, cadunt sub admonitione consilii.‖ 
19
 ST I 21.1 ad 2: ―Quod secundum legem facimus, iuste facimus.‖ 
20
 ST I-II 100.2 ad 2: ―Iustitia proprie dicta attendit debitum unius hominis ad alium, sed in omnibus aliis 
virtutibus attenditur debitum inferiorum virium ad rationem. Et secundum rationem huius debiti, philosophus 
assignat, in V ethic., quandam iustitiam metaphoricam.‖ 
21
 ST I-II 100.2 ad 1: ―Adimpletio mandatorum legis etiam quae sunt de actibus aliarum virtutum, habet rationem 
iustificationis, inquantum iustum est ut homo obediat deo. Vel etiam inquantum iustum est quod omnia quae sunt 
hominis, rationi subdantur.‖ 
22
 See ST I-II 91.5; 98.1; 107.1. 
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question about the precepts of charity. Though the greater part of the question deals with the 
commandment of charity, the first article argues, after having defined spiritual union with 
God as the purpose of all precepts, in the same line as ST I-II 100.2: 
 
All virtues, whose acts are commanded by given precepts, are directed either to the freeing of 
the heart from the whirl of the passions, such as the virtues that regulate the passions, or at 
least to the possession of a good conscience, such as the virtues that regulate operations, or to 
the having of a right faith, such as those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three 
things are required of man that he may love God.
23
 
 
Thus, the divine precepts not only governs external acts, but contain the necessary 
requirements for allowing divine friendship. Aquinas continues: ―For an impure heart 
becomes drawn away from love for God because of the passion which inclines it to earthly 
things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God‘s justice because of fear of his 
punishments; and a fictive faith draws man‘s affections to something what is fictive about 
God, and separates him from the truth of God.‖24 
Furthermore: All discussions of the various virtues in the Secunda secundae – the theological 
as well as the cardinal – end with a special question on the corresponding divine precepts.25 
This structure only makes sense if Aquinas has in mind something like a divine legal justice 
according to our description; otherwise a discussion of divine precepts would be reasonable 
only in the particular case of justice. 
 
Do the texts of Aquinas contain the notion an infused legal justice? 
Thus, it is clear what infused legal justice would have to be. But does Aquinas ever speak 
about such a virtue? Aquinas never uses the term of ―iustitia legalis infusa,‖ and we will list 
some reasons for this omission in the second part of this chapter. However, there are some 
places in which he speaks implicitly of legal justice in the way described. We already quoted 
                                                 
23
 ST II-II 44.1: ―Omnes enim virtutes, de quarum actibus dantur praecepta, ordinantur vel ad purificandum cor a 
turbinibus passionum, sicut virtutes quae sunt circa passiones; vel saltem ad habendam bonam conscientiam, 
sicut virtutes quae sunt circa operationes; vel ad habendam rectam fidem, sicut illa quae pertinent ad divinum 
cultum. Et haec tria requiruntur ad diligendum deum.‖ For an outline of the bona spiritualia necessaria for the 
order of grace, see Roey, De virtute charitatis, 341-348. 
24
 ST II-II 44.1: ―Nam cor impurum a dei dilectione abstrahitur propter passionem inclinantem ad terrena; 
conscientia vero mala facit horrere divinam iustitiam propter timorem poenae; fides autem ficta trahit affectum 
in id quod de deo fingitur, separans a dei veritate.‖ 
25
 ST II-II 16 about the precepts regarding divine faith, q. 22 about precepts of hope, q. 44 of charity, q. 56 of 
prudence, q. 122 of justice, q. 140 of fortitude, and 170 of temperance. 
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Super Hebr. XI 7: ―Justice is a general virtue, when it obeys the divine law.‖26 We find a 
similar a short note in Super Phil. III 2: ―Justice is called a general virtue insofar as man 
observes a law because of the common good. And in this way in Sacred Scriptures [justice] is 
often taken for the observance of divine law.‖27 And in Super Mt.: ―There is a legal justice 
which includes all other virtues, piety, clemency, and others. When it was said that Joseph 
was ‗just,‘ it was understood according to general justice.‖28  
Even in the Summa theologiae, where the terminology is more precise than in the 
Commentaries on Sacred Scripture, the concept of iustitia legalis is used in contexts that 
clearly demand the understanding of divine justice. A good example is the discussion of 
humility. St. Thomas attributes humility to the virtue of temperance. McKay argued
29
 that 
humility has to be understood here as infused virtue, namely as recognition of God‘s 
superiority and man‘s inferiority (and only subsequently – because of the submission to God – 
as readiness to subject himself to a fellow man). From this point it can be seen that political 
virtues do not require this kind of humility (since political virtues per se disregard man‘s 
relation to God). St. Thomas even mentions explicitly that legal justice in the Aristotelian 
sense does not contain humility.
30
 But the situation is quite different in the case of Christian 
legal justice: Article 5, whether humility is the most prominent virtue (potissima virtus), 
presents an overview of the hierarchy of virtues: In first place there are the theological virtues 
which perfect man in regard to his final end. In second place, virtues pertaining to the right 
choice of the necessary means for attaining the final end, which is the primary task of legal 
justice. Though Aquinas does not speak of infused legal justice, the previous reference to the 
theological virtues and the description of legal justice as directing actions as the right means 
for the sake of the end of faith, hope and charity, obviously requires more than mere political 
                                                 
26
 See footnote 15. 
27
 Super Phil. III 2: ―Iustitia dicitur virtus generalis, secundum quod homo servat legem propter bonum 
commune, et hoc modo frequenter in Scriptura sacra ponitur pro observantia divinae legis. Ps. Cxviii, V. 121: 
feci iudicium et iustitiam, scilicet, legem.‖  
28
 Super Mt. I 4: ―Est iustitia legalis, quae includit omnem virtutem, et pietatem, et clementiam, et huiusmodi. 
Quando ergo dicitur quod Ioseph iustus erat, intelligendum est de iustitia generali.‖ Also interesting is a note in 
Aquinas‘s exposition of the letter to the Romans where he relates legal justice to divine justification: ―Per 
obedientiam et inobedientiam probat nos per unum peccatores effici, et per unum iustificari: quia iustitia legalis, 
quae est omnis virtus, attenditur in observatione praeceptorum legis, quod pertinet ad rationem obedientiae. 
Iniustitia autem legalis, quae est omnis malitia ut dicitur V ethicorum, attenditur in transgressione mandatorum 
legis, quae pertinet ad rationem inobedientiae. Sic ergo convenienter dicitur quod per obedientiam constituuntur 
homines iusti, et per inobedientiam peccatores.‖ (Super Rom. V 5). 
29
 See McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 149-156. 
30
 ―Philosophus intendebat agere de virtutibus secundum quod ordinantur ad vitam civilem, in qua subiectio 
unius hominis ad alterum secundum legis ordinem determinatur, et ideo continetur sub iustitia legali. Humilitas 
autem, secundum quod est specialis virtus, praecipue respicit subiectionem hominis ad deum, propter quem 
etiam aliis humiliando se subiicit.‖ (ST II-II 161.1 ad 5). Another clear indication of infused virtue is contained 
in a. 5 a 2: ―Virtutes autem verae infunduntur a deo.‖ 
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justice. An infallible cue, however, is the reference to humility in that context: ―Justice makes 
a universal order, especially legal justice. But humility makes a man well subjected to the 
ordinance in general and in all things.‖31 And therefore, Aquinas concludes, humility is less 
important than legal justice.
32
 Now, if we reconsider the definition of humility in the first 
article as subjection to God, then the comparison of humility and legal justice in art. 5 
specifies the latter clearly as governing all human actions according to the divine law; legal 
justice in combination with humility as ready submission to God makes sense only as infused 
legal justice. 
 
 
a) First Objection: How Does Human Legal Justice Command All 
Virtues? 
 
The reader may raise the following objection: Aquinas often refers to the Aristotelian doctrine 
that legal justice commands all virtues; it is one in substance with all virtues, even with the 
affective ones. Hence, is our divine legal justice not simply identical with its Aristotelian 
counterpart?  
To answer the objection we have to determine the qualified meaning of Aristotle‘s assertion. 
As the Philosopher notes, legal justice commands only the external effects of affective virtues. 
It orders the achievement of courageous deeds, but not – since this is impossible for a human 
law – the calmness of internal passions. He writes in the Nicomachean Ethics:  
 
The law prescribes the acts of a brave man [], as not to desert 
our post or take to flight or throw away our arms, and those of a temperate man 
[], as not to commit adultery or outrage, and those of a good-tempered 
man [] as not to strike another or speak evil, and similarly with regard to the 
other virtues and vices, commanding some acts and forbidding others.
33
 
 
                                                 
31
 ST II-II 161.5: ―Ordinationem universaliter facit iustitia, praesertim legalis. Ordinationi autem facit hominem 
bene subiectum humilitas in universali quantum ad omnia.‖ 
32
 The whole context: ―Bonum humanae virtutis in ordine rationis consistit. Qui quidem principaliter attenditur 
respectu finis. Unde virtutes theologicae, quae habent ultimum finem pro obiecto, sunt potissimae. Secundario 
autem attenditur prout secundum rationem finis ordinantur ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec quidem ordinatio 
essentialiter consistit in ipsa ratione ordinante, participative autem in appetitu per rationem ordinato. Quam 
quidem ordinationem universaliter facit iustitia, praesertim legalis. Ordinationi autem facit hominem bene 
subiectum humilitas in universali quantum ad omnia, quaelibet autem alia virtus quantum ad aliquam materiam 
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Aristotle describes legal justice as ―complete virtue,‖ and it is complete regarding a man‘s 
fellow-citizen; but it is not complete in the sense of a universal human perfection. ―This form 
of justice then is complete excellence, not absolutely, but in relation to others [ 
   ].‖34  
Thus, if St. Thomas sometimes identifies legal justice in the Aristotelian sense with all virtues 
this is to be understood in a qualified sense, namely regarding the external effects of all 
virtues.
35
 And if Aquinas follows Aristotle saying that legal justice is one in substance with all 
virtues (even with the affective ones), then ―substance‖ means here the external act which is 
in the case of temperance and fortitude normally an effect of an affective virtue, but in this 
special case of legal justice is commanded by another virtue (sc. legal justice). Therefore, only 
regarding the external acts does justice command all virtues, namely iusta (just deeds), fortia 
(courageous deeds), and temperata (temperate acts). And in this respect the ―substance of all 
virtues‖ belongs to legal justice.36 Insofar as all external acts can be measured by their relation 
                                                                                                                                                        
specialem. Et ideo post virtutes theologicas; et virtutes intellectuales, quae respiciunt ipsam rationem; et post 
iustitiam, praesertim legalem; potior ceteris est humilitas.‖ (ST II-II 161.5) 
33
 NE V 3 1129b10-12.  
34
 NE V 3 1129b18. Its completeness consists in the power to command the acts of the other virtues. ―It is 
complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue []. It is 
complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue towards others too and not merely by himself; for 
many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to others.‖ (Ibid.). However, it is not 
complete in regard to every moral perfection. Konicic shows clearly why legal justice is limited to the 
observance of human laws for the sake of the social order (Giordano Kunicic, ―Natura della giustizia sociale,‖ 
Sapienza 16 (1963): 57-61). 
35
 In this point, Aquinas is faithful to the philosopher: ―Lex praecipit ea quae pertinent ad singulas virtutes. 
Praecipit enim facere opera fortitudinis, puta cum praecipit, quod miles non derelinquat aciem, et quod non 
fugiat, neque proiiciat arma. Similiter etiam praecipit ea quae pertinent ad temperantiam, puta cum praecipit 
quod nullus moechetur, et quod nullus faciat mulieri aliquod convicium in propria persona; et similiter etiam 
praecipit ea quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem: sicut cum praecipit quod unus non percutiat alium ex ira, et quod 
non contendat cum eo opprobria inferendo. Et similiter est de aliis virtutibus quarum actus lex iubet, et de aliis 
malitiis quarum actus lex prohibet.‖ (In ethic. V 2.5). 
36
 Admittedly, Aquinas first repeats the very imprecise expression of Aristotle: ―Manifestum est in quo differant 
virtus et iustitia legalis. Quia secundum substantiam est eadem, sed secundum rationem non est idem; sed per 
comparationem ad alterum dicitur iustitia; inquantum autem est habitus operativus talis boni, est simpliciter 
virtus.‖ (In ethic. V 2.13). But in the following statement he is very clear that his affirmation has to be read in 
respect of the act of virtues: ―Hoc autem intelligendum est quantum ad ipsum actum iustitiae et virtutis. Actus 
enim idem subiecto producitur a iustitia legali et a virtute simpliciter dicta, puta non moechari; tamen secundum 
aliam et aliam rationem.‖ (Ibid.).  
Maybe even clearer is In sent. III 33.3.4A, where Aquinas emphasizes expressis verbis that legal justice extends 
only to the external acts of affective virtues, to the actus exterioris of fortitude, whereas passions themselves are 
not the right matter for legal determination. ―Quaedam [virtutes] vero hoc circa quod est virtus, non principaliter, 
sed secundario, ordinant ad alterum; sicut quando fortitudo actum exteriorem, circa quem secundario est, ordinat 
ad alterum ut ad bonum gratiae, et sic induit quodammodo formam iustitiae; et sic omnis virtus potest reduci ad 
iustitiam; unde iustitia legalis est idem quod omnis virtus in 5 ethic. Quantum ad passiones autem, circa quas 
principaliter sunt illae virtutes, nihil possunt habere de modo iustitiae, eo quod per passiones immediate homo 
non ordinatur nisi ad seipsum.‖ 
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ad alterum (at least ad bonum commune), the acts of all virtues can somehow become justice, 
which is ad alterum; they ―assume the ratio of justice.‖37 
This brief return to political legal justice shows that there is really something new about legal 
justice regarding the divine laws which command external as well as internal acts.  
 
 
b) Second Objection: Is Divine Legal Justice Simply Metaphorical   
Justice? 
 
One may get the impression that infused legal justice is simply identical with infused 
metaphorical justice: If supernatural friendship with God presupposes man‘s total rectitude, if 
the divine laws are given for the sake of this divine friendship, and if legal justice observes 
those laws, then, in fact, infused legal justice seems to be identical with metaphorical justice. 
The immediate effect of divine justification is the reestablishment of man‘s rectitude; it is a 
certain state (status rectitudinis), not a principle of action; it certainly includes some virtues 
(as necessary concomitants) but – as Aquinas notes – in itself it is not a virtue.38 Therefore, a 
simple identification would be imprecise. Rather infused divine legal justice is that virtue 
which commands all acts of the divine law that are necessary for the preservation of the status 
rectitudinis of infused metaphorical justice. As political legal justice is in itself a specific 
virtue (determined by the common good as its proper object) but general by command,
39
 
likewise infused legal justice commands every virtuous act which is required by the divine 
law but in it self it is specified as a particular virtue by its proper good, i.e. by God as the 
common good of the heavenly community. As a particular virtue it resides in the human will 
and rules therefrom man‘s internal and external actions.40 Thus, whereas metaphorical justice 
signifies man‘s total order as an integral whole, including all virtues as integral parts,41 legal 
justice is general by command, as universal cause of the total order, while in itself it remains a 
specific virtue. Describing the various senses of justice, Aquinas explains exactly this 
                                                 
37
 ST I-II 100.2: ―assumunt rationem iustitiae.‖ 
38
 E.g. ST I-II 114.1. 
39
 Again ST I-II 60.3 ad 2. 
40
 The will extends by command to all actions (see ST I-II 17). 
41
 So for example in De veritate 28.4 ad 11 where Aquinas explains: ―In iustitia generali, de qua nunc loquimur, 
includitur ordinatio debita hominis ad deum, ut supra, art. I huius quaestionis dictum est; et sic tam fides quam 
spes quam caritas sub huiusmodi iustitia continentur.‖ In this sense then, divine faith – as the principle virtue for 
justification – can be called the ―first part‖ of justice. See Super Rom. III 3: ―Ipsa fides quasi prima pars iustitiae 
est nobis a deo.‖ 
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difference between metaphorical and legal justice: ―Thus, this justice [i.e. metaphorical justice] 
is called general insofar as it includes all virtues; however not in the way of a universal whole 
as the foregoing justice [legal justice], but it is called general in the way of an integral 
whole.‖42 
 
 
c) Third Objection: Is Infused Legal Justice Identical with Charity? 
 
The foregoing distinction of infused legal justice and metaphorical justice suggests a 
similarity with charity. On many occasions Aquinas outlines charity as a specific virtue but 
general by command insofar it moves all virtues to their proper acts towards its own specific 
end.
43
 Further, God himself is the object of divine charity; and is he not also the object of 
infused legal justice, as the common good of the heavenly community?
44
  
Despite an external similarity, there is an important difference: charity (like the other 
theological virtues) is directed to God as its immediate end; in contrast, though infused legal 
justice relates in a certain way to God, it does so under the aspect of man‘s righteousness 
towards him. Its proper object is God as common good of the community of saints, which is 
ordered according to the rules of the divine law. A comparison with the human city may be 
helpful: Personal friendship with the king certainly includes respect for all his laws; but 
nevertheless, the faithful observation of all precepts is due to a different virtue which works 
                                                 
42
 In sent. IV 17.1.1A: ―Unde haec iustitia [sc. iustitia metaphorica] generalis etiam dicitur, inquantum omnes 
virtutes includit, non quidem per modum totius universalis, sicut praecedens iustitia [sc. iustitia legalis]; sed 
generalis dicitur per modum totius integralis.‖ In In sent. III 9.1B Aquinas distinguishes four senses of 
―general;‖ the first and forth meanings are relevant for the present issue: ―Aliqua virtus dicitur generalis quatuor 
modis. Uno modo quia praedicatur de qualibet virtute, sicut iustitia legalis, quae convertitur cum virtute, et est 
idem subiecto, ratione differens, ut dicit philosophus: et sic dicitur generalis quantum ad suam essentiam. 
Secundo modo dicitur generalis, inquantum ab ea dependent aliae virtutes participantes eius actum; et hoc modo 
prudentia generalis dicitur, quia ex ea omnes aliae virtutes morales rectitudinem electionis participant, et sic 
actus eius immiscetur actibus omnium aliarum virtutum: nihilominus ipsa in se est specialis secundum quod 
habet specialem rationem obiecti, scilicet eligibile ad opus. Tertio modo dicitur generalis, inquantum operatur 
circa actus omnium virtutum, ita quod omnes cedunt ei pro materia; sicut magnanimitas, quae operatur magna in 
omnibus virtutibus, ut dicitur 4 eth.; et tamen in se specialis virtus est, quia rationem specialem obiecti in 
omnibus attendit, scilicet dignum magno honore. Quarto dicitur aliqua virtus generalis, inquantum ad eam 
concurrunt diversae virtutes, quia scilicet actus eius praeexigit actus multarum virtutum; sicut etiam ad 
magnanimitatem praeexiguntur aliae virtutes, quia nullus potest dignificari magnis nisi virtuosus sit. Prima ergo 
generalitas, est quasi universalis; secunda quasi causae dantis esse; tertia quasi moventis per imperium; quarta 
quasi totius integralis comprehendentis multa.‖ (In sent. III 9.1B). 
43
 For example ST II-II 23.8. 
44
 St. Thomas mentions several times, God himself can be called the common good which is intended by divine 
law. ―Finis autem humanae vitae et societatis est deus.‖ ST I-II 100.6; see also ST I-II 100.8; ST II-II 25.1 ad 2; 
26.3; 26.4 ad 3. Very clear also Super Rom.: I 6: ―Divinum enim bonum dicitur bonum commune quod ab 
omnibus participatur.‖ 
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for the common good of all men who lives under the king‘s reign. Likewise there is a 
difference between charity and infused divine legal justice: ―Faith and charity imply a special 
directing of the human mind to God by intellect and will. But justice implies a general 
rectitude of order.‖45 Of course, as we have seen in section 5.4.1 the acts of justice may be 
performed because of charity; nevertheless, legal justice remains a specific virtue and the act 
it commands retain their proper significance as just acts.
46
 
At this point, we can see that infused legal justice conforms rather to Aquinas‘s account of 
sanctity. In the Commentary on the Sentences he defines sanctity as general virtue which 
commands all human acts for the sake of God as final end. Sanctity ―regulates all other acts of 
the life regarding to God; therefore . . . sanctity is that science which makes the faithful and 
servants achieve just things regarding God.‖47 In one of the replies he writes even more 
explicitly: ―Sanctity relates to all virtues in the same way as legal justice, since, just as legal 
justice achieves the acts of all virtues because of the common good, so also sanctity because 
of God.‖48 
Certainly, charity is also a general virtue insofar as it informs and commands the acts of all 
virtues propter deum; but as we saw above, this ―because of‖ can adopt several meanings (see 
section 5.4.1) and God is the formal object only for the theological virtues. The proper objects 
of sanctity, however, are created things and human actions. By sanctity, the graced agent uses 
these things (as ea quae sunt ad finem) for the sake of the final end, i.e. God. Hence, although 
the definition of sanctity does not refer to the divine law, its resemblance to infused legal 
justice is obvious. The divine law is given as the guardian of charity, for the preservation of 
man‘s ordered relationship to God; it demands that no human act undermines this order. 
                                                 
45
 ST I-II 113.1 ad 2: ―Fides et caritas dicunt ordinem specialem mentis humanae ad deum secundum intellectum 
vel affectum. Sed iustitia importat generaliter totam rectitudinem ordinis.‖ 
46
 Likewise vice versa: Not every transgression of the divine law is against infused legal justice in the same 
manner. Though every (mortal) sin is a transgression of the divine law, not every evil act is achieved for the sake 
of such a transgressing. We find this distinction in the discussion of pride; pride can lead an agent to every kind 
of offense against the divine law; but not every legal transgression is out of pride, i.e. because of contempt for a 
divine precept (ex contemptu praecepti); sins are often a question of ignorance or weakness. (ST II-II 162.2: 
―Non . . . semper ex contemptu aliquis praecepta divina transgreditur, sed quandoque ex ignorantia, quandoque 
ex infirmitate.‖ See also ad 1). The assertion is based on the distinction between acts which are formally or 
materially against the divine law and consequently against the infused virtue of legal justice. Since legal justice 
is a specific virtue but general by command, only acts of a particular malice are specifically against it (sc. 
because of scorn for the divine precept), but every sin is opposed to it in a general sense. 
47
 In sent. III 33.3.4F: ―[Sanctitas] ordinat ad deum in omnibus aliis operibus vitae; unde . . . sanctitas est scientia 
faciens fideles et servantes quae ad deum iusta sunt.‖ The second part of the quotation is taken from Andronicus 
Peripateticus: ―Dicit enim Andronicus Peripateticus, quod sanctitas est quae facit fideles et servantes ea quae ad 
deum iusta.‖ (In ethic. I 6.5). He refers to the citation again in ST I-II 58.2 arg. 2 (affirmative). A similar 
statement is made in ST I 36.1: ―Sanctitas vero illis rebus attribuitur, quae in deum ordinantur.‖  
48
 In sent. III 33.3.4F ad 3: ―Sanctitas eodem modo comparatur ad omnes virtutes, sicut et iustitia legalis: quia 
sicut iustitia legalis operatur actus omnium virtutum propter bonum commune, ita sanctitas propter deum.‖ 
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Consequently infused legal justice is concerned with all human acts and redirects them to God 
as the common good of divine friendship. But this is exactly the description of sanctity.  
 
 
6.2.2 The Pejorative Sense of “Legal Justice” in the Theological Context 
 
The preceding paragraph has shown in which way Aquinas indicates a kind of infused legal 
justice, although he never uses this exact term. Yet an important difficulty remains: In several 
places Aquinas opposes explicitly legal justice (and even legal justice regarding the divine 
law) to divinely infused justice. In those texts the term of iustitia legalis bears a clear 
pejorative sense, whereas iustitia dei, iustitia fidei, and iustitia caritatis are praised as the only 
true and godly justice.
49
 Thus, is it possible to maintain the foregoing reconstruction of 
infused legal justice?  
We will quote several texts of the Commentary on the epistle to the Romans since they 
present most obviously the present problem: ―It is a fact that [St. Paul] has said that [the Jews] 
ignored the justice of God and that they did not want to be subject to him, though they tried to 
establish legal justice.‖50 Further: ―Justice which comes from faith, is not the same as justice 
from works. Peoples are not converted for observing a legal justice, but for being justified by 
faith in Christ, . . . but the justice of God comes by faith in Jesus Christ.‖51 Finally, and most 
clearly: 
 
[St. Paul] proves the truth which the Jews failed to recognize, namely that justice of God is 
more perfect than legal justice, and this by authority of the old legislator Moses. By his words 
he shows first the conditions of legal justice, secondly the conditions of the justice of faith. . . . 
He explains first: rightly I have distinguished human justice from the justice of God . . . We 
can say that by legal observation man is ordered in regard to the present life: the law promises 
temporal goods, and it commands some things which pertain to the order of the carnal life. . . 
Afterwards, when he says justice which is from faith etc. he introduces the authority of Moses 
concerning the justice of faith. . . Moses not only speaks about the justice of the law, but he 
himself speaks also about the justice which is from faith.
52
 
                                                 
49
 See similar expressions see ST II-II 59.1 ad 2: ―iustitia divina;‖ Super Phil. III 2: ―iustitia moralis;‖ ST I-II 
107.1 ad 2: ―iustitia legis amoris;‖ Super Rom. X 1: ―iustitia dei‖ and ―iustitia fidei.‖ 
50
 Super Rom. X 1: ―Manifestat quod [paulus] dixerat, scilicet eos [i.e. Iudaeos] dei iustitiam ignorare et quod ei 
subiici nolunt, cum tamen iustitiam legalem statuere velint.‖ 
51
 Super Rom. IX 7: ―Iustitiam autem quae ex fide est, non eam quae in operibus consistit. Non enim ad hoc 
gentes conversae sunt, ut iustitiam legalem observent, sed ut iustificentur per christi fidem, . . . iustitia autem dei 
per fidem iesu christi.‖ 
52
 Super Rom. X 1: ―[Paulus] probat veritatem eorum quae iudaei ignorabant, scilicet quod iustitia dei sit 
perfectior quam iustitia legalis et hoc auctoritate ipsius moysi veteris legislatoris. Primo ergo per eius verba 
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According to these quotations, legal justice stands for a virtue that is acquired by the 
observance of precepts, but that is insufficient for attaining divine friendship, whereas only 
divine justice (as iustitia fidei or iustitia dei) signifies an infused habit. Obviously, it would be 
contradictory to introduce here a kind of infused legal justice. Hence, is it possible to maintain 
the reconstruction of infused legal justice, or does it become a self-contradictory term? 
In the present case, it is important not to be misled by the terminology, but to distinguish 
carefully what Aquinas intends in different contexts by using the same concepts. In the 
foregoing chapter, the term ―legal justice‖ stood for the perfection of the will to observe a 
certain law, given for the sake of the common good, namely divine friendship. However, the 
term ―legal justice‖ can also focus on the fact that by acting according to a certain law, which 
is imposed externally, an agent acquires some virtues. As is clear from section 2.3, this is one 
of the principal reasons for the introduction of human laws: by observing the laws – whether 
out of virtue or without virtue – the agent in time becomes virtuous. By doing fortia and 
temperata, external acts commanded by law, the corresponding internal virtues grow by 
degree. From this perspective, legal justice consists not only in observing precepts for the 
common good, but rather in ―making virtues.‖ Legal justice is – as Aquinas glosses Aristotle 
– factiva totius virtutis. ―It is evident that positive laws are productive of the whole virtue 
according to the discipline by which man is instructed in reference to the common good.‖53 
For this reason Aristotle describes legal justice as the key-virtue of the good citizen; the 
observance of public precepts will – if the laws are just – sooner or later ―produce‖ a good 
citizen.
54
 
What is right for the human law is to a certain extend even true for divine law. Or more 
precisely: it was true for the Old Testament and the corresponding Old Law. The precepts of 
the Old Testament (divine precepts) were externally imposed on the chosen people, virtuous 
as well as wicked ones, in order to lead them to virtues. Thus, the precepts of the Old Law 
functioned in the manner of the ―pagan model.‖ However, they failed to achieve man‘s 
friendship with God; they prepared the Jews for the state of grace by removing the graver 
                                                                                                                                                        
ostendit conditionem iustitiae legalis; secundo, conditionem iustitiae fidei. . . . Dicit ergo primo: recte distinxi 
iustitiam humanam a iustitia dei . . . Possumus ulterius dicere quod per legis observationem homo ordinatur in 
vita praesenti: promittebat enim lex temporalia bona, et quaedam mandabat, quae ad ordinationem carnalis vitae 
pertinebant. . . . Deinde cum dicit quae autem ex fide est iustitia, etc., inducit auctoritatem moysi de iustitia 
fidei. . . . Non solum loquitur moyses de iustitia legis, sed etiam ipse sic dicit de iustitia quae est ex fide.‖ 
53
 In ethic. V 3.13: ―Manifestum est enim quod illa quae sunt lege posita sunt factiva totius virtutis secundum 
disciplinam qua instruitur homo in ordine ad bonum commune.‖ 
54
 Cf. ST I-II 92.1. Gilby notes rightly that legal justice (as political virtue) does not contain all perfections which 
are necessary for the good man (Gilby, Principality and Polity, 227). 
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vices, but they could not introduce the supernatural order.
55
 This did not become possible 
until the New Testament, which brought the grace of divine justification. But – and this is the 
important point – Aquinas directly opposes this new justice to legal justice. 
 
Justice is called a general virtue insofar as man serves the law because of the common good; 
and in this way it is often taken in Holy Scripture for the observance of the divine law. Ps 
Xxviii, 121: I did judgment and justice, i.e. the law, which he observed by love, as if a 
movement from within; and in this way it is a virtue; not, however, in another way, namely if 
it is done from an external cause, either because of profit or because of punishment, or if the 
observation is unpleasant. Thus, there is a double mode of justice: one moral justice, another 
legal justice, by which a law is not observed by love but by fear.
56
 
 
Obviously it is impossible to transfer this account of legal justice to a divinely infused virtue; 
they are contradictorily opposed. Infused virtues are generally not acquirable by repeated 
actions. If legal justice signifies the ordinary mode of education for a virtuous life, the concept 
of an infused legal justice is inconsistent.  
Aquinas contrasts this understanding of legal justice as an acquired habit ex operibus legis 
with iustitia dei or iustitia moralis understood as infused virtue caused by divine faith. 
However, this does not exclude the possibility of reading the latter as infused legal justice in 
the sense which we have discussed above. On the contrary, iustitia dei or iustitia moralis – 
once infused by justification and not by legal observance – will effect subsequently man‘s 
faithful observation of all divine laws, and is therefore legal justice in an eminent way. What 
is opposed in the forgoing citations is two distinct modes of the generation of justice as 
general virtue; in one case acquired by legal observance, in another by divine infusion. The 
                                                 
55
 Super Rom. X 1: ―Considerandum est, quod sicut etiam philosophi dicunt, intentio cuiuslibet legislatoris est 
facere homines iustos: unde multo magis lex vetus hominibus divinitus data ordinabatur ad faciendum homines 
iustos. Hanc tamen iustitiam lex per semetipsam facere non poterat, quia neminem ad perfectum adduxit lex. . . . 
Quod impossibile erat legi, mittens deus filium suum, damnavit peccatum in carne, ut iustificatio legis impleretur 
in nobis. Et hoc dico omni credenti, quia per fidem suos iustificat.‖ 
56
 Super Phil. III 3: ―Iustitia dicitur virtus generalis, secundum quod homo servat legem propter bonum 
commune, et hoc modo frequenter in Scriptura sacra ponitur pro observantia divinae legis. Ps. Cxviii, 121: feci 
iudicium et iustitiam, scilicet, legem, quam servabat ex amore, quasi motus ex se: et sic est virtus. Non autem si 
alio modo, id est ex aliqua exteriori causa, scilicet vel propter lucra, vel propter poenas, et si observatio ei 
displiceat. Et secundum hoc est duplex modus iustitiae: unus est iustitiae moralis, alius est iustitiae legalis, per 
quam, legem non ex amore, sed timore servat.‖ See also Super Rom. IV 1: ―Ex consuetudine operum exteriorum 
generatur interior habitus, secundum quem etiam cor hominis bene disponitur, ut sit promptum ad bene 
operandum et in bonis operibus delectetur, sicut philosophus docet in II ethicorum. Sed dicendum est quod hoc 
habet locum in iustitia humana, per quam scilicet homo ordinatur ad bonum humanum. Huius enim iustitiae 
habitus per opera humana potest acquiri, sed iustitia quae habet gloriam apud deum, ordinatur ad bonum divinum, 
scilicet futurae gloriae, quae facultatem humanam excedit, secundum illud I Cor. II, 9: in cor hominis non 
ascendit quae praeparavit deus diligentibus se. Et ideo opera hominis non sunt proportionata ad huius iustitiae 
habitum causandum, sed oportet prius iustificari interius cor hominis a deo, ut opera faciat proportionata divinae 
gloriae.‖ 
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distinction focuses on the strict gratuity of the latter and the strict insufficiency of human 
actions according to their own resources. However, the comparison disregards the fact that 
infused iustitia fidei subsequently observes the divine law to its full extend. Aquinas explains 
that God gives ―justice without previous works, but not without following works, since, as it 
is said in Jac II, faith without works, sc. subsequent works, is dead.‖57 Aquinas elsewhere 
describes the relation of laws and actions: ―From such works the habit of justice is not 
acquired, but rather we do such work by the infused habit of justice.‖58 In this way, it is fully 
consistent to describe divine justice, given by faith, as legal justice insofar as it disposes man 
to observe – subsequently – all divine laws. It thereby realizes the essence of legal justice in 
an even higher degree since it conduces to a life in full accordance to its corresponding law.  
At this place, we cannot refrain from briefly mentioning St. Thomas‘s interpretation of 
evangelical freedom from the law. For Aquinas this freedom is to be understood either in 
regard to the abolishment of all Old Testament precepts insofar as they are dispensable for the 
preservation of charity (i.e. the ceremonial and judicial precepts), or to the special mode by 
which the graced agent can fulfill the divine precepts, namely led by the internal instigation of 
the Holy Spirit.  
 
The New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to 
do or avoid certain things, except such which are by themselves necessary or opposed to 
salvation, which come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because it 
also allows us to achieve these precepts and prohibitions freely, inasmuch as we do so by the 
instigation of grace.
59
 
 
Thus, it is clear that even the graced agent has to observe the divine law; that there is 
something like legal justice in regard to the divine precepts. However, the proper reason for 
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 Super Rom. III 4: ―Sine operibus praecedentibus iustitiam, non autem sine operibus consequentibus, quia, ut 
dicitur Iac. II, 26: fides sine operibus, scilicet subsequentibus, mortua est.‖ Similar in Super Eph. II 5: ―Lex 
vetus dicitur lex factorum, quia praecipiebat tantum quid facere deberent, sed non conferebat gratiam, per quam 
ad legem implendam iuvarentur. Lex vero nova dirigit in agendis, praecipiendo, et iuvat ad implendum, gratiam 
conferendo.‖ 
58
 Super Rom. II 3: ―Ex quibus [sc. operibus] habitus iustitiae non acquiritur, sed potius per habitum iustitiae 
infusum huiusmodi opera facimus.‖ Similarly in Super Gal. III 4: ―Iustificare potest accipi dupliciter: vel 
quantum ad executionem iustitiae et manifestationem, et hoc modo iustificatur homo, id est, iustus ostenditur, ex 
operibus operatis. Vel quantum ad habitum iustitiae infusum, et hoc modo non iustificatur quis ex operibus, cum 
habitus iustitiae qua homo iustificatur apud deum, non sit acquisitus, sed per gratiam fidei infusus. Et ideo 
signanter apostolus dicit apud deum, quia iustitia quae est apud deum, in interiori corde est: iustitia autem quae 
est ex operibus, id est, quae manifestat iustum, est apud homines.‖ 
59
 ST I-II 108.1 ad 2: ―Lex nova dicitur lex libertatis dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non arctat nos ad facienda vel 
vitanda aliqua, nisi quae de se sunt vel necessaria vel repugnantia saluti, quae cadunt sub praecepto vel 
prohibitione legis. Secundo, quia huiusmodi etiam praecepta vel prohibitiones facit nos libere implere, 
inquantum ex interiori instinctu gratiae ea implemus.‖ 
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legal observance is not compulsion, but a habitual inclination towards the guidelines of the 
law. It is the work of the Holy Spirit ―who perfects the internal mind by a good habit‖ so that 
the graced agents ―are inclined by a good habit to achieve that which the divine law 
determines.‖60 That habit, infused by the Spirit, is our divine legal justice.  
 
In summary, not acquired from the observance of laws but infused for the observance of 
laws 
Admittedly, the original function of legal justice and the corresponding laws are turned upside 
down: In the human city the primary reason for laws (and for legal justice) is to make man 
good (factiva virtutis); on the contrary, the graced person possessing infused legal justice is 
already good; he intends by himself – by a quasi-natural inclination – the end for which the 
precepts are constituted, namely acts of charity. ―Spiritual men are not under the law, since by 
charity which the Holy Spirit infuses in their hearts, they comply voluntarily with what 
belongs to the law.‖61 Thus, the function of the law is less coercive than directive.62 
Therefore, the juxtaposition of iustitia legalis and iustitia fidei does not contradict our 
reconstruction of an infused legal justice. St. Thomas confronts two kinds of legal justice, 
namely justice acquired from laws with justice infused for laws. 
 
 
6.2.3 Conclusion: The Transformed Function of Divine Legal Justice 
 
We can summarize the results of the two forgoing chapters as follows: If we reconstruct the 
meaning of infused legal justice, the original sense of political legal justice is transformed in a 
double way: regarding the concept of justice as well as regarding the term legal. On the one 
hand, its range is extended beyond the standardmatter of justice, i.e. external operations; 
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 Super II Cor. III 3; see the whole text: ―Ubi spiritus domini, ibi libertas, intelligitur, quia liber est, qui est 
causa sui: servus autem est causa domini; quicumque ergo agit ex seipso, libere agit; qui vero ex alio motus, non 
agit libere. Ille ergo, qui vitat mala, non quia mala, sed propter mandatum domini, non est liber; sed qui vitat 
mala, quia mala, est liber. Hoc autem facit spiritus sanctus, qui mentem interius perficit per bonum habitum, ut 
sic ex amore caveat, ac si praeciperet lex divina; et ideo dicitur liber, non quin subdatur legi divinae, sed quia ex 
bono habitu inclinatur ad hoc faciendum, quod lex divina ordinat.‖ 
61
 ST I-II 93.6 ad 1: ―Spirituales viri non sunt sub lege, quia per caritatem, quam spiritus sanctus cordibus eorum 
infundit, voluntarie id quod legis est, implent.‖ See also ST I-II 108.1 ad 2: ―Gratia spiritus sancti est sicut 
interior habitus nobis infusus inclinans nos ad recte operandum, facit nos libere operari ea quae conveniunt 
gratiae, et vitare ea quae gratiae repugnant.‖ 
62
 In ST I-II 96.5 ad 3 Aquinas distinguishes between ―vis coactiva legis‖ and ―vis directiva legis.‖  
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divine legal justice has to rule all human acts. Thus, it is justice only in an analogous way. On 
the other hand, the function of that legal justice is also transformed. The observance of laws 
does not aim at the acquisition of virtue, but is rather a consequence of a virtue already 
possessed; it moves a person from within towards the good; it does not achieve good deeds 
because of the law, but only according to the law; it is justice not ex legibus but ad agendum 
secundum leges. 
 
 
6.3 Infused Justice as Human Justice  
 
Besides the species of infused divine justice there must exist something like infused human 
justice, i.e. a cardinal virtue that perfects the agent regarding the human social life in accord 
with his personal supernatural status; an infused but human virtue for living in a res publica 
hominum sub deo; this is the point to which the findings in section 5.5.3 had brought us. How 
could we arrange such a reconstruction? 
In chapter 4, we mentioned the objective character of justice: In contrast to the acts of the 
affective virtues, the just act is determined irrespective of the subjective conditions of the 
agent, his affective status and temperament. Whether an action is just or unjust is defined only 
in comparison to the other. We repeat ST II-II 57.1: ―A thing is called iustum, as having the 
rectitude of justice, at which the act of justice aims, even without considering how it is done 
by the agent.‖63 Therefore justice is defined as the inclination of the will to render everyone 
his iustum.  
Hence, if we want to reconstruct the proper meaning of justice as infused human virtue, then 
we have to determine first of all the object of this justice, namely the opus iustum of an agent 
in the state of grace. As Aquinas describes acquired justice indirectly by its object – the ius as 
opus adaequatum alteri – and justice grants man the permanent will to achieve this ius, 
likewise the determination of infused human justice has to begin with the opus iustum 
regarding the other according to the supernatural status of the agent involved. Thus we must 
ask: Which acts are required for attaining equality between two agents under the conditions of 
grace? Is what the Christian faithful owes to his fellow-citizen the same as what the pagans 
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 ST II-II 57.1: ―Iustum dicitur aliquid, quasi habens rectitudinem iustitiae, ad quod terminatur actio iustitiae, 
etiam non considerato qualiter ab agente fiat. Sed in aliis virtutibus non determinatur aliquid rectum nisi 
secundum quod aliqualiter fit ab agente.‖ 
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owe, or are the requirements for an equal relationship to his neighbors higher than in the case 
of a pagan? Has he to be readier to support the other? And vice versa: Has he to be content 
with less than unbelievers? There are some remarks in Aquinas which suggest such an 
interpretation; for example: ―Charity for Christ makes all things more common than political 
friendship.‖64 Hence, the primary concern of this chapter is to outline the content of the 
―iustum supernaturale,‖ i.e. the actions which are adequate to the other as fellow-citizen of 
the human city but according to the supernatural order. 
Therefore, the reader should not be surprised if subsequently he finds only few explicit 
references to justice as virtue. Though our primary concern is infused justice, at the present 
stage we have to determine the object of that virtue. Only afterwards, according to the axiom 
that virtues are specified by their proper objects,
65
 will it ―automatically‖ clear what infused 
justice has to be – namely the habit of the will which enables to the agent to achieve 
constantly, easily and with delight
66
 the described actions.  
Our investigation must proceed in two steps, in analogy to the determination of the opus 
iustum in the case of acquired justice, where Aquinas distinguishes between ius naturale and 
ius positivum. To reward the employee and to punish the evildoer is just by nature; to repay 
him a certain amount and to impose a specific punishment belongs to the positive law. 
Likewise, we have to ask in the case of infused justice:  
First, is there something analogous to the ius naturale for the graced person? This means: 
Does man‘s membership in the Church imply ―by nature‖ (i.e. by the very fact that somebody 
is in the state of grace, that he is rightly ordered to his supernatural final end) some additional 
obligatory actions in regard to the other, which become now iustum, but which weren‘t 
required before? Or do the requirements of the natural law simply remain the same? (See 
section 6.3.1).  
Secondly, it is necessary to ask whether there exist positive determinations of the divine law. 
In section 4.2.2 we saw how the human law can constitute new legal obligations – not by 
subverting the natural law, but by rendering further determinations of the ius naturale. In the 
same manner, we have to inquire whether the divine law contains further specifications which 
constitute new and additional debts ad alterum for the graced person (section 6.3.2). After 
these clarifications, we shall be ready to describe in more detail particular species of justice as 
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 Contra Imp. 2.6: ‖Caritas christi magis facit omnia communia quam amicitia politica.‖  
65
 For example De caritate 3 ad 9: ―A proprio obiecto quaelibet virtus habet formam specialem.‖ 
66
 Cf. De virt. in com. 1. 
Chapter 6. The Reconstruction of Justice as an Infused Virtue 
 364 
infused virtues: legal justice regarding the political community, infused commutative and 
distributive justice, and its potential parts (section 6.3.3). 
 
 
6.3.1 The Unaffectedness of the ius naturale by Divine Friendship  
 
In chapter 5 we reached the conclusion that charity does not dispense from natural obligations 
regarding the other which are based on familial, domestic and political relationships. Since 
each particular debt is founded on a specific fellowship, divine friendship understood as 
―additional‖ solidarity leaves others obligations untouched.  
Does this non-interference of charity also allow the contrary conclusion, namely that it does 
not constitute additional duties in respect to other companionships? Indeed, Aquinas claims 
that – regarding such special companionships ‒ the order of charity only requires to want for 
his neighbor what belongs to him by reason of such already existing friendships, namely ―on 
the basis of the good which pertains to the communication upon which the friendship is 
based‖67 which is – besides the proper object of charity, i.e. the attainment of eternal beatitude 
– the specific good due to the other as a member of the relative community in which both 
partake. More is not required by the order of charity. Charity commands the fulfillment of all 
interfamilial duties, but it does not constitute new, additional obligations regarding family-
members as family-members. Likewise, charity requires that each render to his co-citizens 
what is due to them as fellow-citizens; to ―dwell in civil operations;‖68 more, however, – with 
respect to the human society – is not required. 
The consequences for our present project of reconstructing justice as infused human virtue are 
important: The order of grace does not imply a principal change of the right mean of proper 
justice. What is just between two pagans as ius politicum remains just also between two 
Christians, and likewise between believer and unbeliever. Charity commands the acts of 
justice but it does not change its object. The measure of just and unjust acts remains man‘s 
relation to the other as fellow-citizen, as cohabitant, as family-member, even disregarding his 
personal status with respect to grace. 
We can substantiate our assertion from the side of justice as well as from the perspective of 
charity: 
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 In sent. III 29.6: ―Quantum ad bona pertinentia ad communicationem illam super quam amicitia fundatur.‖ 
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Argument from the notion of justice 
We can prove our claim by showing the inconsistency of the opposite position: Assuming that 
the state of grace changes the conditions of justice, it would be ipso facto not only a 
transformation of the proper structure of justice but its destruction. The object of justice (the 
opus iustum) is determined by the thing itself which is due to the other, what is adaequatum 
by its nature; it is a medium rei; hence, every additional obligation because of charity would 
be a manipulation of this iustum. If a graced person – for attaining equality – were obliged to 
repay a greater reward for a received service than an unbeliever, the act would no longer be 
measured by the thing itself (iustum naturale), but by an other standard. Or, if he had to 
abstain not only from damaging the other (or his goods) but from additional things, it would 
no longer be a matter of justice which seeks equality. Since equity is the chief-principle of 
justice, there cannot be an a priori obligation on the side of one agent.
69
 
Consequently, if there is a kind of infused human justice, then it preserves the fundamental 
structure of justice. This means that the just act is measured by the thing itself, regardless of 
further conditions of the agent (or the recipient).
70
 A graced person who receives a service 
from another person on the basis of a contract is obliged on the basis of the very nature of this 
service to reward the other – whether he is one of the faithful or not, and independent of any 
religious motive. An inequality arises because of the service received and it is iustum because 
of the thing itself to restore equality. Moreover, if the accomplished service were done out of 
charity – maybe because a man recognized the other a fellow-citizen of the same heavenly 
community, or because he wants to expresses his love for Christ by the service – it would be 
an act of friendship, but not of justice; not even of infused justice. One may argue that even 
those acts should be rewarded. Let it be so. Still it would not be a question of proper justice 
but a case of a moral due of friends.  
In short, since the positive obligation to repay a received service is determined by the thing 
itself, by the nature of the accepted benefit, the fact that the agent may live in the state of 
grace does not imply a different measure of justice. 
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 In sent. III 29.6: ―Morari in operibus civilibus.‖ 
69
 Of course, emphasizing equity as the indispensable character of justice does not mean that two persons who 
belong to the same human community, and therefore are equal in this respect, could not be ordered from another 
viewpoint hierarchically. Aquinas notes in the context of familial relations that – though there is no proper 
justice between father and son – insofar as both are men there is justice involved. ―Filius, inquantum filius, est 
aliquid patris; et similiter servus, inquantum servus, est aliquid domini. Uterque tamen prout consideratur ut 
quidam homo, est aliquid secundum se subsistens ab aliis distinctum. Et ideo inquantum uterque est homo, 
aliquo modo ad eos est iustitia.‖ (ST II-II 57.4 ad 2). See on this point also Gallagher, ―Desire for Beatitude ...‖ 
25. 
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Argument from the nature of charity 
Not only does the just act itself resist a contentual transformation by charity, but also the 
nature of charity itself contradicts the constitution of new obligations for justice in its proper 
sense. The proper object of charity is God; charity extends to other people insofar as they are 
capable of God and as fellow-members in divine friendship. ―This we have to love within the 
other that he may be in God.‖71 According to In sent. 29.6 the common principle of the 
heavenly community is to want eternal life for the other. This is the formal object of charity. 
Of course, St. Thomas does not tire of describing charity as the mother of all virtues, as 
commanding the acts of all other virtues. But the object of these virtues does not thereby 
become the object of charity.
72
 Rather, the other virtues rule their proper matter in order that 
charity can attain undisturbed its proper object (God). But the matter of justice as human 
virtue – interpersonal actions according to the measure of equality – belongs to a different 
order than charity. Therefore, charity by its own essence cannot transform the basic structure 
of human justice. 
 
Some consequences 
From the preceding discussion we have to draw the following important conclusion: Though 
the order of charity includes and respects the order of human justice (in its different species: 
as political, residential, familial justice etc.), it does not change those natural obligations. 
What is just or unjust by nature, i.e. by the very thing which is at issue, that is and remains 
just for agents with or without grace. Thus, the fact of divine friendship may provide an 
additional and stronger motivation for rendering to the other what is due to him; but the 
contentual determination of the obligation regarding the fellow-citizen, cohabitant, and 
family-member, is principally identical for acquired and infused justice. J. Porter describes the 
effect of charity for those virtues: ‖Charitable love of others also prompts this person to 
respect the legitimate claims of others, to avoid harming them . . . These are properly acts of 
infused justice.‖73 
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 Thus, for the case of commutative justice Aquinas explains: ―In iustitia commutativa non attenditur diversa 
conditio personarum.‖ (In ethic. V 8.5). 
71
 ST II-II 25.1: ―Hoc enim debemus in proximo diligere, ut in deo sit.‖ 
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 See De virt. in com. 10 ad 10. 
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 Porter, ―The Virtue of Justice,‖ 283. 
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However, it would be too hasty to conclude our investigation at this point. Though the ius 
naturale of infused justice is identical with its acquired counterpart, Aquinas indicates some 
divine determinations of these naturally just acts. Therefore we must ask: do the proper acts of 
infused justice differ by means of such additional determinations? Are there some ―Christian 
duties‖ to the other which the graced agent has to achieve generally because of a divine 
command which are irrelevant for the nonbeliever?  
 
 
6.3.2 Positive Determinations of Infused Human Justice by the Divine 
Law  
 
As seen in the foregoing paragraph, the principle structure of human justice remains 
unchanged in the graced agent. We did not yet consider the question whether infused justice 
differs from its acquired counterpart because of a positive determination by the divine law. In 
section 2.2 we mentioned already the distinction between laws which explicate (i.e. repeat) 
something that is just by nature, and other laws which provide a further determination of 
something that is indifferent by itself; acts of the second kind are just only because of that 
previous determination by the entitled authority, e.g. a specific punishment for a specific 
crime. Aquinas also applies this distinction to the divine law:  
 
Divine right is called that which is promulgated by God. And this is partly about things which 
are naturally just, but their justice is hidden to man, and partly about things which are made 
just by divine institution. Hence also the divine right may be divided in respect of these two 
things, even as the human right. For in the divine law there are some things prescribed because 
they are good, and some prohibited because they are evil, while others are good because they 
are prescribed, and evil because they are forbidden.
74
 
 
Thus, we can formulate the present issue as follows: Does the divine law contain some 
positive precepts derived from the natural law per modum determinationis, so that for the 
graced believer some actions, which are right by nature, are forbidden because of divine 
friendship, whereas they remain lawful for the unbelievers? 
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 ST II-II 57.2 ad 3: ―Ius divinum dicitur quod divinitus promulgatur. Et hoc quidem partim est de his quae sunt 
naturaliter iusta, sed tamen eorum iustitia homines latet, partim autem est de his quae fiunt iusta institutione 
divina. Unde etiam ius divinum per haec duo distingui potest, sicut et ius humanum. Sunt enim in lege divina 
quaedam praecepta quia bona, et prohibita quia mala, quaedam vero bona quia praecepta, et mala quia 
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We will answer the question in two steps: (a) the issue is very clear in the Old Law, which 
also contains, beyond the moral precepts, ceremonial and judicial precepts. Therefore, we 
inquire first into the Old Testament laws. Admittedly, those precepts are not the relevant 
standard for infused justice today. However, it shall be a good test case for clarifying various 
implications of the question.
75
 The judicial precepts of the Old Law show what infused justice 
would have been in former times. In a second step (b) we investigate the positive 
determinations of justice in the Evangelical Law; determinations which are relevant for 
infused human justice today.  
 
 
a) Positive Determinations of Justice in the Old Law 
 
In section 2.2 we were already acquainted with three different kinds of precepts in the Old 
Law: moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts. The first explicates the ius naturale, the second 
contains positive determinations of man‘s natural obligation towards God and prescribes 
specific acts of the divine cult, and the judicial precepts rule interpersonal actions for 
promoting the human common good. This third kind of precept is of interest for our study of 
infused human justice. It is defined as ―determination of the common precept of justice which 
must be observed between men.‖76 For Aquinas, the common precept of justice is expressed 
by the Decalogue which can be known by mere reason, namely, not to inflict harm on anyone 
– on the other person (5th), on conjunct persons (6th), on the other‘s property (7th) etc. These 
common precepts of justice – by themselves moral precepts – are further specified by positive 
determinations, i.e. the juridical precepts. These positive laws are iustum not because of an ius 
naturale, but only because of divine institution and revelation.
77
 Consequently, if we suppose 
                                                                                                                                                        
prohibita.‖ Cf. ST I-II 71.6 ad 4. (By the way: the quotation shows finely that a Virtue Ethics would be one-sided 
if it denied every relevance of legal obligation for morality.) 
75
 Aquinas explicitly concedes that some Jews possessed divine grace by the Holy Spirit including charity and 
infused virtues even before the advent of Christ – namely in anticipation of Christ‘s merits. ―Fuerunt tamen 
aliqui in statu veteris testamenti habentes caritatem et gratiam spiritus sancti, qui principaliter expectabant 
promissiones spirituales et aeternas.‖ (ST I-II 107.1 ad 2). In Sermo X 3 Aquinas mentions David as an example 
of a graced member of the faithful of the Old Testament: ―Aliqui fuerunt spirituales in populo, sicut david qui 
deo adherebat propter se.‖ 
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 ST I-II 99.4: ―Determinatio communis praecepti de iustitia observanda inter homines.‖ 
77
 Cf. ST I-II 104.1: ―Alia vero praecepta sunt quae non habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia 
scilicet in se considerata non habent absolute rationem debiti vel indebiti; sed habent vim obligandi ex aliqua 
institutione divina vel humana. Et huiusmodi sunt determinationes quaedam moralium praeceptorum. . . . Si 
autem in his quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, talia dicentur praecepta iudicialia. In duobus 
ergo consistit ratio iudicialium praeceptorum, scilicet ut pertineant ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem; et ut 
non habeant vim obligandi ex sola ratione, sed ex institutione.‖ 
Chapter 6. The Reconstruction of Justice as an Infused Virtue 
 369 
an agent in the time of the Old Testament who had grace and infused virtues,
78
 then these 
judicial precepts (together with the moral precepts) would determine exactly the content of 
infused human justice; justice in its proper sense which perfects the faithful in regard to the 
human community. 
St. Thomas subdivides the judicial precepts into four parts:
79
 They rule (a) the relation 
between the common citizen and the leader, (b) interpersonal relations, (c) the relation of 
members of the community to a foreigner, and (d) interfamilial relationships. 
All four of these relationships belong in a certain way to justice. Nonetheless, it will be 
enough to inquire into the second part, which contains the determinations of commutative 
justice, i.e. laws regarding the ―order of the subjects to each other.‖80 Aquinas dedicates a 
special article to this issue.
81
 He distinguishes two different categories of relations: (1) 
interpersonal actions as ruled by the public authority, and (2) actions which underlie the 
proper disposal of each agent (i.e. private property).  
Concerning the first relationship, the judicial precepts provide a determination of the 
following topics: They constitute judges for all the tribes for guaranteeing the right order in 
all parts of the people (Deut 16.18
82
), they determine the order of processes (Deut 1.16-17), 
they limit the occasion for unjust judgments and bribery (Ex 23.8 and Deut 16.19), they set 
the minimum of witnesses (Deut 17.6 and 19.15-21
83
), and they determine the punishments 
for various crimes. They also provide some general principles for all judgments, e.g. the 
exemption of punishment in the case of involuntary actions (Deut 22.25-27), the sentences for 
acts out of ignorance (Lev 4.2 seqq.), malice (Deut 25.2), or obstinacy (Num 15.30-31); and 
the particular punishment for special crimes, for example for stealing (Ex 22.1-9), the capital 
punishment for irreverence regarding parents (Ex 21.15), murder (Ex 21.12), adultery and 
incest etc.
84
  
The second relationship focuses on the private disposal of property. Aquinas distinguishes 
three different respects: 
 
                                                 
78
 Aquinas assumes that there were saints in the Old Testament, because of their faith in the future Messiah; see 
footnote 75. 
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 Cf. ST I-II 104.4. A good exposition of the Old Testament precepts about justice contains Stump, Aquinas, 
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 ST I-II 105.2. 
82
 See esp. ad 7. 
83
 Cf. esp. ad 8. 
84
 See ad 9 and 10. 
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(1) Determinations with respect to the just distribution of private property.  
He invokes three examples: The judicial precepts of the Old Law determine the distribution of 
property depending on the number of people: more people should command more property 
(Num 33.54); further, for avoiding a permanent impoverishment of people, the vended 
property should return after 50 years to the original owner (Lev 25
85
); third, for preserving the 
property of families, some judicial precepts rule the issues of heritage (Num 27.8-11 and Num 
36.1-13). 
 
(2) Determinations regarding the common use of the distributed property.  
Though things are attributed to single persons for private use, a connection always remains 
between private property and the whole community: First, regarding the common care for the 
other‘s property: Every member is obliged to care – at least to a certain degree – for the 
property of the other (for example, if somebody sees the neighbor‘s cow running away, he 
should bring it back; Deut 22.1-4). Second, regarding the common use of the other‘s property. 
On this point, the Old Law allowed for entrance into the other‘s vineyard for eating from its 
fruits but without taking fruits outside (Deut 23.25-26
86
). Third, regarding the poor. They 
receive the right to do the after-crop (Lev 19.9-10 and Deut 24.19-22); likewise the fruits of 
the seventh year were reserved for them (Ex 23.11 and Lev 25.4-7).  
 
(3) Special duties of the proprietors themselves. 
Some of the juridical precepts obliged the proprietors to few acts of gratuity, e.g. every third 
year to pay an additional tithe to the Levite, the foreigners, the fatherless, and the widows 
(Deut 14.28-29). More prescriptions were given about interpersonal transactions which aim at 
private benefit, i.e. determinations regarding the circumstances of contracts, buying and 
selling.
87
 
All these precepts have one thing in common: they are further determinations of things that 
are already just (or unjust) by their nature. They determine only the concrete procedure of 
judgment, the concrete measure of punishment, the concrete extent of obligations which result 
from private property etc. However, it is presupposed that judging, punishing, having property, 
etc. is just in itself. Thus, though the judicial precepts of the Old Law belong to the divine law, 
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 See esp. ad 3 
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 See esp. ad 1. 
Chapter 6. The Reconstruction of Justice as an Infused Virtue 
 371 
they do not introduce a new dimension of right, but provide a concretization of the natural law. 
Aquinas even argues that the juridical precepts of Old Testament could be used nowadays to 
rule a human community, i.e. as ―human law‖ for the common good.88 This observation 
shows that the divine determinations concerning justice do not introduce something 
essentially supernatural. 
Admittedly, Aquinas himself raises the objection whether those precepts do not abandon the 
natural structure of justice, if they demand (for example) the fivefold restitution of a stolen 
cow (Ex 22.1
89). However, even such ―unequal‖ compensations do not contradict the principle 
idea of justice. Punishment is not a question of material equality
90
 but aims at adequate 
atonement for a delict; therefore, some evils are compensated for only by an especially severe 
penalization.
91
  
In short, the judicial precepts are simply determinations of the natural law. They belong to the 
divine law not because of a ―supernatural content‖ but because they are divinely revealed. 
It is not necessary to go into further detail. The general structure of the judicial precepts is 
clear enough: The Old Testament contains many positive determinations, which had to be 
observed by an agent equipped with infused justice. Thus, in former times a description of 
infused justice would have been quite easy insofar as its content – i.e. the just acts – was 
determined by the judicial precepts.  
But what about just acts in the New Covenant? The specification of the ius positivum may 
change from time to time. ―The determination of things which are just according to human or 
divine institution must be different, according to the different states of mankind.‖92 Hence, we 
must ask how the acts of infused human justice are determined in the New Testament. 
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 Cf. the many quotations in ad 3-6. 
88
 See ST I-II 104.3. The only restriction is that the motive of the prince might not be the rejection of Christ‘s 
fulfillment of the Old Law: ―Praecepta autem iudicialia sunt quidem mortua, quia non habent vim obligandi, non 
tamen sunt mortifera. Quia si quis princeps ordinaret in regno suo illa iudicialia observari, non peccaret. . . . Sed 
intentio observandi tanquam ex obligatione legis, praeiudicat veritati fidei, quia per hoc haberetur quod status 
prioris populi adhuc duraret, et quod christus nondum venisset.‖ Similar in ST II-II 62.3 ad 1 and De reg. princ. I 
16. 
89
 Some editions number as Ex 21.37; cf. arg. 9) 
90
 See ST II-II 61.4 about the contrapassum. 
91
 Aquinas gives several reasons why the Old Law punishes some delicts extraordinarily harshly: because of the 
serious sinfulness, because of the consuetude of committing the delicts, because of the pleasure felt by sinning, 
because of the facility in committing them (cf. ST I-II 105.2 ad 9). 
92
 ST I-II 104.3 ad 1: ―Determinatio eorum quae sunt iusta secundum institutionem humanam vel divinam, 
oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum statum.‖ 
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b) Divine Legal Determinations in the New Law 
 
In ST I-II 108.1 Aquinas raises the question whether the New Law commands and prohibits 
external actions. Though he dos not mention justice, the article relates to the matter of human 
justice in its general sense, sc. external operations. Aquinas asserts the following: Although 
charity (i.e. the internal order towards God) is the primary end of the New Law, it 
presupposes certain external actions, either as presuppositions or as effects of this new order. 
Thus, some external actions, which are necessarily connected with charity, are strictly owed 
by the graced agent and commanded by law; and consequently, those acts belong to justice, or 
more precisely, to infused justice, since they depend on the order of charity 
As an example of external acts which are presupposed for grace, Aquinas names the 
sacraments, which are external operations that induce internal grace.
93
 Of the second kind are 
external actions ―which proceed from the instigation of grace.‖94 St. Thomas mentions the 
precept of professing the divine faith and the prohibition of its disavowal – as promulgated in 
Mt 10.32-33.
95
  
However the prevailing number of external actions have no such necessary connection or 
opposition to the state of grace. Concerning these actions the New Law contains no 
determinations, but leaves the decision about acting or non-acting either to the judgment of 
the single person or to the prescription of the human legislator.
96
 
Thus the first article shows why the New Law commands some external acts; but leaves 
unclear the concrete content of those laws. The second article provides this clarification 
asking whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts. First, Aquinas 
summarizes the conclusion of the previous article: ―The New Law had to make prescriptions 
or prohibitions in external [acts] only in things by which we are introduced to grace or which 
pertain to the right use of grace by necessity.‖97 The right ―use‖ of grace consists – Aquinas 
continues – in charitable operations. It is not by chance that St. Thomas uses at this place the 
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 ST I-II.108.1: ―Sicut inducentia aliqualiter ad gratiam.‖ 
94
 ST I-II.108.1: ―Quae ex instinctu gratiae producuntur.‖ 
95
 ―Quaedam enim habent necessariam convenientiam vel contrarietatem ad interiorem gratiam, quae in fide per 
dilectionem operante consistit. Et huiusmodi exteriora opera sunt praecepta vel prohibita in lege nova, sicut 
praecepta est confessio fidei, et prohibita negatio; dicitur enim Matth. X, qui confitebitur me coram hominibus, 
confitebor et ego eum coram patre meo. Qui autem negaverit me coram hominibus, negabo et ego eum coram 
patre meo.‖ (ST I-II.108.1; cf. also ST II-II.3.2 ad 1). 
96
 Aquinas notes that external operations which are only conductive to the state of grace may be recommended, 
but do not possess a strict legal obligation. He refers to such recommendations as the evangelical councils; cf. ST 
I-II 108.4. 
97
 ST I-II 108.2: ―Lex nova in exterioribus illa solum praecipere debuit vel prohibere, per quae in gratiam 
introducimur, vel quae pertinent ad rectum gratiae usum ex necessitate.‖ 
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concept of opera caritatis instead of actus caritatis. He has in mind not internal acts of 
charity, but external actions commanded by charity, i.e. ―charitable operations.‖98 However, 
which external actions are commanded necessarily by charity? St. Thomas: Regarding 
external acts, divine friendship requires nothing other than the observation of the moral 
precepts, which are ―dictated by the natural law.‖99 Therefore the New Law has nothing to 
add to the Old Law regarding external operations. ―The right use of grace is by means of 
works of charity. Those which are necessary for virtue pertain to the moral precepts, which 
are also passed down in the Old Law. Thus, in this respect, the New Law had nothing to add 
regarding external operations.‖100 
On the contrary, the New Law actually contains fewer precepts regarding external action than 
the Old. The lex vetus commanded many external actions beyond the natural law, namely, the 
ceremonial and judicial precepts. The New Law obliges only for moral precepts. From this 
viewpoint the New Law seems even less perfect, almost a step backwards. Aquinas explains: 
―We are directed to works of virtue by natural reason, which is the rule of human action . . . 
Thus, in such matters there was no need for further precepts beyond the moral precepts of the 
law which proceed from the dictate of reason.‖101 
The justification for this reduction is found in ST I-II 91.5 concerning the specific end of both 
laws: Though both laws are given finally for attaining the community of saints, the immediate 
and proximate end of the Old Law is the sensible and terrestrial good, admittedly as 
preparation and prophetical likeness of the true supernatural end. Therefore, it contains many 
additional judicial precepts beyond the moral precepts, which regulate interpersonal 
relationships. This does not undermine its preparative function regarding the New Covenant; 
but its direct and immediate end is not the spiritual good. On the other hand, the New Law 
achieves directly the intelligible and heavenly common good, whereas the temporal welfare of 
the human city is just an accidental consequence insofar the order of charity includes ordered 
relationships in the earthly city (see section 5.2). Consequently, the New Law commands 
interpersonal acts only when necessary for the heavenly city, but leaves freedom with regard 
to specific determinations.  
                                                 
98
 Of course, these acts are likewise acts of charity but as actus imperatus. 
99
 ST I-II.99.4: ―de dictamine legis naturae.‖ 
100
 ST I-II.108.2: ―Rectus autem gratiae usus est per opera caritatis. Quae quidem secundum quod sunt de 
necessitate virtutis, pertinent ad praecepta moralia, quae etiam in veteri lege tradebantur. Unde quantum ad hoc, 
lex nova super veterem addere non debuit circa exteriora agenda.‖ 
101
 ST I-II.108.2 ad 1: ―Ad opera virtutum [sc. exteriora] dirigimur per rationem naturalem, quae est regula 
quaedam operationis humanae . . . . Et ideo in his non oportuit aliqua praecepta dari ultra moralia legis praecepta, 
quae sunt de dictamine rationis.‖ More cautious is ST I-II.107.3: ―Lex nova . . . praeter praecepta legis naturae 
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From this perspective it becomes clear in which way the New Law is more perfect than the 
Old Law, though it contains fewer external obligations;
102
 it focuses on the perfect internal 
regulation regarding supernatural friendship with God, and that is why moral precepts are 
enough. ―The moral precepts have to continue under the New Law, because they belong to the 
ratio of virtue.‖103 Therefore, the New Law deserves the name of law of perfect liberty, since 
it obliges man only to actions that are the conditio sine qua non for salvation in the strict 
sense. ―It does not bind us to do or avoid certain things, except such which are of themselves 
necessary or opposed to salvation and come under the prescription or prohibition of the 
law.‖104  
 
Binding determinations by the civil authority and the ecclesiastical hierarchy 
Having stressed that Christ has abolished the ceremonial and judicial precepts as divine law 
and has given freedom in these areas, ST I-II 108.2 continues, saying that the free 
determination of these actions depends either on the decision of the individual person, or on 
the responsible authority of the community, which may be the authority of the earthly society 
or of the spiritual community. 
 
These determinations are not in themselves necessary for inward grace wherein the law 
consists; therefore they do not fall under the precept of the New Law, but are left to human 
decision; some to [the decision of] the inferiors, as when a precept is given to an individual; 
others to temporal and spiritual superiors, if they pertain to the common utility.
105
 
                                                                                                                                                        
paucissima superaddidit in doctrina christi et apostolorum; licet aliqua sint postmodum superaddita ex 
institutione sanctorum partum.‖ 
102
 ―Difficultas est circa opera virtutum in interioribus actibus, puta quod aliquis opus virtutis exerceat prompte 
et delectabiliter. . . . Et quantum ad hoc, praecepta novae legis sunt graviora praeceptis veteris legis, quia in nova 
lege prohibentur interiores motus animi, qui expresse in veteri lege non prohibebantur in omnibus, etsi in 
aliquibus prohiberentur; in quibus tamen prohibendis poena non apponebatur.‖ (ST I-II.107.3) 
103
 ST I-II 108.3 ad 3: ―Praecepta moralia omnino in nova lege remanere debebant, qui secundum se pertinent ad 
rationem virtutis.‖ This does not mean that the New Law includes only the moral precepts. In response to the 
quotation of the Gratians Decretum (―ius naturale est quod in lege et in Evangelio continetur‖) he replies: 
―Verbum illud non est sic intelligendum quasi omnia quae in lege et in evangelio continentur, sint de lege 
naturae, cum multa tradantur ibi supra naturam, sed quia ea quae sunt de lege naturae, plenarie ibi traduntur.‖ 
(ST I-II.94.4 ad 1). But as we shall see, the positive new content of the evangelical law contains principally 
precepts concerning internal acts. 
104
 ST I-II 108.1 ad 2: ―Non arctat nos ad facienda vel vitanda aliqua, nisi quae de se sunt vel necessaria vel 
repugnantia saluti, quae cadunt sub praecepto vel prohibitione legis.‖ As second reason for the description of the 
New Law as lex libertatis Aquinas explains: ―Quia huiusmodi etiam praecepta vel prohibitiones facit nos libere 
implere, inquantum ex interiori instinctu gratiae ea implemus. Et propter haec duo lex nova dicitur lex perfectae 
libertatis.‖ (Ibid.). 
105
 ST I-II 108.2: ―Istae determinationes non sunt secundum se de necessitate interioris gratiae, in qua lex 
consistit; idcirco non cadunt sub praecepto novae legis, sed relinquuntur humano arbitrio; quaedam quidem 
quantum ad subditos, quae scilicet pertinent singillatim ad unumquemque; quaedam vero ad praelatos 
temporales vel spirituales, quae scilicet pertinent ad utilitatem communem.‖ Similar in ad 4: ―Iudicialia etiam, 
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The two possibilities allow for additional laws, even in the time of the New Law, which 
exceed the range of moral precepts: positive laws promulgated either by the civil power or by 
the ecclesiastical authority.
106
  
The lawful civil government possesses this power because its proper task is the human 
common good, and the supernatural order does not supercede but retains the natural order. 
Thus, the observance of civil laws is important even for attaining the supernatural end. We 
have seen in section 5.2 how natural relationships (e.g. the common citizenship and the 
resulting obligations) remain valid within divine friendship. Holy Scripture teaches the same: 
―Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar‘s‖ (Mt 22.21). And St. Paul: ―Let 
every person be subject to the governing authorities. . . . The person who resists such 
authority resists the ordinance of God, and those who resist will incur judgment‖ (Rom 13.1-
2). St. Thomas adopts these assertions.
107
 Thus, there is no difference between the obligations 
of a graced person and an unbeliever; as citizen of the same politia both have to respect the 
human determination of the ius naturale. 
Quite different is the case of the ecclesiastical laws: as is clear from a previous chapter, state 
and Church differ in their ends (sc. the good of the human city and divine beatitude), but 
overlap in many areas.
108
 Therefore, the ecclesiastical authority can enact laws (at least to a 
certain extent) governing interpersonal relationships. For example, it specifies the formal 
requirements of a legitimate and valid marriage – a law that is not primarily about spiritual 
affairs, but which interferes in the civil life. Nonetheless, an unbeliever does not become a 
bad citizen if he disregards these determinations. The Church establishes such laws in order to 
help the faithful to lead their civil life in the state of grace. The ultimate end of these precepts 
is divine friendship, but their immediate consequences relate to the social life. Precisely this is 
                                                                                                                                                        
secundum se considerata, non sunt de necessitate virtutis quantum ad talem determinationem sed solum quantum 
ad communem rationem iustitiae. Et ideo iudicialia praecepta reliquit dominus disponenda his qui curam aliorum 
erant habituri vel spiritualem vel temporalem.‖ In Quodl. IV 8.2 Aquinas concedes to the prelates of the Church 
and the Christian princes (―praelatis ecclesiae et principibus christiani populi‖) the right to determine further 
laws.  
106
 cf. ST I-II.108.2. 
107
 ―Si enim potestas principum, inquantum talis est, a deo est, et nihil est a deo sine ordine, consequens est, quod 
etiam ordo, quo inferiores potestatibus superioribus subiiciuntur, sit a deo. Itaque qui contra hunc ordinem 
resistit potestati, dei ordinationi resistit. . . . Resistere autem divinae ordinationi contrariatur honestati virtutis. 
Unde contra virtutem agit quicumque potestati resistit, in eo quod pertinet ad ordinem suae potestatis.‖ (Super 
Rom. XIII 1). St. Thomas even claims that ―in his autem quae ad bonum civile pertinent, est magis obediendum 
potestati saeculari quam spirituali.‖ (In sent. II 44.2.3 ad 4). 
108
 Cf. section 5.5.3. In more detail: Sabra, Thomas Aquinas’ Vision of the Church: Fundamentals of an 
Ecumenical Ecclesiology, 107-121. 
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the proper area of infused human justice, a kind of justice that requires more than its acquired 
counterpart, but less than divine justice.
109
 
If we look back to our discussion of the Old Testament laws, it becomes clear that the human 
laws and the ecclesiastical precepts have adopted the function of the judicial precepts. Why 
this change? Why did Christ give men freedom from the judicial precepts, if afterwards they 
were to be bound again by new precepts – precepts that even differ from one country to the 
next? We want to suggest the following explanation: The Old Law was given as an external 
preparation for grace for one people; one people in particular historical circumstances. Thus, 
the divine lawgiver not only determined the necessary requirements for grace (the moral 
precepts) but also the concrete issues of the social life of this particular people at a particular 
time. The New Law, however, is binding for all people; for all people in all historical and 
local circumstances. Even here, the specification of the necessary conditions for grace causes 
(again) no problem – hence the moral precepts. However, it would have been impossible to 
determine the particular issues of the social life once and for all. These may differ from time 
to time and from place to place (provided the moral precepts remain constant). Of course, in 
principle positive regulations are necessary, and the graced agent must respect them. However, 
a universally valid specification of those issues was (and is) impossible. Therefore the power 
to determine ―judicial precepts‖ was given to the human and ecclesiastical authority. 
The discussion to this point suffices for the clarification of the general features of infused 
justice. In the next chapter, we want to apply these results to the various species of justice as 
infused virtue: Infused political legal justice, infused commutative and distributive justice, 
and the infused potential parts of justice. 
 
 
6.3.3 Particular Species of Infused Human Justice 
 
The object of infused human justice consists of the ius naturale including positive 
determinations of the civil and ecclesiastical authority. This is the result of our general 
                                                 
109
 We should note that not every ecclesiastical law belongs to the matter of infused human justice. For example, 
the obligation to participate every Sunday in the celebration of the holy Eucharist is a positive determination of 
something naturally just (namely to honor God); by itself, it would not be against natural law to neglect 
sometimes the content of this positive law; even charity would not be immediately in danger. Conscious and 
deliberate absence becomes unjust only because of the positive determination of the Church, and only therefore 
it implies the destruction of charity. Nonetheless, it would not be an act against infused human justice, since the 
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reconstruction of infused human justice. Based on these findings it should be possible to 
reconstruct legal justice regarding the human society, commutative and distributive justice, 
and the potential parts of justice as infused virtues. 
 
 
a) The Reconstruction of Infused Human Legal Justice  
 
Section 6.2 was concerned with divine legal justice which is required for observing the whole 
divine law for the sake of charity-friendship. At first glance, one might suggest that this 
divine ―legal justice‖ simply adopts the task of human legal justice. However, different 
objects demand different virtues, and the common good of the human city is not the proper 
end of grace, even if divine friendship requires (―includes‖) the simultaneous consideration of 
the communicatio politica. Thus, the graced agent requires a ―second‖ kind of legal justice by 
which he is ready to observe the laws that are relevant for the good of the human polis; a legal 
justice whose purpose is ―the welfare of mankind according to supernatural principles, on 
behalf of and in subordination to supernatural purposes.‖110 
Scholars who distinguish between these two legal justices usually interpret the latter as 
acquired human justice which cooperates in some way with the former.
111
 Infused legal 
justice observes the divine law; acquired legal justice respects the human law for the earthly 
common good. The former does not supersede the latter, but both species coexist side by side 
in the graced person.  
We do not want to deny the possibility of such a coexistence, but the assertion is insufficient. 
The infusion of grace does not immediately cause acquired virtues; those virtues demand a 
long development by repeated actions. Hence, according to this view, a baptized adult could 
possess infused justice regarding the divine law for the heavenly common good, but 
simultaneously lack legal justice regarding the human common good (which is interpreted as 
acquired virtue). This example, however, is impossible. Though the infusion of grace does not 
clear up all negative tendencies (and therefore there is need of continuous practice), it 
                                                                                                                                                        
transgression is not against the good of the human city, but against divine justice (i.e. justice which is an integral 
part of divine friendship). Thus, only a part of the ecclesiastical canons is relevant for infused human justice. 
110
 Horváth, Eigentumsrecht, 41: ―Das Menschenwohl in übernatürlichen Prinzipien, im Interesse und in 
Unterordnung unter übernatürliche Zwecke.‖ Horváth describes at great length this infused legal justice (ibid., 
38-43). However, he fails to distinguish it from infused divine legal justice as described above.  
111
 Cf. Labourdette, La justice (IIa-IIae, 57-79) 46-47; Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 139; 
Aumann, Spiritual Theology, 280-284. 
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provides a positive inclination towards all those things which are necessary for divine 
friendship. Admittedly, infused human justice does not immediately make a thoroughly 
perfect citizen of the human city. Furthermore, the baptized man may lack political prudence; 
he may be unable to lead the community and to take the initiative in resolving social problems, 
or he may not know how to draw up a contract etc.; in short he may lack many qualities of a 
good citizen in the human sense. But his infused human legal justice instantly provides an 
infused inclination towards the observance of all human laws which are necessary for 
maintaining divine friendship. It is in a certain way a basic human legal justice; ―basic‖ since 
it provides only the indispensable qualities for the state of grace. But this basic disposition is 
not acquired but immediately infused by grace.
112
 Hence, simply distinguishing justice into 
infused divine justice and acquired legal justice is insufficient; the graced agent must receive 
immediately something like infused human legal justice. 
Aquinas did not discuss the question of infused legal justice; a fortiori he does not mention 
explicitly infused human legal justice. However, his texts provide some indirect ―hints‖ which 
call for something like this virtue. We shall first investigate this virtue regarding the human 
law, and afterwards its relation to ecclesiastical canons.  
 
 
i) Infused Justice Directed at Observing Human Laws 
 
The civil law determines some actions as duties which would otherwise be optional. 
According to ST I-II 96.4 a human law obliges in foro conscientiae if it is just; and it is just if 
it fulfills three criteria: it has to be useful for the common good, constituted by the lawful 
authority and charging in an equal manner all members (according to their power and dignity).  
How, then, does the graced agent relate to those positive human laws? Written laws constrain 
the agent from the outside; but the virtuous man is inclined from within, first of all by his 
virtue, but ultimately by the instigation of the Holy Spirit (cf. section 1.3). Positive human 
laws provide only the external determination of these actions.
113
 As to this point, St. Thomas 
explains: ―Precisely this is due to the leading of the Holy Spirit, that spiritual men are subject 
to human laws, according to 1 Peter 2: Be subject to every human creature because of 
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 These virtues differ in an important respect: acquired (i.e. natural) legal justice works for the human common 
good as final end; infused political legal justice ultimately aims at divine friendship and perfects the agent in 
regard to the human city only as terminus a quo. See De virt. card. 4 ad 5, quoted and discussed in section 5.5.3. 
113
 See ST I-II 96.5. 
Chapter 6. The Reconstruction of Justice as an Infused Virtue 
 379 
God.‖114 Thus, even if the human law determines the concrete content of political actions, the 
Holy Spirit himself moves the graced agent to actions according to that law.
115
 Yet, as seen in 
the first chapter, the agent must be equipped by gifts and specific infused virtues in order to 
be amendable for the movement of the Holy Spirit. Consequently, for observing the human 
laws, the graced agent must possess infused human legal justice.  
 
 
ii) Infused Justice and the Observance of Ecclesiastical Laws 
 
For a good pagan citizen legal justice regarding the human law may be enough. This 
observance is also indispensable for a Christian, but it is not enough. The human city is not 
the final end of infused human legal justice, but rather its terminus a quo, for tending 
therefrom to something higher (―ut ab ea in aliud tendens‖116). Consequently infused human 
legal justice must observe more determinations, even within the range of the human city. 
However, the New Law in the gospel does not contain such determinations. It belongs to the 
hierarchy of the Church to establish such precepts, which carry the same obligation as divine 
laws. ―A precept of the Church has the same firmness as a precept of God.‖117 As seen in 
section 5.5, the Church‘s authority to constitute additional laws is not limited to the 
immediate scope of divine friendship but also extends to the human city. In this way infused 
human legal justice entails some special acts beyond the requirement of its acquired 
counterpart. 
This difference becomes apparent in Quodl. XII 16.2. The article asks whether a man who 
acquires something mala fide by adverse possession is obliged to make restitution for the 
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 ST I-II 96.5 ad 2: ―Sed tamen hoc ipsum est de ductu spiritus sancti, quod homines spirituales legibus 
humanis subdantur; secundum illud I Petr. II, subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae, propter deum.‖ See also 
ST II-II 10.10: ―Ius autem divinum, quod est ex gratia, non tollit ius humanum, quod est ex naturali ratione.‖ 
Likewise ST II-II 12.2.  
115
 This internal divine guidance brings with it that the graced agent does not observe laws that contradict one of 
the three conditions of just laws. ―Lex spiritus sancti est superior omni lege humanitus posita. Et ideo viri 
spirituales, secundum hoc quod lege spiritus sancti ducuntur, non subduntur legi, quantum ad ea quae repugnant 
ductioni spiritus sancti.‖ (ST I-II 96.5 ad 2). Keys explains with respect to that: ―Natural legal justice, in 
Aquinas‘s thought, serves as a common basis, a foundation for furthering the common good by means of acts 
proper to the various ethical virtues, whether legally mandated, or transcending the letter of the civil law yet in 
accord with its spirit, or when necessary even in opposition to positive legislation.‖ (Keys, Aquinas, Aristotle, 
and the Promise of the Common Good, 189). 
116
 De virt. card. 4 ad 5. See footnote 112. 
117
 In sent. IV 40.4 sed contra 1: ―Dominus dicit discipulis Luc. 10, 16: qui vos audit, me audit. Ergo praeceptum 
ecclesiae habet firmitatem sicut praeceptum dei.‖ Admittedly, not every ecclesiastical precept implies the same 
degree of duty. ―In lege civili non facit semper dignum poena mortis corporalis transgressio legalis statuti. Ita 
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acquired good. For us the casuistic question is not of interest, but rather the clear distinction 
between the mandatory extent of human laws and ecclesiastical canons:  
 
There is a contrariety between civil and canonical right: since according to the civil law such 
[acquisitive] prescription is binding, according to the canonical law such a prescription is 
impossible. The reason for this contrariety is the fact that the end, which is intended by the civil 
legislator, is different, sc. to save and preserve peace between citizens, which would be hindered if 
the prescription was not valid; since everybody would be able to come and explain: this was mine 
at a certain time. However, the end of the canonical right aims at the tranquility of the Church and 
the salvation of souls. But nobody [living] in sin can be saved, repent from condemnation, or 
something other unless makes restitution. And therefore we must say: If a man acquires something 
bona fide by adverse possession, he is not obliged to make restitution, even if he recognizes after 
the prescription that it belonged to the other: since the law can punish somebody [only] in his own 
property for a sin and negligence, and give and concede this [property] to another. But anyone who 
acquires mala fide by adverse possession is obliged to repair and satisfy by repaying the harm 
which he had committed.
118
 
 
Obviously, the demand of infused human legal justice are more challenging than those of its 
natural counterpart. A similar case is given in the following article: Aquinas questions 
whether the consummation of something that is lawfully but mala fide acquired (i.e. knowing 
that it does not belong to the seller) calls for the restitution of the acquired good to the original 
proprietor. Principally he affirms the issue since ―justice consists in a certain equality.‖119 In 
the reply to the objection he refers again to the distinction between human and divine law: 
―Admittedly, according to the ius civile he cannot pressure the consumer; but he can pressure 
him according to the ius divinum whose end is the salvation of souls.‖120 This short remark 
shows again the difference between acquired and infused legal justice: The former is content 
to observe the human law. The latter, since he is working for divine friendship (here: salus 
animarum), goes beyond the civil obligation. It achieves a ―more.‖ But this ―more‖ is not 
                                                                                                                                                        
nec in lege ecclesiae omnes ordinationes vel statuta obligant ad mortale.‖ (ST II-II 186.9 ad 2). As Gilby says, 
ecclesiastical laws are in a sense ―between‖ human and divine law (Gilby, ―Introduction,‖ 8, footnote b). 
118
 Quodl. XII 16.2: ―Circa hoc est contrarietas iuris civilis et canonici: quia secundum ius civile talis 
praescriptio tenet, secundum ius canonicum talis praescribere non potest. Et ratio huius contrarietatis est, quia 
alius est finis quem intendit civilis legislator, scilicet pacem servare et stare inter cives, quae impediretur, si 
praescriptio non curreret; quicumque enim vellet, posset venire, et dicere: istud fuit meum quocumque tempore. 
Finis autem iuris canonici tendit in quietem ecclesiae, et salutem animarum. Nullus autem in peccato salvari 
potest nec poenitere de damno, vel de alieno, nisi recompenset. Et ideo dicendum est, quod si quis praescribat 
bona fide possidendo, non tenetur ad restitutionem, etiam si sciat alienum fuisse post praescriptionem: quia lex 
potest aliquem pro peccato et negligentia punire in re sua, et illam alteri dare et concedere. Sed qui mala fide 
praescribit, tenetur emendare et satisfacere reddendo damnum quod intulit.‖ 
119
 Quodl. XII 16.3: ―Quilibet tenetur ad faciendum iustitiam alteri. Consistit autem iustitia in quadam aequalitate; 
unde nisi reintegretur aequalitas, non potest aliquis esse iustus. Inaequalitas autem fuit quod consumpsit rem non 
suam; et ideo oportet quod reddat.‖ 
120
 Quodl. XII 16.3: ―Licet non habeat actionem in eum qui consumpsit secundum ius civile, habet tamen 
secundum ius divinum, cuius finis est salus animarum.‖ 
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contrary to the human law but would be judged from the perspective of the human law as 
liberality.  
A more modern example of the extended function of infused legal justice is the field of 
marriage. Aquinas refers to ecclesiastical canons that constitute special requirements for valid 
matrimony, aiming at maintaining the state of grace of the spouses and likewise for the good 
of the human city.
121
 Thus, it is impossible for a Christian to get married disregarding or even 
contradicting a determination of the Church-law; rather he is inclined by infused human legal 
justice to observe the canon law in that matter.
122
  
Moreover, Aquinas mentions a possible intervention of the Church regarding the legitimacy 
of games – namely by specifying particular circumstances as time, place etc.123  
 
Conclusion 
We can sum up our reconstruction as follows: Infused human legal justice disposes the graced 
agent to live in the human society without losing divine friendship. It provides an inclination 
to observe all human laws, since contempt of the lawful human authority would destroy 
divine friendship. In addition, it respects all ecclesiastical canons which are given for ruling 
the social life. In this respect, infused human legal justice makes a ―better‖ citizen, since at 
least in some issues it goes beyond the obligations of the civil law.  
However, it is also true that a citizen who is equipped with this virtue may lack many good 
qualities which would be helpful (and even necessary) for a successful life in a society ruled 
by human laws – as for example comprehensive knowledge of juridical laws, a prudent 
approach in lawsuits, the political skills to institute a law, leadership qualities etc. These 
properties, essential for the successful citizen according earthly measures, are to be acquired 
by training and repeated actions, even though the faithful already has infused legal justice. 
These qualities do not belong to the features of infused human legal justice because they are 
dispensable for divine friendship.  
                                                 
121
 Hence, it is clear that the Church-laws are not limited to purely spiritual things; rather it adopts here a true 
matter of the communitas civilis. ―Sicut olim matrimonia gentilium dispensabantur per leges civiles; ita nunc per 
statuta ecclesiae.‖ (In sent. IV 40.4 sed contra 2). 
122
 ―Sicut deus non coniungit illos qui coniunguntur contra divinum praeceptum, ita non coniungit illos qui 
coniunguntur contra ecclesiae praeceptum, quod habet eamdem obligandi efficaciam quam et praeceptum 
divinum.‖ (In sent. IV 40.4 ad 1). 
123
 ―Potest esse excessus in ludo secundum defectum debitarum circumstantiarum, puta cum aliqui utuntur ludo 
vel temporibus vel locis indebitis, aut etiam praeter convenientiam negotii seu personae. Et hoc quidem 
quandoque potest esse peccatum mortale, propter vehementiam affectus ad ludum, cuius delectationem praeponit 
aliquis dilectioni dei, ita quod contra praeceptum dei vel ecclesiae talibus ludis uti non refugiat.‖ (ST II-II 168.3). 
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b) The Content of Infused Commutative Justice  
 
Next, we want to reconstruct commutative justice as an infused virtue. Aquinas‘s 
commentaries on the New Testament offer a good starting point for such an inquiry. In these 
texts, he several times distinguishes different meanings of justice, including commutative 
justice as virtus specialis. How, then, do those texts – which clearly presuppose a theological 
context – describe the object of ―Christian‖ commutative justice? Admittedly, the 
Commentaries are not systematic treatises; but at least for a first approximation their 
investigation should be interesting. 
The result is unequivocal: describing the proper acts of commutative justice, Aquinas never 
demands something beyond the ius naturale. Justice implies the readiness to give everybody 
his due; actions which are required for the ordinary common life of people, such as buying, 
selling and business-contracts. ―Special justice which means that man renders to everybody 
his due . . . is about buying, selling, hiring.‖124 Or: ―Sometimes justice is taken as a special 
virtue by which man achieves rectitude in things which belong to living together in common, 
and what is directive in these things.‖125 Especially illuminating is his assertion in Super hebr. 
XI 7: Aquinas first determines legal justice as observance of the divine law – a clear 
indication that the context is not political justice. ―Justice is a general virtue when it obeys the 
divine law.‖126 Afterwards follows the unexpected description of justice as a special virtue: 
―Sometimes, however, it is a special virtue, and this consists in man‘s actions and exchanges, 
namely when he renders to each his due. But the saints had both kinds of justice.‖127 The final 
notice about the saints is a reliable indication that St. Thomas is describing not acquired but 
infused commutative justice – though he characterizes this justice by the same terms.128 
 
 
                                                 
124
 Super Mt. V 2: ―Iustitia speciali, quae est, quod homo reddat unicuique quod suum est . . . est circa emptiones, 
venditiones, conductiones.‖ 
125
 Super Phil. III 2: ―Iustitia quandoque sumitur ut est specialis virtus, per quam homo ponit rectitudinem in his, 
quae sunt ad communem convictum et secundum quod est in his directiva.‖ 
126
 Super Hebr. XI 7: ―Iustitia est virtus generalis, quando scilicet obedit legi divinae.‖ 
127
 Super Hebr. XI 7: ―Aliquando autem est virtus specialis, et ista consistit in actionibus et communicationibus 
humanis, quando scilicet reddit quis unicuique quod suum est. Utramque autem iustitiam habuerunt sancti.‖ 
128
 Even in the Prima secundae we find an indirect remark, which suggests exactly the same position: in ST I-II 
67.1 (whether the moral virtues remain after this life) St. Thomas describes a material ―part‖ of moral virtues 
which ceases after this life – namely sensible pleasures, fears, and ―distributiones et communicationes rerum 
quae veniunt in usum praesentis vitae‖ (whereas the ordo rationis as formal part of moral virtues remains). But 
from the context it is clear that the discussion is about infused moral virtues; thus, infused justice has the same 
matter as its acquired counterpart: distributions and exchanges in the present life. 
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The indirect verification through Aquinas’s discussion of love for one’s enemies  
Though the previous citations contain concrete descriptions, they do not provide a systematic 
proof of our thesis. Lacking an ex-professo-text of this issue, it is necessary to pursue an 
indirect approach, using Aquinas‘s discussion of the Christian‘s obligation to love his 
enemies.
129
 Though this question does not employ the term ―justice,‖ it confirms our assertion 
regarding infused commutative justice. The case of love for one‘s enemy offers the advantage 
that the agent is (a) clearly in the possession of grace, but (b) between the two involved 
partners there is certainly no positive obligation which could distort the relation of proper 
justice (as e.g. in the case of family-members, fellow-students etc.); it is a case of pure 
equality, the relation between two citizens. Sometimes Thomas mentions special duties of the 
graced person regarding his parents, relatives, benefactors, superiors, people of special dignity 
etc. These qualifications disrupt the equality between the involved parts, and therefore are 
unsuited for clarifying the issue whether charity implies a new kind of commutative justice 
(which is by definition between two non-obliged equals). The relationship of a graced person 
towards his enemy, however, can show whether there are some special obligatory actions 
exclusively due because of charity. 
ST II-II 25.8 treats the issue of whether we should love our enemies out of charity.
130
 The sed 
contra gives – by reference to divine authority – a clear affirmative answer. Christ himself 
commands: ―Love your enemies.‖ (Mt 4.44). At first glance, this response seems to contradict 
our thesis: If there were an obligation for some charitable actions to one‘s enemies, then some 
goods would be due to him (as debitum) which he could not demand by nature. Does the 
precept to love one‘s enemies, then, disprove our reconstruction of infused justice? 
Let us first read the answer Aquinas gives: Love of enemies can be considered in a threefold 
manner: First, it is impossible to love the enemy inquantum est inimicus; but charity demands 
rather hatred of what is evil in the other; hating the other‘s evil reveals true charity. Secondly, 
love of one‘s enemy can mean to love him in a general way because of his nature, which is 
capable of divine friendship; and in this general way it is necessary to have charity for one‘s 
enemies. Thirdly, love of one‘s enemy might be understood as special benevolence, directed 
to him as an individual. As to this possibility, St. Thomas explains:  
 
                                                 
129
 See ST II-II 25.8 and 9. Also ST II-II 184.2 ad 3 is helpful. 
130
 Labourdette notes rightly that ST II-II 25.8 refers to justice as the necessary foundation (or ―minimum‖) of 
charity (Labourdette, La charité, 97). However, he unfortunately disregards the question of infused justice. 
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Thirdly, love of one‘s enemies may be considered in its specific sense, namely that we should 
have a special movement of love towards our enemies. And this charity does not require 
absolutely, because it does not require that we should have a special movement of love to 
every individual man, since this would be impossible. However, charity requires this in respect 
of the preparation of the mind, namely that we should be ready to love our enemies 
individually in the case of necessity.131  
 
The assertion shows two things. Let us begin with the second: Charity requires the readiness 
to support the other in the case of necessity. As to that, there is nothing surprising; St. Thomas 
argues even from a natural viewpoint that individuals have to assist each other in cases of 
necessity because of their common membership in the human society. In special 
circumstances, the assistance may become a matter of justice even on a natural level
132
 – 
mutual support as something naturally just.
133
 Hence, it is not an additional obligation which 
is introduced by the state of grace, which makes a specific characteristic of infused justice.
134
 
Of greater significance is the first claim: Charity by itself implies no absolute obligation for 
special acts which the graced person is required to perform for all. Aquinas is not saying that 
charity does not introduce some new strict additional obligations with respect to special 
persons; obviously it does so, for example regarding the ecclesiastical superiors (which is 
understood as an act of restitution, since the graced person has received special benefits
135
). 
But this is not the present question. St. Thomas emphasizes that charity does not require that 
one be moved ―ad quoslibet homines singulariter.‖ This means: Charity does not add 
additional obligations in regard to everyone, as individual. But this was exactly our claim 
about infused commutative justice: It does not entail some principally new and additional 
duties ad alterum. 
                                                 
131
 ST II-II 25.8: ―Tertio modo potest considerari dilectio inimicorum in speciali, ut scilicet aliquis in speciali 
moveatur motu dilectionis ad inimicum. Et istud non est de necessitate caritatis absolute, quia nec etiam moveri 
motu dilectionis in speciali ad quoslibet homines singulariter est de necessitate caritatis, quia hoc esset 
impossibile. Est tamen de necessitate caritatis secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo habeat animum 
paratum ad hoc quod in singulari inimicum diligeret si necessitas occurreret.‖ 
132
 Stump identifies this kind of justice in the case of necessity as part of distributive justice; i.e. the individual 
who can help the needy person by means of his own property represents in a certain way the whole community. 
―Although almsgiving takes place between one individual and another within a society and so looks like a 
commutative exchange, in fact it is not. If such exchanges fit anywhere within the species of justice as a special 
virtue, they would seem to fall more nearly under distributive justice.‖ (Stump, ―Aquinas on Justice,‖ 64-67, here 
66). See also Roey, De virtute charitatis, 356-560. 
133
 ScG III 131.4: ―Societas autem inter homines conservari non posset nisi unus alium iuvaret. Est igitur naturale 
hominibus quod unus alium in necessitatibus iuvet.― And similarly in In sent. III 30.2 ad 2 (here with explicit 
reference to justice): ―Necessitas autem facit omnia communia; et ideo in necessitate subveniendum est etiam 
inimicis. Sed hic est magis effectus iustitiae quam amicitiae.‖ 
134
 See thereto ST II-II 118.4 ad 2: ―Aliquis tenetur ex debito legali bona sua pauperibus erogare, vel propter 
periculum necessitatis, vel etiam propter superfluitatem habitorum.‖ 
135
 See St. Paul‘s assertion in 1 Cor 9.11. 
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The discussion is resumed in the following article, whose focus is even closer to the topic of 
justice, namely charity‘s relation to obligatory external acts: whether it is necessary for 
salvation that we should show our enemies the signs and effects of love.
136
 Aquinas repeats 
the answer of the antecedent article: Charity as internal acts must include all men at least in 
communi, but not in speciali, except by being prepared for the case of the other‘s need.137 The 
case of external acts is analogous. He explains:  
 
There are some signs and favors of love which are shown to our neighbors in general, as when 
we pray for all the faithful or for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on the 
whole community: and such favors and signs of love towards our enemies fall under the 
necessity of precept.
138
 
 
Obviously, the obligation to those acts is not a matter of commutative but rather of general 
justice, i.e. in regard to the good of the whole community. The common good demands its 
promotion by all of its members; thus, there is an obligation of the citizen to support the 
community as a whole (materially and spiritually).  
But does charity also entail some obligatory external action in regard to the other as 
individual? Aquinas applies the same solution as in the previous article: ―There are other 
favors or signs of love, which one shows to some persons in a particular way. And it is not 
necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such favors and signs of love, except 
regarding the preparation of the mind.‖139 Similarly, he argues in the Commentary on the 
Sentences: ―Everybody is beholden by necessity to wish eternal goods those who hate him, 
but not temporal goods.‖140  
Therefore, it is clear: charity does not oblige the graced agent to some additional external acts 
in regard to the other as individual which would be due solely because of the state of grace.
141
 
                                                 
136
 ST II-II 25.8. 
137
 ST II-II 25.9: ―Dilectio autem interior ad inimicum in communi quidem est de necessitate praecepti absolute; 
in speciali autem non absolute, sed secundum praeparationem animi, ut supra dictum est.― 
138
 ST II-II 25.9: ―Sunt enim quaedam beneficia vel signa dilectionis quae exhibentur proximis in communi, puta 
cum aliquis orat pro omnibus fidelibus vel pro toto populo, aut cum aliquod beneficium impendit aliquis toti 
communitati. Et talia beneficia vel dilectionis signa inimicis exhibere est de necessitate praecepti.‖ 
139
 ST II-II 25.9: ―Alia vero sunt beneficia vel dilectionis signa quae quis exhibet particulariter aliquibus personis. 
Et talia beneficia vel dilectionis signa inimicis exhibere non est de necessitate salutis nisi secundum 
praeparationem animi.‖ 
140
 In sent. III 30.2: ―Quilibet ex necessitate tenetur odienti se optare bona aeterna, non autem bona temporalia.‖ 
And he continues: ―Sed hoc est de perfectione caritatis ut etiam ad ista se extendat.‖ 
141
 ST II-II 25.9 ―Sed quod praeter articulum necessitatis huiusmodi beneficia aliquis inimicis exhibeat, pertinet 
ad perfectionem caritatis, per quam aliquis non solum cavet vinci a malo, quod necessitatis est, sed etiam vult in 
bono vincere malum, quod est etiam perfectionis, dum scilicet non solum cavet propter iniuriam sibi illatam 
detrahi ad odium; sed etiam propter sua beneficia inimicum intendit pertrahere ad suum amorem.‖ 
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The truth of our thesis is thereby demonstrated: Commutative justice in the graced agent (i.e. 
as infused virtue) does not entail new additional obligations. Rather it belongs to the very 
essence of commutative justice to disregard any potential obligation between the involved 
parts; its acts are measured only by the ―thing‖ which is to be exchanged. 
 
An important observation: External similitude, but essential difference 
Granting the described equality of the iustum of acquired and infused commutative justice, 
nonetheless every act of infused justice qua actus humanus differs essentially from acts of its 
acquired counterpart. In the present chapter we determined (as we mentioned already in its 
introduction) only the opus iustum, i.e. the external just act. But an external act may be 
achieved for different reasons, depending on the internal voluntary act.
142
 Paying the suitable 
wages to one‘s employees is something iustum for a faithful employer as well as for an 
unbeliever. Regarding its external determination there is no difference. However, the very 
same external act done out of charity differs essentially from the same act done for merely 
natural motives (e.g. out of fear of a civil lawsuit, or the desire of being a decent employer). 
Here lies the proper reason for the necessity of commutative justice as infused virtue: Though 
the faithful citizen achieves the very same external act, he does so for a different ultimate 
end.
143
 The immediate purpose of infused justice may be identical (finis proximus, namely to 
achieve something just); but the moral value of the concrete action hinges on the final end of 
the interior act; and a supernatural act can only arise from a supernatural habit, from infused 
commutative justice. 
 
 
c) The Structure of Infused Distributive Justice  
 
After the reconstruction of infused commutative justice, we have yet to clarify the meaning of 
infused distributive justice. Commutative and distributive justice count as proper species of 
particular justice, the one as being concerned with the iustum between two individuals, the 
other with the iustum of the community in regard to its members and vice versa. Thus, 
                                                 
142
 Cf. ST I-II 18.2-4. 
143
 Thus, Bujo is quite imprecise describing the precept of charity as mere explications of the natural law 
(Bénézet Bujo, Moralautonomie und Normenfindung bei Thomas von Aquin (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 
1979), 258-259).  
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distributive justice is not only important for the leader of a community, but likewise for its 
subjects insofar as by that virtue they are content with the iustum distributed to them.
144
 
We can formulate the topic of the present chapter as follows: What is the distributed iustum in 
the human community regarding its members who are Christians? Does this iustum differ 
from the case of pagan citizens? Can (or must) the government treat faithful in a different 
manner? Can the believers demand special recognition? If there were such special rights, they 
would constitute the matter of infused distributive justice.
145
  
But this is not yet the whole substance of that virtue. According to the view of Aquinas, the 
Church and the political state are not two isolated entities: The Church subsists in the human 
society and infused moral virtues perfect man regarding the Church understood as the ―human 
city‖ under the reign of God (―res publica hominum sub deo‖146). Thus, infused distributive 
justice perfects man also in regard to the structure of the Church insofar as it is concerned 
with the distribution of administrations and material goods.  
Consequently, we can suggest that in the case of distributive justice the infused species differs 
noticeably from its acquired counterpart.  
In section 4.5.1 we described roughly the general function of distributive justice. We shall 
first repeat two essential points, then subjoin two further characteristics, and thereby it will 
become possible to give a description of infused distributive justice. 
First, the proper matter of distributive justice is goods and evils, comforts and discomforts (in 
the widest sense) which belong to a community and should be enjoyed and supported equally 
by its members. Therefore, distributive justice ―consists in the distribution of common things 
which are to be divided between people who share a civil community: honors, money, or 
whatsoever belongs to external goods, or even to evils, as labor, expenses and things of this 
kind.‖147 
Secondly, the measure of just distribution – as opposed to commutative justice – is not the 
thing itself, but the dignity of each person. ―Something is called iustum in distributions 
                                                 
144
 ST II-II 47.12; explicitly confirmed in ST II-II 61.1 ad 3: ―Actus distributionis quae est communium bonorum 
pertinet solum ad praesidentem communibus bonis, sed tamen iustitia distributiva est et in subditis, quibus 
distribuitur, inquantum scilicet sunt contenti iusta distributione.‖ 
145
 We should notice the clearly limited focus of the present chapter: We are not discussing the question whether 
there should be such a thing as a religious state; whether the state today could (or should) interfere in religious 
cults; whether it ought to support the Church etc. We focus only on the question of what distributive justice 
would be like in a political community of Christians. 
146
 ST I-II 100.5. 
147
 In ethic. V 4.1: ―Consistit in distributionibus aliquorum communium, quae sunt dividenda inter eos qui 
communicant civili communicatione: sive sit honor, sive sit pecunia, vel quicquid aliud ad bona exteriora 
pertinens, vel etiam ad mala; sicut labor, expensae et similia.‖  
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inasmuch as it is given to everybody according to his dignity, i.e. insofar as he is worthy of 
what is given to him – which designates a certain proportionality, so that this be as fitting for 
the one as that is fitting for the other.‖148 Thus, all members receive their equal due, not 
according to an arithmetical equality, but according an equal geometrical proportion. We are 
brought thus far by the description of distributive justice in section 4.5.1. 
 
Infused distributive justice within the human city 
For an understanding of infused distributive justice within the human city, we must clarify 
two further points: On what criteria does the dignity of a citizen depend? The dignity of a 
member depends on the agent‘s contribution to the common good – ―according to the 
proportion according to which they supported the community [intullerung in commune].‖149 
St. Thomas first gives an example and then applies it to the case of justice: ―In businesses, the 
more someone invests in a society, the more he receives. And in politics [in civitatibus], the 
more someone serves the community, the more he receives from the goods of the 
community.‖150 This does not mean that the question of utility is the exclusive criterion of 
whether the community has special obligations towards its members. Just by being a member 
of the community, the individual has certain rights and duties. The point is that some citizens 
deserve some particular goods (or have to accept some particular discomforts); and these 
special treatments depend on their extraordinary utility for the common good. Moreover, the 
criterion is not to be limited to immediate utility. The principle also implies that a community 
has special obligations e.g. regarding a pregnant woman (insofar as the offspring bears a 
special importance for the future of the community). 
There is a further point that we should clarify: The standard of the citizen‘s dignity varies in 
different forms of government.  
 
However, all do not judge dignity in distribution in agreement with the same norm. In a 
democratic state where the people govern, dignity is judged according to freedom. Because the 
common people are equal in freedom, therefore they think it proper that equal distribution be 
made to them. In an oligarchy, where some few rule, dignity is measured according to a man‘s 
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 In ethic. V 4.10: ―Aliquid dicitur esse iustum in distributionibus in quantum unicuique datur secundum 
dignitatem, id est prout cuique dignum est dari, in quo designatur proportionalitas quaedam, ut scilicet ita hoc sit 
dignum uni sicut aliud est dignum alteri.‖  
149
 In ethic. V 6.3: ―Si communes pecuniae civitatis, vel aliquorum hominum debeant distribui in singulos, hoc 
erit ita faciendum ut singulis detur aliquid de communi, secundum illam proportionem secundum quam ipsi 
intulerunt in commune.― 
150
 In ethic. V 6.3: ―In negotiationibus, quantum aliquis plus posuit in societatem, tanto maiorem partem accipit. 
Et in civitatibus, quanto aliquis plus servivit communitati, tanto plus accipit de bonis communibus.‖  
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riches or according to nobility of birth, so that men who are more eminent by birth or riches 
should have more of the common goods. In an aristocracy, where certain men govern because 
of virtue, dignity is measured according to a state of virtue, so that a man should have more 
who is more perfect in virtue. Thus, it is clear that the mean of distributive justice is 
understood according to a relationship of proportion.
151
 
 
We quoted the text in some length since it contains the key for resolving the issue of infused 
distributive justice: Dignity as the measure of a just distribution is not a univocal criterion, but 
admits of different measures depending on different communities. Supposing that a man 
belongs to two different kinds of communities, his dignity might be differently measured with 
regard to each citizenship. For example, a politician may have a special precedence because 
of his social function; on the other side, a hero of altruism, such as blessed Mother Theresa 
may deserve special attention because of her virtuousness which provides (as Aquinas says) 
even the ―most eminent dignity.‖152 Supposing that both communities are interrelated, infused 
distributive justice shall observe both measures. Of course, it does not follow that Christians 
should be privileged in the sense of paying fewer taxes; all the more, because it is impossible 
to judge infallibly one‘s sanctity during his lifetime. But Aquinas‘s argument justifies things 
like the public veneration of Saints, the prescription of public respect for religious feast days 
in commemoration of extraordinary people or histories, etc.  
 
Infused distributive justice in regard to the hierarchy of the Church 
Beyond this criterion of dignity, infused distributive justice has to perfect the Christian 
faithful also in his relationship towards the hierarchical structure of the Church on earth, i.e. 
regarding the distribution of ministries in the Church, goods of the Church etc. Aquinas 
discusses several concrete issues of ecclesiastical distributive justice, showing that good 
membership in the Church requires special perfections that are indifferent for a non-believer. 
For example: Which criteria are important for the election of the right candidate for an 
ecclesiastical office? St. Thomas explains:  
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 In ethic. V 4.11: ―Non tamen dignitatem distributionis omnes secundum idem attendunt; sed in democratica 
politia, in qua scilicet plebs dominatur, attenditur dignitas secundum libertatem, quia enim plebei sunt aequales 
aliis in libertate, ideo reputant dignum esse ut aequaliter eis principentur; sed in oligarchica politia, in qua aliqui 
pauci principantur, mensuratur dignitas secundum divitias vel secundum nobilitatem generis, ut scilicet illi qui 
sunt excellentiores genere vel divitiis plus habeant de bonis communibus; sed in politia aristocratica in qua aliqui 
principantur propter virtutem, mensuratur dignitas secundum virtutem; ut scilicet ille plus habeat qui plus 
abundat in virtute. Et sic patet quod medium iustitiae distributivae accipitur secundum proportionalitatem.‖ 
152
 Super Ps. XXXII 11: ―Dignitas sanctorum maxima est; quia ipsi soli perveniunt ad quod omnes homines 
naturaliter desiderant.‖ The text continues: ―Si unus vel pauci pervenirent ad unum ad quod omnes pervenire 
desiderarent, hoc esset magna dignitas. Omnes autem desiderant tendere ad beatitudinem, ad quam tamen soli 
Chapter 6. The Reconstruction of Justice as an Infused Virtue 
 390 
 
It is fitting to choose somebody as prelate or for an ecclesiastical office who is simply 
good. . . . However, it is not necessary that that one is always elected who is simply better, for 
it may be that the one who is more perfect in charity lacks many perfections which are 
required of a qualified prelate, but which are found in one who has less charity – as science, 
industry, power and things like these.
153
 
 
In other articles St. Thomas discusses whether it is allowed for a prelate to prefer his own 
relatives in the distribution of church-goods.
154
 This issue is again a clear indication of a kind 
of distributive justice that exceeds the limits of the acquired species. Membership in the 
Church implies some new distributive criteria which are irrelevant for a merely earthly 
community, although the immediate object of infused distributive justice remains the res 
publica hominum, but sub deo. It must therefore be a special kind of distributive justice.  
We are now able to sum up the special feature of this virtue: Infused distributive justice – 
given at once at the moment of divine justification – enables the agent to distribute (or receive 
distributions) in a manner which maintains divine friendship: no more and no less. As in the 
case of legal justice, it does not provide the perfection of being a master in leadership, of 
deciding the most efficient tax system, of being an expert in judging the most qualified 
candidate for certain ministries, etc. It only enables the graced agent to deal with these matters 
without losing divine friendship. It is not as much a positive perfection for the human 
common good, as a ―negative perfection,‖ i.e. its possessor can avoid acts in this matter that 
would injure the supernatural order.  
                                                                                                                                                        
iusti perveniunt, quia eam consequentur in futuro perfecte, nunc vero inchoative et in spe. Ergo dignitas iustorum 
est magna.‖ Likewise n. 15; similar in Super Rom. II 2. 
153
 Quodl. VIII 4.1: ―Oportet eligere ad praelationem vel ecclesiasticum officium aliquem qui sit bonus 
simpliciter. . . . Non tamen oportet quod semper eligatur ille qui est melior simpliciter. Possibile est enim quod 
illi qui est in caritate perfectior, deficiant multa quae requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquis sit praelatus idoneus, quae 
in alio qui est minoris caritatis, inveniuntur: ut sunt scientia, industria, potentia, et alia huiusmodi.‖ 
154
 Quodl. VIII 8.4: ―Si enim sit aeque idoneus, potest praelatus suum consanguineum praeferre, nisi forte ex hoc 
scandalum oriatur, vel aliqui exinde malum exemplum accipiant . . . Si vero sit minus idoneus consanguineus 
praelati, non debet eum praeficere ad curam ecclesiae postposito meliori.‖ Similarly and even more explicit in 
Quodl. VI 5.3: ―Aliquis potest dici melior dupliciter: uno modo simpliciter, quia est sanctior, plus habens de 
caritate; alio modo dicitur aliquis melior quoad aliquid. Contingit autem quandoque aliquem esse meliorem 
simpliciter, qui tamen non est melior quantum ad hoc quod beneficium percipiat: quia alius forte potest 
ecclesiam magis iuvare vel per consilium sapientiae, vel per auxilium potentiae, vel quia servivit in ecclesia. Non 
ergo episcopus tenetur semper dare meliori simpliciter, sed tenetur dare meliori quoad hoc: non enim potest esse 
quod unum praeferat alteri nisi propter aliquam causam: quae si quidem pertineat ad honorem dei et utilitatem 
ecclesiae, iam quantum ad hoc iste est melior; si autem illa causa ad hoc non pertineat, erit acceptio personarum, 
quae tanto est gravior, quanto in rebus divinis committitur.‖ 
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d) Basic Features of the Infused Potential Parts of Justice  
 
Justice in its proper sense renders to the other what is due to him in its full amount: two 
individuals to each other (commutative justice), or the community regarding the individual 
(distributive justice). Not all virtues which are concerned with external actions, however, 
attain a complete equity – as for example religion (towards God), piety (towards ones parents), 
and observance (towards ones teachers) etc. In these cases, there always remains a certain 
indebtedness. Other virtues fall short of justice since they give goods to the other without a 
strict obligation, freely, moved by moral excellence: virtues such as affability, liberality, etc. 
These habits are justice only by an ―amplification of the name of justice‖155 insofar as they 
achieve a ―compensation of a debt in any way.‖156 In section 4.5 we distinguished between 
potential parts of justice of the first degree (if it is impossible to fully pay back what is strictly 
owed) and potential parts of the second degree (if there is non absolute obligation to perform 
the act). 
What, then, do these virtues become as infused species?  
It is impossible to provide a detailed reconstruction for each particular virtues, nor is it 
necessary for our argument. It should be enough to clarify the general structure which 
characterizes these virtues as infused habits. 
 
 
ii) Infused Potential Parts of the First Degree 
 
Regarding the potential parts of the first degree, the infused species follow the structure of 
their acquired counterparts in an important respect: On a natural level, everyone owes his 
parents reverence and assistance because of the manifold benefits they bestowed on him. Thus, 
acts of piety are nothing other than the attempt to compensate for something already received. 
The situation is the same in the case of religion and observance.
157
 Aquinas: ―The natural 
order requires that he who receives a benefit turns back to the benefactor by compensation of 
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 ST 60.3 ad 1: ―ampliato nomine iustitia.‖ 
156
 Ibid., ―secundum quamcumque debiti redditionem.‖ 
157
 ―Religio est per quam redditur debitum deo; pietas est per quam redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; 
gratia est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.‖ (ST I-II 60.3). 
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thanks.‖158 But grace does not supercede nature; hence, infused piety has to achieve exactly 
the same thing as acquired piety. Its measure is not the subjective status of the agent (graced 
or in sin) but the goods received. To reward his parents for the good of birth and education (as 
far as possible) is owed because of their having been given – not because of grace. Thus, in an 
important respect these virtues are identical.  
Nonetheless, there are two important differences: 
 
The Greater the Benefits, the Greater the Recompense 
First, the graced agent has received (at least usually) many spiritual benefits by the mediation 
of other people: Someone has prayed for him, provided his religious education, given him 
spiritual advice, etc. Above all, God has bestowed upon him the gift of grace. Thus, the state 
of grace introduces additional benefactors, and this means: new obligations for repayment. 
When Aquinas discusses the forth commandment in De duo. prae., he explains: ―Men are 
called father not only because of carnal generation, but they may be called father because of 
other notions; and to each one we owe a specific reverence.‖159 In fact, in the following list of 
―fathers‖ he places in the first position the apostles and saints,160 then prelates, kings and 
leaders, benefactors and seniors.
161
 The attempt to reward any kind of received gifts as far as 
possible is the proper task of these potential parts. As a result, infused piety and infused 
religion will account for more things and regard more persons than their acquired counterparts. 
Secondly, presupposing a graced agent, even the recompense for received natural goods (e.g. 
honor for one‘s parents because of their commitment in education) are inspired by charity (at 
least habitually) and consequently, they differ from the reverence of a man who is has 
willingly turned away from his ultimate end. The acts themselves are (elicited) acts of piety, 
i.e. they answer a strict debt, but their final motivation is love for God and divine love for the 
parents, which is expressed by the concrete (commanded) act of piety (see section 5.4.1). 
Thus, the final intention of these virtuous acts is not the harmony of the family (familial 
friendship); nor does it provide the perfect disposition for such a life (e.g. psychological 
                                                 
158
 ST II-II 106.3: ―Naturalis ordo requirit ut ille qui suscipit beneficium, per gratiarum recompensationem 
convertatur ad benefactorem.‖  
159
 De duo. prae. 6: ―Non solum dicitur aliquis pater ratione carnalis generationis; sed quibusdam aliis rationibus 
aliqui dicuntur patres, et cuilibet eorum debetur aliqua reverentia.‖ 
160
 De duo. prae. 6: ―Dicuntur enim patres apostoli et alii sancti per doctrinam et exemplum fidei. Apostolus, I 
Cor. IV, 15: nam si decem millia paedagogorum habeatis in christo, sed non multos patres: nam in christo iesu 
per evangelium ego vos genui.‖ 
161
 Concerning the prelates he explains: ―Dicuntur etiam praelati patres; et isti venerandi sunt, sunt enim dei 
ministri. Luc. X, 16: qui vos audit, me audit; et qui vos spernit, me spernit.‖ (De duo. prae. 6). 
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intuition for the other‘s sensitive situation). It enables the agent to live in a family without 
losing divine friendship.  
The case of religion is similar: Of course, by nature man is already obliged to honor God as 
the principle of being
162
 – an attitude which is expressed by prayers, sacrifices etc. Infused 
religion will also render honor to God for these natural goods, but it does so because of 
supernatural love for God. Its ultimate end is not being an obedient creature but union with 
God in friendship. Thus, even sacrifices in recognition of God‘s natural gifts arise from an 
essentially different motivation, are directed to a different end, and therefore require a 
different virtue: infused religion. 
This should suffice to indicate the general meaning of the infused virtues that are annexed to 
justice as potential parts of the first degree.  
 
 
ii) Infused Potential Parts of the Second Degree 
 
Something analogous is true for the virtues that are annexed to justice as potential parts of the 
second degree. They do not answer a strict (legal) obligation but correspond to a debitum 
morale, a moral due between friends, namely, the bestowal of free gifts upon the other 
because of previously received benefits, or because of the mere fact of a certain fellowship; 
virtues which depend on the agents moral excellence. At first glance, it may seem that in this 
case the infused species must differ in important respect from the acquired ones: if they 
depend on the agent‘s subjective virtuousness (since now man gives freely from his own), and 
grace makes men virtuous and results in a universal friendship with all men, then – it seems – 
the infused species is something very different. 
However, this objection misunderstands the meaning of these virtues. Although the final end 
of for example infused liberality is charity, its proper end is not divine friendship, but better 
communal life within the human city – i.e. political friendship. As seen in section 5.2, each 
human fellowship implies not only a specific kind of justice, but also of friendship, e.g. 
friendship between fellow-citizens. And this is the proper purpose of the potential parts of 
justice in the second degree. Thus, the immediate end of infused liberality is pleasant life in a 
human community – of course, ultimately for the attainment and preservation of divine 
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 Cf. ST I-II 109.3 ad 1. 
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friendship. It is concerned about political friendship not as terminus ad quem but as terminus 
a quo,
163
 moved by the final intention of charity. 
Therefore, analogously to the forgoing paragraph, the infused potential parts of the second 
degree follow principally the same structure as the acquired ones: They dispose the agent to 
bestow friendly gifts on benefactors and fellow-citizens. But the two species also differ in two 
points: (a) the infused species also make a return for spiritual gifts: gratitude for prayers and 
invocations, regarding holy men, priests, spiritual directors, etc. (b) Even returns for natural 
gifts or generous acts for the sake of common life are motivated finally by charity in regard to 
the supernatural end. Thus, any act of these virtues differs formally from its natural 
counterpart.  
 
 
6.4 Conclusion: The Scope and Limitation of Infused Justice 
 
In this chapter, we investigated the concrete content of justice as infused virtue in its various 
meanings. The result: the task of infused justice (in its different species) is nothing else but to 
render to each one the ius naturale as determined by the human and ecclesiastical authority. 
This perfection is infused at once by God in conjunction with sanctifying grace to every 
faithful. Consequently, every graced agent possesses this kind of justice, and is thereby 
disposed and inclined to act justly. 
However, we should carefully note the obvious limitations of this kind of justice:  
Infused virtues provide the ability to manage the practical issues of everyday life insofar as 
necessary for preserving divine friendship. This purpose of infused virtues simultaneously 
indicates their limit. Infused justice does not imply a special virtuousness for organizing one‘s 
daily affairs in the best way: to make the right decision concerning a career; to behave 
pleasantly in forming friendships; to judge the advantages and risks of raising a credit; to 
avoid any conflict in family-life; to establish the most efficient laws for the society, etc. It 
does not provide the father with the necessary cleverness to procure the indispensable 
livelihood for his family, or the bishop with the means to maintain his diocese without debt, 
or the individual member of the faithful with good advice in the parish council. The only task 
of infused virtues is to give man the competence to deal with any practical matters ―as tending 
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 De virt. card. 4 ad 5. See footnote 112. 
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therefrom to something else‖164 – i.e. as tending to divine friendship. It enables living and 
acting in a social environment while simultaneously preserving the state of grace. This, 
however, only requires rendering to each one what is due to him because of the specific 
fellowship that unites both. The graced agent may remain unskilled and awkward in human 
affairs, without any apparent difference in his abilities from what they were before the 
reception of grace. The only new, and very limited (though, of course, also most important) 
capacity which he receives by infusion is that he is inclined to treat his neighbors in a way 
that is compatible with charity towards God and his neighbors.  
Beyond this limited change, all the old contrary habits that have been acquired, as for example 
envy, greed, and disfavor, will remain, at least for a certain time (see section 1.2). Though the 
convert is suddenly equipped with the new (and true) inclination to just actions, the infused 
affinity will remain under fire from lingering contrary habits. This may make infused justice 
appear weak, ineffective, and almost invisible. But this experience is neither an argument 
against the doctrine of infused virtues in general, nor against the reality of infused justice in 
particular. St. Thomas is careful enough to limit its function to an inclination for actions 
which are necessary for divine friendship. Hence, the confusing experience of ―weak‖ infused 
justice rather confirms the cautious teaching about infused virtues. 
This, then, suffices for our reconstruction of infused justice. In the next (and final) chapter, we 
want to verify the previous results by reading through the questions on justice in the Secunda 
secundae. 
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 Again: De virt. card. 4 ad 5: ―Ut ab ea in aliud tendens.‖ 
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THIRD PART: Verification of Our Thesis 
 
7. Justice as Infused Virtue in the Treatise on Justice in ST II-II 
 
After six chapters of long preparation, we are ready to examine our thesis by reference to the 
text itself. Do the questions on justice in the Secunda secundae (qq. 57-122) concern an 
acquired or an infused moral virtue? Does the text provide unequivocal indications in favor of 
infused justice? For infused justice as reconstructed in chapters 5 and 6?
1
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, almost all scholars read the treatise as a discussion 
of acquired justice. Admittedly, such an interpretation also somehow stands to reason. In q. 
58-79 (the section about justice in its proper sense), Aquinas never mentions an infused habit. 
The term ―infusus‖ simply does not exist. Moreover, the discussions of the other cardinal 
virtues in the Secunda secundae include special articles asking whether those virtues may 
exist without grace (e.g. ST II-II 44.11 about prudence, ST II-II 136.3 about patience). These 
questions obviously imply an agent in the state of grace, and consequently infused virtues, 
even if they are not mentioned explicitly. In the treatise on justice, however, there are no 
articles of this kind. Further, the sections on fortitude and temperance treat some virtues 
whose matter is only relevant for a graced agent: for example, ST II-II 124 about martyrdom 
as the principal act of fortitude, and ST II-II 161 about humility as part of temperance. These 
facts are again strong indications of infused moral virtues. In the section on justice, however, 
the reader looks in vain for such ―facts.‖ How, then, ought we to interpret this obvious lack as 
proof for acquired justice? We should note that even the term ―acquisitus‖ is totally absent in 
the section. In this respect, both interpretations are possible. 
But is not the absence of special questions about the necessity of grace a clear argument 
against infused justice? It is not. Based on the findings of the previous chapters, we should 
rather expect such a lack because of the special character of justice, whose object is – in 
contrast to the other moral virtues – defined irrespective of the subjective status of the agent 
himself. In ST II-II 59.2 ad 3, St. Thomas clarifies the peculiarity of the object of justice by 
comparing it with temperance: 
 
                                                 
1
 Thus, from the very beginning of this final chapter we want to emphasize that the reasoning of this concluding 
chapter is cogent only on condition of the validity of our previous arguments. If somebody denies our prior 
results, he will regard also the argument of chapter 7 as less stringent. 
Chapter 7. Justice as Infused Virtue in the Treatise on Justice in ST II-II 
 397 
The object of temperance is not something constituted externally, as is the object of justice. 
But the object of temperance, i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on a proportion to man 
himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be temperate 
either materially or formally. . . . And in this respect there is dissimilarity between justice and 
the other moral virtues.
2
 
 
Thus, even if the whole treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae were about infused justice, 
it would be clear from the very beginning that its specific object is not to be determined in 
reference to the graced status of the agent but objectively, disregarding subjective conditions. 
Even the supernatural intention of any concrete act would remain invisible. In this respect, 
justice clearly represents an exception in comparison with the other moral virtues. As seen in 
chapters 5 and 6, the proper matter of infused justice are the interhuman transactions of a 
graced agent which are measured by the (received) thing itself (ipsa res). The presence of 
grace is accidental to the determination of the iustum; it does not affect the specification of the 
object of infused justice. The only exception would be positive obligations for the faithful to 
observe ecclesiastical laws. Only in this case may there be a contentual difference between the 
object of acquired and infused justice. Therefore, it is clear from the very character of justice 
that in its discussion there cannot be such apparent indications for an infused virtue as in the 
other treaties.  
On the basis of these preliminary remarks, we want to demonstrate our thesis by the 
followings steps: First, we examine the sequence of the various questions in the treatise. 
Despite a superficial similarity to Aristotle, the structure of the discussion in the Secunda 
secundae differs in important respects, videlicet clearly for theological reasons (section 7.1). 
The following sections, 7.2 to 7.5, concentrate on qq. 58-79, which discuss justice in its 
proper sense. The second long part of the treatise (qq. 80-119), which portrays the potential 
parts of justice, contains some more obvious assertions about infused virtue. We will be 
content to list some of them briefly in section 7.6. Much more difficult is the interpretation of 
Aquinas‘s outline of proper justice in qq. 58-79 as pertaining to an infused virtue. Therefore, 
we concentrate primarily on these questions. If we succeed in demonstrating that our thesis 
holds true for this part of the treatise, it will be right a fortiori for the second part. In section 
7.2 we search these questions for different indications that their subject is infused justice, as 
e.g. references to the divine law, to ecclesiastical determinations, to charity as foundation of 
                                                 
2
 ST II-II 59.2 ad 3: ―Obiectum temperantiae non est aliquid exterius constitutum, sicut obiectum iustitiae, sed 
obiectum temperantiae, idest temperatum, accipitur solum in comparatione ad ipsum hominem. Et ideo quod est 
per accidens et praeter intentionem non potest dici temperatum nec materialiter nec formaliter . . . Et quantum ad 
hoc est dissimile in iustitia et in aliis virtutibus moralibus.‖ 
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justice, to merit, to mortal sin as its contrary, etc. Section 7.3 raises some objections. Sections 
7.4 and 7.5 discuss the different kinds of justice (e.g. commutative justice) as infused virtues. 
By way of completion, in the final section we investigate q. 121 on piety as a gift of the Holy 
Spirit (section 7.8). We will see that this concluding question fits perfectly to a reading of the 
whole treatise as concerning infused justice. 
 
 
7.1 The Theological Structure of the Treatise on Justice 
 
Some years ago, Gauthier mentioned the sketchy and superficial character of Aquinas‘s 
portrayal of justice in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. He suggested the 
following explanation:  
 
It is possible that St. Thomas, who, at the moment when he edited his literal explication of the 
Ethics, composed the Second part of the Summa of theology, reserved the discussion of problems 
for the latter. Indeed, the Second part itself constitutes a commentary on the Ethics, a commentary 
about questiones which would normally have to complete the expositio littere.
3
  
 
As we have seen, it is a common conviction that the discussion of justice in ST II-II 57-122 is 
nothing other than a systematic outline of an Aristotelian idea, portrayed in more detail.
4
 
In this first paragraph we want to show that already the structure of the treatise provides clear 
indications that it is more than an extensive Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Admittedly, many concepts and issues of Aristotle are taken up again. But it shall become 
clear that Aquinas submits the whole matter to a fundamental reorganization and 
                                                 
3
 René A. Gauthier and Jean Y. Jolif, L’Éthique a Nicomaque: Introduction, traduction et commentaire, vol. 1 
(Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1970), 131: ―Il est possible aussi que S. Thomas, qui, au moment même 
où il rédigeait son explication littérale de l‘Éthique, composait la Seconde Partie de la Somme de théologie, ai 
réservé pour cette dernière la discussion des problèmes; au fait, la Seconde Partie constitue elle aussi un 
commentaire de l‘Éthique, le commentaire par questiones qui devait normalement compléter l‘expositio littere.‖ 
Of similar kind is the judgment of Wieland, who asserts regarding Aquinas‘s Commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics: ―It seems to have served as a preparation for the substantive moral theory of his Summa theologiae.‖ (Cf. 
Georg Wieland, ―The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle‘s ‗Ethics‘,‖ in The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600, ed. 
Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 661-662, 
here 662). Likewise, Bourke argues that the ―approach to the questions of moral science is developed by St. 
Thomas from the analytic study of the four virtues of the classic Greek and Roman ethicians.‖ (Vernon J. Bourke, 
St. Thomas and the Greek Moralists (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1947), 38). 
4
 E.g. Wieland, ―The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle‘s ‗Ethics‘,‖ 661-662. 
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transformation, videlicet according to a theological viewpoint, which surpasses by far the 
Greek idea of justice. 
 
 
7.1.1 Aquinas’s Innovation in Structuring the Treatise on Justice 
 
The general method of ST II-II 
Whereas the Prima secundae contains a discussion of virtue in general, the Secunda secundae 
focuses on the seven principal virtues in particular (qq. 1-169): the three theological virtues 
of faith, hope, charity, and the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and 
temperance. Within this general architecture, Aquinas simultaneously arranges together with 
the different virtues the various vices, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the precepts of the 
divine law. He chooses this method for portraying the whole matter of morals – which was 
original in his day
5
 – since it avoids exhausting repetitions, which would become inevitable if 
virtues, vices, gifts, and precepts were discussed separately, one after the other.  
In the prologue of ST II-II he explains: 
 
If we determined separately the virtues, gifts, vices and precepts, it would be necessary to 
explain the same things many times. Whoever wants to treat sufficiently the precept you shall 
not commit adultery must investigate adultery, which is a specific sin whose understanding 
depends on the opposed virtue. Therefore, it will be a more balanced and expedient method of 
consideration if the consideration in the same treatise is simultaneously about the virtue and 
the corresponding gift, the contrary vices, and the affirmative and negative precepts.
6
 
 
The double mention of the gifts is noteworthy. Aquinas attributes to each virtue some 
precepts (of the divine law) and a corresponding gift of the Holy Spirits which complement – 
as he claims – the discussion of the particular virtues. He does so not only in the case of the 
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, but likewise in the discussion of the four 
cardinal virtues. At the beginning of our research (section 1.3) we briefly described the 
                                                 
5
 See Jordan, ―Ideals of ‗Scientia moralis‘ and the Invention of the ‗Summa theologiae‘,‖ 91-95; Pope, 
―Overview of Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,‖ 37-38. 
6
 ST II-II prologus: ―Si seorsum determinaremus de virtutibus, donis, vitiis et praeceptis, oporteret idem 
multoties dicere, qui enim sufficienter vult tractare de hoc praecepto, non moechaberis, necesse habet inquirere 
de adulterio, quod est quoddam peccatum, cuius etiam cognitio dependet ex cognitione oppositae virtutis. Erit 
igitur compendiosior et expeditior considerationis via si simul sub eodem tractatu consideratio procedit de virtute 
et dono sibi correspondente, et vitiis oppositis, et praeceptis affirmativis vel negativis.‖ 
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general connection of gifts and virtues, or more precisely: of gifts and infused virtues. Thus, 
the reference to the gifts is an infallible indication of the supernatural order. If Aquinas 
mentions the dona spiritus in the context of virtues, then the discussion is obviously not about 
acquired but about infused virtues.  
But does Aquinas follow this general idea also in the case of justice? 
 
The structure of the treatise on justice 
J. Porter noticed that the discussion of justice is ―the longest, the most complex, and arguably 
the most difficult treatment of a particular virtue in the Summa theologiae.‖7 Nonetheless, it 
strictly follows the same structure as the discussion of the other virtues in the ST II-II, i.e., it 
contains the outline of some sub-virtues, vices, gifts and precepts: each treatise begins with a 
general exposition of the virtue itself, including its contrary vices. Secondly, there follow 
some questions about the ―parts‖ of the virtue (its subjective, integral and potential parts; see 
section 4.5), again together with the corresponding vices. Thirdly, there is a question about a 
parallel gift of the Holy Spirit, and the treatise ends with an outline of the relating precepts 
promulgated by the divine law.
8
 
In the same way, the treatise on justice begins with four questions on justice in itself: 
concerning its object, the ius (q. 57), justice in general (q. 58), injustice (q. 59) and judgment 
as the ―definition or determination of the iustum or ius.‖9 
A second (and very long) section treats the different ―parts‖ of justice: First its subjective 
parts, i.e. its particular species, commutative and distributive justice (q. 61); further restitution 
as its proper act (q. 62); an extensive discussion of the opposed vices: on the one hand, 
distinction of persons as contrary of distributive justice (q. 63), on the other hand, murder, 
mutilation, theft, evil deeds on court, injustice by speech, etc. as the contrary of commutative 
justice (qq. 64-78). Q. 79 discusses the integral parts of justice, defined as doing good and 
avoiding evil (the opposed vices being omission and transgression). Qq. 80-120 treat the 
potential parts of justice, i.e., virtues which fall short of the full account of justice, as religion 
(qq. 81-100), piety (qq. 101-104), and virtues of civil courtesy (qq. 105-119, inclusive the 
                                                 
7
 Porter, ―The Virtue of Justice,‖ 272. 
8
 Aquinas does not follow this structure in all cases. For example, the treatise on prudence orders some special 
vices after the question about the gift of counsel (ST II-II 52, de dono consili). Subsequently, three questions 
follow about related vices before treating the question of the precepts of prudence. Similarly, the discussion of 
temperance lacks a question about a corresponding gift. (The treatise on temperance ends in ST II-II 170 with a 
question on the corresponding precepts.) However, the treatise of justice, which is the longest part on a specific 
virtue (which can easily cause the reader to lose sight of the whole) follows the aforesaid order. 
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opposed vices). The section ends with a question about epieikeia, understood as a special part 
of legal justice (q. 120).
10
 
Thirdly, there follows a single question about piety as the corresponding gift of the Holy 
Spirit (q. 121). 
Fourthly, the treatise ends with a short discussion of the Decalogue as the proper precepts of 
justice (q. 122). 
Thus, the whole treatise is structured as follows. 
                                                                                                                                                        
9
 ST II-II 60.1. 
10
 See ST II-II 120.2, esp. ad 1. 
Chapter 7. Justice as Infused Virtue in the Treatise on Justice in ST II-II 
 402 
The structure of the treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae 
 
  1. right…………………………………………………………………………………………….………………... q. 57 
 1. justice 2. justice…………………………………………………………………………………………….……………… q. 58 
    in itself 3. injustice…………………………………………………………………………………………….……………. q. 59 
4. judgment……………………………………………………………………………………………….………… q. 60 
   1. of 1. distinction between commutative and distributive justice………………….……... q. 61 
   justice 2. restitution……………………………………………………………………….…. q. 62 
    1. respect of persons (as the opposite of distributive justice) ……………………… q. 63 
      by injur- 1. in his person…...……..……… q. 64 
  1. subjec-   1. by deed ing one‘s 2. by mutilation………………… q. 65 
  tive parts    neighbor 3. in his belongings…………..… q. 66 
       1. of the judge………………….. q. 67 
   2. its    2. of the prosecutor……………... q. 68 
   opposite   1. in judicial 3. of the defendant……………… q. 69 
    2. opp.      proceedings 4. of the witness……………...… q. 70 
    of com-   5. of the advocate………………. q. 71 
    mutative 2. by word  1. of reviling……………………. q. 72 
    justice   2. of backbiting………..….….… q. 73 
      2. uttered 3. of tale-bearing……..………… q. 74 
         extrajudicially 4. of derision…………..…..…… q. 75 
       5. of cursing………….………… q. 76 
         3. by cheating……………………………………………….………… q. 77 
 2. its    4. by usury…………………………………………………..………… q. 78 
     parts 2. integral parts: doing good and avoiding evil…………………………………………………….…..………… q. 79 
   1. in general: potential parts of justice…………………………………………………………….… q. 80 
     1. religion itself…………………………………………………..…… q. 81 
      1. interior 1. devotion……………………… q. 82 
          acts 2. prayer……………...………… q. 83 
       1. adoration…………………….. q. 84 
     2. its acts  2. sacrifice ……………………… q. 85 
       3. oblations…………………..… q. 86 
      2. exterior 4. tithes…..…………………..… q. 87 
    1. religion      acts 5. vows…...………………..…… q. 88 
justice       6. oath…………….………….… q. 89 
ST II-II       7. adjuration…….……………… q. 90 
57-122       8. invocation…………….……… q. 91 
  3. poten-     1. superstition……..…………… q. 92 
      tial parts    1. by excess  1. undue worship…… q. 93 
       2. its  2. idolatry…..……… q. 94 
     3. opposite      parts 3. divination……...… q. 95 
         vices   4. vain observance….. q. 96 
       1. contr. 1. temptation of God.. q. 97 
           God 2. perjury…………… q. 98 
      2. by defect 2. contr. 1. sacrilege……….… q. 99 
          things 2. simony…………… q. 100 
    2. piety…………………………………………………………………………...…… q. 101 
     1. in itself………………………………………………….……...…… q. 102 
    3. obser-  1. honor………………………………..……………. q. 103 
   2. in par-      vance 2. its parts  1. in itself…………………..…… q. 104 
       ticular   2. obedience 2. disobedience………….……… q. 105 
    4. gratitude 1. in itself…………………………………………………...……….… q. 106 
     2. ingratitude………………………………..………………………… q. 107 
    5. vengeance…………………………………………….…………………………… q. 108 
     1. in itself……………………………………………………………… q. 109 
    6. truth  1. lying………………….…………………………… q. 110 
     2. opposite 2. dissimulation……………………………………… q. 111 
         vices 3. boasting……………..………………………..…… q. 112 
      4. irony………………….…………………………… q. 113 
    7. friendly- 1. in itself……………………………………………………………… q. 114 
        ness 2. opposite 1. flattery………………………………….………… q. 115 
         vices 2. quarreling…………………………………….…… q. 116 
     1. in itself 1. covetousness…………...………………….……… q. 117 
    8. liberality 2. opposite 2. prodigality………………………………………… q. 118 
         vices……………………………………...…………………….…… q. 119 
    9. epikeia………………………………………………..……………………..…..… q. 120 
 3. the gift of piety………………………………………………………………………………..………………………..…… q. 121 
 4. the precepts of justice……………………………………………………………………………………………...………… q. 122 
 
Figure 14 
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In light of this structure, is it possible to read the text as a pure commentary on the fifth book 
of the Nicomachean Ethics, though with additional details? Certainly there are some overlaps, 
in language as well as in structure; principal concepts are adopted: legal justice, commutative 
justice, distributive justice, the distinction between general and particular justice, the 
arithmetical and geometrical mean, contrapassum, epieikeia, etc; terms which are borrowed 
from Aristotle. But there is also a clear development. The helpful study of Mongillo provides 
an elaborated juxtaposition of Aquinas‘s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics book V and 
ST II-II 57-122.
11
  
Even if it is not necessary to recite the various points of this development in detail (since our 
interest is neither the relation of Aquinas‘s doctrine to a special source, nor a potential 
progression from one of his works to another), it shall be helpful for our own project to 
examine whether there are some totally new topics which Aquinas discusses in ST II-II 57-
122; issues which cannot be read as a development of Nicomachean Ethics V, but which 
contain new matters; especially, if they bear a theological relevance. 
 
Four concrete hints for the theological context  
We want to list four observations which suggest a theological background: 
First. The most obvious innovation in comparison with the Aristotelian account of justice is 
the integration of religion into the discussion of justice (qq. 81-100), including an outline of 
its proper acts as devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifices, etc.
12
 Admittedly, religion is not 
classified as a proper species of justice. It is only a potential part since man falls short of 
reaching a status of equality in regard to his creator. Nevertheless, it is only this incapability 
which separates religion from true justice. But this virtue and its specific acts are – as we will 
see – clearly described as infused virtue.13 It would be a strange leap of argumentation if in 
the previous part Aquinas discussed only an acquired virtue, and continued afterwards – 
without warning – with infused religion. 
                                                 
11
 Dalmazio Mongillo, ―La struttura del ‗De iustitia:‘ Summa theologiae II-II qq. 58-122,‖ Angelicum 48 (1971): 
356-368. 
12
 See therefore: Francesco S. Fedele, ―La dottrina delle virtù morali e della giustizia da Aristotele a San 
Tommaso,‖ Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali e Discipline Ausiliarie 71 (1916): 177-184. ―In sostanza, da 
Aristotele a S. Tommaso, l‘elemento veramente nuovo entrato nella storia del pensiero è l‘assoluto concreto, Dio, 
principio dell‘uomo e del mondo in contrapposto all‘uomo ed al mondo.‖ (Ibid., 179). 
13
 See section 7.6.1. It is a different issue, whether there can be a natural virtue of religion. 
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Secondly. Aquinas integrates into the treatise a question about piety as a gift of the Holy 
Spirit, corresponding to justice as virtue (q. 121). But the conjunction of a specific moral 
virtue and a gift of the Holy Spirit makes sense only in the case of an infused virtue. 
Therefore, we can reach the same conclusion: If the treatise on justice is systematically 
structured, then its primary concern is infused justice. 
Thirdly. Something analogous can be said in the case of the ultimate question about the 
Decalogue which is presented as the precepts of justice. Though most of them are just moral 
precepts, i.e. laws about acts which are due by nature, nevertheless, Aquinas introduces those 
precepts as divine law which is given explicitly for the attainment of man‘s supernatural 
end.
14
 Hence, this is again a suggestive sign of the order of grace. 
Fourthly. ST II-II 63 addresses the vice contrary to distributive justice, namely, the distinction 
of persons. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, never mentions this issue; it is clearly 
something new. As a consequence, Aquinas refers surprisingly often to Sacred Scripture as an 
authority, as he does already in the first sed contra: ―Nothing but sin is forbidden in the divine 
law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, Dt. 1.17. Neither shall you respect any man’s 
person. Therefore respect of persons is a sin.‖15 The percentage is impressive: though the 
question contains only four articles, there are 19 quotations taken from Scripture, not taking 
into account the many citations from the Church Fathers. In contrast, we find only one 
citation of Aristotle. Admittedly, the distinction of persons is unjust not only because of 
positive divine precepts, but already by nature. However, the example shows the important 
impact of divine revelation in Aquinas‘s treatise on justice.  
Something similar holds true for the 10 questions of ST II-II 67-76 concerning unjust actions 
by speech, either injustice at court (on the part of the accused, the lawyer, the witnesses, etc), 
or injustice in daily speech. Not even these topics were mentioned by Aristotle, and as a result, 
there are only few quotations taken from the Nicomachean Ethics, but many from Scripture. 
                                                 
14
 Cf. ST I-II 91.4-5. 
15
 ST II-II 63.1 sed contra. 
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7.1.2 The Decalogue as Model for the Structure of the Treatise on Justice 
 
Hitherto we have mentioned some observations that suggest a theological context for the 
treatise on justice. In what follows, we want to show that the Ten Commandments, which are 
determined by the ultimate question (q. 122) as ―the precepts of justice,‖ provide the general 
structure of the whole section.
16
 
 
 
a) The Ten Commandments as Precepts of Justice 
 
The first article of q. 122 explains why the Decalogue contains exclusively precepts of justice. 
Of course, the divine law combines all virtues (it commands external acts as well as internal). 
But the Ten Commandments are quasi-first principles in practical matters, to which ―natural 
reason assents immediately as to most evident principles.‖ 17  Most evident are the basic 
obligations of the agent in regard to the other. ―In matters which relate to himself it would 
seem at first glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes; whereas in 
matters that refer to another it appears manifestly that man is under obligation to render to 
another that which is his due.‖18 For these reasons, the Decalogue as most basic principles 
contains only precepts about justice. 
Regarding the single precepts, Aquinas gives the following division: ―The first three precepts 
are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of 
piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining [precepts] are about justice 
commonly so called, which is observed among equals.‖19 The expression pars iustitia is taken 
in its proper sense: The first three commandments, though the noblest ones, are not about 
justice in its proper sense, but about religion as its potential part since it is impossible to attain 
a status of equality regarding God. The same is true in the case of the fourth commandment, 
                                                 
16
 Mongillo has pointed out the structure of the treatise on justice in ST II-II according to the pattern of the 
Decalogue. Even if we don‘t agree with him in all particular points, we owe much to that seminal piece of work. 
See Mongillo, ―La struttura del ‗De iustitia‘,‖ 355-377. 
17
 ST II-II 122.1: ―Praecepta decalogi sunt prima praecepta legis, et quibus statim ratio naturalis assentit sicut 
manifestissimis.‖ 
18
 ST II-II 122.1: ―In his quae spectant ad seipsum, videtur primo aspectui quod homo sit sui dominus, et quod 
liceat ei facere quodlibet; sed in his quae sunt ad alterum, manifeste apparet quod homo est alteri obligatus ad 
reddendum ei quod debet.‖ 
19
 ST II-II 122.1: ―Tria prima praecepta sunt de actibus religionis, quae est potissima pars iustitiae; quartum 
autem praeceptum est de actu pietatis, quae est pars iustitiae secunda; alia vero sex dantur de actibus iustitiae 
communiter dictae, quae inter aequales attenditur.‖ 
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about piety regarding one‘s parents. The other precepts concern justice in its proper sense, i.e., 
iustitia communiter dicta. Of course, the lapidary formulation of six rules does not make 
explicit mention of all kinds of injustice. Nevertheless, all particular cases of injustice are 
reducible to these ―more common and principal precepts.‖20 
The distinction returns in the final article of q. 122: 
 
Just as by the parts of justice man pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom 
he is bound for some special reason, so also by justice properly so called, he pays that which is 
due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man pays 
what is due to God, and after the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is 
due to his parents, which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any special reason, it 
was necessary to give consequently certain precepts pertaining to justice in the proper sense, 
which pays to all indifferently what is due to them.
21
 
 
This quotation adds the explanation that the fourth precept, which is verbatim only about the 
debts towards one‘s parents, includes all obligations regarding individuals to whom the agent 
is connected by special relations, as relatives, teachers, benefactors, friends, etc.
22
  
It is noteworthy that the precepts make no determination regarding distributive justice, though 
it belongs to justice in the strict sense. The reason is simple: The Ten Commandments contain 
the most common principles of human actions, but distributive justice is primarily in the 
                                                 
20
 ST II-II 122.6 ad 2: ―Omnia alia nocumenta quae proximis inferuntur, possunt ad ista reduci quae his 
praeceptis prohibentur tanquam ad quaedam communiora et principaliora.‖ And further on, he explains: ―Nam 
omnia nocumenta quae in personam proximi inferuntur, intelliguntur prohiberi in homicidio, sicut in 
principaliori. Quae vero inferuntur in personam coniunctam, et maxime per modum libidinis, intelliguntur 
prohiberi simul cum adulterio. Quae vero pertinent ad damna in rebus illata, intelliguntur prohiberi simul cum 
furto. Quae autem pertinet ad locutionem, sicut detractiones, blasphemiae, et si qua huiusmodi, intelliguntur 
prohiberi falso testimonio, quod directius iustitiae contrariatur.― (Ibid.). 
21
 ST II-II 122.6: ―Sicut per partes iustitiae debitum redditur aliquibus determinatis personis quibus homo ex 
aliqua speciali ratione obligatur, ita etiam per iustitiam proprie dictam aliquis debitum reddit communiter 
omnibus. Et ideo post tria praecepta pertinentia ad religionem, qua redditur debitum deo et post quartum 
praeceptum, quod est pietatis, qua redditur parentibus debitum, in quo includitur omne debitum quod ex aliqua 
speciali ratione debetur; necesse fuit quod ponerentur consequenter alia praecepta pertinentia ad iustitiam proprie 
dictam, quae indifferenter omnibus debitum reddit.‖ Similar in ST II-II 122.5 ad 2 about the fourth precept: ―In 
hoc praecepto, quod est de honoratione parentum, intelligitur mandari quidquid pertinet ad reddendum debitum 
cuicumque personae, sicut secundarium includitur in principali.‖ 
22
 ST II-II 122.5 ad 2 ―Per prius debetur aliquid parentibus quam patriae et consanguineis, quia per hoc quod 
sumus a parentibus nati, pertinent ad nos et consanguinei et patria. Et ideo, cum praecepta decalogi sint prima 
praecepta legis, magis per ea ordinatur homo ad parentes quam ad patriam vel ad alios consanguineos. 
Nihilominus tamen in hoc praecepto, quod est de honoratione parentum, intelligitur mandari quidquid pertinet ad 
reddendum debitum cuicumque personae, sicut secundarium includitur in principali.‖ 
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leader of a community, and only derivatively in the subject.
23
 Consequently, the Decalogue 
determines nothing on that score.
24
 
With this description of the Decalogue as a list of the most basic precepts of justice, we are 
prepared to return to the structure of our treatise in the Secunda secundae. It will be striking to 
see that Aquinas exactly follows the construction of the Ten Commandments in organizing 
the section on justice. 
 
 
b) Qq. 64-76: Commandments Five through Ten 
 
ST II-II 61 opens the long section on distributive and commutative justice as subjective parts 
of proper justice. There follows a question on restitution as a proper act of justice, and 
afterwards the discussion of the opposed vices. This part begins in q. 63 with the distinction 
of persons as contrary to distributive justice; the prologue of q. 64 introduces the long 
discussion of vices contrary to commutative justice: 
 
Subsequently it is necessary to consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. And firstly 
it is necessary to consider those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary 
commutations, and secondly those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. 
Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one‘s 
neighbor against his will, and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By 
deed when one‘s neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person connected with 
him, or in his possessions.
25
 
 
The preface may be misleading: its reference to the distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary acts arouses some connotations of the Aristotelian discussion in Nicomachean 
Ethics III, and in ST II-II 61.3 Aquinas classifies the matter of distributive and commutative 
justice by the Aristotelian criterion of voluntary and involuntary acts, by secrete and public 
actions, etc. However, although these concepts are present in the general structure of the 
                                                 
23
 Cf. ST II-II 61.1 ad 3. 
24
 ST II-II 122.1 ad 3: ―Ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune oportet diversimode dispensari secundum 
hominum diversitatem. Et ideo non fuerunt ponenda inter praecepta decalogi, sed inter praecepta iudicialia.‖  
25
 ST II-II 64 prologus: ―Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis commutativae iustitiae. Et primo 
considerandum est de peccatis quae committuntur circa involuntarias commutationes; secundo, de peccatis quae 
committuntur circa commutationes voluntarias. Committuntur autem peccata circa involuntarias commutationes 
per hoc quod aliquod nocumentum proximo infertur contra eius voluntatem, quod quidem potest fieri dupliciter, 
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following questions, they are undeniably integrated into, orientated towards, and structured by 
the divine law. A comparison of q. 64 to 78 and the Decalogue reveals the following 
accordance: 
 
Structure in the Secunda secundae Decalogue 
q. 64  
about murder  
q. 65 
about the other injuries to the person 
5
th
 commandment 
q. 65.4 ad 3 – at the end of the third reply: 
―About adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also 
to chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on temperance.‖26 
6
th
 commandment 
q. 66 
about theft and robbery 
7
th
 commandment 
q. 67 prologus 
―We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice 
that consists in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider 
first those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and second 
harmful words uttered extra-judicially.‖27 (See qq. 67-76) 
8
th
 commandment 
Figure 15 
 
Some annotations  
At first glance, the absence of a discussion on adultery seems to contradict our thesis. But the 
remark in ST II-II 65.4 ad 3 explains why adultery is treated more aptly later on in the context 
of temperance. In this way, the short notice placed at the end of the discussion about injuries 
inflicted on other persons (the final sentence of the final reply) is rather a confirmation than a 
counter-argument for our claim. Aquinas anticipates the expectation of the reader that the 
discussion should continue with the 6
th
 commandment about adultery, and therefore he 
justifies the omission at this point. 
                                                                                                                                                        
scilicet facto, et verbo. Facto quidem, cum proximus laeditur vel in persona propria; vel in persona coniuncta; 
vel in propriis rebus.‖ 
26
 ST II-II 65.4 ad 3: ―De adulterio tamen, quod non solum iustitiae, sed etiam castitati opponitur, erit locus infra 
agendi in tractatu de temperantia.‖ 
27
 ST II-II 67 prologus: ―Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis commutativae iustitiae quae consistunt in 
verbis in quibus laeditur proximus. Et primo, de his quae pertinent ad iudicium; secundo, de nocumentis 
verborum quae fiunt extra iudicium.‖ 
Chapter 7. Justice as Infused Virtue in the Treatise on Justice in ST II-II 
 409 
Further, the discussion of injustice in speech quotes the 8
th
 commandment only at an almost 
hidden position (ST II-II 70.4); moreover the section contains a greater number of examples of 
unjust actions than of the rendering of false testimony. However, this objection hinges on our 
constrained interpretation of the 8
th
 precept: For Aquinas it is neither limited to the prohibition 
of telling lies, nor are lies its first concern; its proper meaning consists in preventing any 
injury for the other committed by words.
28
 In this way he describes the 8
th
 commandment 
generally as prohibiting any ―nocumentum oris,‖ 29  and thereby it covers all acts which 
―pertain to speech.‖30 Given such guidelines, qq. 67-76 fit perfectly to the 8th commandment.  
What about the 9
th
 and 10
th
 commandments, regarding the prohibition of concupiscence? 
Apparently there are no additional questions concerning the two ultimate precepts of the 
Decalogue. This lack can be justified through other remarks of Aquinas. The prohibition of 
external acts includes the prohibition of the corresponding internal acts. Only the human law – 
because of its imperfection – leaves unpunished the mere internal acts.31 Properly speaking, 
however, the interdiction of an external act contains inclusively the interdiction to desire it 
internally.
32
 Therefore, the 6
th
 and the 7
th
 commandments already the 9
th
 and 10
th
 
commandment.  
If there are nonetheless two special precepts, it is for the following reasons:  
 
The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth are in themselves objects of the appetite, 
in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful goods. And therefore it was 
necessary not only to forbid their deeds but also their desires. But murder and falsehood are in 
themselves horrible things, since the neighbor and truth are loved by nature and are not desired 
for the sake of something else. Consequently, regarding murder and false testimony it was not 
necessary to prohibit sins of the heart but only sins of deed.
33
 
                                                 
28
 In ST II-II 70.4 Aquinas explicitly distinguishes the sinfulness of committing false testimony as committing an 
act of injustice (by damaging the other) and as speaking against truth. Therefore, the topic of lies is not discussed 
at all in that context (but as a potential part of justice in ST II-II 110). 
29
 ST I-II 100.5. 
30
 ST II-II 122.6 ad 2: ―pertinent ad locutionem.‖ See also ST I-II 100.11 where Aquinas – reading the Decalogue 
as very principles of all moral precepts – attributes other precepts to the 8th commandment: ―Octavo vero 
praecepto, quod est de prohibitione falsi testimonii, additur prohibitio falsi iudicii, secundum illud Exod. XXIII, 
nec in iudicio plurimorum acquiesces sententiae, ut a veritate devies; et prohibitio mendacii, sicut ibi subditur, 
mendacium fugies; et prohibitio detractionis, secundum illud Levit. XIX, non eris criminator et susurro in 
populis.‖ 
31
 See ST I-II 100.9. 
32
 In sent. III 37.2A ad 1 ―Quamvis in praeceptis negativis privetur actus exterior potius quam ponatur; includitur 
tamen actus rationis eligentis repressionem cupiditatis vel concupiscentiae, quae ad actus prohibitos inclinabat.‖ 
33
 ST I-II 100.5 ad 5: ―Delectatio adulterii, et utilitas divitiarum, sunt propter seipsa appetibilia, inquantum 
habent rationem boni delectabilis vel utilis. Et propter hoc oportuit in eis prohiberi non solum opus, sed etiam 
concupiscentiam. Sed homicidium et falsitas sunt secundum seipsa horribilia, quia proximus et veritas naturaliter 
amantur, et non desiderantur nisi propter aliud. Et ideo non oportuit circa peccatum homicidii et falsi testimonii 
prohibere peccatum cordis, sed solum operis.‖ See likewise ST II-II 122.6 ad 4: ―Homicidium secundum se non 
est concupiscibile, sed magis horribile, quia non habet de se rationem alicuius boni. Sed adulterium habet 
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This suffices for our account of the second table of the Decalogue. Something analogue can 
be shown for the first three precepts regarding God and the fourth commandment about piety. 
 
 
c) Qq. 81-101: The First through Forth Commandments  
 
The influence of the Decalogue-schema remains evident also in the subsequent discussion of 
the potential parts of justice. We find the following structure:  
 
Structure in the Secunda secundae Decalogue 
qq. 81-100 
about religion and its internal acts 
qq. 84-91 
the external acts of religion 
3
rd
 commandment 
qq. 92-96 
about superstition 
2
nd
 commandment 
qq. 97-100 
about irreligiosity 
1
st
 commandment 
  
qq. 101-108 
about piety (q. 101) 
subsequently: annexed virtues such as observance, dulia, obedience, 
gratitude etc (qq. 102-108) 
4
th
 commandment 
Figure 16 
 
When Aquinas explains the first three precepts of the Decalogue, he often interprets the first 
two as removing the obstacles to the true religion, and the third as introducing the right 
                                                                                                                                                        
aliquam rationem boni, scilicet delectabilis. Furtum etiam habet rationem alicuius boni, scilicet utilis. Bonum 
autem de se habet rationem concupiscibilis. Et ideo fuit specialibus praeceptis prohibenda concupiscentia furti et 
adulterii, non autem concupiscentia homicidii.‖ Alike in In sent. III 37.2B ad 4. 
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cultus.
34
 In ST I-II 100.6 (whether the Ten Commandments of the Decalogue are fittingly 
ordered), he undertakes a further specification between the first and the second precept:  
 
It was necessary that by the precepts of the Decalogue man be directed first of all to God . . . 
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that man should be 
subjected to him faithfully, by having nothing in common with his enemies. The second is that 
he should show him reverence. The third, that he should offer him service. Thus, in an army, it 
is a greater sin for a soldier to be unfaithful and make a compact with the enemy, than to 
commit some act of irreverence toward the commander, and this is also graver than if he is 
found wanting in some point of service to him.
35
 
 
It is a parallel structure to that of commutative justice as represented in the second table, 
which begins with the worst offense (murder, fifth commandment) and continues through to 
concupiscence (ninth and tenth commandment). Likewise, the first commandment prohibits 
the greatest hindrance to a true cultus, i.e., the general refusal of God‘s primacy or 
irreligiosity. The second commandment prohibits irreverent actions in regard to God, i.e., 
superstition, which, however, includes principally the recognition of God‘s privileges. Once 
these obstacles are removed, the third commandment prescribes positively the correct cult. 
Hence, the divine ―pedagogy‖ follows the order of generation of the virtue of religion; first 
the removal of all obstacles, then the institution of the positive to which they are opposed. In 
the Secunda secundae, however, Aquinas orders morals by the various virtues, and from there 
goes on to discuss the vices as a defect of man‘s ultimum posse. It is for this reason that 
Aquinas has to reverse the order of the three first commandments in his discussion of religion. 
Accepting this change, the structure of ST II-II 81-100 again reveals a surprising congruence 
with Aquinas‘s others descriptions of the first table of the Decalogue.  
The article about the third commandment in ST II-II 122 distinguishes between an internal 
and an external divine cultus.  
 
Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God. And just as the divine scriptures teach 
interior worship under the similitude of certain corporal things, so external worship is given to 
God by some sensible signs. And since man is more induced to pay interior worship, 
consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Spirit, it was 
                                                 
34
 E.g. In sent. III 37.2C; ST I-II 100.6; ST II-II 122.2-3. 
35
 ST I-II 100.6: ―Primo oportuit per praecepta decalogi hominem ordinare ad deum. . . . Inter ipsa autem per 
quae ordinamur in deum, primum occurrit quod homo fideliter ei subdatur, nullam participationem cum inimicis 
habens. Secundum autem est quod ei reverentiam exhibeat. Tertium autem est quod etiam famulatum impendat. 
Maiusque peccatum est in exercitu si miles, infideliter agens, cum hoste pactum habeat, quam si aliquam 
irreverentiam faciat duci, et hoc est etiam gravius quam si in aliquo obsequio ducis deficiens inveniatur.‖ 
Chapter 7. Justice as Infused Virtue in the Treatise on Justice in ST II-II 
 412 
necessary to give a precept of the law regarding the exterior worship that consists in sensible 
signs.
36
 
 
In agreement with this description, the treatise on religion begins with a general outline of 
religion as such (q. 81). Q. 82 continues: ―Subsequently, it is necessary to consider the acts of 
religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as said above, are more principal; 
secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of religion 
are seemingly devotion and prayer.‖37 There follow questions on devotion (q. 82) and prayer 
(q. 83), and subsequently some questions about the external cultic acts (qq. 84-91).
38
 Even the 
sequence of these external acts follows a theological pattern, taken from a previous discussion 
of the divine law: In ST I-II 101, the question about the precepts regarding the divine cultus in 
the Old Law, St. Thomas introduced a fourfold distinction:  
 
The ceremonial precepts are ordained to the worship of God. Now in this worship we may 
consider the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship 
consists specially in sacrifices, which are offered up in reverence of God. The instruments of 
worship refer to the sacred things, such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. Regarding 
the worshippers two points may be considered: Their institution for the divine worship, which 
is effected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of the ministers, and to this the 
sacraments refer. Further, their particular mode of life, whereby they are distinguished from 
those who do not worship God. And to this pertain the observances, for instance, in matters of 
food, clothing, and so forth.
39
 
 
This fourfold categorization of the ceremonial precepts – sacrifices, holy things, sacraments 
and observations – provides the structure of the discussion of external cultic acts in the ST II-
II 84-91. Aquinas discusses in this section: 
                                                 
36
 ST II-II 122.4: ―Ad religionem autem pertinet cultum deo exhibere. Sicut autem in scriptura divina traduntur 
nobis sub aliquibus corporalium rerum similitudinibus, ita cultus exterior deo exhibetur per aliquod sensibile 
signum. Et quia ad interiorem cultum, qui consistit in oratione et devotione, magis inducitur homo ex interiori 
spiritus sancti instinctu, praeceptum legis dandum fuit de exteriori cultu secundum aliquod sensibile signum.‖ 
37
 ST II-II 82 prologus: ―Deinde considerandum est de actibus religionis. Et primo, de actibus interioribus, qui, 
secundum praedicta, sunt principaliores; secundo, de actibus exterioribus, qui sunt secundarii. Interiores autem 
actus religionis videntur esse devotio et oratio.‖  
38
 ―Deinde considerandum est de exterioribus actibus latriae.‖ (ST II-II 84 prologus). 
39
 ST I-II 101.4: ―Caeremonialia praecepta ordinantur ad cultum dei. In quo quidem cultu considerari possunt et 
ipse cultus, et colentes, et instrumenta colendi. Ipse autem cultus specialiter consistit in sacrificiis, quae in dei 
reverentiam offeruntur. Instrumenta autem colendi pertinent ad sacra, sicut est tabernaculum, et vasa, et alia 
huiusmodi. Ex parte autem colentium duo possunt considerari. Scilicet et eorum institutio ad cultum divinum, 
quod fit per quandam consecrationem vel populi, vel ministrorum, et ad hoc pertinent sacramenta. Et iterum 
eorum singularis conversatio, per quam distinguuntur ab his qui deum non colunt, et ad hoc pertinent 
observantiae, puta in cibis et vestimentis et aliis huiusmodi.‖ Admittedly, the concrete determinations of that law 
are abolished in the New Covenant; however, the general ordering of the determining matter remains certainly 
valid. 
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q. 84 
adoration  
(as observance) 
―whereby one uses one‘s body to reverence 
God.‖40 
qq. 85-88 sacrifices 
―acts whereby some external thing is offered 
to God.‖41 
qq. 89-91 sacraments 
―acts whereby something belonging to God is 
assumed.‖42 
q. 99 
sacrilege 
(as opposite to sacra) 
acts ―whereby sacred things are treated with 
irreverence.‖43 
Figure 17 
 
After this follows the section on vices contrary to the divine cult (qq. 92-100). The questions 
are clearly two-parted: ―Subsequently we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. 
First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship to God; secondly, 
we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion.‖44 The first part (qq. 
92-96) corresponds to the second commandment regarding irreverence: irreverent agents may 
acknowledge God‘s primacy but fail in regard to the worship that is due. This is the case with 
superstition (q. 92), undue cult (q. 93); idololatry (q. 94), divinization (q. 95), and vain 
observance (q. 96). The remaining questions (qq. 97-100) discuss the vices that are prohibited 
by the first commandment. ―We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, 
through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they come under 
the head of irreligion.‖45 This section contains the temptation of God (q. 97), perjury (q. 98), 
sacrilege (q. 99), and simony (q. 100). 
In this way the sequence on religion reveals an intrinsic congruence with the structure of the 
first three commandments.  
                                                 
40
 ST II-II 84 prologus: ―per quam aliquis suum corpus ad deum venerandum exhibet.‖ 
41
 ST II-II 84 prologus: ―de illis actibus quibus aliquid de rebus exterioribus deo offertur.‖ Similarly the prologue 
of q. 85. 
42
 ST II-II 84 prologus: ―de actibus quibus ea quae dei sunt assumuntur.‖ Similar the prolog of q. 89.  
43
 ST II-II 99 prologus: ―quibus rebus sacris irreverentia exibetur.‖ We might suggest that Aquinas is content 
with a negative description of the misuse of sacra and omits a positive determination, since thanks to the 
evangelical freedom the ecclesiastical authority determines these practical questions for each time and place – in 
contrast to the Old Law. 
44
 ST II-II 92 prologus: ―Deinde considerandum est de vitiis religioni oppositis. Et primo, de illis quae cum 
religione conveniunt in hoc quod exhibent cultum divinum; secundo, de vitiis manifestam contrarietatem ad 
religionem habentibus.‖ 
45
 ST II-II 97 prologus: ―Deinde considerandum est de vitiis religioni oppositis per religionis defectum, quae 
manifestam contrarietatem ad religionem habent, unde sub irreligiositate continentur.‖ 
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In due order, the discussion continues in q. 101 with piety as ―justice‖ regarding one‘s parents. 
The relation to the fourth commandment is obvious. Moreover, as seen above, for Aquinas the 
fourth commandment contains all kinds of restitutions which answer a special obligation.
46
 
Consequently, his examination of the potential parts of justice continues in qq. 102-108 with 
virtues such as observance, obedience, gratitude etc. We can recognize in these appendices 
the repercussion of Aquinas‘s interpretation of the divine law. 
 
Why the reversed order? 
The treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae follows the reverse order of the Decalogue: St. 
Thomas first treats precepts 5 through 8 (and implicitly 9 and 10), and then 1 through 4, again 
with an interior reversion 3-2-1. The section begins with actions between two equals (qq. 64-
78), and adds afterwards man‘s relation to his Creator (qq. 81-100) and to his parents (q. 101). 
Why this transposition? 
We want to suggest an explanation: Aquinas proceeds in his discussion from justice in its 
most proper sense, i.e. distributive and commutative justice, to other virtues which fail to 
realize the full ratio of justice, i.e., religion, piety, and other annexed virtues. But within this 
composition we clearly recognize the structure of the divine law. 
 
 
d) Further Remark: The Limited Function of Justice in ST II-II 
 
The whole treatise is characterized by the domination of negative precepts. It rather explains 
what man has to avoid than what he has to do. In particular, the first section, which concern 
the subjective parts of justice, discusses only two positive acts, namely, judgment and 
restitution, but a long list of vices that are prohibited. This finding fits perfectly to the modus 
of the Ten Commandments.  
 
Man is obligated generally to inflict injury on no one. Therefore, the negative precepts, which 
forbid those injuries which can be inflicted on one‘s neighbor, had to be given a place among 
the precepts of the Decalogue as general precepts. The duties, however, which we owe to our 
                                                 
46
 Cf. ST II-II 122.6; footnote 21. 
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neighbors are paid in different ways to different people. Thus, it was not fitting to include 
affirmative precepts concerning those duties among the precepts of the Decalogue.
47
 
 
Moreover, an interpretation of the treatise on justice as a ―commentary‖ to the Decalogue 
explains the obvious lack of a discussion of many issues which pertain to the concrete 
realization of justice. For example, the treatise does not contain an argument concerning the 
successful making of contracts, penal law, or international alliances; there is no debate about 
precepts for the government and politicians; distributive justice is – though not omitted – only 
touched at best. Even private relations regarding exchange are not deepened, and the case of 
contracts is limited to purchasing agreements and loans, and this only by prohibiting unjust 
deeds.  
It would be incorrect if one accused Aquinas of being unaware of these issues. In the 
introductory question about the ius, he distinguishes the ―iustum‖ between two citizens (ius 
simpliciter) from justice in the household and the family,
48
 and he is aware of the ius gentium, 
which could be used as the starting point for an international law.
49
 Moreover, in the context 
of the Old Law he presents a very detailed discussion of various interhuman relationships – 
between government and inferiors, between two citizens, towards foreigners, and within the 
family.
50
 In the Secunda secundae, however, such issues are absent. Why this reservation in 
entering into particular matters of justice? 
The Prima secundae distinguishes between moral precepts and their juridical determination. 
Whereas the former are consequences of human nature, the latter depend on a human or 
divine specification. ―The act of justice in general pertains to the moral precepts, but its 
determination in particular issues pertains to the judicial precepts.‖51 Consequently, human 
and divine laws differ in regard to the permanence of their legal force. ―Justice must always 
be observed. But the determination of things which are just because of a human or divine 
institution, may differ according to the different states of men.‖52 Hence, one may suggest that 
                                                 
47
 ST II-II 122.6 ad 1: ―Communiter ad hoc obligatur homo ut nulli inferat nocumentum. Et ideo praecepta 
negativa, quibus prohibentur nocumenta quae possunt proximis inferri, tanquam communia, fuerunt ponenda 
inter praecepta decalogi. Ea vero quae sunt proximis exhibenda, diversimode exhibentur diversis. Et ideo non 
fuerunt inter praecepta decalogi ponenda de his affirmativa praecepta.‖ See likewise ST I-II 100.5 ad 4 ―Statim 
ratio naturalis homini dictat quod nulli iniuriam faciat, et ideo praecepta prohibentia nocumentum, extendunt se 
ad omnes. Sed ratio naturalis non statim dictat quod aliquid sit pro alio faciendum, nisi cui homo aliquid debet.‖ 
48
 Cf. ST II-II 57.4. 
49
 Cf. ST II-II 57.3. 
50
 ST I-II 105; see section 6.3.2a. 
51
 ST I-II 99.4 ad 3: ―Actus iustitiae in generali pertinet ad praecepta moralia, sed determinatio eius in speciali 
pertinet ad praecepta iudicialia.‖ 
52
 ST I-II 104.3 ad 1: ―Iustitia quidem perpetuo est observanda. Sed determinatio eorum quae sunt iusta 
secundum institutionem humanam vel divinam, oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum statum.‖ 
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Aquinas refrained from the discussion of particular issues in order to guarantee a broader 
validity for the Summa. Its utility should not be limited to a particular state or to a specific 
period of history, but it should remain applicable for all times in its principal features.
53
 
However, if this argument is correct, St. Thomas should already omit the discussion of 
concrete particularities of justice in the Prima secundae. But he does not do so. Thus, we want 
to suggest a theological justification for Aquinas‘s approach in the Secunda secundae. 
Omitting a discussion of concrete issues – which have to be determined in the real life – is the 
only appropriate way of describing justice as an infused virtue. Let us remember ST I-II 
108.1-2 on determinations of the New Law regarding external acts: The Gospel only 
prescribes external acts that are required for the preservation of the order of charity, and 
prohibits acts that would destroy charity – i.e. the moral precepts, expressed as negative 
precepts. Regarding particular practical matters, however, it does not limit freedom It is for 
the secular and ecclesiastical authorities to determine these questions, adapting to the 
particular time and place. Following the assertion in De virt. card. 4 ad 5, infused virtues 
enable the graced agent to handle the ordinary matter of a specific moral virtue as tending 
therefrom (as terminus a quo) towards the supernatural end, but without providing a special 
capacity to do well in these matters as such.  
Hence, from the perspective of the New Law, it is almost to be expected that a theological 
discussion of justice will avoid entering into concrete questions which the Gospel has left to 
the determination of the human authority. This ―imprecision‖ is simply a consequence of the 
theological point of view.
54
 
The same is clear if we take into account the general limitation of infused moral virtues as 
found in section 1.2. Though they bestow a strong inclination to the right use of earthly things 
regarding man‘s attainment of his final end, they do not provide a specific perfection for 
handling these matters as the proper end. As a result, infused justice does not make a virtuous 
citizen in the Aristotelian sense who knows positively how to rule and lead the human city. It 
                                                 
53
 This is the conclusion of Mongillo: ―Nella Summa S. Tommaso non ha voluto esporre una teoria della 
giustizia la quale risentisse di una particolare situazione sociologica, ispirata a un ordinamento giuridico positivo. 
Egli ha inteso riflettere sui valori fondamentali del vivere associato dai quali scaturisse un criterio di 
orientamento generale per le situazioni contingenti. Espone la dottrina della giustizia non le determinazioni che 
riceve in un ordinamento particolare. Per questo si è ispirato alla più autorevole proposta di valori, quella del 
Decalogo.‖ (Mongillo, ―La struttura del ‗De iustitia‘,‖ 375). 
54
 Mongillo mentions rightly that the Decalogue ―offre un criterio dal quale non si dovrebbe prescindere 
nell‘impostazione di un discorso teologico sulla giustizia. La componente biblica del testo di S. Tommaso ci 
obbliga a impostare un discorso interpretativo rinnovato nelle prospettive e nelle ottiche.‖ (Ibid., 377). We want 
to admit the value of Mongillo‘s study on that score to its full amount. However, he was content with the mere 
observation that the structure of the treatise on justice follows the Decalogue. He did not assert any consequent 
implication for justice as virtue. At least he gave no indication concerning this matter. 
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only enables the Christian to live on earth in the human community without losing his general 
orientation towards God as the supernatural end. Such a virtuous agent might lack many 
positive qualities that would be helpful for promoting the common good of the human society. 
He might even remain inclined to destructive acts at first (by the lingering habits of former 
vices). Infused justice provides The Christian only the limited capability of living in 
community with his fellow-men without losing supernatural friendship with God.  
Precisely this understanding of the narrow function of infused justice fits perfectly to the fact 
that Aquinas limits his discussion of justice almost exclusively to an outline of prohibited 
unjust actions. The treatise defines justice primarily as avoiding injuring the other or the 
human community, but it omits a description of how a virtuous citizen should positively build 
up the human city. 
These observations make perfect sense if we suppose that in this treatise Aquinas is treating of 
infused justice. 
 
 
e) An Objection and the Need for a More Detailed Research 
 
We interpreted the limitation of the discussion to the basic principles of justice as an 
indication that its subject is an infused moral virtue. However, one could also interpret the 
observation in a different way. An objector may argue that the limitation of the discussion to 
the moral precepts is a downright proof that Aquinas is not speaking about infused justice; 
that he intends to conduct the discussion in a more general way as concerning justice as such. 
The treatise is indeed structured according to the divinely revealed Decalogue, but these 
precepts not already available to mere natural reason? 
We concede that the discussion of justice on the basis of the Ten Commandments is 
compatible with a natural virtue understood as a ―perfect acquired virtue‖ (see on this point 
section 2.3). Things are, however, less clear if justice is understood as a political virtue: 
Political justice requires rendering everyone his due according to the prescriptions of the civil 
law. In ST II-II 122, however, Aquinas clearly counts the 9
th
 and 10
th
 commandments as 
precepts of justice, not only in regard to eventual resulting acts, but already in regard to a 
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voluntary consent ―to delight‖55 in unjust acts. Further, though it is true that the Decalogue 
contains precepts that are available to natural reason, Aquinas does not portray them at the 
end of the treatise as moral precepts but on the contrary as ―first principles of the divine 
law.‖56 But the divine law is given explicitly for attaining the supernatural end.57 Hence, by 
referring to the Decalogue, St. Thomas obviously intends more than just an outline of the 
natural law. He himself invokes the order of charity mentioning that ―the precepts of the 
Decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Tim 1.5, that the end of the 
commandment is charity.‖58 Thus, it is clear that in this place the moral precepts bear an 
intrinsic order towards charity. This, however, is the exact function of infused justice, as we 
found in the previous chapters.
59
 
Nevertheless, it will be important to investigate whether there are more concrete indications 
that Aquinas is speaking about infused justice in the treatise. As to that, we will turn to the 
text itself. 
 
 
7.2 Apparent Indications of Infused Justice in ST II-II 58-79 
 
After having shown how Aquinas built up the whole treatise following the structure of the 
divine law, we want to advert to some contentual elements which are obvious indications of 
justice intended here as an infused virtue. 
 
 
                                                 
55
 See ST 122.6 ad 3: ‖Per praecepta prohibitiva concupiscentiae non intelligitur prohiberi primus motus 
concupiscentiae, qui sistit infra limites sensualitatis. Sed prohibetur directe consensus voluntatis qui est in opus 
vel in delectationem.‖ 
56
 ST 122.1 arg. 1 (affirmative): ―prima principia totius divinae legis.‖ 
57
 See ST I-II 91.4; 98.1; 99.1 and 2; 100.2 etc. 
58
 ST 122.1 ad 4: ―Praecepta decalogi pertinent ad caritatem sicut ad finem, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, finis 
praecepti caritas est.‖ 
59
 Very interesting on that score is Aquinas‘s commentary on Rom 13. There he clarifies how a Christian must 
live in interpersonal relationships without losing charity. And he does so by referring to the commandments of 
the second table of the Decalogue (see Super Rom. XIII 2). Thus, in this context, which is clearly theological, he 
uses exactly the same measure which is also relevant to the treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae.  
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7.2.1 The Determination of Just Actions by Human and Divine Laws 
 
In our reconstruction of infused justice in section 6, we reached the conclusion that the acts of 
infused commutative justice concern the ius naturale plus concrete determinations of the 
divine law. Whereas the Old Law contained many juridical precepts, the New Law only 
commands external acts insofar as they are indispensable for maintaining the internal order of 
charity, the ius naturale. The determination of further positive laws is left to the legitimate 
authority, civil as well as ecclesiastical. In conformity to that guideline, we found in the 
discussion of the juridical precepts in the Old Law in the Prima secundae a plenitude of 
quotations from Scriptures,
60
 whereas the articles about the New Law are quite restrained in 
this respect.
61
 Thus, for our present project we can make the following prognosis: Even if ST 
II-II 58-79 is about infused justice according to the measures of the New Law, we cannot 
expect many references to the divine law; rather we must look for a preeminence of the 
natural law (as moral precepts) and of the human law as its positive determinations. With this 
observation we have exhausted the horizon of expectation.  
The result of a statistic overview, however, is even more surprising: In the entire section 
Aquinas invokes the ius naturale extremely rarely;
62
 more often he mentions the human law, 
and – wholly unexpected – he refers most frequently to the divine law. Qq. 57 through 79 
contain 12 explicit references to the ―lex humana,‖ 63  but 15 to the ―lex divina.‖ 64  This 
observation is difficult to explain if one suggests a reading of the treatise as concerning 
acquired justice.  
Nevertheless, a cross-reading of the relevant texts brings out some tricky issues. 
 
 
                                                 
60
 ST I-II 105. 
61
 ST I-II 108.1-2. 
62
 In ST II-II 64.5 he mentions that suicide is against the natural law and against charity. Hence, he refers 
likewise to the supernatural order. In ST II-II 66.2 ad 1 he invokes the natural law for clarifying the right to own 
property. (―Secundum ius naturale non est distinctio possessionum, sed magis secundum humanum condictum, 
quod pertinet ad ius positivum.‖) In ST II-II 66.7 he argues that neither the human nor the divine law can 
abrogate the natural law. (―Ea quae sunt iuris humani non possunt derogare iuri naturali vel iuri divino.‖ See also 
ST I-II 95.2). Finally, in ST II-II 78.1 ad 3 he shows that the human law permits some acts that are unjust by 
nature. (―Philosophus, naturali ratione ductus, dicit, in I polit., quod usuraria acquisitio pecuniarum est maxime 
praeter naturam.‖). 
63
 ST II-II 57.1 arg. 3; 59.3 ad 2; 62.3 ad 1; 69.2 ad 1 (3 times); ad 2; 77.1 ad 1 (3 times);78.1 ad 1; ad 3. 
64
 ST II-II 57.1 arg. 3; ad 3; 57.2 ad 3; 59.3 ad 2; 62.3 arg. 1; 63.1 sed contra; 64.1 arg. 3 (2 times), 67.4 ad 1; 
77.1 ad 2 (2 times); 78.1 arg. 2; 79.1; 79.2 arg. 1; 79.3. 
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The role of the human law in the treatise on justice 
A discussion of justice, whether acquired or infused cannot refrain from referring to the 
human law, since Christians as well as pagan citizens must respect it. Therefore, it is 
impossible to determine from the presence of such citations whether the treatise is dealing 
with acquired or infused justice.  
However, the fact that Aquinas devotes a special article to the question whether a citizen in 
the state of grace is obliged to observe human laws, encourages the assumption that the 
treatise is about more than just pagan justice.  
 
By faith in Christ the order of justice is not suspended, but rather strengthened. Now the order 
of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, otherwise the status of human affairs 
could not be conserved. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation 
of obeying secular princes.
65
 
 
Some lines later, Aquinas even asserts that obedience to the civil authority is due to the divine 
law. ―Man is bound by divine law to obey man.‖66  
Admittedly, these quotations are not a demonstrative argument that the treatise concerns 
infused justice; however they demonstrate Aquinas‘s awareness of the graced agent within the 
context of these questions.  
 
The divine law as formulation and confirmation of the ius naturale 
In many cases Aquinas refers to the divine law for determining certain acts as ―iustum‖ which 
are already just by nature. In these cases, the divine law confirms and explicates the natural 
law (per modum conclusionis), but it does not create additional rights (per modum 
determinationis).
67
 For example, Aquinas quotes the lex divina for qualifying partiality as 
injustice. ―Nothing but sin is forbidden in the divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, 
Dt. 1.17: Neither shall you respect any man‘s person. Therefore, respect of persons is a sin.‖68 
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 ST II-II 104.6: ―Per fidem Christi non tollitur ordo iustitiae, sed magis firmatur. Ordo autem iustitiae requirit ut 
inferiores suis superioribus obediant, aliter enim non posset humanarum rerum status conservari. Et ideo per 
fidem Christi non excusantur fideles quin principibus saecularibus obedire teneantur.‖ 
66
 ST II-II 104.6 ad 2. The whole text: ―Lex vetus fuit figura novi testamenti, et ideo debuit cessare, veritate 
veniente. Non autem est simile de lege humana, per quam homo subiicitur homini. Et tamen etiam ex lege divina 
homo tenetur homini obedire.‖ 
67
 Cf. ST I-II 95.2. 
68
 ST 63.1 sed contra:―Nihil prohibetur in lege divina nisi peccatum. Sed personarum acceptio prohibetur Deut. I, 
ubi dicitur, non accipietis cuiusquam personam. Ergo personarum acceptio est peccatum.‖ 
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Thus, what is already a strict moral due (since mere reason acknowledges respect of person as 
unjust) becomes in addition a legal due by the divine law. 
Similarly in the case of suicide: Aquinas notes that suicide is unjust by nature because it 
implies injury against the human community (to which the agent belongs as part of the whole) 
as well as against God (since he is his image). Nevertheless, he also refers to the divine law, 
asserting that the suicide ―is to be punished according to the divine law as well as the human 
law.‖69  
We find the same line of argument in the case of choosing the right witnesses: St. Thomas 
first shows, why it is just by nature to demand several witnesses, and afterwards he confirms 
his thesis by invoking the divine law. ―Since the accused is the only one who denies, while 
several witnesses affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is reasonably established both by divine 
and by human law, that the assertion of several witnesses should be upheld.‖70 
 
Does Aquinas refer to the divine law as positive determinations of the ius naturale?  
Generally, the divine law as ius positivum is not limited to the explication and confirmation of 
the ius naturale; it can also provide an additional determination of certain actions as just or 
unjust. Concerning the question whether it is lawful for a judge to pass sentence that is 
contrary to what he knows to be the truth, Aquinas explains that a judge has to bring to 
account a twofold knowledge: In particular, the officially gathered documents concerning a 
concrete crime (e.g., the testimonies of witnesses), and in general his knowledge of ―the 
public laws, whether divine or human.‖71 In a similar way he replies to an objection: ―There is 
a place for the judge‘s mercy in matters that are left to the discretion of the judge, because it is 
due to the good man to reduce the punishment, as the philosopher says in Ethic V. But in 
matters that are determined according to divine or human laws, it is not left to him to show 
mercy.‖72 Both cases are clear: If a judge must pronounce a sentence for a crime for which the 
divine law foresaw a determined punishment, then he must judge according to that divine 
precept; the imposed punishment is just only because of the determination of the divine law. 
Aquinas actually gives an example in the very same article: ―It is said in Dt 13 concerning 
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 ST II-II 59.3 ad 2: ―Punitur tam secundum legem divinam quam secundum legem humanam.‖ 
70
 ST II-II 70.2: ―Cum reus sit unus qui negat, sed multi testes asserunt idem cum actore, rationabiliter institutum 
est, iure divino et humano, quod dicto testium stetur.‖ 
71
 ST II-II 67.2: ―per leges publicas vel divinas vel humanas.‖ 
72
 ST II-II 67.4 ad 1: ―Misericordia iudicis habet locum in his quae arbitrio iudicis relinquuntur, in quibus boni 
viri est ut sit diminutivus poenarum, sicut philosophus dicit, in V ethic. In his autem quae sunt determinata 
secundum legem divinam vel humanam, non est suum misericordiam facere.‖ 
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anyone who persuades a man to serve strange gods: Neither let your eye spare him to pity and 
conceal him, but you shall put him to death immediately. And about murder it is said in Dt 19: 
He shall die. You shall not pity him.‖73  
However, we should note that the example is given in the sed contra. Neither the body of the 
article, nor any of the replies discusses any concrete punishment determined by the divine law. 
And further, both examples belong to the judicial precepts of the Old Law which have been 
abolished since the advent of Christ.
74
 On the contrary, the New Law leaves the determination 
of those issues to the human authority,
75
 and many civil legislators have abandoned capital 
punishment today. Thus, even if it is possible to read the whole treatise as about justice 
according to the standard of the divine law, the references to the ceremonial law serve only as 
an example for a possible determination of the natural law which is, however, actually invalid. 
At this point our examination has reached an impasse: At first, we observed the paucity of 
references to the natural law over against the frequent citations of the divine law. Hence, we 
suggested a context of infused virtue. However, this argument itself also leads to the contrary 
conclusion, since the laws of the New Testament contain only the precepts of the natural law 
plus the positive law of the political and ecclesiastical authorities. Thus, the references to the 
divine law seem to be superfluous.What, then, is the actual significance of the repeated 
advertence to the lex divina in the context of justice? 
In order to suggest an answer, it is necessary to make a brief observation concerning the 
structure of the treatise: Before Aquinas opens his investigation of the different parts of 
justice, he handles in a special question the topic of judgment (q. 60), understood – first of all 
– as adjudication in court. What is the reason for the eminent position of the judgment, almost 
as a preface of the proper acts of justice? Does not every human act presuppose a right 
judgment?
76
 Justice in its proper sense governs the external interaction of two equal citizens 
insofar as ―both are under the ruler of the state.‖77 It therefore belongs to the essence of every 
act of justice to be judged – at least potentially – by the public authority; to be ―judgable‖ by 
a superior, independent of the subjective standpoint of the parties involved.
78
 This assertion is 
nothing else but a consequence of the objective determination of the ius: Its adequacy hinges 
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 ST II-II 67.4 sed contra: ―Dicitur Deut. XIII de eo qui persuadet servire diis alienis, non parcat ei oculus tuus 
ut miserearis et occultes eum, sed statim interficies eum. Et de homicida dicitur Deut. XIX, morietur, nec 
misereberis eius.‖ 
74
 ST I-II 104.3. 
75
 ST I-II 108.1-2. 
76
 Cf. ST I-II 13-16. 
77
 ST II-II 57.4: ―ambo sunt sub uno principe civitatis.‖ 
78
 Certainly not every act of justice has to be judged actually by an official judge. 
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neither on the subjective status of the agent, nor on his insight into his moral obligation; it is 
determined from the outside.
79
 
In this context Aquinas poses the question whether every judgment has to be passed according 
to a written law.
80
 He first repeats the distinction between natural and positive laws arguing 
that the written law contains both kinds but in different ways: ―The written law contains 
natural right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force, not from the law but 
from nature: whereas the written law both contains positive right, and establishes it by giving 
it the force of authority.‖81 Therefore, every judgment must be passed according to a written 
law.  
But why does Aquinas reckon the mere ius naturale apart from its positive formulation as 
insufficient for grounding a proper judgment? The problem is not the weakness of the natural 
right, but the special type of obligation introduced by the written form. In section 4.3 we 
summed up St. Thomas‘s teaching on legal and moral dues; obligations that stem from written 
laws, or from one‘s own reasonable insight into the justness of an action.82 Without a legal 
fixation, the fulfillment of an ius naturale depends on the agent‘s understanding and good will 
(in its proper sense). Thus, the insight in the ius naturale might guide the agent himself 
according to the moral due (and it is likewise the measure for constituting just laws by the 
human authority). But for an official judgment in a dispute between two agents, the unwritten 
ius naturale is an impracticable measure. Some questions later, Thomas gives an example: ―A 
man should keep any promise he makes to another man for the sake of honesty [secundum 
honestatem], and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man to be under a civil 
obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are requisite.‖83 And consequently 
St. Thomas demands the written laws as the basis of a judgment – i.e., a legal due. 
Unfortunately in ST II-II 60.5 Aquinas remains silent on which kind of written law he has in 
mind. However, we want to argue that it is both the human law as well as the divine law. In 
the subsequent questions, he mentions several cases in which the human law falls short in 
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 See ST II-II 59.2 ad 3, quoted in footnote 2. 
80
 ST II-II 60.5. 
81
 ST II-II 60.5: ―Nam legis scriptura ius quidem naturale continet, sed non instituit, non enim habet robur ex 
lege, sed ex natura. Ius autem positivum scriptura legis et continet et instituit, dans ei auctoritatis robur.‖ 
82
 Cf. ST I-II 99.5. 
83
 ST II-II 88.3 ad 1: ―Secundum honestatem ex qualibet promissione homo homini obligatur, et haec est 
obligatio iuris naturalis. Sed ad hoc quod aliquis obligetur ex aliqua promissione obligatione civili, quaedam alia 
requiruntur.― Similarly in ST II-II 78.2 ad 2, where Aquinas notes that only the legal due implies a ―civilis 
obligatio.‖ It is worthwhile to note that already in ST I-II 92.1 St. Thomas avoids referring to the natural law as 
the measure of human laws. Rather, he prefers the divine law as the standard: ―Si enim intentio ferentis legem 
tendat in verum bonum, quod est bonum commune secundum iustitiam divinam regulatum, sequitur quod per 
legem homines fiant boni simpliciter.‖ See on this point section 4.3.3. 
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qualifying and prohibiting certain deeds as unjust actions; the civil laws prevent the gravest 
offense but tolerates the minor ones. Therefore, if every judgment has to be passed on the 
basis of a written law, a discussion in reference to the human law would have to omit a 
treatment of those actions which, however, are actually discussed – not on the basis of the 
human law but in reference to the divine law. St. Thomas explicitly notes this difference, 
arguing that the divine law – as written law – provides the necessary basis for classifying 
these acts as unjust, even if they may be qualified as legal and just according to the measure 
of the human law: 
 
Human laws leave many things unpunished, that according to the divine judgment are sins, as, 
for example, simple fornication; because human law does not demand perfect virtue from man, 
which belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a number of people as human law has to 
direct. . . . Therefore, if the accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins 
indeed by inducing him to do what is illicit, yet the civil law does not punish this sin, and in 
this sense it is said to be licit.
84
 
 
Something analogous is asserted in the case of unjust transactions: The human law falls short 
of qualifying the deceitful trader as unjust, as long as the difference between the price and the 
worth of the good does not threaten the existence of the human community.
85
 Not so the 
divine law: ―The divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue. Hence, 
according to the divine law, it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice is not observed in 
buying and selling.‖ 86  In both cases, Aquinas refers to the divine law (or to the divine 
judgment) to justify the description of an act as iniustum that is already unjust by nature, 
whereas the human law fails to prohibit it. Why does Aquinas not simply make reference to 
the natural law? The reason is that, according to ST II-II 60.5, a lawful judgment is to be 
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 ST II-II 69.2 ad 1: ―Multa secundum leges humanas impunita relinquuntur quae secundum divinum iudicium 
sunt peccata, sicut patet in simplici fornicatione, quia lex humana non exigit ab homine omnimodam virtutem, 
quae paucorum est, et non potest inveniri in tanta multitudine populi quantam lex humana sustinere habet 
necesse. . . . Et ideo si reus in causa sanguinis corrumpat adversarium suum, peccat quidem inducendo eum ad 
illicitum, non autem huic peccato lex civilis adhibet poenam. Et pro tanto licitum esse dicitur.‖ Likewise the 
reply to the second objection: ―Accusator, si colludat cum reo qui noxius, est, poenam incurrit, ex quo patet quod 
peccat. Unde, cum inducere aliquem ad peccandum sit peccatum, vel qualitercumque peccati participem esse, 
cum apostolus dicat dignos morte eos qui peccantibus consentiunt, manifestum est quod etiam reus peccat cum 
adversario colludendo. Non tamen secundum leges humanas imponitur sibi poena, propter rationem iam dictam.‖ 
85
 ―Lex humana populo datur, in quo sunt multi a virtute deficientes, non autem datur solis virtuosis. Et ideo lex 
humana non potuit prohibere quidquid est contra virtutem, sed ei sufficit ut prohibeat ea quae destruunt 
hominum convictum; alia vero habeat quasi licita, non quia ea approbet, sed quia ea non punit. Sic igitur habet 
quasi licitum, poenam non inducens, si absque fraude venditor rem suam supervendat aut emptor vilius emat, 
nisi sit nimius excessus, quia tunc etiam lex humana cogit ad restituendum, puta si aliquis sit deceptus ultra 
dimidiam iusti pretii quantitatem.‖ (ST II-II 77.1 ad 1). 
86
 ST II-II 77.1 ad 1: ―Lex divina nihil impunitum relinquit quod sit virtuti contrarium. Unde secundum divinam 
legem illicitum reputatur si in emptione et venditione non sit aequalitas iustitiae observata.‖ 
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passed on the basis of a written law; but the natural law implies only a moral obligation and 
fails to establish an enforceable legal due.
87
 Thus, the repeated reference to the divine law 
instead of the natural law provides the necessary foundation for the qualification of just (or 
unjust) actions on the basis of a written law. And in fact, Aquinas elsewhere reduces all unjust 
acts to offences against the divine law. ―Whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary 
to the law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to 
something of the kind.‖88 
 
What does this discussion contribute to our project?  
Can we gain anything from our analysis of the usage of the divine law in the ST II-II 58-79 for 
the verification of infused justice as the subject of these questions? At first glance, the answer 
seems negative. The divine law in this context simply explicates the moral precepts and 
provides their written form; therefore one might suggest that we are dealing rather with 
acquired than infused justice. However, this conclusion would be too hasty. The frequent 
advertence to the divine law already proves that Thomas has more than simply acquired 
justice in mind;
89
 for the primary reason of the institution of the divine law was man‘s 
preparation for divine friendship.
90
 Moreover, if the treatise were concerned only with 
acquired virtue, Aquinas would be content to refer simply to the human law as the guiding 
principle. As seen in section 2.3, political justice aims at the preservation of the human 
common good; the principal content of acquired justice is the observation of the human law, 
which prevents all acts that would seriously hinder the development of the human city. We 
may repeat the quotation of the Prima secundae that correlates acquired justice and human 
laws: ―Human precepts justify according to acquired justice.‖91 Aquinas, however, makes use 
of the divine law in the context of justice; admittedly, as a confirmation of the natural law, but 
precisely in this way it surpasses by far the scope of acquired justice, which does not 
rigorously demand the observance of all natural rights.
92
 Thus, the use of the divine law as 
confirmation of the natural right makes absolutely sense in a discussion of justice as a virtue 
                                                 
87
 See quotation in footnote 83. 
88
 ST II-II 59.4 sed contra: ―Quicumque facit iniustum facit contra praeceptum legis dei, quia vel reducitur ad 
furtum, vel ad adulterium, vel ad homicidium; vel ad aliquid huiusmodi.‖ 
89
 There are some more references to the divine law which we have not yet discussed. For example ST II-II 79.1; 
79.2 (esp. ad 1); 79.3. 
90
 ―Quia homo ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem naturalis facultatis 
humanae, . . . ideo necessarium fuit ut supra legem naturalem et humanam, dirigeretur etiam ad suum finem lege 
divinitus data.― (ST I-II 91.4). 
91
 ST I-II 100.12 ad 3: ―Praecepta legis humanae iustificant iustitia acquisita.‖ 
92
 ST I-II 63.2 ad 2. 
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regarding external acts according to the order of grace. Hence, the results of the present 
analysis perfectly correspond to our reconstruction of infused justice in chapters 5 and 6. 
On the basis of this conclusion, the next step of our research immediately suggests itself: The 
New Testament calls for only the moral precepts, enforced by the divine law, while leaving 
the determination of concrete issues either to the individual agent or to the civil authority, i.e. 
the human law, or to the ecclesiastical authority. ―These determinations . . . are left to the 
decision of man; some relating to inferiors, as when they pertain to the individual; others, 
relating to superiors, temporal or spiritual, as when they pertain to the common usefulness.‖93 
Precepts of the spiritual authority (i.e., the Church) are binding only for graced agents. Does 
this statement carry some implications for the treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae? We 
will examine this issue in the following chapter.  
 
 
7.2.2 Legal Determinations by the Ecclesiastical Authority 
 
If the treatise on justice is about infused justice, there should be some references to the divine 
law – and indeed, there are. If the just acts are determined by the divine law of the New 
Testament, they should be limited to the explication of the moral precepts – and, as we have 
seen, they are. But the freedom from judicial precepts, which is given by the New Law, can 
become again restricted by determinations of the civil authority as well as of the ecclesiastical 
superiors. The first point is – as mentioned above – clear: Infused justice must respect the 
human law to its full extend (at least if it is in agreement with the natural law). But what about 
legal determinations of the Church? Are there in the Secunda secundae some acts which are 
qualified as iustum only because of a previous specification by the ecclesiastical authority? In 
the later question on obedience, Aquinas clearly asserts such a possibility. In an objection, he 
even suggests that any precepts of a prelate should be considered directly as divine commands. 
―The precepts of prelates must be considered as precepts of God.‖94 In the reply he limits the 
power of the superiors, but he concedes that they can establish an obliging law ad aliqua 
determinate. ―Man is subject to God simply regarding all things, both internal and external, 
and therefore he is bound to obey him in all things. But inferiors are not subject to their 
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 ST I-II 108.2: ―Istae determinationes . . . relinquuntur humano arbitrio; quaedam quidem quantum ad subditos, 
quae scilicet pertinent singillatim ad unumquemque; quaedam vero ad praelatos temporales vel spirituales, quae 
scilicet pertinent ad utilitatem communem.‖ 
94
 ST II-II 104.5 arg. 2: ―Praecepta praelati sunt reputanda tanquam praecepta dei.‖  
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superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way. And in this respect, 
the superior stands between God and his subjects.‖95 Thus, the principle is clear. Are there 
also, however, concrete hints in the treatise on justice? 
There are. Throughout the section we find both the recognition of the common principle that 
the Church can determine positive rights, and concrete examples of its application. 
Regarding the question whether a prelate of the Church can interfere in earthly affairs, i.e., 
whether he can determine precepts about non-spiritual things, the answer is unequivocal: ―The 
secular power is subject to the spiritual as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently, it is 
not a usurped judgment if the spiritual authority interferes in temporal matters which are 
subject to the secular authority or which have been committed to the spiritual by the temporal 
authority.‖96  For Aquinas, the spiritual prelate enjoys a certain superiority over the civil 
authority, even regarding earthly affairs. So, for example, when Pope Leo subjected himself to 
the emperor, it happened ―by his own spontaneous human decision,‖ but not by legal 
obligation.
97
 Hence, it is clear that Aquinas assumes in the context of justice that the Church 
may establish binding laws.
98
 
We will list some concrete cases in which a particular action is just only because of a 
determination of ecclesiastical law. For example, clerics are not permitted to execute capital 
punishment or an imposed sentence of mutilation; if they did so it would be unjust.
99
 Aquinas 
mentions some reasons of convenience, but finally the prohibition depends on a law of the 
Church. Further, the denunciation of an observed crime counts as a just act even if it is made 
only in oral form if it is made to the church-authority (normally the written form is 
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 ST II-II 104.5 ad 2: ―Deo subiicitur homo simpliciter quantum ad omnia, et interiora et exteriora, et ideo in 
omnibus ei obedire tenetur. Subditi autem non subiiciuntur suis superioribus quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad 
aliqua determinate. Et quantum ad illa, medii sunt inter deum et subditos.‖  
96
 ST II-II 60.6 ad 3: ―Potestas saecularis subditur spirituali sicut corpus animae. Et ideo non est usurpatum 
iudicium si spiritualis praelatus se intromittat de temporalibus quantum ad ea in quibus subditur ei saecularis 
potestas, vel quae ei a saeculari potestate relinquuntur.‖ 
97
 See ST II-II 67.1 ad 2: ―In rebus humanis aliqui propria sponte possunt se subiicere aliorum iudicio, quamvis 
non sint eis superiores, sicut patet in his qui compromittunt in aliquos arbitros. Et inde est quod necesse est 
arbitrium poena vallari, quia arbitri, qui non sunt superiores, non habent de se plenam potestatem coercendi. Sic 
igitur et christus propria sponte humano iudicio se subdidit, sicut etiam et leo papa iudicio imperatoris se 
subdidit.‖ 
98
 It is important to note that the focus of our research does not require an evaluation of Aquinas‘s position on 
that score. Certainly one could raise some objections to his description of the relation of the Church and the 
political authority. Finally, it would be anachronistic to apply his doctrine to the self-understanding of the 
modern state. These reservations, however, do not undermine our principal argument, which only concerns the 
obvious fact that in the treatise on justice Aquinas is aware of the possibility of the ecclesiastical authority 
interfering in earthly affairs. We are note arguing about the legitimacy of his claim. We simply mention that he 
himself makes that claim. 
99
 ST II-II 64.4, also ad 3. 
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required).
100
 Further, the Decrets constitute special conditions for a lawful accusation against 
the high officials of the Church: To condemn a bishop requires 72 witnesses, a cardinal priest 
of the Roman Church 64, a cardinal deacon 27; the condemnation of clergies with minor 
ordinations (as subdeacons, acolytes, exorcists, readers and doorkeepers) require 7 witnesses; 
without adherence to these determinations, a judgment is illegal.
101
 Further, for a monk or a 
priest it is unlawful to accept the office of advocate – except in cases of necessity. 102 
Moreover, they must abstain from trade, commercial activities, and business affairs (except in 
the case of necessity).
103
 Priests are legally obliged to celebrate the holy Mass each day.
104
 
All of the cases we have mentioned have in common that a specific act is iustum only because 
of an ecclesiastical determination. Under the conditions of mere political justice, it would be 
impossible to classify an offence against one of these precepts as something unjust.  
Of special interest is a remark regarding the question whether man is obliged to press charges 
against someone whose crime is known to him.
105
 After some distinctions, Aquinas affirms 
the issue under two conditions: first, if the crime threatens the common good, and secondly, if 
the accuser is able to prove his accusation. If he cannot furnish the proof, he is dispensed from 
the obligation of pressing charges. So far the issue is simple. The first objection argues 
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 ST II-II 68.2 ad 3: ―Denuntiator non obligat se ad probandum, unde nec punitur si probare nequiverit. Et 
propter hoc in denuntiatione non est necessaria scriptura, sed sufficit si aliquis verbo denuntiet ecclesiae, quae ex 
officio suo procedet ad fratris emendationem.‖ 
101
 ST II-II 70.2 arg. 3: ―Praeterea, II, qu. IV, dicitur, praesul non damnetur nisi in septuaginta duobus testibus. 
Presbyter autem cardinalis nisi quadraginta quatuor testibus non deponatur. Diaconus cardinalis urbis romae nisi 
in viginti octo testibus non condemnabitur. Subdiaconus, acolythus, exorcista, lector, ostiarius, nisi in septem 
testibus non condemnabitur. Sed magis est periculosum peccatum eius qui in maiori dignitate constitutus est, et 
ita minus est tolerandum. Ergo nec in aliorum condemnatione sufficit duorum vel trium testimonium.‖ And the 
reply: ―Ad tertium dicendum quod illud locum habet specialiter in episcopis, presbyteris, diaconibus et clericis 
ecclesiae romanae, propter eius dignitatem. Et hoc triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia in ea tales institui debent 
quorum sanctitati plus credatur quam multis testibus. Secundo, quia homines qui habent de aliis iudicare, saepe, 
propter iustitiam, multos adversarios habent. Unde non est passim credendum testibus contra eos, nisi magna 
multitudo conveniat. Tertio, quia ex condemnatione alicuius eorum derogaretur in opinione hominum dignitati 
illius ecclesiae et auctoritati. Quod est periculosius quam in ea tolerare aliquem peccatorem, nisi valde publicum 
et manifestum, de quo grave scandalum oriretur.‖ 
102
 ST II-II 71.2: ―Monachos et presbyteros non decet in quacumque causa advocatos esse, neque clericos in 
iudicio saeculari, quia huiusmodi personae sunt rebus divinis adstrictae. . . .Tamen huiusmodi indecentiae 
necessitas praefertur. Et propter hoc huiusmodi personae possunt pro seipsis, vel pro personis sibi coniunctis, uti 
officio advocati. Unde et clerici pro ecclesiis suis possunt esse advocati, et monachi pro causa monasterii sui, si 
abbas praeceperit.‖ Similar also in ad 2. 
103
 ST II-II 77.4 ad 3: ―Clerici non solum debent abstinere ab his quae sunt secundum se mala, sed etiam ab his 
quae habent speciem mali. Quod quidem in negotiatione contingit, tum propter hoc quod est ordinata ad lucrum 
terrenum, cuius clerici debent esse contemptores; tum etiam propter frequentia negotiatorum vitia, quia 
difficiliter exuitur negotiator a peccatis labiorum, ut dicitur Eccli. XXVI. Est et alia causa, quia negotiatio nimis 
implicat animum saecularibus curis, et per consequens a spiritualibus retrahit, unde apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, 
nemo militans deo implicat se negotiis saecularibus. Licet tamen clericis uti prima commutationis specie, quae 
ordinatur ad necessitatem vitae, emendo vel vendendo.‖ 
104
 ST II-II 79.3 ad 2: ―Sacerdos etiam non tenetur dicere missam nisi supposita debita opportunitate, quae si 
desit, non omittit.‖ In an analogous way, the faithful are obliged by the ecclesiastical law to confess their sins in 
sacramental confession; see ST II-II 62.6 ad 2: ―Homo . . . tenetur . . . crimen suum detegere deo in confessione.‖ 
105
 ST II-II 68.1. 
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against such an obligation, since there are some people who are disqualified from making 
accusation, namely ―such as those who have been excommunicated or are of evil fame, or 
who are accused of grievous crimes and have not yet been proved to be innocent,‖106 and the 
law commands only possible things. Hence, so argues the objector, there cannot be a general 
obligation for pressing charges.
107
 In the reply Aquinas refers to a distinction made in the 
body of the article: the accuser is only obliged to accuse if he can furnish sufficient proof – 
which is impossible if he himself suffers excommunication. It follows that the punishment of 
excommunication renders one incapable of fulfilling a duty to which he is generally obliged. 
Aquinas: ―Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing what men are under 
obligation to do.‖108 One is disqualified from pressing charges by excommunication, however, 
even more than by sin, as the first objection argues. Yet excommunication is a matter of 
discipline in the Church.
109
 And consequently, we have a further case where the imposition of 
ecclesiastical sanctions changes what would be just under normal conditions. 
In sum, there are some quite clear cases in which a determination of the ecclesiastical 
authority specifies an action as just or unjust, although the very same act would be judged in a 
different way apart from the Church‘s authority.  
 
 
7.2.3 Charity as the Necessary Foundation of Justice 
 
The reconstruction of infused justice in chapter 5 touched upon its relationship to charity: 
charity constitutes the supernatural order as such, but it does not introduce additional 
obligations of justice for the graced person. Infused justice commands those acts which are 
due because of the common political life, although it commands them ex caritate. ―Charity 
imports benevolence . . . to the fellow-citizen in things which belong to the civil life, such as 
                                                 
106
 ST II-II 68.1 arg. 1: ―Videtur quod homo non teneatur accusare. Nullus enim excusatur ab impletione divini 
praecepti propter peccatum, quia iam ex suo peccato commodum reportaret. Sed aliqui propter peccatum 
redduntur inhabiles ad accusandum, sicut excommunicati, infames, et illi qui sunt de maioribus criminibus 
accusati prius quam innoxii demonstrentur. Ergo homo non tenetur ex praecepto divino ad accusandum.‖ 
107
 Note that even here Aquinas refers to the divine precept; see footnote 106. 
108
 ST II-II 68.1 ad 1: ―Nihil prohibet per peccatum reddi aliquem impotentem ad ea quae homines facere 
tenentur.‖ A similar argument is found in ST II-II 60.2 ad 3: Thomas explains that man in grave sin should not 
judge other people with fewer sin. 
109
 Cf. ST II-II 76.1. 
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conversing and assisting in civic works.‖110 Nevertheless, the motivation for these acts of 
infused justice is God, beloved by charity, loved even in the other person.  
It is obvious that acquired justice does not presuppose charity.
111
 However, we should note 
that even if we assume that ST II-II 58-79 speaks about infused justice, the description of just 
or unjust actions takes place only by reference to their objective adequacy to the other as co-
citizen. Though charity would provide the ultimate motivation for rendering to each his due, it 
would contradict the reconstruction of infused justice in chapter 5 if St. Thomas were to 
determine the content of infused justice in reference to charity. A discussion of the proper acts 
of infused justice would not require any direct reference to charity. Consequently, we can 
conclude conversely: If Aquinas sometimes refers to charity as the foundation of justice (as its 
final motivation) it is a fortiori an argument that he is speaking about infused justice. 
Let us examine the text itself.  
The first surprising reference is found immediately in the first article, ST II-II 58.1, and in a 
significant position: Aquinas begins his inquiry with an article on Justinian‘s definition of 
justice, i.e., whether justice is fittingly defined as the perpetual and constant will to render to 
each one his due?
112
 The article contains six objections, the first five of which argue for the 
inappropriateness of the various parts of that classic definition. Justice as virtue means a habit 
but not the will itself (1
st); it is rather the will‘s rectitude than a power (2nd); justice is 
perpetual only in God (3
rd); if justice is perpetual, then the description of a ―constant will‖ is 
redundant (4
th
); to render to each one his due belongs to the leader but not to the subject (5
th
). 
These objections provide the occasion for Aquinas to deepen the understanding of the 
definition. The 6
th
 objection, however, does not criticize a certain element of the definition, 
but raises a completely new issue; it addresses the relation of justice and charity: ―Further, 
Augustine says in the book De Moribus Eccles. that justice is love, serving God alone. 
Therefore it does not render to each one his right.‖113  
Supposing that Aquinas intends in this place (and subsequently in the whole treatise) to 
discuss acquired justice, he should reply to the objection more or less as follows: Justice can 
be taken in different senses: In its proper sense it rules interhuman actions, namely, that one 
                                                 
110
 In sent. III 29.6: ―Caritas benevolentiam importat . . . ad concives in his quae ad civilem vitam spectant, sicut 
est simul conversari, et morari in operibus civilibus.‖ 
111
 Keenan, who reads the Secunda secundae as concerning acquired moral virtues, claims: ―In the Summa, 
however, concepts of desiring, wanting, or loving justice are conspicuously absent. . . . In the Summa, we are just 
when we act and live justly. We are just when we have attained just lives.‖ (Keenan, Goodness and Rightness in 
Thomas Aquinas’s ‘Summa Theologiae’, 105). 
112
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Chapter 7. Justice as Infused Virtue in the Treatise on Justice in ST II-II 
 431 
must render to each his due. This perspective disregards man‘s relation to God. But Augustine 
uses the term ―justice‖ in a broader way according to which it may be applied even to man‘s 
service to God. Something like this argument is to be anticipated if Aquinas‘s concern is 
acquired justice. In any case, he would have to make clear that justice in its proper sense is by 
definition possible without love for God. However, Aquinas replies with precisely the 
opposite assertion: ―Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as stated above [ST II-
II 25.1], so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due.‖114 Instead of 
explaining the independence of justice from the order of charity, he rather declares that justice 
is contained in charity: Whoever loves God must likewise love his neighbor; whoever serves 
God also gives what is due to his neighbor. Justice is described as integral part of charity. It is 
hard to miss the exact parallel to the argument of In sent. III 29.6 (see section 5.2). 
The reader may object that Aquinas does not speak of caritas but simply of amor which could 
mean any kind of love, even a natural love, which constitutes an amicitia civilis between two 
citizens, and which is also the foundation of acquired justice. However, if we take the context 
of this reply into account, the argument is impossible for two reasons: First, the reply 
introduces the concept of amor not as love for one‘s neighbor, but in regard to God. Only 
subsequently is love for the other mentioned – as contained in the love of God. Hence, amor 
obviously does not mean civil friendship, but rather relates to God. Secondly, Aquinas points 
to a prior discussion in the Summa where the issue was already clarified (―ut supra dictum 
est‖). But the relation of amor dei and amor proximi is only discussed in the context of charity 
– understood as a theological virtue. Thus, the only possible conclusion is that ST II-II 58.1 ad 
6 concerns the relation of justice to supernatural charity. That it does not use the term of 
caritas is due to the citation of Augustine who dictates the terminology of the reply.
115
 
Moreover, if we consider the special position of the reply – in the first article, as the 
concluding objection – it is a further indication that justice as discussed in the subsequent 
questions relates in some way to charity. 
A second interesting remark is found some articles later (still q. 58), asking whether particular 
justice has a special matter:
116
 The second objection again quotes a text of St. Augustine: 
―Augustine says . . . that the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, sc. 
                                                                                                                                                        
113
 ST II-II 58.1 arg. 6: ―Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus eccles., quod iustitia est amor deo 
tantum serviens. Non ergo reddit unicuique quod suum est.‖ 
114
 ST II-II 58.1 ad 6: ―sicut in dilectione dei includitur dilectio proximi, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in hoc 
quod homo servit deo includitur quod unicuique reddat quod debet.‖ Cf. In sent. III 29.6. 
115
 That Aquinas also sometimes uses the term amor to refer to supernatural charity can be seen in ST II-II 136.3 
ad 3: Comparing natural love and charity, he invokes the latter as amor supernaturalis. 
116
 ST II-II 58.8. 
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temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice; and he says that the fourth is justice, which 
pervades all the virtues. Therefore; particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, 
has no special matter.‖ 117  In the reply Aquinas makes the distinction between virtues 
regarding a particular matter – it is in this way that justice is taken in the body of the article – 
and as the general mode of all virtues. And ―in this latter sense Augustine speaks in the 
passage quoted.‖ 118  Referring to the second meaning, Aquinas continues: ―Justice which 
pervades the other virtues is love of God and our neighbor, what is the common root of the 
entire order towards the other.‖119 One can easily overlook the importance of this assertion. 
As the mode of all virtues, justice is universal love for God and all men. If this assertion were 
understood as pertaining to a natural kind of justice, it could be described as the common root 
of a good civic life, of political friendship, not, however, as the common root of totius ordo 
ad alterum.
120
 The expression agrees rather with In sent. III 26.6 or ST II-II 26.6-7, where 
charity includes benevolence regarding the other on the basis of the various human 
communities (family, household, city, etc.). Hence, as in the sixth reply of the first article, 
Aquinas determines charity to God and one‘s neighbor as the foundation of justice (communis 
radix totius ordinis ad alterum), but such an assertion only makes sense in regard to infused 
justice.
121
 
The following questions do not refer directly to charity as the foundation of the just act. This 
silence is not surprising since the discussion is almost exclusively limited to unjust acts which 
– by definition – cannot emerge from charity. (We will investigate the relation of unjust acts 
and charity in the next chapter.) Nonetheless, there are some incidental remarks that reveal an 
implicit presupposition of a graced agent. This shows that – even if the acts of justice can be 
described without reference to charity – the ―context‖ of these acts is a person who acts out of 
charity.  
                                                 
117
 ST II-II 58.8 arg. 2: ―Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., dicit quod quatuor sunt animae virtutes, 
quibus in hac vita spiritualiter vivitur, scilicet prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia, et dicit quod quarta est 
iustitia, quae per omnes diffunditur. Ergo iustitia particularis, quae est una de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, 
non habet specialem materiam.‖ 
118
 ST II-II 58.8 ad 2: ―Et hoc modo loquitur ibi Augustinus.‖ 
119
 Ibid., ―Iustitia est, quae per ceteras diffunditur, dilectio cei et proximi, quae scilicet est communis radix totius 
ordinis ad alterum.‖ 
120
 In the Latin text, the relative clause begins with ―quae‖ which could relate either to iustitia or to dilectio. 
However, since Aquinas identifies both virtues, the two possible ways of translating the text do not matter. 
121
 We might note, incidentally, that the Augustinian quotation of the objections already suggests infused moral 
virtues when he speaks about ―virtues of the soul by which it lives in this life spiritually [spiritualiter],‖ which – 
as Aquinas notes elsewhere – depend on divine grace (e.g. De caritate 3 ad 19). 
As a further indirect indication, we can refer to ST II-II 59.3 ad 2, the brief remark regarding suicide, which we 
have already mentioned, is characterized not only as an offense against the human community, but likewise 
against God. ―Potest considerari aliquis homo inquantum est aliquid civitatis, scilicet pars; vel inquantum est 
aliquid dei, scilicet creatura et imago. Et sic qui occidit seipsum iniuriam quidem facit non sibi, sed civitati et 
deo. Et ideo punitur tam secundum legem divinam quam secundum legem humanam.‖ 
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For example, describing judgment as an act of justice, St. Thomas notes that a right judgment 
presupposes a ―good affection‖ (bonum affectum) in regard to the other,122 – a formulation 
that arouses connotations of the motivation of charity.
123
 The aspect of motivation is more 
explicit in the question whether a subject is bound to accuse his superior: the accusation is 
prohibited if it is not done ―from the affection of charity.‖ But ―it is lawful for subjects to 
accuse their superiors out of charity.‖124 Admittedly, Aquinas does not qualify this special act 
as a matter of justice, since the inferior is not legally obliged to accuse his superior (on the 
contrary, it is a proper act of charity). However, the issue appears in the context of a question 
about justice. Hence, the agent in question in the whole context seems to be a graced person.  
Another hint is found in the discussion of the duties of a lawyer, whether an advocate is 
bound to defend the suits of the poor.
125
 Principally, the gratis defense of a poor man is an act 
of mercy. It is praiseworthy to take on the defense (―laudabiliter faciat‖) but there is no legal 
obligation, since – quoting St. Augustine – ―one cannot do good to all.‖ St. Thomas 
consequently refers the reader consequently to the treatise on charity.
126
 Only in cases of true 
necessity – he lists some conditions (e.g., pressing time) – ―is one bound to bestow the work 
of mercy on him.‖127 Then – to express it in our own terms – the work of mercy becomes a 
work of proper justice. Is there an indication that it is an act of infused justice, or is Aquinas 
simply speaking about merciful deeds performed for merely natural reasons, and which 
become obligatory for acquired justice under certain circumstances? In the later case, the line 
of reasoning strictly reproduces Aquinas‘s general argument in the case of charity for one‘s 
enemy:
128
 external acts of benevolence in regard to singular persons are required as strict 
obligation (sine qua caritas esse non potest) only in casu necessitatis. In these circumstances, 
                                                 
122
 ST II-II 60.4 ad 2: ―In iudicio quo iudicamus de hominibus praecipue attenditur bonum et malum ex parte eius 
de quo iudicatur, qui in hoc ipso honorabilis habetur quod bonus iudicatur, et contemptibilis si iudicetur malus. 
Et ideo ad hoc potius tendere debemus in tali iudicio quod hominem iudicemus bonum, nisi manifesta ratio in 
contrarium appareat. Ipsi autem homini iudicanti, falsum iudicium quo bene iudicat de alio non pertinet ad 
malum intellectus ipsius, sicut nec ad eius perfectionem pertinet secundum se cognoscere veritatem singularium 
contingentium, sed magis pertinet ad bonum affectum.‖ 
123
 See ST II-II 27.2. Aquinas emphasizes that charity is not just willing the good of the other, but being in union 
with the other through affection. 
124
 ST II-II 68.1 ad 2: ―Ad secundum dicendum quod subditi praelatos suos accusare prohibentur qui non 
affectione caritatis, sed sua pravitate vitam eorum diffamare et reprehendere quaerunt; vel etiam si subditi 
accusare volentes, fuerint criminosi; ut habetur II, qu. VII. Alioquin, si fuerint alias idonei ad accusandum, licet 
subditis ex caritate suos praelatos accusare.‖ Also from the previous objection, the context of charity is obvious: 
―Omne debitum ex caritate dependet, quae est finis praecepti, unde dicitur Rom. XIII, nemini quidquam debeatis, 
nisi ut invicem diligatis. Sed illud quod est caritatis homo debet omnibus, maioribus et minoribus, subditis et 
praelatis. Cum igitur subditi non debeant praelatos accusare, nec minores suos maiores, ut per plura capitula 
probatur II, qu. VII; videtur quod nullus ex debito teneatur accusare.‖ 
125
 ST II-II 71.1. 
126
 See ST II-II 30-32. The reference to the discussion of charity already somehow suggests infused virtue. 
127
 ST II-II 71.1: ―In tali casu tenetur ei opus misericordiae impendere.‖ 
128
 ST II-II 25.8 and 9. See also section 6.3.3b. 
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however, the act becomes a matter of justice. Apart from such cases, the merciful act is due to 
a higher perfection of charity (properly speaking: a counsel), but to omit the assistance, would 
not destroy charity. This structural parallel to the discussion of charity (distinguishing 
precepts and counsels) suggests a reading of the present issue against the background of 
charity.
129
 
Further indications that Aquinas frames this question within the order of charity are found in 
the article asking whether one ought to tolerate being reviled. Aquinas explains: ―As we need 
patience in things done against us, so do we need it in those said against us.‖130  As an 
authority he appeals to the commandment of Lord in Mt 5.39 and Lk 6.29. The minimum is 
that one be prepared to be patient if necessary.
131
 Patience in its proper sense, however, is 
clearly defined in a later question as an infused virtue (and consequently unknown to 
Aristotle).
132
 Hence, even this article presupposes the supernatural order. Moreover, the first 
reply contains an allusion to the order of charity: ―The daring of the railing reviler should be 
checked with moderation, sc. as a duty of charity [propter officium caritatis].‖133 Likewise in 
the reply to the second objection: ―When a man prevents another from being reviled there is 
not the danger of desire for one‘s own honor as there is when a man defends himself from 
being reviled. Rather it seems to proceed from the affection of charity [ex caritatis 
affectu].‖134 
A similar indication of the order of charity is found in the question of usury.
135
 
Last but not least, Aquinas describes the act of restitution – the principle act of commutative 
justice – as ―de necessitate salutis.‖136 Though he does not give a precise specification of what 
                                                 
129
 We can consider the Augustinian quotation as a further indication of a connection to charity. ―Cum omnibus 
prodesse non possis.‖ Aquinas refers to this citation several times (for example ST II-II 26.6 arg. 1 and ad 1; 31.2 
arg. 1 and ad 1; 31.3 sed contra; De caritate 8 and 9; Contra. imp. 2.6 arg. 44; Super Hebr. VIII 3), and it is 
significant that it always in asserting different degrees in charity. 
130
 ST II-II 72.3: ―Sicut patientia necessaria est in his quae contra nos fiunt, ita etiam in his quae contra nos 
dicuntur.‖ 
131
 ST II-II 72.3: ―Tenemur enim habere animum paratum ad contumelias tolerandas si expediens fuerit.‖ 
132
 ST II-II 136.3: ―Patientia non potest haberi sine auxilio gratiae.‖ 
133
 ST II-II 72.3 ad 1: ―Audaciam conviciantis contumeliosi debet aliquis moderate reprimere, scilicet propter 
officium caritatis.‖ 
134
 ST II-II 72.3 ad 2: ―In hoc quod aliquis alienas contumelias reprimit, non ita timetur cupiditas privati honoris 
sicut cum aliquis repellit contumelias proprias, magis autem videtur hoc provenire ex caritatis affectu.‖ 
135
 See ST II-II 78.1 ad 2: ―Iudaeis prohibitum fuit accipere usuram a fratribus suis, scilicet Iudaeis, per quod 
datur intelligi quod accipere usuram a quocumque homine est simpliciter malum; debemus enim omnem 
hominem habere quasi proximum et fratrem, praecipue in statu evangelii, ad quod omnes vocantur.‖ We know 
from the treatise on law in the Prima secundae that the Jewish people in the Old Testament are a type of the 
People of God in the New Covenant (e.g. ST I-II 91.5), which – in contrast to the Jews – is no longer limited to a 
single nation. Hence, if Aquinas enlarges the prohibition of taking usury from one‘s fellow-citizen in the Old 
Law to everyman, it is because he has in mind the universal connection of all men constituted by charity – as can 
be seen by the phrase ―praecipue in statu evangelii.‖ 
136
 ST II-II 62.2: ―de necessitate salutis.‖ 
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he means by salvation in this context, normally it is used as a technical term for eternal 
salvation. In a similar way, the giving of testimony in court is qualified as necessary for 
salvation.
137
 
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis of the treatise reveals many references to the order of charity, but this frequent 
advertence makes sense only if the treatise concerns infused justice. Thus, an interpretation of 
this section as treating of acquired justice is impossible. 
 
 
7.2.4 The Qualification of Unjust Acts as Mortal Sins 
 
In the previous chapter we examined some descriptions of just acts in which St. Thomas 
manifestly presupposes an agent in the state of grace, equipped with charity. Furthermore, the 
introductory question 58 twice refers to the connection between charity and justice. 
The observation is also confirmed on the negative side, i.e., by the description of injustice. 
The just act is determined by the appropriate adequation to the other. Conversely, injustice 
implies inequality. Because of the objectivity of the opus iustum, there is no need for a 
reference to an underlying motivation, e.g. whether the act is done out of charity or out of 
ambition. Moreover, even compatibility with charity is not the ultimate criterion of justice. 
We can imagine acts against charity that do not offend justice (in its proper sense), as for 
example incontinence or hatred (though these would be against divine justice). Even an 
account of infused justice would not refer to charity as its measure (the description of infused 
temperance in ST I-II 63.4 similarly forgoes any reference to charity). A fortiori, a discussion 
of injustice in the case of acquired justice would preclude any mention of charity. What, then, 
is the text actually saying? 
We observe a threefold surprise:  
First, on many occasions Aquinas determines the relation of the unjust act and charity as one 
of opposition, whereby these unjust acts are destructive of charity, such as mortal sins. This 
relation is surprising, since the formal definition of injustice does not depend on its opposition 
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 See ST II-II 70.3 ad 3: ―de necessitate salutis.‖ 
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to charity, but on its failure to attain equality; its character as damaging the peaceful political 
life. But in a few places he refers to this formal ratio of injustice.
138
 More often, he qualifies 
the unjust act simply as contrary to charity.  
Secondly, he classifies different unjust acts as venial sins which – by definition – presuppose 
charity.  
Thirdly, he asserts that extrajudicial speech cannot be specified by merely external standards, 
but it has to take into account the agent‘s internal intention. This requirement, however, 
clearly exceeds the scope of acquired justice as a political virtue; hence, it is a further 
indication for infused virtue. 
An important preliminary remark: Assuming that Aquinas determines unjust acts as 
against charity – why should this be a hint for infused justice? Would such a description make 
sense not also for acquired justice? For acts contrary to acquired justice which are – 
simultaneously – destructive to the order of grace?  
Indeed, it is a serious objection. It can be replied only in an indirect way: It is true that every 
act against acquired justice is simultaneously against charity; it is a mortal sin since any kind 
of injustice contradicts benevolence and contradicts therefore charity (see section 5.2). 
However, it is likewise true that an agent, who has charity, has likewise infused justice; he 
must have infused justice (since for Aquinas by grace all virtues are given at once). Moreover, 
the graced agent who achieves a just act never acts by mere acquired justice but he must act 
by infused justice. This follows clearly from Aquinas‘s general understanding of the graced 
agent and his infused virtues.
139
 Thus, if St. Thomas discusses justice and injustice in 
reference to charity, i.e. justice of the graced agent, he obviously speaks about somebody who 
acts against his infused justice. The agent may have also acquired justice, but this would be in 
fact an accidental supplement.  
Consequently, if the treatise on justice portrays unjust acts as against charity, we can count it 
indeed as strong indication for infused justice.  
 
 
                                                 
138
 One of the few texts is ST II-II 109.3 ad 1: ―Homo est animal sociale, naturaliter unus homo debet alteri id 
sine quo societas humana conservari non posset.‖ Similarly in ST II-II 114.2 ad 1. 
139
 See the results of chapter 3. Aquinas‘s position as to that is clear from De virt. in com. 10 ad 4. 
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a) The Determination of Unjust Acts as Contrary to Charity 
 
Aquinas devotes four articles to the question about injustice.
140
 As one would expect, he 
determines injustice by a defect of the formal notion of justice, i.e., as inaequalitas ad alterum. 
―Injustice is said in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man 
wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and 
losses.‖141 This suffices for his description of injustice in regard to a particular matter. Legal 
injustice, however, simply means the transgression of any law (we will say more about this 
second option later, in section 7.5). The analysis of the unjust act is deepened in the second 
article, which carves out the consequences of the objective character of justice, for example, 
the possible material determination of the unjust act regardless of the intention or attention of 
the agent (which is impossible in the case of, e.g., temperance).
142
  
At this point Aquinas could conclude his specification of the unjust act. Everything that is 
essential has been said. However, there follows in the third article – apparently as an 
Aristotelian vestige – an inquiry whether one can suffer injustice willingly (we will soon see 
that it is more than a question continued in honor of Aristotle). And there is yet a fourth 
article: Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally. But why is a question on this matter 
pertinent? Injustice was already determined by its formal notion in the first article, while the 
second article clarified the relationship of its substance to the interior act of the will. Why at 
the end a question about mortal sins? 
The fourth article claims that every unjust act is a mortal sin. Aquinas argues in two ways: 
First, in the sed contra from the perspective of the divine law.  
 
Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin. Now, whoever does something unjust 
does that which is contrary to the law of God, since it is traced back either to theft, or to 
adultery, or to murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on. Therefore, 
whoever does something unjust sins mortally.
143
 
 
                                                 
140
 ST II-II 59. 
141
 ST II-II 59.1: ―Dicitur iniustitia secundum inaequalitatem quandam ad alterum, prout scilicet homo vult 
habere plus de bonis, puta divitiis et honoribus; et minus de malis, puta laboribus et damnis.‖ 
142
 ST II-II 59.2 ad 3; see footnote 2. 
143
 ST II-II 59.4 sed contra: ―Quidquid est contra legem dei est peccatum mortale. Sed quicumque facit iniustum 
facit contra praeceptum legis dei, quia vel reducitur ad furtum, vel ad adulterium, vel ad homicidium; vel ad 
aliquid huiusmodi, ut ex sequentibus patebit. Ergo quicumque facit iniustum peccat mortaliter.‖ 
Chapter 7. Justice as Infused Virtue in the Treatise on Justice in ST II-II 
 438 
The argument in the body of the article runs from the proper essence of a mortal sin, i.e. its 
contrariety to charity: 
 
A mortal sin is what is contrary to charity, which gives life to the soul. Now every injury 
inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves one will the good of 
another. And so, since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is 
evident that to do something unjust is a mortal sin according to its genus.
144
 
 
Admittedly, the assertion is not sensational but rather trivial. Charity implies benevolence for 
one‘s neighbor; injustice inflicts damage. Consequently, unjust acts are ipso facto contrary to 
charity. What is sensational, however, is the fact that Aquinas makes the assertion in this 
place; that he felt urged in the context of injustice to devote a special article to the issue of 
whether an unjust act, which is already sufficiently determined as retaining something due, 
contradicts charity, beyond its formal inadequacy ad alterum. For the determination of the 
unjust act as unjust act, the fourth article is simply superfluous. The analysis of the unjust act 
as mortal sin clarifies in addition its relationship to charity, and this means: its impact on the 
relationship of the graced person to God as his final end.  
The architecture of q. 59 teaches us that the unjust act can be considered from two sides: 
Either as defined by its proper object or in regard to its implications for the order of charity; 
either as withholding what is due to the other, or as destructive to charity. For justice itself (or 
injustice itself), the first characterization is sufficient; the second is redundant – except 
supposing that the whole discussion is about infused justice. Only if in q. 59 Aquinas is 
describing injustice as opposed to infused justice, it makes perfect sense to add a special 
article for determining its relationship to charity as the end of all infused virtues. According to 
our reconstruction in chapters 5 and 6, infused justice disposes man to render to everyone his 
due for the sake of preserving the order of charity. The object of infused justice is determined 
by the objective relation to the other, but the final intention of its acts stems from charity. The 
two-part structure of q. 59 – namely the formal determination of injustice (articles 1 and 2) 
and its relationship to charity (article 4) – makes only sense if Aquinas is discussing infused 
justice. 
                                                 
144
 ST II-II 59.4: ―Peccatum mortale est quod contrariatur caritati, per quam est animae vita. Omne autem 
nocumentum alteri illatum ex se caritati repugnat, quae movet ad volendum bonum alterius. Et ideo, cum 
iniustitia semper consistat in nocumento alterius, manifestum est quod facere iniustum ex genere suo est 
peccatum mortale.‖ 
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Our thesis is also confirmed by the subsequent questions. The formal ratio of the vices to 
justice must be determined by their inaequalitas ad alterum. Hence, unjust acts are first of all 
sins against justice. ―To take an alien thing is a sin against justice.‖145 ―If . . . he wickedly 
extorts something, he sins against justice.‖146 ―If somebody takes money, by tacit or expressed 
agreement, as a return for lending money or anything else that is consumed by being used, he 
sins against justice.‖147 However, in addition to the specification of proper object of the unjust 
act (i.e. its inequality), Aquinas describes throughout the treatise the impact of the unjust act 
on the order of charity. A good example is provided by q. 66 on theft and robbery. After some 
introductory articles
148
 Aquinas poses the question whether theft is always a sin.
149
 He affirms 
the sinfulness of the act ―because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is 
his, so that for this reason theft is contrary to justice.‖150 So far so good. The malice of 
thievery is defined by reference to the formal notion of justice. However, Aquinas is not 
content with this formal determination. He adds a further article on the same topic, now 
asking whether theft is a mortal sin. It is here that he determines the impact of thievery on 
charity:  
 
A mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity 
consists principally in love of God, and secondarily in love of our neighbor, which is shown in 
our wishing and doing him well. But by thievery man inflicts harm to his neighbor in his 
belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human society would be undone. 
Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.
151
 
 
This second discussion of thievery brings nothing new regarding its formal determination as 
an unjust act; the substance of the act was already clarified in art. 5. Supposing that the 
subject of the question is acquired justice, the sixth article is needless. The only reasonable 
argument for a resumption of the issue is the intention to clarify the effects of thievery on the 
supernatural order, beyond its proper object.  
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 ST II-II 62.8: ―Accipere rem alienam est peccatum contra iustitiam.‖ 
146
 ST II-II 71.4: ―Si . . . aliquid immoderate extorqueat, peccat contra iustitiam.‖  
147
 ST II-II 78.2: ―Si aliquis pro pecunia mutuata, vel quacumque alia re quae ex ipso usu consumitur, pecuniam 
accipit ex pacto tacito vel expresso, peccat contra iustitiam.‖  
148
 For example, whether it is licit to possess something as his own; what is the right definition of thievery etc. 
149
 Cf. ST II-II 66.5. 
150
 ST II-II 66.5. Aquinas also mentions a second reason, which is, however, irrelevant for our question, namely 
―ratione doli seu fraudis, quam fur committit occulte et quasi ex insidiis rem alienam usurpando.‖ 
151
 ST II-II 66.6: ―Peccatum mortale est quod contrariatur caritati, secundum quam est spiritualis animae vita. 
Caritas autem consistit quidem principaliter in dilectione dei, secundario vero in dilectione proximi, ad quam 
pertinet ut proximo bonum velimus et operemur. Per furtum autem homo infert nocumentum proximo in suis 
rebus, et si passim homines sibi invicem furarentur, periret humana societas. Unde furtum, tanquam contrarium 
caritati, est peccatum mortale.‖ 
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Another example is the article on suicide in ST II-II 64.5. St. Thomas gives three reasons why 
killing oneself is not allowed: First, it is against man‘s own self-love; secondly, it is against 
justice regarding the human community; thirdly, it is against God who alone is the Lord of 
life and death. Hence, suicide is always sinful. Whereas the body of the article points to the 
injury of that threefold relation (against oneself, against the human community, and against 
God), the reply to the first objection distinguishes suicide as contrary to justice and/or charity; 
i.e. the twofold opposition of the unjust act: ―Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to 
justice, but also because it is opposed to charity, which a man should have towards himself: in 
this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is 
sinful because of its opposition to justice.‖152 The description of suicide as an unjust act is 
extended: It is not only depicted as opposed to justice (though such an account would be 
sufficient in this context), but also as contrary to charity. 
A reader may doubt whether it is necessary to read the concept of caritas generally as a 
signal-term for love as a theological virtue, and consequently as an indication of the 
supernatural order. Would it not be possible to read the whole article – and also the preceding 
quotations – as statements about acquired justice on the basis of a natural love; injustice as 
opposed to justice and the amor naturalis? Every agent is inclined to preserve his own 
substantial being by nature, to live in a human community by nature, and ultimately to love 
God by nature as his creator.
153
 The objection may theoretically be made, even if it is difficult 
to imagine Aquinas using the technical term of caritas here for man‘s natural inclination. But 
Aquinas himself eliminates that interpretation. In the very same article on suicide he explains: 
―Suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature and contrary to charity, whereby every man 
should love himself. Hence, suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural law 
and contrary to charity.‖154 Thus, St. Thomas himself acknowledges the difference between 
natural love and supernatural charity in this context, and describes the unjust act as opposed to 
both kinds of love. Something analogous can be shown for the previous quotations.
155
 
                                                 
152
 ST II-II 64.5 ad 1: ―homicidium est peccatum non solum quia contrariatur iustitiae, sed etiam quia contrariatur 
caritati quam habere debet aliquis ad seipsum. Et ex hac parte occisio sui ipsius est peccatum per comparationem 
ad seipsum. Per comparationem autem ad communitatem et ad deum, habet rationem peccati etiam per 
oppositionem ad iustitiam.‖ 
153
 See ST I-II 94.2; 109.3 ad 1. 
154
 ST II-II 64.5: ―Quod aliquis seipsum occidat est contra inclinationem naturalem, et contra caritatem, qua 
quilibet debet seipsum diligere. Et ideo occisio sui ipsius semper est peccatum mortale, utpote contra naturalem 
legem et contra caritatem existens.‖ 
155
 So for example in ST II-II 66.6, where he describes sin as ―contrariatur caritati secundum quam est spiritualis 
animae vita.‖ But Aquinas would never describe natural love as the spiritual life of the soul.  
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It is impossible to analyze each text that qualifies a particular unjust act as a mortal sin and 
opposed to charity. The issue is present like a golden thread throughout the whole section.
156
 
It is a fact that could can be hardly explained if the treatise were only concerned with acquired 
justice. 
 
 
b) Unjust Acts as either Venial or Mortal Sins 
 
Besides the examination of the impact of unjust actions on the order of charity, we find 
another topic in the treatise, the repetitive resumption of which only makes sense if a graced 
agent is presupposed. It is the specification of some unjust acts as venial sins. The section qq. 
58 to 79 contains a number of articles devoted to a classification of unjust acts as either mortal 
or venial sins, or permitted acts (i.e. not unjust acts). A good example is suspicion; Aquinas 
distinguishes different kinds of the judgment to suspect another, which are not always mortal 
sins. 
 
Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt of 
another‘s goodness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light sin . . . The second 
degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man‘s wickedness as certain. 
This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one‘s 
neighbor. . . . The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: 
this pertains directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.
157
 
 
                                                 
156
 Some further examples: ―Quicumque facit contra debitum iustitiae, mortaliter peccat.‖ (ST II-II 69.1). And: 
―Ille qui mentitur in iudicio se excusando, facit et contra dilectionem dei, cuius est iudicium; et contra 
dilectionem proximi, tum ex parte iudicis, cui debitum negat; tum ex parte accusatoris, qui punitur si in 
probatione deficiat.‖ (ST II-II 69.1 ad 3). Likewise in ST II-II 76.3: The act of cursing means the utterance of evil 
against someone by way of command or desire; but ―Velle autem, vel imperio movere ad malum alterius, 
secundum se repugnat caritati, qua diligimus proximum volentes bonum ipsius. Et ita secundum suum genus est 
peccatum mortale.‖ ST II-II 64.6 ad 2 pictures the killing of an innocent person as contrary to charity. The case is 
especially interesting since Aquinas asserts that the unjust act can differ in the degree of sinfulness depending on 
the amount of charity which the other deserves. ―Ille qui occidit iustum gravius peccat quam ille qui occidit 
peccatorem . . . quia nocet ei quem plus debet diligere, et ita magis contra caritatem agit.‖ ST II-II 70.4 describes 
rendering a false testimony as a mortal sin. In some cases, jesting is also contrary to charity (ST II-II 75.2 ad 2).  
157
 ST II-II 60.3: ―Est autem triplex gradus suspicionis. Primus quidem gradus est ut homo ex levibus indiciis de 
bonitate alicuius dubitare incipiat. Et hoc est veniale et leve peccatum . . . Secundus gradus est cum aliquis pro 
certo malitiam alterius aestimat ex levibus indiciis. Et hoc, si sit de aliquo gravi, est peccatum mortale, 
inquantum non est sine contemptu proximi . . . Tertius gradus est cum aliquis iudex ex suspicione procedit ad 
aliquem condemnandum. Et hoc directe ad iniustitiam pertinet. Unde est peccatum mortale.‖ 
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Similar quotations could be multiplied.
158
 
The relevance of this classification – unjust acts as either mortal or venial sins – for the 
question of infused justice demands a short excursus on peccatum veniale:
159
 Sin in its proper 
sense signifies the aversion of the reasonable creature to God as his final end. In other words: 
Since man‘s order towards God as finis ultimus is constituted by charity, every act that 
contradicts charity is a sin in its proper sense. Sin of such kind is called mortal since, once the 
order to the final end is destroyed, it is impossible to restore the order by the agent‘s own 
powers. The choice of a wrong means may be revised if one acknowledges the 
inappropriateness of a past decision in reference to one‘s final end; but once the principal 
orientation is lost, there remains no possibility of self-restoration – just as the dead body is 
unable to recover.
160
 Hence, sins against charity are called mortal sins. ―If the will intends 
something which by itself contradicts charity, by which man is directed to the ultimate end, 
the sin is mortal by its own object.‖161  
Not every sin, however, undermines the agent‘s orientation towards his final end. There is a 
large range of actions which are neither acts inspired by charity, nor which directly destroy 
man‘s ordering towards God; acts concerning temporal goods used for wrong motives, but 
which do not destroy man‘s habitual orientation towards God. Since the order to the final end 
remains preserved, they can be repaired by an actual reconsideration and affirmation of the 
order of charity (i.e. by an act of charity); hence, they are called venial sins.
162
  
Thus, the special character of venial sins consists in the compatibility of their acts with the 
habit of charity. Whereas every mortal sin – even the first one – excludes the orientation of 
charity and thereby destroys the habit of charity (and with it all the other infused virtues and 
gifts), venial sins only exclude an actual orientation towards God. They exclude the act of 
                                                 
158
 See ST II-II 59.4 ad 2; 60.3; 72.2; 73.2, esp. ad 2 and 3; 73.3-4 75.1-2; 76.3-4; 79.4 ad 3 etc. Besides ST II-II 
60.3 also ST II-II 72.2 contains a ―complete‖ distinction of reviling as a mortal sin, as a venial sin, or as a 
permissible act. Normally, reviling is a mortal sin. ―Si vero aliquis verbum convicii vel contumeliae alteri dixerit, 
non tamen animo dehonorandi, sed forte propter correctionem vel propter aliquid huiusmodi, non dicit 
convicium vel contumeliam formaliter et per se, sed per accidens et materialiter, inquantum scilicet dicit id quod 
potest esse convicium, vel contumelia. Unde hoc potest esse quandoque peccatum veniale; quandoque autem 
absque omni peccato.‖ Similar ad 3. 
159
 P. DeLetter, ―Venial Sin and its Final Goal,‖ The Thomist 16 (1953): 32-70; Donlan, ―The Theology of 
Venial Sin,‖ 74-94; Pieper, ―Über den Begriff der Sünde,‖ 255-260. 
160
 Cf. ST I-II 88.1. 
161
 ST I-II 88.2: ―Cum enim voluntas fertur in aliquid quod secundum se repugnat caritati, per quam homo 
ordinatur in ultimum finem, peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale.‖ 
162
 ―Peccata autem quae habent inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, conservato ordine ad ultimum finem, 
reparabilia sunt. Et haec dicuntur venialia.‖ (ST I-II 88.1). Elsewhere Aquinas notes that such sins are ―facile 
remissibile‖ (ST I-II 89.3 ad 1). He even affirms that venial sins are not ―contra legem‖ but rather ―praeter 
legem‖ (De malo 7.1 ad 1), and consequently not ―malum simpliciter‖ but ―malum secundum quid‖ (De malo 
7.5 ad 4). See the helpful article Michael Konrad, ―I peccati veniali sono degli ‗intrinsece mala‘?,‖ Aquinas 47 
(2004): 611-638.  
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charity, but they leave untouched the habitual orientation. ―The venial sin does not exclude 
the habitual orientation of the human act towards the glory of God, but only the actual 
[orientation], since it does not exclude charity, which habitually orders to God.‖163 
That brief synopsis of venial sin is enough for appreciating the observation that Aquinas 
invokes the distinction of venial and mortal sin in the context of justice: The effort to 
differentiate unjust acts as mortal or venial sins is possible only under the condition of the 
agent‘s principal directedness towards God as the final end by charity. Therefore, if the 
treatise on justice were concerned only about an acquired virtue, which by definition 
disregards man‘s relation towards his final end, then it would not make sense to ask again and 
again whether some unjust acts are compatible with the habit of charity or not. Hence, 
Aquinas‘s labor to distinguish precisely between unjust acts as mortal or venial sins 
demonstrates once more that his concern is for infused justice. 
 
A further indication: The theological use of Aristotle.  
To this point we have argued only from the fact that Aquinas differentiates between mortal 
and venial sins. The question of what a venial unjust act must be like, will again show how 
the structure of the treatise is formed by a theological intention. 
In ST II-II 59.4, which asks whether every unjust act is a mortal sin, the second objection 
doubts whether injustice ―in a small matter‖ can be considered as a mortal sin. Aquinas 
responds: ―He who does injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection of an unjust 
deed, in so far as what he does may be judged not altogether contrary to the will of the person 
who suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such thing from another 
man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased.‖164 Though he does 
not use the term of ―venial sin,‖ the example is certainly a case of a peccatum veniale. The 
argument is: If somebody commits an act of inequality against another that does not really 
contradict the other‘s will, it does not realize the full ratio of injustice. It is not an injury in the 
proper sense, and therefore it is not to be considered as a mortal sin – though materially 
speaking the act (i.e., objectively) causes a certain inequality (e.g., taking the other‘s property). 
Stealing a ―small matter‖ creates an inequality, but may not be against the will of the other; 
                                                 
163
 ST I-II 88.1 ad 2: ―Veniale autem peccatum non excludit habitualem ordinationem actus humani in gloriam 
dei, sed solum actualem, quia non excludit caritatem, quae habitualiter ordinat in deum.‖ 
164
 ST II-II 59.4 ad 2: ―Ille qui in parvis facit iniustitiam, deficit a perfecta ratione eius quod est iniustum facere, 
inquantum potest reputari non esse omnino contra voluntatem eius qui hoc patitur, puta si auferat aliquis alicui 
unum pomum vel aliquid tale, de quo probabile sit quod ille inde non laedatur, nec ei displiceat.‖ 
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hence, it is a venial sin. Similarly the mere doubting someone‘s goodness because of some 
indications (without prejudging him, see ST II-II 60.3) is not mortal. With this reasoning in 
mind, the significance of the preceding ―Aristotelian‖ article suddenly becomes clear. As we 
have seen (section 7.2.4a), ST II-II 59.3 poses the question whether one can suffer injustice 
willingly; a question that at first glance reproduces a particular issue out of reverence for 
Aristotle, who discussed the question at great length,
165
 but which is superfluous for the 
argument in the Summa. Now, however, the Aristotelian question appears as the preparatory 
introduction to the more serious question in the forth article concerning injustice as mortal sin; 
as a preparation for the understanding that at times the achievement of some inequality does 
not injure the other because of his consent. Consequently, it is not to be evaluated as mortal 
sin but rather as venial. 
Admittedly, this observation does not provide a further specification of infused justice. But it 
is an excellent example of, how Aquinas employs an issue raised by the Greek philosopher in 
the service of his theological concern, and thereby gives it a wholly new function. Yes, there 
is an external resemblance to the Nicomachean Ethics; but the matter is internally transformed. 
Aquinas uses the traditional questions to determine the impact of just and unjust acts on the 
supernatural order.  
 
 
c) Unjust Acts That Depend on the Inward Intention 
 
As we noted in section 7.1, ST II-II 67-76 corresponds to the eighth precept of the Decalogue, 
which is not primarily about telling lies, but about any injustice committed by words. Qq. 67-
71 describe unjust acts committed within the context of court proceedings, which are not 
limited to false testimony, but include any speech which can influence the judge‘s sentence 
and thereby cause injustice. The following part, qq. 72-76, analyses injustice committed in 
everyday conversations, such as reviling (openly damaging someone‘s reputation), detraction 
(privately damaging someone‘s reputation), whispering (speaking or conversing maliciously 
about a person), mockery (publicly heaping insult on another) and cursing (uttering evil 
against someone, either by ordering it or expressing the desire for it). It is noteworthy that 
none of these acts imply the telling of untruths. They are qualified as unjust acts not because 
of a contrariety to truth (rather it is presupposed that the things revealed are true) but because 
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 See NE V 11, commented by Aquinas in In ethic. V 14. 
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they are a certain kind of ―thievery‖ of another‘s good name and reputation.166 However, there 
is an important difference to murder and theft: Whereas a murderer or thief destroys or 
removes the good of the other directly, in verbal offeanses he does so indirectly. The direct 
action is the uttering of something evil regarding the other – an action that is not evil in all 
cases. For example, it might sometimes be an act of charity to inform a superior about a 
hidden crime so that he can apply the necessary remedies. But the same speech may be uttered 
with the intention of undermining the other‘s good reputation. Hence, it is not the speech in 
itself that causes an inequality regarding the other (in the case of detraction, the act itself is 
only to a third person), but its effects, namely, that it prevents the other from receiving the 
respect that is due to him by a third party.  
Because of this indirectness, Aquinas explains that injustice in extra-juridical speech depends 
on the intention on account of which it is uttered. ―Words are not damaging to other persons 
as being sounds, but as being signs, and this signification depends on the speaker‘s inward 
intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to consider with what intention the 
words are uttered.‖167  
Of course, this assertion does not imply that reviling, detraction, whispering, etc. depend on 
the individual affective conditions of the subject, as do the acts of temperance or fortitude; in 
this case it is the voluntary intention that qualifies a certain external act (i.e. the revelation of 
an evil) as just or unjust – depending on whether it was done for the other‘s good (correction) 
or evil (calumny). 
There are two points which are significant for our project:  
First, the dependence of the determination of justice on the interior intention implies that it 
can be difficult to estimate a concrete action from a merely external standpoint. As a result, 
these acts are not judged by the public authority. In these questions, Aquinas does not once 
refer to the human law as the measure of these acts,
168
 and we want to suggest that 
incommensurability of these acts with the human law is precisely the reason that Aristotle 
altogether omitted a discussion of them.
169
 At the same time, however, we notice an 
increasing number of quotations taken from Sacred Scripture that condemn reviling, 
detraction, etc. The divine law can prohibit these acts since it governs external and internal 
                                                 
166
 Aquinas describes those acts indeed as parallel to thievery; cf. ST II-II 73.3.  
167
 ST II-II 72.2: ―Verba inquantum sunt soni quidam, non sunt in nocumentum aliorum, sed inquantum 
significant aliquid. Quae quidem significatio ex interiori affectu procedit.‖ Likewise in ST II-II 75.1 or 109.1. 
 
168
 See our list in footnote 64. 
169
 As Mongillo notes, Aristotle omits even unjust deeds on legal proceedings (Mongillo, ―La struttura del ‗De 
iustitia‘,‖ 360). 
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acts.
170
 Admittedly, the acts in question are already prohibited by the natural law, but Aquinas 
uses the precepts of the divine law as ius positivum for guaranteeing the observance of the 
natural law in cases where the human law must fall short. In this way, all acts which would 
damage the supernatural order – even acts that are compatible with the public order of the city 
(as, e.g., derision) – are qualified as unjust. 
Secondly, though it is true that these vices are contrary to the natural love for the other (or 
possibly you mean: contrary to love for the other for purely natural reason), Aquinas describes 
them – throughout the questions – as contra caritatem171 and as peccatum mortale,172 and 
carefully distinguishes some special cases as peccata venialia.
173
 Hence, it is clear that 
Aquinas presupposes an agent equipped with charity. 
 
In summary, we can conclude at the end of this section: If St. Thomas describes unjust acts as 
a mortal sins and as contrary to charity, he is principally writing about infused justice. Our 
thesis is confirmed by the repeated distinction of mortal and venial sin, insofar as the latter 
term is defined as a disordered act under the condition of charity. Further, there is an entire 
section that treats of unjust acts whose qualification as virtuous or evil depends only on the 
agent‘s internal motivation – an issue which would be irrelevant for acquired justice. 
 
 
7.2.5 The Promise of Supernatural Merit for Just Actions  
 
As a final indication that infused justice is the object of consideration in ST II-II 58-79, we 
want to call attention to some scattered remarks which describe just actions as meritorious. 
We assert that in the context of the Secunda secundae, the term merit implies supernatural 
merit, i.e., works performed by an agent in the state of grace whereby he earns eternal life ex 
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 Of course, the observation does not imply that reviling, detraction, whispering, etc. are only determinable by 
the individual conditions of the subject, as is the case with the acts of temperance or fortitude. Whether an act is 
detraction or not does not depend on the emotional constitution of the agent. 
171
 E.g. ST II-II 75.2 ad 1: ―Ludus non importat aliquid contrarium caritate respectu eius cum quo luditur: potest 
tamen importare aliquid contrarium caritati respectu eius de quo luditur, propter contemptum.‖ Similar explicit 
in ST II-II 76.3. Significant is also his argument for the sinfulness of detracting in ST II-II 74.2 ad 3: ―Ille qui 
detrahit fratri intantum videtur detrahere legi inquantum contemnit praeceptum de dilectione proximi. Contra 
quod directius agit qui amicitiam disrumpere nititur. Unde hoc peccatum maxime contra deum est, quia deus 
dilectio est, ut dicitur I Ioan. IV.‖  
172
 Cf. ST II-II 72.2; 73.2; 74.4; 75.2. 
173
 See ST II-II 72.2, corp. and ad 3; 73.2 ad 2 and 3; 75.2 corp. and ad 2; 76.3. 
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condigno.
174
 If we succeed in proving this claim, we will once again have demonstrated that 
Aquinas speaks about acts of infused justice, as only the acts of infused virtues merit eternal 
reward.
175
 
Two preliminary remarks: We admit that Aquinas mentions the meritorious character of just 
acts only a few times. This observation, however, is not an objection: rather, it is to be 
expected. As Aquinas explains in an earlier question, merit is earned – first of all – by the act 
of charity, and only secondarily by the acts of other virtues insofar as they are commanded by 
charity.
176
 Hence, the mere achievement of the ―object‖ of justice – i.e. the opus adaequatum 
– does not carry merit unless it is achieved out of charity.177 But as we have seen, the just act 
has to be determined irrespective of motives, simply by reference to its objective adequacy 
with respect to the other – as materialiter iustum.178 Thus, it is no cause of wonder that we 
discover only incidental remarks concerning merit for just acts. 
Furthermore, when Aquinas mentions merit for just actions he does not specify it expressis 
verbis as meritorious for eternal life. Of course, St. Thomas also has a concept of temporal 
merit. In the Prima secundae he asserts generally for every human act: ―Merit and demerit are 
said in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. But retribution according to 
justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another‘s advantage or 
injury.‖179 He goes on to show how our actions deserve merit (or demerit) from the human 
community as well as from other individuals.
180
 Hence, could the scattered remarks on merit 
in the Secunda secundae not be read as assertions about temporal reward? We do not think 
this reading can be sustained, because of the common use of the term meritum in the context 
of the Secunda secundae. In the treatises on the other virtues, Aquinas often discusses the 
meritorious character of the virtue‘s acts. In these discussions, the struggle to act virtuously 
                                                 
174
 Cf. ST I-II 114.3. 
175
 Cf. De virt. in com. 10 ad 4. 
176
 ―Meritum vitae aeternae primo pertinet ad caritatem, ad alias autem virtutes secundario, secundum quod 
eorum actus a caritate imperantur.‖ (ST I-II 114.4). 
177
 Helpful, therefore, is In sent. III 36.1.6: Merely by observing the commandments, the agent does not earn 
merit. Only if they are observed by the right modus does the agent also receive the fruit of the precepts. ―Dicimur 
enim ad mandata teneri dupliciter. Uno modo ita quod nisi impleamus hoc ad quod tenemur, sumus omissionis 
vel transgressionis rei, et secundum hoc tenemur solum ad substantiam mandati, non ad modum. Alio modo ita 
quod si non impleamus id ad quod tenemur, non percipimus mandati fructum; et sic tenemur ad substantiam 
operis, et ad modum, sine quo quantumcumque homo substantiam operis exequatur, ad vitam non perveniet.― 
178
 ST II-II 59.2. 
179
 ST I-II 21.3: ―Meritum et demeritum dicuntur in ordine ad retributionem quae fit secundum iustitiam. 
Retributio autem secundum iustitiam fit alicui ex eo quod agit in profectum vel nocumentum alterius.‖ See also 
ST I-II 114.1. 
180
 This is particularly clear from ST I-II 21.4 ad 3, where he emphasizes that not every act deserves merit from 
the human community (since some are known only to God). This implies, however, that some actions are 
meritorious regarding the human society. 
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(almost) always demands supernatural merit.
181
 In the question on prayer – as potential part of 
justice – he even asserts that prayer without grace cannot be meritorious.182 Thus, the term 
merit must refer to a supernatural reward.  
Furthermore, the few remarks of this kind in the treatise on justice are accompanied by other 
indirect references to the supernatural order; we will investigate them in what follows. 
The first remark is found in ST II-II 58.3. The second objection claims: ―That which is done 
by necessity is not meritorious. But to render to a man what is due to him, which belongs to 
justice, is necessary. Therefore, it is not meritorious. But by the acts of virtues we gain merit. 
Therefore justice is not a virtue.‖183 Aquinas replies by arguing that not every necessitas 
contradicts merit:  
 
Necessity is twofold. One arises from constraint, and this takes away the account of merit, 
since it is against the will. The other necessity arises from the obligation of a precept or from 
the necessity of an end, sc. when a man is unable to attain the end of virtue without doing that 
particular thing. The latter necessity does not exclude merit, when a man does voluntarily that 
which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the glory of supererogation, according 
to 1 Cor 9, If I preach the gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lies upon me.
184
 
 
Theoretically, the argument could be read as an assertion about any just act which earns a 
temporal reward from the human community. But in addition to the typical use of the term 
meritum in the Secunda secundae, the comparison of voluntary but necessary acts with 
supererogatory acts in the citation of St. Paul also indicates a theological background. In 
many places Aquinas invokes the distinction between necessary acts, which are due to 
                                                 
181
 The ―statistics‖ of the ST II-II is impressive: In the following texts, the term meritorious is used clearly in 
regard to a supernatural reward: ST II-II 2.9; 10.4; 13.4 ad 2; 17.7 ad 3; 24.10; 27.7 and 8; 29.4 ad 1; 32.9 ad 2; 
33.2 ad 3; 40.2 ad 4; 83.7 ad 2; 83.13; 83.15; 83.16 ad 2; 88.6; 104.3; 110.2 ad 3; 124.2 ad 2; 124.4 ad 3; 164.1 
ad 6; 182.2; 184.8. Uncertain whether temporal or supernatural reward are only ST II-II 104.1 ad 3 (one earns 
merit ―maxime apud deum‖); 129.6 ad 3; 158.2 ad 1; 162.4. But even these texts do not exclude an interpretation 
as concerning supernatural merit.  
Also of interest is Aquinas‘s discussion of merit in general (ST I-II 114). There he specifies merit in its proper 
sense as earning eternal life. ―Vita aeterna est simpliciter praemium operum iustitiae.‖ (ST I-II 114.10). 
Temporal goods belong to merit only secundum quid. 
182
 ―Oratio quae est sine gratia gratum faciente meritoria non est, sicut nec aliquis alius actus virtuosus. Et tamen 
etiam oratio quae impetrat gratiam gratum facientem procedit ex aliqua gratia, quasi ex gratuito dono, quia 
ipsum orare est quoddam donum dei.‖ (ST II-II 83.15 ad 1. See also 83.16 ad 2). 
183
 ST II-II 58.3 arg. 2: ―Quod fit ex necessitate non est meritorium. Sed reddere alicui quod suum est, quod 
pertinet ad iustitiam, est necessitatis. Ergo non est meritorium. Actibus autem virtutum meremur. Ergo iustitia 
non est virtus.‖ 
184
 ST II-II 58.3 ad 2: ―Duplex est necessitas. Una coactionis, et haec, quia repugnat voluntati, tollit rationem 
meriti. Alia autem est necessitas ex obligatione praecepti, sive ex necessitate finis, quando scilicet aliquis non 
potest consequi finem virtutis nisi hoc faciat. Et talis necessitas non excludit rationem meriti, inquantum aliquis 
hoc quod sic est necessarium voluntarie agit. Excludit tamen gloriam supererogationis, secundum illud I ad Cor. 
IX, si evangelizavero, non est mihi gloria, necessitas enim mihi incumbit.‖ 
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precepts, and supererogatory acts, which are due to the evangelical counsels; but always as 
two degrees of the Christian perfection in charity.
185
 This distinction also suggests that we 
war dealing here with a question of supernatural merit. 
Q. 79 twice affirms the meritorious character of the act of justice. Both quotations are 
concerned with avoiding evil. However, merely failing to commit evil does not imply an act, 
and consequently, does not earn a reward. As a voluntarily rejection, however, refraining from 
evil can be meritorious. ―To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, does not denote 
a pure negation, viz. not to do evil; for this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the 
punishment. But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term decline 
shows. And this is meritorious.‖186 Here too we find an indirect hint that Aquinas is thinking 
of an eternal reward: Regarding the insufficiency of the bare non-committing of evil acts 
(without a proper act), he makes the assertion (in allusion to the Gloss): ―This does not 
deserve the palm.‖187 In other texts, however St. Thomas uses this biblical image to indicate 
martyrdom,
188
 or for the palm of beatitude.
189
 From these indications, it seems probable that 
ST II-II 79 also speaks about an eternal reward. 
There are further allusions to supernatural merit: ―An advocate, when he mercifully pleads the 
cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a divine reward.‖190 Though the 
citation does not claim merit for acts of proper justice, but rather for acts connected with 
justice, it is sufficient for our argument to show that in this article Aquinas describes the agent 
as someone who can earn supernatural merit by any actions, since this requires that he has 
infused justice. ‗We find something similar two questions later, when Aquinas argues that 
                                                 
185
 E.g. ST II-II 25.9; 184.3; De perf. spirit. vitae 5 and 6. Aquinas makes a similar comparison in ST II-II 78.1 ad 
4, with explicit reference to the evangelical counsel: ―Dare mutuum non semper tenetur homo, et ideo quantum 
ad hoc ponitur inter consilia. Sed quod homo lucrum de mutuo non quaerat, hoc cadit sub ratione praecepti.‖ 
186
 ST II-II 79.1 ad 2: ―Declinare a malo, secundum quod ponitur pars iustitiae, non importat negationem puram, 
quod est non facere malum, hoc enim non meretur palmam, sed solum vitat poenam. Importat autem motum 
voluntatis repudiantis malum, ut ipsum nomen declinationis ostendit. Et hoc est meritorium, praecipue quando 
aliquis impugnatur ut malum faciat, et resistit.‖ And ST II-II 79.3 ad 4: ―Omissio directe opponitur iustitiae, ut 
dictum est, non enim est omissio boni alicuius virtutis nisi sub ratione debiti, quod pertinet ad iustitiam. Plus 
autem requiritur ad actum virtutis meritorium quam ad demeritum culpae, quia bonum est ex integra causa, 
malum autem ex singularibus defectibus. Et ideo ad iustitiae meritum requiritur actus, non autem ad 
omissionem.‖ 
187
 ST II-II 79.1 ad 2. 
188
 E.g. ST II-II 124.1 ad 1. 
189
 E.g. De perf. spirit. vitae 4. 
190
 ST II-II 71.4 ad 1: ―Advocatus, quando causae pauperum misericorditer patrocinatur, non debet intendere 
remunerationem humanam, sed divinam.‖ However, the advocate may take (and even demand) a human reward. 
If Christians were obliged to act exclusively for a divine reward, it would be – as Aquinas notes – finally 
impossible to sell things (ibid.). See thereto Stump, ―Aquinas on Justice,‖ 70-71. 
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patience (which is essentially an infused virtue
191
) in the case of suffering defamation, 
increases one‘s merit.192 
 
Hence, though not frequently, Aquinas describes the act of justice as meritorious, and this is a 
clear indication that he is speaking about infused justice. 
 
 
7.3 Some Objections to Our Interpretation  
 
We want to raise some objections which could be made against the proposed interpretation: 
 
 
7.3.1 Must Infused Justice Include Even Purely Internal Acts?  
 
The most serious objection against our thesis is the following: The just act is defined as 
rendering everyone his due, inclusively avoiding any act hat is harmful to another. But there 
are many internal acts that are contrary to the good of the other, as, for example, hatred, envy, 
or spitefulness. These acts do not only contradict charity but likewise undermine the 
community between men. Therefore, at least infused justice should take into account such 
internal acts. Or conversely: If a discussion of justice concentrates exclusively on external 
acts, it would seem to be concerned only with acquired justice. 
What reply can be made to this objection? The argument has a superficial persuasiveness, but 
Aquinas himself provides the refutation. It is true that every kind of injury to another is an act 
of injustice. But in what way is a human agent able to injure another person? Every damage 
stands in relation to a certain good pertaining to the other; hence, a proper act of injustice can 
be performed only in regard to a good which can effectively be taken away by the evildoer. 
Thus, the following distinction becomes necessary:  
 
                                                 
191
 See ST II-II 136.3. 
192
 ST II-II 73.4 ad 3: ―Utilitas quae ex detractione provenit non est ex intentione detrahentis, sed ex dei 
ordinatione, qui ex quolibet malo elicit bonum. Et ideo nihilo minus est detractoribus resistendum, sicut et 
raptoribus vel oppressoribus aliorum, quamvis ex hoc oppressis vel spoliatis per patientiam meritum crescat.‖  
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The gravity of sins committed against one‘s neighbor must be weighed per se by the injury 
they inflict on him, since it is from this that they obtain the notion of culpability. Now, the 
greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man‘s good is threefold, namely, 
the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of external things, the good of the soul, 
which is the greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another, save as by an occasional 
cause; for instance, by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the other hand 
the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external things, can be taken away by violence.
193
 
 
Therefore, it belongs to the very essence of injustice (as contrary to a particular human virtue) 
– whether acquired or infused – to be limited to external operations concerning the bodily 
integrity of the other or external goods, material (such as money) as well as spiritual (such as 
a good reputation). The action of one agent can never directly damage the good of the soul of 
the other as grace, virtues, etc., which depends only on his own will (aside from God). The 
external actions of one agent may create circumstances that incline the other agent more 
easily to lose the good of his soul, i.e., an environment that influences his will to consent to 
evil things. These acts – which are the matter of scandals – are certainly sinful; even as mortal 
sins; but they are not acts of injustice.
194
 They may be the occasion in which the other loses a 
spiritual good of his soul, but they do not realize the notion of an active injuring of the other, 
against the will of the other.
195
 
Thus, justice in its proper sense must be limited to external actions, even in the case of 
infused justice.  
 
 
7.3.2 Pure Natural Reason as the Rule of Infused Justice?  
 
One may raise another objection based on the general description of justice given in ST II-II 
58. We know from ST I-II 63.4 that the formal difference between acquired and infused virtue 
lies in their different rule, sc. human reason and the divine law. In full coherence with, and as 
a confirmation of our thesis, we discovered many references to the divine law. Hence, we 
                                                 
193
 ST II-II 73.3: ―Peccata quae committuntur in proximum sunt pensanda per se quidem secundum nocumenta 
quae proximo inferuntur, quia ex hoc habent rationem culpae. Tanto autem est maius nocumentum quanto maius 
bonum demitur. Cum autem sit triplex bonum hominis, scilicet bonum animae et bonum corporis et bonum 
exteriorum rerum, bonum animae, quod est maximum, non potest alicui ab alio tolli nisi occasionaliter, puta per 
malam persuasionem, quae necessitatem non infert, sed alia duo bona, scilicet corporis et exteriorum rerum, 
possunt ab alio violenter auferri.‖ 
194
 It is not by chance that Aquinas attributes them to charity as its opposite vices (ST II-II 43). 
195
 Here again the assertion of ST II-II 59.3 becomes important: It is essential for the unjust act to be against the 
will of the other.  
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should expect a corresponding note in the introductory question on justice. But in ST II-II 
58.3 – whether justice is a virtue at all – we find instead the contrary statement:  
 
A human virtue is one which renders a human act and man himself good, and this can be 
applied to justice. For the act of a man is made good by attaining the rule of reason, which is 
the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it 
is evident that it renders man‘s operations good.196 
 
The rule of justice is not the divine law, but right reason. But this is the exact description of 
the formal notion of acquired virtue.  
A response to the objection can be made in the following way: As we mentioned in section 
2.3.3, Aquinas often speaks in a deliberately imprecise way; i.e., he draws the outlines of his 
argument in general terms for the sake of a broader validity. We mentioned as an example the 
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, where he describes prudence again and again as a 
perfection of reason ―in regard to the whole moral matter‖197 and ―in regard to the whole 
life,‖198 a description that – properly speaking – corresponds only to infused prudence. We 
may assume that St. Thomas had not in mind any infused virtue at this place. He is just 
speaking about moral virtue in the common sense, neither about acquired nor about infused 
virtue. It is in the same way that we can read the quotation from ST II-II 58.3. If Aquinas 
describes justice as virtue that is measured by reason, it is not necessary that he have 
specifically acquired justice in mind. He may simply think of justice as such; as a moral virtue 
which must be ruled by reason – prior to any distinction between acquired and infused justice. 
Thus, Aquinas‘s assertion can ―contain‖ in a certain way both kinds of justice. 
But we can go even a step further. In section 2.2 we discussed reason and the divine law as 
constituting the formal difference of acquired and infused virtues. Our finding there was that 
reason and divine law are not two parallel principles. In the graced person, reason is elevated 
by grace; it is led by the instigation of the Holy Spirit according to the rule of the divine law. 
                                                 
196
 ST II-II 58.3: ―Virtus humana est quae bonum reddit actum humanum, et ipsum hominem bonum facit. Quod 
quidem convenit iustitiae. Actus enim hominis bonus redditur ex hoc quod attingit regulam rationis, secundum 
quam humani actus rectificantur. Unde cum iustitia operationes humanas rectificet, manifestum est quod opus 
hominis bonum reddit.‖ 
197
 See In ethic. VI 11.14. ―Si essent diversae prudentiae circa materias diversarum virtutum moralium, sicut sunt 
diversa artificiorum genera, nihil prohiberet unam virtutem moralem esse sine alia, unaquaque earum habente 
prudentiam sibi correspondentem. Sed hoc non potest esse; quia eadem sunt principia prudentiae ad totam 
materiam moralem, ut scilicet omnia redigantur ad regulam rationis. Et ideo propter prudentiae unitatem omnes 
virtutes morales sunt sibi connexae.‖ 
198
 In ethic. VI 4.3: ―Si ergo ille qui est bene consiliativus ad aliquid particulare est prudens particulariter in 
aliquo negotio; consequens est, quod ille sit totaliter et simpliciter prudens qui est bene consiliativus de his quae 
pertinent ad totam vitam.‖ 
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These movements of the Holy Spirit, which are in correspondence to the divine law, do not 
replace reason, but rather perfect it. Consequently, even in the graced agent reason guides the 
human acts as regula proxima ‒ although ―informed by the divine law.‖199 Thus, if Aquinas 
sometimes refers to reason as the formal principle of justice, it is not a necessary argument 
that he has in mind an acquired virtue. The advertence to reason, in itself, is also open to an 
interpretation within a supernatural context. Concerning the terminology of Aquinas, J. Pieper 
explicitly affirms ―that the concept of ‗reason‘ contains all kinds of perception of reality, that 
especially the ‗reason‘ of a Christian perceives also the reality of faith.‖ 200  In fact, the 
numerous references to the divine law and additional ecclesiastical legal determinations (by 
which human reason is determined) rather suggest an understanding of reason in this more 
qualified sense, namely as informed by the divine law. 
 
 
7.3.3 Is the “Spiritual Man” in Need of Justice?  
 
In ST II-II 60.1, whether judgment is a proper act of justice, we find the following objection:  
 
The Apostle says in 1Cor 2.15: The spiritual man judges all things. Now man is made spiritual 
chiefly by the virtue of charity, which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is 
given to us, as said in Rom 5.5. Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice.
201
 
 
Aquinas responds to the objection: 
 
The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge rightly of all 
things according to divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces 
judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just [man] pronounces judgment through the 
virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law.
202
 
 
                                                 
199
 De malo 8.2: ―lege dei informata.‖ Similar in De malo 2.4: ―Bonum et malum in actibus humanis consideratur 
secundum quod actus concordat rationi informatae lege divina, vel naturaliter, vel per doctrinam, vel per 
infusionem.‖ 
200
 Pieper, ―Traktat über die Klugheit,‖ 23. 
201
 ST II-II 60.1 arg. 2.  
202
 ST II-II 60.1 ad 2: ―Homo spiritualis ex habitu caritatis habet inclinationem ad recte iudicandum de omnibus 
secundum regulas divinas, ex quibus iudicium per donum sapientiae pronuntiat, sicut iustus per virtutem 
prudentiae pronuntiat iudicium ex regulis iuris.‖ 
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The citation suggests a distinction between the capacity of the homo spiritualis, who knows 
how to judge by charity and the gift of wisdom, and the competence of the iustus who judges 
by the virtue of prudence in reference to a given law. It would seem that, if Aquinas were 
concerned with infused justice, he should mention it in this context, namely, in connection 
with charity and wisdom. But the text remains silent. On the contrary, the reply seems to 
distinguish between the just man who is led by prudence and by laws, and the spiritual man 
who has – seemingly – no need of justice. Is justice, then, only a virtue of the natural level, 
whereas the homo spiritualis is led simply by divine wisdom? 
It is not necessary to interpret the spiritual and the just man as exclusive alternatives. They 
can also be read as different aspects of the one graced agent – and such an interpretation also 
conforms more perfectly to Aquinas‘s general theory of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as outlined 
in section 1.3. The gifts do not establish a second mode of acting but cooperate with the 
corresponding infused moral virtues. The gift of wisdom gives a certain connaturality with the 
Holy Spirit as the moving principle in regard to knowing God as the highest cause of all 
things, and therefrom to judge all things. ―He who knows the cause that is simply the highest, 
which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things 
according to the divine rules‖203 – theoretical matters as well as practical.204 Although the 
graced agent is disposed by the gift of wisdom to be moved directly by the Holy Spirit,
205
 he 
nevertheless needs some additional virtues which dispose his powers (intellect, will, passions) 
to act according to that new rule.  
Hence, charity and the gift do not abolish the necessity of prudence and justice as virtue, i.e., 
as infused virtue. Thus, the quoted text not is ultimately an objection against the idea of 
infused justice but on the contrary, a further indication thereof. The graced agent, as 
possessing the gift of wisdom, judges all things, immediately moved by the Holy Spirit. But 
regarding interhuman actions, this universal judgment likewise implies prudence and justice, 
since the spiritual man (because of the guidance of the Spirit) shall respect the human and the 
divine law regarding interhuman actions.
206
 
This interpretation corresponds perfectly to our reconstruction of infused human justice 
regarding the human law in section 6.3.3a-i. We quoted there ST I-II 96.5 ad 2: ―It belongs to 
                                                 
203
 ST II-II 45.1: ―Ille autem qui cognoscit causam altissimam simpliciter, quae est deus, dicitur sapiens 
simpliciter, inquantum per regulas divinas omnia potest iudicare et ordinare.‖ 
204
 ST II-I 45.3: ―Sapientia . . . per divinas regulas dirigens actus humanos.‖ See also ad 2 and ad 3. 
205
 ―Homo habens intellectum illustratum et affectum ordinatum per spiritum sanctum, de singulis quae pertinent 
ad salutem, rectum iudicium habet.‖ (Super I Cor. II 3). 
206
 See ST II-II 104.6. 
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the guidance of the Holy Spirit that spiritual men are subject to the human laws.‖207 Therefore, 
the seemingly problematic reply of ST II-II 60.1 ad 2 does not undermine but rather confirms 
our thesis. 
 
 
7.4 Commutative, Distributive and Metaphorical Justice as Infused Virtues 
 
After the discussion of some general indications of infused justice, we want to investigate the 
description of the particular species of justice in the Secunda secundae, namely distributive 
and commutative justice; we will also make a note concerning metaphorical justice. 
 
 
7.4.1 Distributive Justice as an Infused Virtue 
 
The special character of distributive justice consists in attaining equality, measured in relation 
to the dignity of the other. Some additional things are due to the leader of a community 
beyond what is due to him as a common member; persons who have a special function in the 
community are entitled to more recognition, and obliged to more duties than other citizens. 
Distributive justice realizes equality as geometrical mean. Our reconstruction of infused 
distributive justice has shown that there are true differences between it and its acquired 
counterpart: Since by grace man attains a new grandeur, and since the ministries of the 
Church bestow different degrees of dignity, infused distributive justice takes account of some 
additional factors in just distributions. Does Aquinas recognize such additional determinations 
for distributive justice in ST II-II? 
The issue is clearly to be affirmed. Although only four articles are dedicated to the discussion 
of distributive justice (or better: of a contrary vice, namely, q. 63 on the distinction of 
persons), in these texts Aquinas explicitly recognizes certain criteria, arising from the 
supernatural order, for a special dignity. Yet, in the first article, he mentions the possibility of 
a vicious distinction of persons in choosing a man for an ecclesiastical ministry (praelatio 
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 ST I-II 96.5 ad 2: ―Hoc ipsum est de ductu spiritus sancti, quod homines spirituales legibus humanis 
subdantur.‖ For the complete quotation, see chapter 6, footnote 114. 
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ecclesiastica) for the wrong reasons; e.g., consanguinity.
208
 The second article treats a purely 
ecclesiastical issue, namely whether distinction of persons takes place in the dispensation of 
spiritual goods. The term spiritualia is taken in this context for the different ministries of the 
Church. On that score, he draws a parallel to the distribution of secular ministries: the 
candidates ought to be selected according to their suitability for the intended ministry. In the 
case of ecclesiastical ministries, the choice be taken even more seriously since the good at 
stake is above the temporal good of the city. ―Since spiritual things are of greater importance 
than temporal, distinction of persons is a graver sin in dispensing spiritual things than in 
dispensing temporal things.‖209  Subsequently, he states two criteria: First, ―the man who 
abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace [qui magis abundat in spiritualibus gratiae 
donis] is the more worthy.‖210 Secondly, the choice has also to take into account his ability to 
work for the common good, since ―it may happen at times that the less holy and less learned 
man may conduce more to the common good, on account of worldly authority or assiduity, or 
something of the kind.‖211  
It is not necessary to follow the argument further, or to outline in particular the many 
distinctions of the replies to the various objections, which are highly nuanced.
212
 It is clear 
enough that distributive justice, as portrayed here, makes sense only for a member of the 
Church. According to Aquinas, distributive justice does not perfect the agent primarily in 
justly dispensing the various secular ministries according to (secular) competence and the 
dignity of the citizen. This perfection would be the proper task of distributive justice if 
Aquinas had an acquired virtue in mind, for the description would have be restricted to 
reference to ―political‖ dignity. However, taking the greater abundance of the spiritual gifts of 
grace as the principal criterion of the dignity relevant to distributive justice, exceeds the 
proper measure of an acquired virtue. 
The fact that this question lacks an explicate reference to the infused virtue is not a counter-
argument. Indeed, the four articles contain only two incidental references to the term ―iustitia 
distributiva‖ at all.213 What is true for the whole treatise on justice in ST II-II is true here as 
                                                 
208
 ST II-II 63.1: ―Contingit tamen aliquam conditionem personae facere eam dignam respectu unius rei, et non 
respectu alterius: sicut consanguinitas facit aliquem dignum ad hoc quod instituatur heres patrimonii, non autem 
ad hoc quod conferatur ei praelatio ecclesiastica.‖  
209
 ST II-II 63.2: ―Unde cum spiritualia sint temporalibus potiora, gravius peccatum est personas accipere in 
dispensatione spiritualium quam in dispensatione temporalium.‖ 
210
 ST II-II 63.2: ―Maioris dignitatis est ille qui magis abundat in spiritualibus gratiae donis.‖  
211
 ST II-II 63.2: ―Contingit enim quandoque quod ille qui est minus sanctus et minus sciens, potest maius 
conferre ad bonum commune, propter potentiam vel industriam saecularem, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi.‖  
212
 For example, though he principally negates the choice of a relative for an ecclesiastical ministry, for certain 
reasons he likewise allows it (ST II-II 63.2 ad 1).  
213
 ST II-II 63.1 ad 1 and 4 ad 1. 
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well: The primary concern of the discussion is the determination of the just and unjust object; 
the corresponding underlying virtue (or vice) is considered only inasmuch as it is determined 
thereby. But q. 63 obviously describes some actions as evil only because of their implications 
for the order of the Church. Thus, the underlying virtue has to be infused distributive 
justice.
214
 
 
 
7.4.2 Commutative Justice as an Infused Virtue 
 
According to our reconstruction in chapters 5 and 6, infused commutative justice is 
substantially concerned with the same acts as its acquired counterpart. A received service 
demands an adequate reward. Hence, the principle act of commutative justice is restitution.  
 
To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his 
property, so that in restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one 
thing for another thing [rei ad rem], and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution 
is an act of commutative justice.
215
 
 
Thus, the supernatural order does not provide a different rule for measuring the just act; the 
received thing determines the due thing. Res ad rem. The act of infused commutative justice 
differs only insofar as it is commanded by charity. But this does not imply a change of the 
proper object of the act. Consequently, it is not surprising that the issue is not discussed in q. 
62, on the act of restitution. 
Nonetheless, in that question too, we find indications for the supernatural level. The second 
article handles the question of whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary 
for salvation. Aquinas‘s answer: ―Since the preservation of justice is necessary for salvation, 
it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.‖216 The 
                                                 
214
 There are also other questions which contain incidentally some assertions about distributive justice which 
demand an understanding of an infused virtue. So for example in ST II-II 62.2 ad 4: To hinder a candidate to 
attain a prebend as just act if there is a more worthy person. We discussed already another case: Aquinas argues 
in ST II-II 70.2 ad 3 for a proper order for witnesses against bishops, priests, deacons etc. because special dignity. 
A fact which would be unreasonable apart from the hierarchy of the Church. 
215
 ST II-II 62.1. ―Restituere nihil aliud esse videtur quam iterato aliquem statuere in possessionem vel dominium 
rei suae. Et ita in restitutione attenditur aequalitas iustitiae secundum recompensationem rei ad rem, quae pertinet 
ad iustitiam commutativam. Et ideo restitutio est actus commutativae iustitiae.‖ 
216
 ST II-II 62.2: ―Cum igitur servare iustitiam sit de necessitate salutis, consequens est quod restituere id quod 
iniuste ablatum est alicui, sit de necessitate salutis.‖ 
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term ―salvation‖ does not imply an escape from the punishment of the political authority but 
eternal salvation. This is clear from the second argument and the sed contra, where salus is 
contrasted with sin. But such reasoning would be out of place if the whole question were 
concerned with an acquired virtue. Hence, the second article indirectly demonstrates that 
Aquinas is considering infused commutative justice.
217
 
(What about the objection that also the refusal of what is due by acquired justice would be a 
hindrance of eternal salvation? For an answer to that argument, we can refer to our 
preliminary remark of section 7.2.4.) 
 
 
7.4.3 Metaphorical Justice as an Infused Status 
 
In chapter 6, we investigated the difference between acquired and infused metaphorical justice. 
The first meaning is adopted from Aristotle, and denotes the internal order of the agent i.e., 
the various human powers are considered analogously as individual agents, and render each 
other what is due (e.g., the passions follow the rule of reason). Infused metaphorical justice, 
on the other hand, implies man‘s universal rectitude: in regard to God and to his neighbors, as 
well as the internal order. In ST II-II 58, an article is concerned with this issue. Aquinas 
reports the classical understanding of metaphorical justice, ―insofar as to each part of man is 
ascribed what is becoming to it.‖218 In the first reply, however, he makes an assertion which is 
identical with our reconstruction of infused metaphorical justice. The objection quotes Rom 
3.22: ―The justice of God is by faith in Jesus Christ.‖ Commenting on that phrase, St. Thomas 
answers: ―The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the impious is justified; it 
consists in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated above, where we were 
treating of the justification of the impious. Now this belongs to metaphorical justice, which 
may be found even in a man who lives by himself.‖219 This kind of metaphorical justice is 
                                                 
217
 A further hint that there is more under consideration than acquired virtue is found in the same question, ST II-
II 62.5 ad 5: Aquinas argues there that not only a prelate who has abused the property of the Church is obliged to 
restitution, but even that that one who has set his heart on the property; he would be obliged to a spiritual 
restitution. ―Potest praelatus surripere rem ecclesiae solo animo, dum scilicet incipit habere animum possidendi 
eam ut suam, et non nomine ecclesiae. Et tunc debet restituere talem animum deponendo.‖ 
218
 ST II-II 58.2: ―Secundum quod unicuique parti hominis attribuitur quod ei convenit.‖ Incidentally, Aquinas 
refers to metaphorical justice a second time in the treatise on justice in ST II-II 106.3 ad 1, but without relevance 
for our topic. 
219
 ST II-II 58.2 ad 1: ―Iustitia quae fit per fidem in nobis, est per quam iustificatur impius, quae quidem in ipsa 
debita ordinatione partium animae consistit, sicut supra dictum est, cum de iustificatione impii ageretur. Hoc 
autem pertinet ad iustitiam metaphorice dictam, quae potest inveniri etiam in aliquo solitariam vitam agente.‖ 
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obviously nothing that can be acquired, but rather something that has to be infused. It is not 
limited to the order of the various parts of man‘s soul but is the effect of the justification of 
the impious ―as stated above‖ – referring to the question of divine justification, where he 
defined this kind of justice as ―a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, 
insofar as what is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are 
subject to the superior, i.e., to the reason.‖220 
Thus, the brief remark on metaphorical justice in the treatise on justice once again demands 
that we read it as concerning infused justice.  
 
 
7.5 The Meaning of Legal Justice in ST II-II 
 
In chapter 6, we reconstructed infused legal justice by distinguishing it from its acquired 
counterpart. The latter – following the Aristotelian account of legal justice in Nicomachean 
Ethics V 3, as the virtue of the good citizen – commands all virtues insofar as they are 
prescribed by the human law for the sake of the common good of the earthly city. Though the 
affective virtues are presupposed (as political virtues, otherwise the uncontrolled arousal of 
passions would undermine the functioning of legal justice), it commands only their external 
―effects,‖ sc. courageous and temperate deeds. 221  Hence, intermittent internal sins of 
concupiscence are compatible with acquired legal justice, as long as the human laws are 
observed. 
In the case of infused legal justice a twofold reconstruction is possible: On the one hand, it 
can signify a general justice which commands the acts of all virtues insofar as they are 
prescribed by the divine law. We referred to it as divine legal justice. On the other hand, based 
on the common axiom that infused and acquired virtues pertain to the same matter, infused 
legal justice focuses on the divine law in a restricted aspect, namely insofar as it commands 
operations in relation to the common good of the human city. It is an infused human legal 
justice. 
                                                 
220
 ST I-II 113.1: ―Importat rectitudinem quandam ordinis in ipsa interiori dispositione hominis, prout scilicet 
supremum hominis subditur deo, et inferiores vires animae subduntur supremae, scilicet rationi.‖ 
221
 Analogously human law, acquired legal justice commands nothing ―nisi de actibus iustitiae; et si praecipiat 
actus aliarum virtutum, hoc non est nisi inquantum assumunt rationem iustitiae.‖ (ST I-II 100.2). 
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The difference between the two ―versions‖ is immense: infused divine legal justice aims at 
man‘s right order in any respect (towards God and his neighbors, as well as towards oneself); 
it is founded on the ―divine communication;‖222 it commands external actions as well as 
internal passions, and excludes any kind of sin.
223
 Infused human legal justice is more 
specified. Its immediate object is – as also for acquired legal justice – the ―political 
communication,‖224 the good of the earthly city, of course, not as proper goal (as terminus ad 
quem) but as terminus a quo.
225
 It commands all the external operations that are prescribed by 
the divine law (incl. the human law) insofar as they are relevant for the good of the city. 
Hence, though every sin is contrary to the divine law, not every sin is necessarily opposed to 
this infused human legal justice.
226
 (For a more detailed description of both species, we refer 
to section 5.5.3 and section 6.2 and 6.3.3a). 
How, then, does Aquinas describe legal justice in ST II-II; does he portray legal justice in 
respect to the human law or to the divine law? As contrary to every sin or as compatible with 
some sins? Does he recognize an infused legal justice at all? In the previous chapters, we 
found that scholars who argue for infused legal justice mention only the first meaning (as 
divine justice), and contrast it with acquired legal justice regarding the human city; they 
ignore the possibility (and necessity) of infused human justice. We must now ask how 
Aquinas himself portrays legal justice in the Secunda secundae? 
We want to argue the following: Many times Aquinas is content to outline legal justice in a 
general way. These texts are applicable to any kind of legal justice. Beyond this, however, 
there are some remarks which imply infused divine legal justice as the observance of all 
divine precepts. On other occasions, – at least implicitly – Aquinas presupposes infused legal 
justice in regard to the human city on earth, i.e., infused human legal justice. Therefore, we 
want to argue that a consistent interpretation of legal justice in these questions demands a 
twofold understanding. 
 
                                                 
222
 In sent. III 29.6: ―Quarta communicatio est divina, secundum quam omnes homines communicant in uno 
corpore ecclesiae vel actu vel potentia.‖ 
223
 ST I-II 100.2: ―Lex divina praecepta proponit de omnibus illis per quae ratio hominis est bene ordinata. Hoc 
autem contingit per actus omnium virtutum, nam virtutes intellectuales ordinant bene actus rationis in seipsis; 
virtutes autem morales ordinant bene actus rationis circa interiores passiones et exteriores operationes.‖ Likewise 
ST II-II 104.5 ad 2: ―Deo subiicitur homo simpliciter quantum ad omnia, et interiora et exteriora.― 
224
 In sent. III 29.6: ―Alia vero communicatio est politica, secundum quam homines ad concives suos 
communicant.‖ 
225
 Cf. De virt. card. 4 ad 5. 
226
 Admittedly, every sin destroys this kind of legal justice, since all infused virtues are lost by any kind of 
mortal sin. However, not every sin is against the specific object of all infused virtues. For example, a sin against 
infused temperance is not directed per se against the object of infused fortitude. 
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7.5.1 The Equivocation of the Ex-professo-Texts 
 
An investigation of legal justice in the Secunda secundae has to begin with ST II-II 58.5 and 6, 
the articles that treat the issue ex professo. Article 5 poses the question whether justice is a 
―general virtue,‖ an expression gleaned from Aristotle, who is quoted in the sed contra as an 
authority.
227
 In the corpus articuli, Aquinas determines the relation between the good of the 
individual and the good of the community to which the individual belongs: Man is part of a 
community; but the good of a part relates to the good of the whole. Hence, man‘s own good is 
referable to the common good. 
 
All who are included in a community stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; 
but a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to 
the good of the whole. It follows, therefore, that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue 
direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable 
to the common good, to which justice directs it: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, 
insofar as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general 
virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above, it 
follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called legal justice, because 
thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common 
good.
228
 
 
Does Aquinas portray acquired or infused legal justice here? And if it is an infused species, is 
it divine or human legal justice? The text does not allow for a univocal answer, the article is 
open for all three interpretations. This ambiguity is in agreement with the general focus of the 
article, namely, whether justice can command acts that belong properly to the good of the 
individual for the sake of the common good. The common character of general justice which 
has been described is valid for acquired legal justice (which commands external acts 
prescribed by the human law) as well as for infused human legal justice, in regard to the 
human common good (which does the same by observing the divine law), and for infused 
divine legal justice (which directs all the acts of the individual in respect to the divine good as 
                                                 
227
 NE V.3. 
228
 ST II-II 58.5: ―Omnes qui sub communitate aliqua continentur comparantur ad communitatem sicut partes ad 
totum. Pars autem id quod est totius est, unde et quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in bonum totius. 
Secundum hoc igitur bonum cuiuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis aliquem hominem ad seipsum sive ordinantis 
ipsum ad aliquas alias personas singulares, est referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinat iustitia. Et 
secundum hoc actus omnium virtutum possunt ad iustitiam pertinere, secundum quod ordinat hominem ad 
bonum commune. Et quantum ad hoc iustitia dicitur virtus generalis. Et quia ad legem pertinet ordinare in 
bonum commune, ut supra habitum est, inde est quod talis iustitia, praedicto modo generalis, dicitur iustitia 
legalis, quia scilicet per eam homo concordat legi ordinanti actus omnium virtutum in bonum commune.‖ 
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communicated by grace). Depending on the interpretation of the bonum commune (either as 
the political common good or as the divine common good) and of the lex (either as human or 
as divine law), the article can be read in different ways.
229
 
The next article (whether justice as a general virtue is essentially the same as all virtue) poses 
the same problem.
230
 Aquinas concedes that legal justice can be identified with all virtues 
―insofar as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end; and this is to move all the 
other virtues by its command.‖231 But the article mentions neither the human law nor the 
divine law as the measure of legal justice; nor does it give a further specification of the 
common good. Again, the argument would hold true for acquired as well as infused legal 
justice (in both senses), depending on the law that is applied. Since Aquinas illustrates the 
function of legal justice through a comparison with charity, which similarly commands all 
virtues for its proper end,
232
 one may be inclined to favor infused legal justice. But, in 
principle, the article is open for both interpretations.  
Something analogous can be said for other incidental remarks concerning legal justice in the 
subsequent articles of ST II-II 58, which repeatedly affirm its character as commanding other 
acts for the sake of the common good; but none of them determine a special law as its 
measure.
233
 
It is impossible, then, to give a precise account of what Aquinas intends by legal justice in ST 
II-II? 
 
 
                                                 
229
 The repeated emphasis on the fact that the good of the individual is ordinabile and referibile to the common 
good, impedes a univocal interpretation. Assuming that the article is about infused legal justice observing the 
whole divine law for partaking in the divine good, it seems to be unfitting to describe the good of the individual 
as merely referable to the common good. In that case, Aquinas should describe it as essential for the common 
good, insofar as every sin contradicts the divine good. Or does Aquinas simply intend to assert that every act of 
the individual can be directed to the common good, i.e., by a special intention, independent of the fact that the 
good of the part always belongs materially to the good of the whole? (See ST I-II 96.4: ―Cum enim unus homo 
sit pars multitudinis, quilibet homo hoc ipsum quod est et quod habet, est multitudinis, sicut et quaelibet pars id 
quod est, est totius.‖) It is indeed impossible to decide the question from the argument of the body of the article. 
Only ad 3 gives a clear hint in favor of one interpretation; we will return to it later on. 
230
 ST II-II 58.6. 
231
 ST II-II 58.6: ―Inquantum scilicet ordinat actus aliarum virtutum ad suum finem, quod est movere per 
imperium omnes alias virtutes.‖ 
232
 ―Sicut enim caritas potest dici virtus generalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum divinum, 
ita etiam iustitia legalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum commune. Sicut ergo caritas, quae 
respicit bonum divinum ut proprium obiectum, est quaedam specialis virtus secundum suam essentiam; ita etiam 
iustitia legalis est specialis virtus secundum suam essentiam, secundum quod respicit commune bonum ut 
proprium obiectum.‖ (ST II-II 58.6). 
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7.5.2 Infused Divine Legal Justice in ST II-II: All Sins Are Injustices 
 
Q. 79 on the integral parts of justice is not directly concerned with legal justice, but it contains 
some interesting remarks. Articles 1 to 3 are especially helpful for our project, since Aquinas 
repeatedly refers to justice as a particular virtue as well as legal justice. The first article 
(whether doing good and declining to do evil are integral components of every kind of justice) 
makes two points about legal justice: it asserts that legal justice – though it can be taken in a 
certain way as ―all virtues‖ – realizes a specific ratio,234 namely, to achieve the good ―with 
respect to the divine or to the human law.‖235 St. Thomas mentions two alternative measures 
for legal justice, sc. the human and the divine law. The reference to the divine law indicates 
an infused species of legal justice. But does he intend legal justice in regard to the common 
good of the human city, or also in relation to God? The text continues: ―It belongs to general 
justice to do the good which is due in relation to the community or in relation to God, and to 
avoid the evil opposed to it.‖236 The statement is clear: the virtue which is not confined to 
ruling human public affairs, but extends likewise to man‘s relation towards God, can only be 
infused divine legal justice, which is incompatible with any kind of mortal sin. The outline 
perfectly corresponds to our reconstruction in section 6.2.  
It is worthwhile to note that the first article refers to both the human and the divine law (lex 
divina vel humana), the human community and man‘s relation to God (in ordine ad 
communitatem vel ad deum). Hence, though it is clear that the article demands a kind of 
divine legal justice, it carefully leaves open the possibility for a less exigent type of legal 
justice, according to the human law for the good for the human community (therefore it 
speaks of divine or human law). 
Our interpretation is confirmed by the second article: whether transgression is a special sin. 
The answer distinguishes between formal and material transgression. Formally speaking, 
transgression implies an actual contempt of a precept or of the lawgiver.
237
 In this way 
transgression is a specific sin. Materially speaking, however, every sin implies a transgression 
of – at least – a divine law. Consequently, every sin can be called a transgression. 
                                                                                                                                                        
233
 See ST II-II 58.6 ad 3 and ad 4; 58.7 ad 1 and ad 2; later on there is also a reference to legal justice in ST II-II 
61.1 ad 4 and 120.2 ad 1, but likewise without a clear indication whether Aquinas speaks of acquired or infused 
virtue. 
234
 ―Iustitia hoc modo accepta respiciat quandam rationem boni specialem.‖ (ST II-II 79.1). 
235
 ST II-II 79.1: ―in ordine ad legem divinam vel humanam.‖ 
236
 ST II-II 79.1: ―Ad iustitiam vero generalem pertinet facere bonum debitum in ordine ad communitatem vel ad 
deum, et vitare malum oppositum.‖ 
237
 ―Ad propriam rationem transgressionis pertinet attendere contemptum praecepti.‖ (ST II-II 79.2). 
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―Transgression, properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept. Now materially 
considered, this may be common to all the species of sin, because by any species of mortal sin, 
man transgresses a divine precept.‖238 St. Thomas again refers to the divine law. What does 
this imply for the specification of legal justice? The article concedes that not every sin is a 
formal transgression of the divine law; however, materially considered every sin contradicts a 
divine precept. This is the same as to say that at least materially every sin contradicts legal 
justice; external actions as well as voluntary, internal concupiscence. And in fact, this is 
exactly what Aquinas asserts in the reply to the first objection: ―As legal justice is all virtue as 
regards its subject and quasi materially, so legal injustice is materially all sin.‖239 Based on 
this statement, we can argue that if every sin is an offense against legal justice, then 
conversely, legal justice is not only concerned with acts necessary for the social life, but 
rather with all acts that are required by a the right ordering towards God. Legal justice, as 
described here, works as guardian of charity – again in agreement with the results of section 
6.2.
240
 If in q. 79.2 Aquinas were concerned with acquired legal justice, then the measure of 
transgression would be the human law, which commands all virtues ―insofar as they assume 
the proper ratio of justice‖241 – i.e., in regard to external acts, and to the extent that they are 
necessary for the common good of the human city. Moreover, even if he had in mind infused 
human justice (i.e., the disposition to live in the human society without losing charity), he 
could not define every sin as an unjust act, since not every interior sin undermines the good of 
the human city. Hence, the repeated reference to the divine law within the discussion of sin as 
opposed to justice indicates it is to be understood here as infused divine legal justice.
242
 
With these results, we return to the fifth article of q. 58, which has already been discussed. 
The previous paragraph has shown that the corpus articuli does not allow an unambiguous 
interpretation as concerning either acquired or infused legal justice. However, we have not yet 
examined the replies to the various objections. The third reply contains an argument that is 
parallel to ST II-II 79.2. The objector doubts whether there can be a general injustice, and 
                                                 
238
 ST II-II 79.2: ―Transgressio proprie dicitur ex eo quod aliquis agit aliquid contra praeceptum negativum. 
Quod quidem materialiter potest esse commune omnibus speciebus peccatorum, quia per quamlibet speciem 
peccati mortalis homo transgreditur aliquod praeceptum divinum.‖ 
239
 ST II-II 79.2 ad 1: ―Sicut iustitia legalis est omnis virtus subiecto et quasi materialiter, ita etiam iniustitia 
legalis est materialiter omne peccatum.‖  
240
 This means neither that legal justice commands every possible virtuous act (there are many acts which are 
only recommended as counsels), nor that the commanded acts are always achieved because they are commanded, 
i.e. by a special attention to the precept. (On that score Aquinas explains in ST II-II 104.3 ad 2: ―Licet actus 
virtutis cadat sub praecepto, tamen potest aliquis implere actum virtutis non attendens ad rationem praecepti.‖) In 
any case, the description exceeds the account of acquired legal justice. 
241
 ST I-II 100.2: ―inquantum assumunt rationem iustitiae.‖ 
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consequently he also negates a general justice.
243
 Aquinas responds: ―Things referable to 
oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Hence, legal justice, 
insofar as it directs to the common good, can be called a general virtue: and in the same way 
injustice can be called a general sin; thus, it is written in 1Jn 3.4 that all sin is iniquity.‖244 
Now, the statement is unequivocal: All sins – including sins against oneself – may be called 
iniquitas, and hence, injustice. This claim would be too strong for acquired legal justice, 
which commands only the external acts of all virtues, but fails to qualify voluntary 
concupiscence or hatred (i.e., internal sins) as iniquitas. Thus, the reply is an indication that 
Aquinas has in mind something like infused divine legal justice.
245
 
This brief observation in q. 58.5 ad 3 makes room for a specification of the general argument 
in the corpus articuli: there, Aquinas outlines the general structure of any kind of legal justice; 
here, the description corresponds to infused divine legal justice. Can we deduce therefrom that 
we should read all references to legal justice in qq. 57-122 as concerning divine justice in the 
sense of section 6.2; as infused legal justice in regard to the whole divine law?  
 
 
7.5.3 Infused Human Legal Justice in ST II-II 
 
Alongside some immediate indications of infused divine legal justice, other assertions suggest 
a type of legal justice in regard to the common good of the human city. 
                                                                                                                                                        
242
 In the third article, Aquinas again refers to the divine law as the measure of legal justice: ―Bonum autem sub 
ratione debiti pertinet proprie ad iustitiam, ad legalem quidem, si debitum accipiatur in ordine ad legem divinam 
vel humanam.‖ (ST II-II 79.3). 
243
 ST II-II 58.5 arg. 1: ―Iustitia est semper ad alterum, ut supra dictum est. Sed peccatum quod est in proximum 
non est peccatum generale, sed dividitur contra peccatum quo peccat homo contra seipsum. Ergo etiam neque 
iustitia est virtus generalis.‖ 
244
 ST II-II 58.5 ad 3: ―Illa quae sunt ad seipsum sunt ordinabilia ad alterum, praecipue quantum ad bonum 
commune. Und et iustitia legalis, secundum quod ordinat ad bonum commune, potest dici virtus generalis; et 
eadem ratione iniustitia potest dici peccatum commune, unde dicitur I Ioan. III quod omne peccatum est 
iniquitas.‖ 
245
 ST II-II 102.1 ad 3 contains an indirect indication of that kind of legal justice. Aquinas confronts particular 
and legal justice: ―Ad iustitiam specialem proprie sumptam pertinet reddere aequale ei cui aliquid debetur. Quod 
quidem non potest fieri ad virtuosos, et ad eos qui bene statu dignitatis utuntur, sicut nec ad deum, nec ad 
parentes. Et ideo ad quandam virtutem adiunctam hoc pertinet, non autem ad iustitiam specialem, quae est 
principalis virtus. Iustitia vero legalis se extendit ad actus omnium virtutum.‖ The reference to justice regarding 
God in the first part of the argument and the conclusive statement about legal justice as extending to all acts of 
virtues, suggest that the latter also includes acts in relation to God. 
Beyond this, we should remember that in section 6.2.1 we already discussed a remark in the treatise on 
temperance in the ST II-II (namely, q. 161.5), which obviously presupposed infused legal justice. 
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There is a brief but interesting comment in ST II-II 59.1, which asks whether injustice is a 
special vice. The context is very similar to q. 58.5 ad 3 and q. 79.2 ad 1, but with an important 
change at the end. The first objection quotes 1 Jn 3.4 again: ―All sin is iniquity.‖ But, while in 
q. 58.5 ad 3 and q. 79.2 ad 1 the scriptural citation provides the reply to an objection, here the 
reference itself is taken as an objection. In the corpus articuli, Aquinas alludes to a solution 
by distinguishing between a material and formal transgression: Injustice is a special vice 
insofar as it includes formal contempt of the common good and the law. Materially, however, 
―all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the character of injustice, just as if 
they arise from injustice.‖246 Based on this statement, the reader may expect Aquinas to 
respond to the first objection in a similar way, i.e., by describing all sins as material injustice. 
We remember q. 79.2 ad 1: ―As legal justice is all virtue as regards its subject and quasi 
materially, so legal injustice is materially all sin.‖247 However, q. 59.1 ad 1 introduces an 
unexpected differentiation: ―As legal justice is said in reference to the human common good, 
so divine justice is said in comparison with the divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and 
in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.‖248 
The answer distinguishes between legal justice ad bonum commune humanum and divine 
justice ad bonum divinum; and it belongs only to the second type of justice to be contrary to 
every sin. The reply is puzzling: It is clear that iustitia divina, as portrayed here, is nothing 
other than our infused divine legal justice, which requires the observation of all divine laws. It 
is opposed to any kind of sin. Yet its juxtaposition to legal justice suggests that divine justice 
itself is not legal justice, and moreover, that not every sin contradicts that legal justice. But in 
q. 58.5 ad 3, as well as in q. 79.2 ad 1, Aquinas himself describes expressis verbis every sin as 
contrary to legal justice. Even in the body of q. 59.1 – some lines before the present reply – he 
portrays sin as injustice in regard to the common good, and not only in regard to the divine 
good, as maintained in the reply. What are we to understand to be the exact difference 
between legal justice and divine justice in q. 59.1 ad 1? 
On the basis of our reconstruction of infused legal justice in chapters 5 and 6, we want to 
argue that the concept of legal justice is used in various analogous ways. The textual basis is 
obvious: q. 58.5 and 6 remain open to every kind of legal justice; q. 79.1 and 2 refer to legal 
justice as observing all divine precepts in ordinem ad deum, as contrary to every sin, and as 
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 ST II-II 59.1: ―Omnia vitia, inquantum repugnant bono communi, iniustitiae rationem habent, quasi ab 
iniustitia derivata.‖ 
247
 See footnote 239.  
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―divine justice,‖ though without mentioning this term. The case is the same in q. 58.5 ad 3. 
Thus, it is impossible to deny that there is an infused legal justice which observes all divine 
laws. However, q. 79.1 and 3 already admit legal justice in regard to the human law. Hence, 
the justice here is not to be understood exclusively as divine legal justice. This assumption, 
based on q. 79.1 and 3, is confirmed by the surprising assertion in q. 59.1 ad 1: Every sin 
contradicts legal justice as divine justice in regard to the divine good, but it may be 
compatible with legal justice with respect to the common good. Moreover, q. 59.1 ad 1 
specifies this legal justice as directed ―to the human common good,‖249 an expression that is 
found uniquely in that place. Obviously, St. Thomas wants to specify a kind of legal justice 
which is compatible with some sins as directed to the common good of the human city – 
without denying the possibility that divine justice can likewise be understood as a certain kind 
of legal justice, directed to God as the common good of all graced men.
250
 
Our interpretation is supported by ST II-II 81.8 ad 1, where Aquinas compares legal justice 
and sanctity as two general virtues, which command all other virtues. Similarly to q. 59.1 ad 1, 
the reply refers to the common good as the object of legal justice, and the divine good as – 
this time – the object of sanctity. ―Sanctity . . . has a certain generality, insofar as by 
command it directs the acts of all virtues to the divine good, even as legal justice is said to be 
a general virtue, insofar as it directs the acts of all virtues to the common good.‖251 What is 
called divine justice in q. 59.1 ad 1, is called sanctity in q. 81.8 ad 1. To command all virtues 
ad bonum divinum means – as he explains in the body of the article – to ―refer to God . . . the 
works of the other virtues,‖ i.e., ―man disposes himself by means of certain good works to the 
worship of God.‖252  Hence, sanctity is identified with infused divine legal justice which 
observes all divine laws. On the other side, q. 81.8 ad 1 portrays legal justice in regard to the 
good of the earthly city, and it is thereby distinguished from legal justice regarding all divine 
precepts (i.e., sanctity). Even in this respect, the textual findings in the Secunda secundae 
conform perfectly to our reconstruction in section 6.2.
253
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 ST II-II 59.1 ad 1: ―Sicut iustitia legalis dicitur per comparationem ad bonum commune humanum, ita iustitia 
divina dicitur per comparationem ad bonum divinum, cui repugnat omne peccatum. Et secundum hoc omne 
peccatum dicitur iniquitas.‖ 
249
 ST II-II 59.1 ad 1: ―ad bonum commune humanum.‖ 
250
 Thus, Delos oversimplifies the issue if he describes any kind of sin as social injustice (Delos, ―Appendice I: 
Notes explicatives,‖ 193-194). 
251
 ST II-II 81.8 ad 1: ―Sanctitas . . . habet autem quandam generalitatem, secundum quod omnes virtutum actus 
per imperium ordinat in bonum divinum, sicut et iustitia legalis dicitur generalis virtus, inquantum ordinat 
omnium virtutum actus in bonum commune.‖ 
252
 ST II-II 81.8: ―Homo . . . aliarum virtutum opera refert in deum . . . homo se disponit per bona opera ad 
cultum divinum.‖ 
253
 The relationship is well described in John A. Leies, Sanctity and Religion According do St. Thomas: A Study 
of the Angelic Doctor’s Identification of Sanctity with the Virtue of Religion (Fribourg: St. Paul's Press, 1963), 92: 
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There are some further texts in the treatise which demand to be read as concerning human 
legal justice. In ST II-II 58.9 ad 3, St. Thomas describes the achievement of courageous and 
temperate deeds as the primary object of legal justice. ―Legal justice extends chiefly 
[principalius] to other virtues [i.e. to the affective virtues] in the point of their external 
operations, insofar, to wit, as the law commands us to perform courageous deeds [fortis 
opera], and actions which are temperate, and the actions which are gentle, as said in Ethic. 
V.‖ 254  If the assertion were concerned with infused legal justice in regard to all divine 
precepts (sanctity), Aquinas could not describe external acts as its primary matter. The right 
order towards God is more disturbed by internal acts, and only secondarily by external deeds. 
Hence, the bonum commune in this context signifies the good of the human city, which 
requires principalius the external accomplishment of its precepts, and only indirectly directs 
the affective life.
255
 
Also illuminating is Aquinas‘s distinction between the truth of justice (veritas iustitiae) and 
the truth of life (veritas vitae), a distinction he takes from Hieronymus and refers to in q. 
109.
256
 The distinction fits perfectly to the difference between human and divine (legal) 
justice.  
 
Justice is a certain rectitude regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way, 
the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, since by the truth of life a man lives rightly in 
himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude of law in those decisions 
which refer to another man.
257 
 
In both cases, the measure is the divine law. The truth of life implies man‘s rectitude in 
himself, i.e. in all of his practical issues, whereas the truth of justice includes only interhuman 
                                                                                                                                                        
―The bonum commune to which legal justice is directed and the bonum divinum of sanctity-religion differ, but 
the comparison between the two virtues remains apt. God prescribes the acts of all the virtues with the purpose 
of leading men to Himself. Thus in practicing the virtues to honor God – which is sanctity – man fulfills the 
purpose of God‘s law, just as the citizen who acts virtuously fulfills the purpose of the civil law.‖ Concerning the 
priority of religion or (human) legal justice, see ibid., 86-88. 
254
 ST II-II 58.9 ad 3: ―Iustitia legalis principalius se extendat ad alias virtutes quantum ad exteriores operationes 
earum, inquantum scilicet praecipit lex fortis opera facere, et quae temperati, et quae mansueti, ut dicitur in V 
ethic.‖ 
255
 In a similar way, ST II-II 101.3 ad 3 requires a reading of legal justice in regard to the common good of the 
city: ―Pietas se extendit ad patriam secundum quod est nobis quoddam essendi principium, sed iustitia legalis 
respicit bonum patriae secundum quod est bonum commune. Et ideo iustitia legalis magis habet quod sit virtus 
generalis quam pietas.‖ 
256
 See ST II-II 109.3 arg. 3. 
257
 ST II-II 109.3 ad 3: ―Iustitia est rectitudo quaedam regulata secundum regulam divinae legis. Et secundum 
hoc, differt veritas iustitiae a veritate vitae, quia veritas vitae est secundum quam aliquis recte vivit in seipso; 
veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quam aliquis rectitudinem legis in iudiciis, quae sunt ad alterum, servat.‖  
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affairs, i.e. justice in its proper sense.
258
 Thus, it is clear that St. Thomas acknowledges in the 
treatise both a human legal justice and a divine legal justice according to the divine law. 
 
 
7.5.4 Reasons for the Vague Determination of Legal Justice in ST II-II 
 
Two important issues remain to be resolved:  
First, granted that ST II-II contains a double usage of legal justice – on the one side, regarding 
all divine precepts and excluding all sins, i.e., as sanctity; on the other side, commanding the 
act necessary for the bonum commune humanum, as human legal justice – it is clear that the 
former can only be an infused habit.
259
 But is it necessary to say the same of the latter? Or 
should we rather agree with those commentators who contrast infused legal justice in regard 
to all divine precepts with acquired legal justice in regard to the human city? 
In fact, it is possible to read the assertions about human legal justice as pertaining to an 
acquired virtue. However, no text strictly requires such an interpretation. They may equally be 
read as pertaining to an infused virtue. We want to suggest two reasons for this indeterminacy: 
First, it belongs to the very nature of the earthly city to demand external acts, so that the 
corresponding law extends only indirectly to the interior sphere of its citizens. Therefore, the 
acts of human legal justice principally do not extend beyond the reach of an acquired virtue, 
regardless of whether they are attained by an infused virtue or not. Secondly, the New Law 
does not contain special precepts regarding external acts. It leaves the concrete determination 
of the moral precepts to the legitimate authority.
260
 Hence, infused political justice must 
principally respect the same rules as its acquired counterpart, and it requires the same external 
deeds, namely, acts commanded by positive laws. From the purely external description of 
their acts, there is no difference between the acquired human legal justice and its infused 
counterpart. 
Nevertheless, as we have shown in the theoretical reconstruction of the preceding chapter, the 
graced person must be equipped with an infused human justice (see section 5.5.3.). Further, in 
                                                 
258
 Also in ST II-II 109.2 ad 3 the truth of life is defined in reference to the divine law: ―Veritas vitae est veritas 
secundum quam aliquid est verum . . . Dicitur autem vita vera, sicut etiam quaelibet alia res, ex hoc quod attingit 
suam regulam et mensuram, scilicet divinam legem, per cuius conformitatem rectitudinem habet.‖ 
259
 For acquired virtue, the fulfillment of the divine law would be impossible. Yet even natural law cannot be 
accomplished without grace (cf. ST I-II 109.4). 
260
 Cf. ST I-II 108.2. 
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section 7.2, we found many unequivocal indications that Aquinas presupposes a graced agent 
in the treatise on justice. Though the object of justice, the ius, is determined by standards 
independent of grace, he nevertheless describes the operation of a person in the state of grace; 
otherwise, the frequent references to charity, mortal sin, merit, and the ecclesiastical hierarchy 
would be unreasonable. Hence, the whole context of the treatise on justice suggests rather 
infused than acquired legal justice. The remarks about legal justice as working for the good of 
the earthly city are taken directly from the very same context. Hence, it seems natural that 
Aquinas also describes human legal justice as a virtue of the graced agent who works for the 
common good, i.e., as infused human legal justice.  
The second question: Can we suggest some reasons why Aquinas favors terms like divine 
justice or sanctity for describing infused legal justice in regard to all divine precepts, rather 
than simply using the term of ―iustitia legalis‖? 
By way of an answer, we should note that the texts that refer to legal justice in regard to the 
whole divine law, always argue in an indirect way; i.e. they assert that every sin, every 
trespassing of the divine law is unjust; is against legal justice.
261
 However, St. Thomas seems 
to avoid the description of legal justice in the positive sense as a virtue which attains the end 
of the divine law, i.e., the divine ―communicatio‖ by commanding all of the necessary acts.262 
On the contrary, when Aquinas describes the positive task of this legal justice, he substitutes 
the term with iustitia divina or sanctity.
263
 Why this asymmetry? 
For a solution, we defer to the result of our research in section 6.2.2, on the pejorative 
meaning of legal justice in Aquinas‘s commentaries on Holy Scripture. In these works he 
repeatedly confronts legal justice (sc. regarding the divine law) with iustia dei, iustia fidei, 
iustitia moralis etc. The juxtaposition is grounded in the holy texts, and emphasizes the 
impossibility of acquiring divine justice by legal observance. Thus, legal justice obtains a 
negative touch. However, those affirmations do not negate the obvious fact that, by infused 
iustia dei or iustia fidei, the graced agent perfectly observes all divine laws. In this sense there 
is, of course, an infused divine legal justice. It may be for this reason that Aquinas also avoids 
a direct description of sanctity or divine justice as iustitia legalis in ST II-II, although he uses 
simultaneously the same term without compunction as the negative measure for specifying 
every sin as injustice. 
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 See ST II-II 58.5 ad 3; 59.1; 79.2 (esp. ad 1).  
262
 An exception is ST II-II 79.1 where Aquinas affirms positively: ―Ad iustitiam vero generalem pertinet facere 
bonum debitum in ordine ad communitatem vel ad deum, et vitare malum oppositum.‖ 
263
 ST II-II 59.1 ad 1; 81.8 ad 1. 
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In summary, our examination shows that in ST II-II 57-120, legal justice carries different but 
analogous meanings: Some texts require an understanding of legal justice as a general virtue 
which commands all acts insofar as they are prescribed by the divine law, external as well as 
internal acts: This is infused divine legal justice (or sanctity). In other texts the scope of legal 
justice is limited to the common good of the earthly city; in such cases the description of legal 
justice remains necessarily open to being read as infused or acquired virtue. Considering the 
context, there are good reasons to suppose that an infused human legal justice is intended.  
 
 
7.6 The Section about the Potential Parts as Portraying Infused Virtues 
 
ST II-II 80-119 discusses the potential parts of justice, i.e., virtues that fall short of realizing 
the full notion of justice. For an account of their general features we defer to section 4.5.2 
(where cited In sent. III 33.3.4A). The corresponding section in the Secunda secundae follows 
the distinctions made in the Commentary on the Sentences exactly: some virtues render the 
other his due as far as possible, though it is from the very beginning impossible to attain full 
equality because the debt is too great. Examples of such parts are religion regarding God (qq 
81-100), piety regarding one‘s parents and homeland (q. 101), and observance regarding 
teachers and persons of special dignity (qq. 102-105). Other virtues do not correspond to a 
legal obligation, but arise rather from the moral excellence of the other, and lead one freely to 
render some good. The Summa theologiae discusses thankfulness (qq. 106-107), vengeance (q. 
108), truthfulness (qq. 109-113), friendliness (qq. 114-116), and liberality (qq. 117-119). 
It would go beyond the scope of our research to offer a complete account of these numerous 
and challenging questions. We have to relinquish a detailed analysis to others. However, we 
want to take up some particular questions and point to a few remarks which plainly and 
distinctly indicate infused virtues.  
We will argue by the following method: Again and again St. Thomas refers in these questions 
to the theological virtues (above all charity) as moving the virtues in question (i.e., moral 
virtues) to their proper act. We can argue, however, that some infused moral virtues must be 
involved. We remember De virt. in com. 10 ad 4: ―The act of acquired virtues cannot be 
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meritorious without the mediation of infused virtue.‖264 If Aquinas describes religion, piety, 
observance etc. as being moved by charity, then he obviously speaks about infused religion, 
infused piety, infused observance, etc. Of course, these virtues may make use of natural 
positive habits (i.e., acquired virtues), but the specific virtue which cooperates with charity 
has to be an infused virtue. 
 
 
7.6.1 Infused Religion and Its Acts: Devotion and Prayer (qq. 81-83) 
 
Aquinas discusses the virtue of religion, its proper acts (internal as well as external), and its 
contrary vices in the long section of ST II-II 81-100.
265
 Does he describe religion as an infused 
or as acquired virtue? Both interpretations have famous apologists.
266
 Let us examine the text 
itself. 
The first question already compares religion as moral virtue with charity as a theological 
virtue several times. But theological virtues cannot cooperate directly with acquired virtues. 
Thus, Aquinas must speak – at least implicitly – about infused religion. The most obvious 
place in which this happens is q. 81.5, which explicitly poses the question whether religion is 
a theological virtue. St. Thomas answers in the negative, since the object of the theological 
virtues is God himself, whereas religion is concerned rather with the worship that is due him. 
The first reply is interesting, as it describes the theological virtues as causing the act of 
religion: ―The theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity have an act in reference to God as 
their proper object, wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which 
performs certain things directed to God.‖267 Obviously, these texts presuppose an infused 
species of religion. 
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 De virt. in com. 10 ad 4: ―Actus virtutis acquisitae non potest esse meritorius nisi mediante virtute infusa.‖ 
265
 As secondary literature see e.g. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, 313-326; (313-323 is about religion in the time 
preceding St. Thomas, 323-326 portrays the account of Aquinas).  
266
 MacIntyre, for example, holds that religion in the Secunda secundae is discussed as a natural virtue 
(MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 188; 201). His argument: Man relates to God already on a level 
of nature. (See also MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition, 141-142). On the contrary, Gilson reads the questions in ST II-II as about infused religion (Gilson, The 
Christian Philosophy, 333-339; 345). A similar account is offered by I. Mennessier, ―Appendice II: 
Renseignements techniques,‖ in Somme théologique: La religion: Tome premier 2a-2ae, questions 80-87 (Paris: 
Desclée & Cie, 1932), 322-324. 
267
 ST II-II 81.5 ad 1: ―Virtutes autem theologicae, scilicet fides, spes et caritas, habent actum circa deum sicut 
circa proprium obiectum. Et ideo suo imperio causant actum religionis, quae operatur quaedam in ordine ad 
deum.‖ See also the body of the article, and already q. 81.4 ad 3. 
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The next two questions concern devotion and prayer as internal acts of religion. In q. 82, St. 
Thomas asserts: ―Charity causes devotion.‖268 Another reply contains a direct statement about 
religion: ―It belongs immediately to charity that man gives himself to God, adhering to him by 
a union of the spirit. But it belongs immediately to religion that man gives himself to God for 
certain works of divine worship, and only mediately to charity which is the principle of 
religion.‖269 
Q. 83 is concerned with prayer, understood not as a proper virtue but as an act of religion.
270
 
The question, in toto 17 articles, has several allusions to a graced agent and charity as a 
precondition of a virtuous prayer. Art. 1: ―Prayer tends toward God as though moved by the 
will of charity.‖271 Art. 5: We should ask first of all for things that promote our heavenly 
beatitude,
272
 and therefore, the Holy Spirit has to inspire prayers.
273
 In art. 7, St. Thomas 
explains that ―charity requires that we pray for others.‖274 And he continues: ―Prayer will be 
meritorious for that one who prays out of charity.‖275 In the next article (q. 83.8) – whether we 
are required to pray for our enemy – he repeats exactly the same distinctions which were 
made in ST II-II 25.8:
276
 as the faithful has to love his enemy by charity, likewise he has to 
pray for him. Similarly clear is art. 11, which asks whether the saints in heaven pray for us: 
―Since prayers offered for others proceed from charity . . . the greater the charity of the saints 
in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers.‖277 Art. 12 distinguishes between particular 
prayers of the faithful and the common prayer of the Church – again an indication of infused 
virtue, which is given for the virtuous life in the Church.
278
 Art. 13, whether attention is a 
necessary condition of prayer, claims that even without continuous actual attention, prayers 
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 ST II-II 82.2 ad 2: ―Caritas et devotionem causat.‖ And the text continues: ―Etiam per devotionem caritas 
nutritur, sicut et quaelibet amicitia conservatur et augetur per amicabilium operum exercitium et meditationem.‖ 
ST II-II 82.3 ad 2 is also noteworthy: the contemplation of Christ‘s life and passion nourishes devotion. This 
statement obviously presupposes more than a natural knowledge of God, sc. faith in Christ as savior. 
269
 ST II-II 82.2 ad 1: ―Ad caritatem pertinet immediate quod homo tradat seipsum deo adhaerendo ei per 
quandam spiritus unionem. Sed quod homo tradat seipsum deo ad aliqua opera divini cultus, hoc immediate 
pertinet ad religionem, mediate autem ad caritatem, quae est religionis principium.‖ 
270
 See ST II-II 83.3. 
271
 ST II-II 83.1 ad 2: ―tendit autem oratio in deum quasi a voluntate caritatis mota.‖ 
272
 ST II-II 83.5, also ad 2. 
273
 ST II-II 83.5 ad 1: ―Homo ex se scire non possit quid orare debeat, spiritus tamen . . . in hoc adiuvat 
infirmitatem nostram quod, inspirando nobis sancta desideria, recte postulare nos facit.‖ 
274
 ST II-II 83.7: ―Caritas hoc requirit, ut pro aliis oremus.‖ 
275
 ST II-II 83.7 ad 2: ―Oratio meritoria erit oranti, qui ex caritate orat.‖ 
276
 Whether we have to love our enemy by charity. We have already discussed the issue in section 6.3.3b. 
277
 ST II-II 83.11: ―Cum oratio pro aliis facta ex caritate proveniat . . . quanto sancti qui sunt in patria sunt 
perfectioris caritatis, tanto magis orant pro viatoribus.‖ 
278
 Similar a short note in ST II-II 83.16 ad 2. 
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are meritorious if they are ―informed by charity.‖279 Such a man ―sets about praying by the 
instigation of the Spirit.‖280 The next article describes the ―desire of charity‖ as the necessary 
cause of a virtuous praying.
281
 Most important among these articles is art. 15, with the explicit 
question of whether prayer is meritorious. The answer is replete with arguments that Aquinas 
considering an infused virtue: prayer ―proceeds from the root of charity;‖282 or more precisely: 
―prayer proceeds from charity mediated by religion.‖283 Further, prayer must be accompanied 
by humility, a virtue that is described later on as infused.
284
 The first reply even affirms that 
prayers without grace do not earn merit in its proper sense. The next article argues conversely: 
―The sinner cannot pray in a pious way as though his prayer were informed by a habit of 
virtue.‖285 Informed by a habit of which kind? Certainly it must be by an infused habit, i.e., 
infused religion. 
These numerous citations provide sufficient evidence that in this discussion, Aquinas 
presupposes religion as an infused virtue. 
 
 
7.6.2 Piety and Obedience as Infused Virtues (qq. 101 and 104) 
 
We have identified the questions about religion as treating of an infused virtue, since its acts – 
devotion and prayer – are described as being commanded by charity. We observe the same 
fact in the discussion of piety, i.e., the virtue by which man renders honors and thanks to his 
parents and his homeland (q. 101). St. Thomas writes: ―Just as religion is a certain 
protestation of faith, hope, and charity whereby man is primarily directed to God, likewise 
piety is a protestation of charity which we bear towards our parents and homeland.‖ 286 
Consequently, the virtue involved is not acquired but infused piety. In another article, he 
again asserts that ―whatever we give our parents out of pity, we refer to God, just as the other 
works of mercy, which we perform in regard to any of our neighbors, are offered to God, 
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 ST II-II 83.13: ―Communis omnibus actibus caritate informatis, quod est mereri. Et ad hunc effectum non ex 
necessitate requiritur quod attentio adsit orationi per totum, sed vis primae intentionis qua aliquis ad orandum 
accedit, reddit totam orationem meritoriam, sicut in aliis meritoriis actibus accidit.‖ 
280
 ST II-II 83.13 ad 1: ―Ex instinctu spiritus ad orandum accedit.‖ 
281
 ST II-II 83.14: ―Causa autem orationis est desiderium caritatis, ex quo procedere debet oratio.‖ 
282
 ST II-II 83.15: ―Oratio autem, sicut et quilibet alius actus virtutis, habet efficaciam merendi inquantum 
procedit ex radice caritatis.‖  
283
 ST II-II 83.15: ―Procedit tamen oratio a caritate mediante religione, cuius est actus oratio.‖ 
284
 See ST II-II 161, discussed in section 6.2.1. 
285
 ST II-II 83.16 ad 2: ―Peccator non potest pie orare quasi eius oratio ex habitu virtutis informetur.‖ 
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according to Mt 25, what you did to one of my least, you did to me.‖287 The reference to the 
works of mercy (discussed by Aquinas within the context of charity
288
) and the citation of the 
Gospel are again indications of an infused species of piety. 
Furthermore, q. 104 on obedience makes a great contribution toward proving our thesis. It 
includes some very clear hints that the virtue under consideration is an infused virtue. 
Aquinas places the discussion of obedience after piety (regarding parents), observance, and 
dulia (regarding people of special merit). Thus, the context suggests that the question is not 
about obedience regarding God, but regarding human superiors. In fact, the first two articles 
seem to affirm this supposition. However, in article 3, which asks whether obedience is the 
greatest of all virtues, Aquinas describes obedience (with apparent abruptness) in reference to 
God as the effect of man‘s charity for him. In the sed contra he argues: ―Obedience is to be 
praised because it proceeds from charity.‖289 In the body of the article, he first affirms the 
priority of the theological virtues over the moral virtues.
290
 This fact in itself should already 
catch our attention. If somebody possesses faith, hope, and charity, and moral virtues, then – 
according to St. Thomas – he must have infused moral virtues. Thus, already this detail 
suggests infused virtues. Moreover, Aquinas continues by saying that among the moral virtues, 
obedience has a certain priority ―whereby we contemn our own will because of God‖291 
whereas by the other moral virtues we ―contemn other goods because of God.‖292 In what 
follows, St. Thomas again maintains an essential connection between charity and obedience: 
it is impossible that works are meritorious before God without respecting the divine will (i.e., 
without obedience) – ―as neither they would be [meritorious] if they were done without 
charity, which cannot be apart from obedience.‖293 Thus, Aquinas describes obedience as a 
concomitant of charity. Without any doubt, this kind of obedience has to be an infused 
species.
294
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 ST II-II 101.3 ad 1: ―Sicut religio est quaedam protestatio fidei, spei et caritatis, quibus homo primordialiter 
ordinatur in deum; ita etiam pietas est quaedam protestatio caritatis quam quis habet ad parentes et ad patriam.‖ 
287
 ST II-II 101.4 ad 3: ―Hoc ipsum quod parentibus carnalibus ex pietate exhibemus, in deum referimus, sicut et 
alia misericordiae opera quae quibuscumque proximis impendimus, deo exhibita videntur secundum illud Matth. 
XXV, quod uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis.‖ 
288
 Cf. ST II-II 32.3. 
289
 ST II-II 104.3 sed contra: ―Obedientia habet laudem ex eo quod ex caritate procedit.‖ 
290
 ST II-II 104.3: ―Illae virtutes quibus deo secundum se inhaeretur, scilicet theologicae, sunt potiores virtutibus 
moralibus, quibus aliquid terrenum contemnitur ut deo inhaereatur.‖ 
291
 ST II-II 104.3: ―quae proper deum contemnit propriam voluntatem.‖ 
292
 ST II-II 104.3: ―quae propert deum aliqua alia bona contemnunt.‖ 
293
 ST II-II 104.3: ―Sicut nec si fierent sine caritate, quae sine obedientia esse non potest.‖ 
294
 ST II-II 105 about disobedience likewise mentions to charity as the point of reference: ―Inobedientia qua quis 
inobediens est praeceptis superiorum, est peccatum mortale, quasi divinae dilectioni contrarium.‖ 
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Our argument is confirmed by the reply to the second objection, which cites the authority of 
St. Gregory: obedience causes all the other virtues; therefore, it must also be superior to all 
the other virtues.
295
 In the reply, Aquinas notes that virtuous acts which are a matter of 
precept must also involve an act of obedience. But since every virtuous act disposes man 
toward an increase of virtue, obedience can become in a certain sense the cause of this virtue. 
However, Aquinas denies that obedience simply precedes all virtues. He makes the following 
important statement with an explicit reference to infused virtue: ―The infusion of grace and 
virtues [infusio gratiae et virtutum] may precede all virtuous acts, even in point of time. And 
in this way obedience is not prior to all virtues; neither in point of time nor by nature.‖296 
Admittedly, Aquinas refers to the infusion of virtue only in order to deny the absolute priority 
of obedience. Nonetheless, the note is interesting in regard to our thesis: he mentions that 
virtues can be had prior to any act of virtue – namely by infusion. But why should Aquinas 
mention the infusion of virtue, unless he is discussing an infused virtue? Hence, the oblique 
reference reveals that Aquinas is speaking about infused obedience. 
If we read the body of art. 3 again, we observe some inconspicuous details that confirm our 
assertion. In order to provide the necessary background for his answer, St. Thomas begins his 
argument with a basic account of virtue as such: ―As sin consists in man contemning God and 
adhering to mutable things, so – conversely – the merit of a virtuous act consists in man 
contemning created goods and adhering to God.‖297 This general description certainly does 
not sound like a typical Aristotelian understanding of virtue, i.e., practical perfections 
regarding the human city on earth.
298
 In contrast, it conforms perfectly to Aquinas‘s account 
of infused virtue. In De virt. card. 4 ad 5, he explains that infused moral virtues are concerned 
with human things, but only ―as matter which is handled as tending from there to something 
else,‖ 299  as starting from created things and tending towards God. Thus, from the very 
beginning of the article, Aquinas presupposes an understanding of infused virtue.
300
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 ST II-II 104.3 arg. 2: ―Praeterea, Gregorius dicit ult. Moral., quod obedientia sola virtus est quae virtutes 
ceteras menti inserit, insertasquae custodit. Sed causa est potior effectu. Ergo obedientia est potior omnibus 
virtutibus.‖ 
296
 ST II-II 104.3 ad 2: ―Infusio gratiae et virtutum potest praecedere, etiam tempore, omnem actum virtuosum. 
Et secundum hoc, neque tempore neque natura est obedientia omnibus aliis virtutibus prior.‖ 
297
 ST II-II 104.3: ―Sicut peccatum consistit in hoc quod homo, contempto deo, commutabilibus bonis inhaeret; 
ita meritum virtuosi actus consistit e contrario in hoc quod homo, contemptis bonis creatis, deo inhaeret.‖ 
298
 Cf. section 2.3. 
299
 De virt. card. 4 ad 5: ―sicut materia circa quam operatur, ut ab ea in aliud tendens.‖ 
300
 A further indirect indication is found in ST II-II 104.3 ad 1, where Aquinas defines obedience according to the 
different kinds of reverence on which it depends: ―Obedientia procedit ex reverentia, quae exhibet cultum et 
honorem superiori. Et quantum ad hoc, sub diversis virtutibus continetur, licet secundum se considerata, prout 
respicit rationem praecepti, sit una specialis virtus. Inquantum ergo procedit ex reverentia praelatorum, 
continetur quodammodo sub observantia. Inquantum vero procedit ex reverentia parentum, sub pietate. 
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Usually, scholars who discuss Aquinas‘s account of obedience pass over this article and 
interpret the whole question as dealing with acquired obedience.
301
 But this solution 
oversimplifies the issue. (Implicitly, it postulates that St. Thomas was inconsistent in 
structuring the articles, turning from a human kind of obedience in art. 1 and 2, to obedience 
regarding God in art. 3). The interpretation of the subject of this question as acquired 
obedience is ultimately impossible, since the other articles also at least indirectly imply 
infused obedience: Although articles 1 and 2 do not mention obedience regarding God, there 
is a reference to the divine law as the authority on account of which inferiors are to obey their 
superiors.
302
 Likewise, in art. 6: ―Man is bound by the divine law to obey his fellow-man.‖303 
A reply to an objection in article 5 calls for obedience regarding God, ―by whom we are 
instructed by the natural or written law‖304 – and the written law clearly refers to the divine 
law. Moreover, the matter of art. 4 to 6, which we previously discussed, makes it clear that, 
for Aquinas, the ultimate reason that one ought to give obedience to a fellow-man, is God: Art. 
4 asks whether God must be obeyed in all things; art. 5, whether subjects are bound to obey 
their (human) superiors in all things; art. 6, whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular 
power. All these issues are answered by reference to man‘s primary obedience regarding God. 
For example, the sed contra of q. 104.6 quotes 1 Pt 2.13-14: ―Be subject to every human 
creature because of God, whether to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him.‖305 
One may object that even by nature man has to obey all lawful superiors. But Aquinas 
emphasizes in the body of the article that also the order of grace requires the faithful to obey 
their earthly superiors. Hence, the articles surrounding q. 104.3 also give sufficient evidence 
                                                                                                                                                        
Inquantum vero procedit ex reverentia dei, sub religione, et pertinet ad devotionem, quae est principalis actus 
religionis.‖ (ST II-II 104.3 ad 1). As we have seen in the previous paragraph, religion and piety are discussed by 
St. Thomas as infused virtues. The virtue of observance, however, is portrayed as a consequent continuation of 
religion and piety: ―Sicut sub religione, per quam cultus tribuitur deo, quodam ordine invenitur pietas, per quam 
coluntur parentes; ita sub pietate invenitur observantia, per quam cultus et honor exhibetur personis in dignitate 
constitutis.‖ (ST II-II 102.1). Thus, observance is obviously of the same order as religion and piety. But if 
obedience proceeds from religion, piety, and observance as infused virtues, it must be itself infused. 
301
 E.g. Sally J. Scholz, ―Civil Disobedience in the Social Theory of Thomas Aquinas,‖ The Thomist 60 (1996): 
449-462; Jean Porter, ―Natural Equality: Freedom, Authority, and Obedience in Two Medieval Thinkers,‖ 
Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 21 (2001): 275-304. A very detailed outline is offered by Karen M. 
Kuss, Obedience as a Virtue: A Thomistic Consideration (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1991); 
she even dedicates a special chapter to the investigation of ―divine obedience‖ (p. 60-112), understood as 
obedience regarding God. However, there are no indications that she understands this virtue as infused obedience. 
A lonely exception of this common reading makes Angela M. McKay, Humble Obedience: References to Infused 
Virtue in the Treatise on Justice (Paper presented at a conference of the International Congress on Medieval 
Studies, Kalamazoo, MI, 2005). 
302
 ST II-II 104.1: ―In rebus humanis, ex ordine iuris naturalis et divini, tenentur inferiores sui superioribus 
obedire.‖ 
303
 ST II-II 104.6 ad 3: ―Ex lege divina homo tenetur homini obedire.‖ 
304
 ST II-II 104.5 ad 2: ―a quo instruuntur per legem naturalem vel scriptam.‖ 
305
 ST II-II 104.6 sed contra: ―Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter deum, sive regi, quasi praecellenti; 
sive ducibus, tanquam ab eo missis.‖ 
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that, for Aquinas, obedience is not to be reduced to subjection to human superiors, but is 
grounded ultimately in man‘s obedience to God, motivated by charity. Granting that this is the 
case, what Aquinas has in mind can only be infused obedience.  
 
 
7.7 The Gift of Piety as the Completion of the Treatise 
 
In section 7.1, we already discussed the precepts of justice (q. 122). We can therefore 
conclude our examination of the treatise on justice with an analysis of q. 121, on piety as a 
gift of the Holy Spirit. In the prologue of the Secunda secundae, Aquinas announces that he 
will treat the virtues together with their corresponding gifts. We took this assertion as an 
indication that he was considering justice as infused virtue since, as seen in section 1.3, 
infused moral virtues presuppose the cooperation of the gifts for their act – in contrast to 
acquired virtues. Every single act of an infused virtue arises at a direct instigation of the Holy 
Spirit, but in order to be disposed for this divine motion, the human powers need to be 
elevated by the gifts. Thus, if the treatise on justice contains an extra question about piety as 
its corresponding gift, the structure itself already suggests an understanding of justice as an 
infused virtue.
306
 
Of course, this observation by itself still leaves open the possibility that Aquinas only added 
the outline of piety as the corresponding gift for systematic reasons, as a structural emphasis 
of his claim that every infused virtue cooperates with a related gift. But does he also give 
some indications of this cooperation in his portrayal of piety (as gift)? Aquinas‘s discussion is 
extremely brief: one single article – quite sparse in comparison with 63 long questions about 
justice. However, a careful examination of the article reveals an astonishing coherence with 
our reading of the treatise as concerning infused justice. 
According to the general theory of the cooperation of gifts and infused virtues, the just man 
requires a corresponding gift in order to be disposed to achieve the proper acts of justice 
(iusta) in a divine mode (divino modo), as moved by the Holy Spirit. How does Aquinas 
                                                 
306
 One might put forth the following objection: The examination of piety as a gift at the end of the treatise 
should not be read as an indication of justice as an infused virtue in the previous discussion, but the contrary as 
argument for acquired virtue. This would man that now, at the end, Aquinas extends his view to the supernatural 
level by introducing piety as a gift. However, the objection misinterprets the function of the gifts. The gifts 
neither substitute nor elevate the task of acquired virtues. Therefore, a reference to piety as a gift after a long 
explication of justice as an acquired virtue without dealing with its infused counterpart would make little sense. 
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describe piety as a gift that relates to justice? Let us first study the content of the brief corpus 
articuli: 
 
The gifts of the Holy Spirit are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the 
motion of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit moves us to this effect among others, of having 
a filial affection towards God, according to Rm 8, you have received the spirit of adoption of 
sons, whereby we cry: Abba, father. And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and 
worship to one‘s father, it follows that piety, whereby we pay worship and duty to God as our 
father under the instigation of the Holy Spirit, is a gift of the Holy Spirit.
307
 
 
At first glance, the attribution of this kind of piety (as a gift) to justice as a virtue may seem 
artificial: Justice as a virtue first of all directs interhuman actions. Only religion as a potential 
part is concerned with man‘s relation to God. Hence, it seems inappropriate that piety, as the 
gift relating to justice, focuses exclusively on God. If Aquinas understands piety as the gift 
corresponding to justice, he should mention a cooperation with infused commutative or 
distributive justice. Moreover, though piety as a virtue belongs to justice as a potential part, it 
is not the noblest one (which would be religion). Thus, if piety as a gift disposes man to be 
moved by God himself, it should rather adopt the name of religion than piety.  
Aquinas addresses both arguments in the objections. 
Comparing piety and religion as two virtues, the latter surpasses the former in dignity, since 
glorifying God is nobler than honoring one‘s parents. This much is clear enough. Nonetheless, 
there are different ways to pay worship to God, namely, as our creator – and this is the task of 
religion as virtue, or even more perfectly, as our father, which is due to the gift of piety.  
 
To pay worship to God as creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to 
one‘s father in the flesh, as does the piety which is a virtue. But to pay worship to God as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Since the gifts require infused virtues for their cooperation, the foregoing discussion was certainly concerned 
with infused justice. 
307
 ST II-II 121.1: ―Dona spiritus sancti sunt quaedam habituales animae dispositiones quibus est prompte 
mobilis a spiritu sancto. Inter cetera autem, movet nos spiritus sanctus ad hoc quod affectum quendam filialem 
habeamus ad deum, secundum illud Rom. VIII, accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba, 
pater. Et quia ad pietatem proprie pertinet officium et cultum patri exhibere, consequens est quod pietas 
secundum quam cultum et officium exhibemus deo ut patri per instinctum spiritus sancti sit spiritus sancti 
donum.‖ 
For a short discussion of the general issue of piety as a gift of the Holy Spirit, see André Marie, ―The General 
Relationship between the Virtues and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost,‖ The Slaves of the Immaculate Heart of Mary 
(May 30, 2007), http://catholicism.org/virtues-gifts.html (accessed February 4, 2010); Horst, Die Gaben des 
Heiligen Geistes nach Thomas von Aquin, 149-153; Aumann, Spiritual Theology, 293-296. Still helpful is 
Mennessier, ―Appendice II: Renseignements techniques,‖ 324-327. 
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father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as creator and lord. Wherefore religion 
is greater than the virtue of piety, while the gift of piety is greater than religion.
308
 
 
This assertion could foster the suspicion that only by piety does man relate to God as his 
supernatural end, whereas religion is understood as a natural virtue, since man may recognize 
God as his creator even apart from grace.
309
 Is religion understood here merely as a natural 
virtue, whereas only the gift of piety implies the order of grace? On the contrary, the detailed 
outline of religion in qq. 81-100 clearly describes religion as a virtue which is based on 
charity.
310
 Thus, piety as a gift does not introduce new supernatural acts or obligations of 
worshipping God beyond infused religion, but enables man to render the worship of religion 
by a ―filial affection,‖ i.e., divino modo.311 In this way, the description of piety fits perfectly 
as the completion of the previous discussion of religion as an infused virtue. It does not 
introduce a parallel, second mode of acting, but focuses on the moving cause of the acts of 
(infused) religion – sc. the Holy Spirit – and the resulting special mode of its acts. 
But is the restrained focus of piety on the worship of God not too narrow for it to be the gift 
that corresponds to justice, which covers many issues beyond religion? In what way does the 
gift of piety make the agent amenable to the Spirit‘s motions with respect to interpersonal acts; 
to paying to each his due?  
Aquinas himself replies this objection: 
 
As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also 
to all his relatives on account of their being related to his father, so by the gift of piety he pays 
worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to 
God.
312
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 ST II-II 121.1 ad 2: ―Exhibere cultum deo ut creatori, quod facit religio, est excellentius quam exhibere 
cultum patri carnali, quod facit pietas quae est virtus. Sed exhibere cultum deo ut patri est adhuc excellentius 
quam exhibere cultum deo ut creatori et domino. Unde religio est potior pietate virtute, sed pietas secundum 
quod est donum, est potior religione.‖ Similarly in ad 1: ―Pietas quae est donum, hoc [sc. officium et cultum] 
exhibet deo ut patri.‖ 
309
 In ST I-II 109.3 ad 1, Aquinas argues that man loves God by nature as principium essendi and creator, but 
only by supernatural charity as his ultimate beatitude. 
310
 See the quotation in footnote 269, where Aquinas describes charity as ―religionis principium.‖ 
311
 Cessario explains: ―Religion continues to bind even a person who is brought into the communicatio 
benevolentiae divinae, that is, elevated to supernatural charity. Even the personal friendship between God and 
the creature that we call created grace does not alter the structure of religion, so that the favor of divine 
friendship never excuses one from rendering to God what is his due.‖ (Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined 
Life, 149). 
312
 ST II-II 121.1 ad 3: ―Sicut per pietatem quae est virtus exhibet homo officium et cultum non solum patri 
carnali, sed etiam omnibus sanguine iunctis, secundum quod pertinent ad patrem; ita etiam pietas secundum 
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The task of piety is not limited to God, but extends to all man insofar as they belong to 
God.
313
 We find the same argument in the case of piety as a virtue, where honoring one‘s 
parents includes respect for all relatives: ―The worship due to our parents includes the 
worship given to all our relatives, since our relatives are those who descend from the same 
parents.‖314 The case of charity is similar, because love for God includes (and demands) love 
for one neighbors insofar as they belong to God.
315
 In the same way, the gift of piety, whose 
proper object is God, to whom we adhere in filial affection, extends to all proper acts of 
justice insofar as all men who are involved in our actions may be considered – at least 
potentially
316
 – as co-adopted sons of God. Cessario points out that ―The gift of Piety . . . 
illumines the just believer to embrace every person, and indeed everything, as a child or 
possession of the heavenly Father – ‗ut filios et res Patris.‘‖317 Thus, filial adherence to God 
also affects the mode of actions towards the other, although Aquinas does not discuss this 
consequence at great length. Here the principle is valid: ―The greater includes the lesser.‖318  
As already seen in the previous paragraph, piety as a gift does not introduce additional duties 
with regard to our neighbors. It only enables the agent to render to each one his due – the 
object of justice – prompted by the divine impulse. Aumann correctly explains: ―The gift of 
piety perfects to a heroic degree the matter that falls under the virtue of justice and the other 
virtues related to justice.‖319  
 
Therefore, we can draw the following two conclusions: 
(a) The short discussion of piety as the gift corresponding to justice, only makes sense if the 
previous chapter already concerned the acts of infused justice. The task of the gift is to 
dispose the agent to be amenable to the impulses of the Holy Spirit, whereas the proper object 
of the action is already determined by justice and its annexed parts. By the gift of piety, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
quod est donum, non solum exhibet cultum et officium deo, sed omnibus hominibus inquantum pertinent ad 
deum.‖ 
313
 Already in the Prima Secundae Aquinas claims this function of piety as a gift regarding man‘s actions ad 
omnes, i.e. as complement of justice. ―Nomen pietatis importat reverentiam quam habemus ad patrem et ad 
patriam. Et quia pater omnium deus est, etiam cultus dei pietas nominatur; ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Et 
ideo convenienter donum quo aliquis propter reverentiam dei bonum operatur ad omnes, pietas nominatur.‖ (ST 
I-II 68 ad 2). 
314
 ST II-II 101.1: ―In cultu autem parentum includitur cultus omnium consanguineorum, quia etiam 
consanguinei ex hoc dicuntur quod ex eisdem parentibus processerunt.‖ 
315
 ST II-II 25.1; De caritate 4 ad 5. 
316
 Cf. ST III 8.3. 
317
 Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 155. 
318
 ST II-II 101.1 ad 1: ―In maiori includitur minus. Et ideo cultus qui deo debetur includit in se, sicut aliquid 
particulare, cultum qui debetur parentibus.‖ 
319
 Aumann, Spiritual Theology, 293. 
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graced agent renders to everybody what the virtue of justice requires, but precisely as moved 
by filial love for God. Gift and virtue cooperate. However, if the whole previous treatise were 
concerned with acquired justice, Aquinas would have to renew the whole discussion about 
justice from the beginning for the graced agent. But he is content to describe the function of 
piety as man‘s disposition to be moved by the Spirit, to act by a certain modus, by filial 
affection towards God; the concrete object of these acts is not discussed. Why? Obviously, 
because the whole treatise was already concerned with the acts of infused justice. 
(b) According to Aquinas‘s description of piety, pious behavior towards the neighbor hinges 
on our adherence to God. We found a similar statement in q. 58, on justice in general, where 
Aquinas portrays the right relationship to God as including the order of justice in regard to the 
other. ―Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor . . . so too the service of God 
includes rendering to each one his due.‖320 Some articles later, he characterizes love of God as 
the ―common root of the entire order towards the other.‖321 Hence, not only in the case of the 
corresponding gift, but also in the case of justice, Aquinas founds the ordo ad alterum on the 
ordo ad deum – a detail that would be superfluous if the discussion were only concerned with 
acquired virtue.  
Thus, the concluding article on piety as the corresponding gift of the Holy Spirit is a final 
confirmation that the subject of the entire treatise is infused justice. 
 
 
7.8 Conclusion: Justice in the Secunda Secundae as an Infused Virtue 
 
At the beginning of chapter 4, we quoted ST I-II 100.12, in which Aquinas explicitly 
recognizes two different kinds of justice, sc. acquired and infused justice: ―Justice, as the 
other virtues, can be taken either as an acquired or as an infused virtue . . . The acquired virtue 
is caused by operations, but the infused virtue is caused by God himself through his grace. 
And this is true justice.‖322 Our reading through of the Secunda secundae has shown that the 
discussion there is indeed about this ―true justice,‖ i.e., infused justice. Or better: about the 
object of infused justice. Or still more precisely: long parts of the treatise are about trespasses 
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 ST II-II 58.1 ad 6: ―Sicut in dilectione dei includitur dilectio proximi, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in hoc 
quod homo servit deo includitur quod unicuique reddat quod debet.‖ Cf. In sent. III 29.6. 
321
 ST II-II 58.8 ad 2: ―Iustitia est, quae per ceteras diffunditur, dilectio dei et proximi, quae scilicet est 
communis radix totius ordinis ad alterum.‖ 
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against the object of infused justice – which is identical with the ius naturale but determined 
by human laws and ecclesiastical canons. This special character of justice, which permits a 
material determination of its object (the ius), combined with the narrow scope of infused 
justice (which only provides the ability to live faithfully in the human society, but without 
extraordinary skills for promoting the welfare of the city), may be the reason why scholars 
have so easily overlooked the true purpose of the whole discussion.  
Of course, for exactly the same reason, large parts of the treatise can be read – at least 
superficially – as dealing with acquired justice. But if we take into account all of the details 
embedded in the articles, it becomes clear that Aquinas is actually portraying infused justice – 
as should be expected, given his general assertion that infused virtues are the only perfect 
virtues, and as he already suggests in the prologue of the Secunda secundae. 
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 ST I-II 100.12: ―Iustitia autem, sicut et aliae virtutes potest accipi et acquisita et infusa . . . Acquisita quidem 
causatur ex operibus, sed infusa causatur ab ipso deo per eius gratiam. Et haec est vera iustitia.‖ 
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CONCLUSION  
 
8. Consequences for the Understanding of the Moral Life 
 
In the previous seven chapters we proved our claim that in the section on justice of the 
Secunda secundae Aquinas is not concerned with an acquired virtue but an infused one. At 
the end of our dissertation the (patient) reader may be tempted to ask whether the only benefit 
from our paper is the satisfaction of defending the right interpretation of a very particular 
issue in a very particular old medieval book. In fact, this would be a quite little gain.  
However, the full title of our thesis is: ―Justice as an infused moral virtue in the Summa 
theologiae II-II and its implications for our understanding of the moral life.‖ On the 
remaining pages we want to focus on this second part of the title and draw some 
consequences for the understanding of the moral life which follow from our interpretation of 
infused justice. 
 
 
8.1 Theoretical Results: The Golden Mean between Virtue Ethics and 
Legalism 
 
As explained in the introductory chapter, our thesis must be read in the context of the 
reappraisal of ―Virtue Ethics‖ in recent times. For centuries the phenomenon of morality was 
described by terms of obligation and duty. The moral good was seen as correlative to 
observance of and obedience to certain precepts, to fulfill one‘s duty.1 Arguing in this line, I. 
Kant defined virtue as ―the moral strength of the human will in observing his duty,‖2 as an 
―internal attitude in fighting,‖3 namely against one‘s own inclinations, only because of a 
moral obligation.  
In contrast, virtue ethics grounds morals in the opposite way. Ethics arises from man‘s natural 
inclinations which are embedded in human nature. It is rooted in man‘s natural desires for the 
good and pleasurable. Virtue ethics conceives of the virtuous agent as wanting to do what 
                                                 
1
 As Lamont has correctly noted, such a ―moral of obligation‖ supposes implicitly an ―identity of justice and 
morality‖ (see Lamont, ―Conscience, Freedom, Rights: Idols of the Enlightenment Religion,‖ 235). 
2
 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956), A 46. 
3
 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956), A 151: 
―Gesinnung im Kampf.‖ 
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morality requires (since morality requires what the virtuous agent wants to do
4
). R.J. 
Devettere thus defines: ―Virtue ethics is about desire and not duty, about what we want to do 
and not what we ought to do.‖5 Similar S.v. Hooft who opposes this account explicitly with 
the morality of obligation: 
 
When a moral agent, as conceived by an ethics of duty, finds himself in a morally complex 
situation he will ask himself what it is his duty to do. He will consider what moral norms or 
principles apply to the situation and seek to apply them. Virtue ethics, in contrast, will 
consider what sort of person the agent should be and what sort of life they should lead.
6
 
 
The general concern of virtue ethics, i.e. the foundation of morals in the natural inclination of 
man, is certainly valid.
7
 Vice versa, the grounding of morals in terms of obligation and duty is 
obviously deficient. But a correct (and necessary) critique has always the tendency to fall into 
the other extreme. Likewise the valid critique of an ―ethics of duty‖ by a virtue ethics is in 
danger to throw out the baby with the bath water. Whilst it is right in denying obligation as 
ultimate rationale of morals, we must also carefully avoid an undervaluation of the legitimate 
function of precepts and legal obligations. Thus, the question is whether an ―ethics of duty‖ 
and an ―ethics of virtue‖ are two exclusive alternatives – either the one or the other. Or have 
we to do with two aspects, two legitimate, necessary, and complementary aspects of human 
morality? 
As to that, the deepened understanding of justice as infused virtue is of great advantage. It 
helps to clarify the relationship between what we want to do by our own inclination and what 
we have to do by a commanded obligation. 
A look back: Justice as virtue is not to be understood as readiness to tolerate legitimate claims 
of the other, but as own internal inclination of the agent to render everybody his due. It is the 
agent‘s own desire to achieve the ius. ―Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render 
everybody his due.‖8 As to that, it fits perfectly to the basic account of virtue ethics. However, 
this does not imply a general dismissal of duty and legal obligation. In section 4.3 we 
                                                 
4
 Likewise for Aquinas the term bonum results from the motion of an appetite: ―Cum autem bonum proprie sit 
motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et 
ideo dicit, quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt, bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt.‖ (In ethic I 1.9). And in ST 
I 6.2 ad 2: ―Cum dicitur bonum est quod omnia appetunt, non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab 
omnibus appetatur, sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet.‖ 
5
 Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 20. 
6
 Hooft, Understanding Virtue Ethics, 10-11. 
7
 J. Pieper expresses it aptly: ―Dass der Mensch etwas ‗soll‘ und was er ‗soll‘ – dies hat wesentlich etwas zu tun 
mit dem, worauf es mit dem Menschen sowieso hinaus will.‖ (Pieper, ―Über das Gute und das Böse,‖ 37). 
8
 ST II-II 58.1: ―Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum unicuique tribuens.‖ 
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investigated Aquinas‘s distinction between debitum morale and debitum legale (by reference 
to ST I-II 99.5). The first one binds the agent from within, the second one from the outside, i.e. 
by law.
9
 According to Aquinas, moral and legal due do not constitute two rival ethical 
versions but describe two different aspects of one moral theory. The debitum morale is 
certainly the more basic foundation. The agent who has virtues is inclined by himself to act 
according to reasonable good (natural reason as well as enlightened by faith). Virtue ethics is 
right in grounding morals in man‘s own inclination. But this is not yet the complete account 
of morals. Beyond that, there is also a legal due; an external obligation which does not only 
command things which are desired in themselves by the virtuous agent, but also things which 
are good only because of an external determination. Only because of positive laws, man 
observes things like the code of procedure, traffic-rules, wage agreements, the civil (and 
ecclesiastical) requirements for marriage and so forth. In and of themselves, these rules do not 
bear the notion of good and desirable. They are good only on condition of a legal 
determination. Aquinas makes an exact distinction: the law ―commands certain things because 
they are good, and forbids others, because they are evil; others, however, are good because 
they are prescribed and evil because they are forbidden.‖10 Thus, the virtuous agent will 
perform the second kind of acts only because they are commanded by the legitimate authority 
– because of the legal obligation. He has – so to speak – an inward inclination to follow an 
externally determined obligation. In this way legal obligation plays an important role even for 
virtue-based ethics. Though the ultimate motivation for moral acting is rooted in human 
inclinations, its concrete determination often hinges on external coordinates, on duties and 
obligations, constituted by positive laws. Both aspects are essential for Aquinas‘s account of 
human morality. In a certain way we can say: His moral account is a virtue ethics with 
legalistic implants. 
So far the implications of justice in general for our understanding of morals. But what about 
the relevance of justice as infused virtue? In which way does our inquiry of infused justice 
allow a better understanding of the moral life? Aquinas‘s doctrine of infused justice clarifies 
how an agent, who is seriously inclined to vicious deeds, who achieves the good only by 
observing the determinations of a legal obligation, can nonetheless be called virtuous. At fist 
glance, the description sounds like a typical case of an ―ethics of obligation:‖ the good is done 
                                                 
9
 Either a law explicates things which are just by nature (per modum conclusionis) or it provides a further 
determination of something what is just by nature (per modum determinationis). 
10
 ST II-II 57.2 ad 3. Aquinas speaks here about the divine law: ―Sunt enim in lege divina quaedam praecepta 
quia bona, et prohibita quia mala, quaedam vero bona quia praecepta, et mala quia prohibita.‖ 
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against the own inclination, by obeying a higher command. How does such a description fit 
the basic features of a virtue ethics? 
The case becomes clear if we consider Aquinas‘s account of infused justice. The recently 
converted sinner, who has received all theological and moral virtues at once, retains his 
previous vicious habits for the first time. He remains inclined to commit thievery, to backbite 
his neighbors, to tell lies, to betray his business partners etc. If he achieves the right actions 
for his new final end in this state, he does so only because he wants to observe divine law, 
human law, and canonic laws, by a permanent endeavor against his quasi-natural vicious 
inclination. Thus, morally good acting against one‘s own inclination? Acting because of a 
legal obligation?  
Yes and no. ―Yes,‖ since the convert acts indeed against his own tendencies. Moreover, he 
follows determinations of the human, canonical, and divine law which command actions – as 
any positive law – from the outside. But likewise ―no,‖ since the good actions of the convert 
arise from a stronger internal inclination which outweighs the old vicious tendencies, i.e. from 
infused virtues, moved by the instigations of the Holy Spirit. Thus, this perspective shows that 
the permanent struggle against old lingering habits can be understood as acting because of 
another, stronger desire (namely the inclination towards divine friendship and the resulting 
order in human things). In fact, the moral life of an agent with bad habits can be understood 
only in this way. If the strife against existing evil habits was not grounded in a more profound 
inclination to the opposite, there would be no reason at all to act against vices. Even if the 
converted obeys decreed laws seemingly ―unwillingly,‖ the ultimate reason is not an 
externally imposed obligation but his own new inclination which comes from within. The law 
determines only the external content of his acts but their achievement is due to a stronger 
internal tendency – i.e. to infused justice which enables the agent to observe all laws for the 
sake of divine friendship.  
The originality of this account becomes clear if we consider the case of a citizen, who 
observes the law by force, from a mere Aristotelian viewpoint. Let us assume an egoistic 
citizen, who feels inclined to get rich at the expense of others, who has acquired vices. 
Admittedly, he observes – nevertheless – the law; but he does so not because of an own 
inclination for the common good but out of fear for punishment. He is not virtuously inclined 
to render others their due and to respect their property. His personal habit would lead him to 
do evil. If he renounces this, it is only due to the external pressure of the law, because of an 
obligation in its proper sense, not because of virtue. This would indeed be an exemplary case 
for an ―ethics of obligation.‖ 
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Thus, the precise understanding of the function of infused justice combines the insights of 
virtue ethics and the legitimate concern of duty and obligation. It allows a balanced synopsis 
of legal obligations and a virtue-based ethics. Aquinas‘s account of infused justice shows us 
how to keep the golden mean between virtue ethics and legalism without overemphasizing 
one alternative.  
 
 
8.2 Practical Conclusions: Infused Justice and the Need for Human Education 
 
Our reconstruction of infused justice made its power as well as its limits very clear. We will 
now draw some practical conclusions from this. 
 
 
8.2.1 Infused Justice: No Substitute for Human Education  
 
Infused justice enables the graced agent to live in the human society without losing 
supernatural friendship with God. This means, the graced agent is disposed to render to his 
fellow-citizens all things which are due to them as fellow-citizens: respect of their life, of 
their corporeal integrity, of their aligned people, of their good name, their property etc. An 
offence against these goods would simultaneously imply an injury of divine friendship. This – 
and only this – is the purpose of infused justice. Our reconstruction fits perfectly if the 
discussion in the Secunda secundae is understood as about infused justice. 
In practice, this means: Admittedly, the bestowal of infuse justice is a powerful gift of divine 
grace, a gift which outweighs even vices against the human society insofar as they would 
destroy divine friendship. This is true and should not be undervalued. But also not overvalued. 
The graced agent may remain – though possessing infused justice – entirely imperfect 
regarding many areas of the everyday life. He may lack perfections which are very important 
for the flourishing of the political life, which he can acquire only by repeated actions after a 
long time of hard training or which he will never acquire because of a missing natural talent. 
We speak about ―important‖ perfections since they may be indeed necessary for a successful 
life in the human city – for the success of the individual as well as for the development of the 
whole society: qualities as farsighted judgment, knowledge of human nature, negotiating 
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skills, inspirational leadership, economical experience etc. The mere perfection of non-
damaging the other is not enough for making a good earthly citizen; but such qualities have to 
be learned and trained. Thus, for a successful life in the human society, mere infused justice – 
to do no harm to the other – is insufficient.  
Something similar can be said about the life in a family: Imaging a wicked husband who is 
used to neglect his wife and children, but who suddenly converts. He receives infused 
―familial justice‖ (together with all other virtues) which provides a real and effective 
inclination to render to each family-member (spouse, children) what is due to them as family-
members (what implies much more than mere political justice) in order to preserve the new 
received divine friendship. Thus, the infused virtue enables him to fulfill his duties as husband 
and father, but it does not mean that he has immediately the skill to mediate any conflict in 
the family, to break with his bad table manners which upset the others, to successfully apply 
for a job which sustains the family financially etc. Infused ―familial justice‖ provides 
virtuousness only insofar as necessary for preserving charity. All other human perfections 
which may be necessary for a successful family life according to human standards must be 
acquired further on by practice and training. 
These considerations reveal the wide, important, and indispensable task of human education. 
Yes, the doctrine of infused justice is important for the understanding of the moral life. But it 
may never lead us to a dangerous neglect of human education on a natural level. 
 
 
8.2.2 Infused Justice: Braking the Circle of Human Vices 
 
We want to draw a second conclusion. In the previous section we mentioned the limited scope 
of infused justice. Now we concentrate on its special advantage.  
Imaging a loose-living person, who was badly brought up, who spends his money for alcohol 
and drugs all the time, who regularly betrays his wife, and who neglects his children. 
According to Aristotle there is little hope for such person. As he states in Nicomachean Ethics 
II, ―it makes no small difference whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our 
very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference 
[].‖ 11  Once somebody has acquired vices, he enjoys doing evil, and 
                                                 
11
 NE II 1 1103b24-25.  
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thereby it is difficult and even impossible for him to change his lifestyle. As long as 
somebody desires to do the wrong thing (the immediate effect of vices), the very principle for 
a fundamental change is lacking. A conversion – not only according to a theological meaning 
but also in a human sense (i.e. the change from a vicious citizen to a virtuous one) – is 
psychologically speaking impossible. If somebody is accustomed to betray, to take advantage, 
to denigrate, to slander, to tell lies with evil intentions etc., if these wicked deeds became his 
lifestyle, it becomes morally impossible for him to change his social behavior on his own 
account. Sin enslaves. As the Lord says in the Gospel of St. John: ―Whosoever commits sin is 
servant of sin.‖ (Jn 8.34).  
Thus grace is necessary not only for a healing of the lost friendship with God, but also to 
break the cycle of evil, to turn a life dedicated to the love of one‘s self into a life dedicated to 
the love of one‘s neighbor. Only the sudden infusion of a stronger counter-inclination renders 
a promising struggle against accustomed habits possible.  
Again, the infusion of supernatural virtues does not simply replace acquired vices. What we 
have said in the previous paragraph remains valid. Endeavor and struggle are necessary. But 
the new infused habits which work by themselves for a higher purpose (sc. for divine 
friendship), make the struggle against existing evil social habits possible. Using an analogy, if 
an ill-behaved young man falls in love with a beautiful woman, his desire to be a good friend 
empowers him to act against many other habits, evil habits, which – by themselves – do not 
relate directly to this new friendship. In a similar way, infused justice perfects the convert by 
itself regarding a new kind of friendship, namely to live the human life in charity with God. 
But right this new inclination makes it possible to break the cycle of social vices and to 
overcome the defective behavior regarding fellow-citizens.  
Thus, Aristotle is certainly right that the habits we develop from youth make a very great 
difference. But thanks to God, they do not make all the difference. Although the purpose of 
infused virtues is explicitly not the perfection of the human society and the development of 
acquired political virtues, it may be the only possible way for the wicked citizen to change his 
life – even in this merely natural sense. M. Sherwin describes the situation in the following 
way: ―For many adult converts, the infused virtues are what make developing the acquired 
virtues possible at all. . . . We become well ordered to our temporal community by first 
becoming citizens of heaven in the gift of grace.‖12  
 
                                                 
12
 Sherwin, ―Infused Virtues,‖ 51. 
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These practical conclusions show two important things: First, they illustrate the importance of 
the education of children‘s character. A tree must be bent while it is young. Secondly, if 
somebody – for whatever reason – lacks such an education, the situation may seem hopeless 
from a human viewpoint. However, what is impossible with man, is possible with God. In 
such cases we should not exhaust ourselves with the desperate attempt to change accustomed 
habits by mere natural motives, by mere human endeavor. Rather, we should be confident in 
the power of God‘s grace which can change radically the human mind. Indeed, to bring 
people into friendship with God is simultaneously the best service to the human society. 
 
 
8.3 Directions for Further Research 
 
We tried to prove that the treatise on justice in the Secunda secundae has to be interpreted as 
about an infused virtue. It is due to the reader to judge whether our attempt was successful or 
not. However, even if the answer is affirmative, the project of recovering the doctrine of 
infused (moral) virtues is not yet completed. There are further interesting as well as 
challenging questions to be explored.  
We want to indicate two different areas which would be interesting fields for further study: 
First, there are still many open questions about reading the Secunda secundae as about infused 
moral virtues (section 8.3.1). Secondly and more specifically for the results of our work, 
Aquinas‘s account of infused justice in the Summa theologiae renders only the basic 
principles about dwelling in the human society without losing divine friendship. However, 
what does this imply for our particular time? In our particular circumstances? Which concrete 
conclusions can we draw for the present social (and economical) situation? Such questions of 
course open a door to a wholly new domain. But they must be addressed if we want to make 
practical use of Aquinas‘s insights for our present time. In section 8.3.2 we will raise some 
actual issues which would profit from a confrontation with infused justice as it is portrayed in 
the Secunda secundae. 
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8.3.1 Reading the Whole Secunda Secundae as about Infused Virtues 
 
a) Open Questions in the Treatise on Justice 
 
Our research concentrates on the subjective and integral parts of justice as discussed in ST II-
II 58-79. Regarding the second long section on the potential parts (qq. 80-120) we were 
content to pick up a few particular questions (see section 7.6). For reasons of length we had to 
skip a detailed inquiry of the numerous questions about the contrary vices of religion (qq. 84-
100) as well as the interesting section on the ―virtues of civility‖ (i.e. justice‘s potential pars 
of second degree), which deals for example with political friendship and liberality (qq. 114-
119). A more detailed inquiry of these questions would confirm our general thesis. Again and 
again Aquinas refers to the divine law as relevant criterion for good and evil acts, for just and 
unjust deeds. Repeatedly he determines the relationship between particular acts and charity, 
and qualifies the vicious acts as venial or mortal sins. Moreover, he describes charity as 
moving principle of the virtuous act. He speaks about the merit of such actions (even of a 
remuneratio aeterna
13
). Thus, a more detailed reading of these questions would certainly 
support and confirm our thesis.  
Admittedly, we don‘t want to hide that there are also difficult issues. For example, in q. 114 
Aquinas distinguishes between friendship as charity and as special virtue annexed to justice 
―which consisted only in external words or deeds which, however, has not the full ratio of 
friendship, but only a certain similitude.‖14 Thus, how can the discussion be understood as 
about an infused kind of friendship if it is marked-off from charity in such a clear way? 
Moreover, some remarks in the question on liberality raise further problems, since Aquinas 
delimits liberality from charity. ―The giving of benefits and mercy proceeds from the fact that 
a man has a special affection towards the person to whom he gives. Therefore this giving 
belongs to charity or to friendship. But the giving of liberality arises from a person who is 
affected in a special way towards money, insofar as he does not desire it nor loves it.‖15 
Assertions like this seem to undermine our claim that St. Thomas must speak about infused 
liberality whose acts would arise – by definition – from charity.  
                                                 
13
 ST II-II 110.4 ad 4. 
14
 ST II-II 114.1 ad 1: ―Aliam vero amicitiam ponit quae consistit in solis exterioribus verbis vel factis. Quae 
quidem non habet perfectam rationem amicitiae, sed quandam eius similitudinem.‖ 
15
 ST II-II 117.5 ad 3: ―Datio benefici et misericordis procedit ex eo quod homo est aliqualiter affectus circa eum 
cui dat. Et ideo talis datio pertinet ad caritatem sive ad amicitiam. Sed datio liberalitatis provenit ex eo quod dans 
est aliqualiter affectus circa pecuniam, dum eam non concupiscit neque amat.‖ 
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We want to claim, however, that it is possible to resolve such problems by a careful 
distinction between different levels (or kinds) of friendship. As we have argued in chapter 5, 
justice and friendship are not unequivocal terms in Aquinas‘s writings. Presupposing different 
kinds of communities (divine, political, familial communities) there are different kinds of 
friendship and different kinds of justice. It would be necessary to deepen this understanding. 
But in general, it should be possible to resolve the issues by following the general principles 
which we suggested in our thesis. Thereby it should be possible to read the whole section as 
about infused virtues in a completely consistent way. 
 
 
b) Infused Temperance in the Secunda secundae 
 
A. McKay gave evidence in her dissertation that the treatises on prudence and fortitude in the 
Secunda secundae are about infused virtues.
16
 We tried to demonstrate the same for the 
section on justice. The same must still be done for the treatise on temperance. McKay refers 
in a short paragraph of her thesis to q. 161 about the virtue of humility, which is discussed in 
the context of temperance, and argues that the description implies infused humility.
17
 In our 
own work we made use of these findings in section 2.3. But in view of 30 long questions on 
temperance, there remains a lot to do. We want to give some hints about how to approach the 
project of such a demonstration. 
The treatise on temperance contains several references to charity as motive of the temperate 
act. For example, in ST II-II 155.4 ad 2 St. Thomas explains: if the agent‘s concupiscence is 
weak, it comes ―from a spiritual praiseworthy cause, namely from the vehemence of charity 
or the strength of reason, as it is the case in the temperate man.‖18 Thus, the quotation refers to 
charity (and prudence) as motive for temperance. Elsewhere Aquinas describes chastity as 
general virtue which ―consists in charity and in the other theological virtues by which man‘s 
mind is conjoined with God.‖19 Both citations obviously imply infused temperance. 
                                                 
16
 See in our introduction section 0.2.1. 
17
 See McKay, ―Infused and Acquired Virtues,‖ 149-156. 
18
 ST II-II 155.4 ad 2. The whole context: ―Quandoque vero debilitas vel magnitudo concupiscentiae provenit ex 
causa spirituali laudabili, puta ex vehementia caritatis vel fortitudine rationis, sicut est in homine temperato. Et 
hoc modo debilitas concupiscentiae auget meritum, ratione suae causae, magnitudo vero minuit.‖ 
19
 ST II-II 151.2: ―Principaliter tamen ration huius castitatis consistit in caritate et in aliis virtutibus theologicis, 
quibus mens hominis coniungitur deo.‖ 
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Moreover, the treatise contains several articles which ask whether particular sub-virtues of 
temperance can be called the ―best virtue‖ (potissima or maxima virtus).20 These texts are 
especially elucidating since Aquinas always compares in these texts the virtue at issue with 
the theological virtues (which in themselves are the most perfect ones). One example: 
―Meekness and clemency make man acceptable to God and [other] men, in so far as they 
concur with the same effect as charity, the greatest of the virtues.‖21 Thus, we can conclude: if 
a virtue relates to charity, and if its effects are compared with those of charity, it must be an 
infused virtue. 
Further, some virtues which are discussed in the treatise do not make sense as perfections of a 
life in the human city; their only purpose is man‘s friendship with God. A good example is the 
question on virginity. Measured by earthly standards, virginity has not the character of a 
virtue. But it is praiseworthy if practiced for religious reasons – i.e. ―because of God.‖22 St. 
Thomas continues: ―And thereby it has the ratio of virtue.‖23 This short notice does not only 
prove that virginity makes only sense considering man‘s relationship to God, but it illustrates 
indirectly for all virtues that Aquinas refers to them in a theological sense in this context: the 
ratio of virtue consists in acting for the sake of God. In a similar way he argues in one of the 
replies: Virginity brings a Christian closer to Christ by a corporeal imitation. ―But the other 
virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of the mind.‖24 There is no further 
specification of these ―aliae virtutes‖ in this context. Thus, we must assume that the assertion 
is made about all virtues.  
Moreover, an inquisition of the treatise should focus on explicit references to the 
ecclesiastical law which provides external standards for temperance. Especially important is q. 
147 about fasting. Article 3 to 6 deal with the canon laws which determine concrete 
conditions and circumstances for a virtuous fasting. But the law of the Church is given – as 
seen in our research – for preserving divine friendship. Thus, it is again a clear indication for 
infused virtues.  
The treatise on temperance does not know a special question on a corresponding gift of the 
Holy Spirit (as to that, it is an exception in the Secunda secundae). Nonetheless, Aquinas 
mentions the issue of gifts in a short note of a reply comparing clemency and cruelty:  
                                                 
20
 ST II-II 141.8 about temperance in general, 152.5 about virginity, 157.4 about meekness and clemency, 161.5 
about humility. 
21
 ST II-II 157.4 ad 2: ―Mansuetudo et clementia reddunt hominem deo et hominibus acceptum, secundum quod 
concurrunt in eundem effectum cum caritate, quae est maxima virtutum.‖ 
22
 ST II-II 152.3 ad 1: ―propter deum.‖ 
23
 ST II-II 152.3 ad 1: ―Et ex hoc habet rationem virtutis.‖ 
24
 ST II-II 152.5 ad 3: ―Aliae virtutes faciunt propinquius inhaerere deo per imitationem mentis.‖  
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Clemency is a human virtue; therefore, it is directly opposed to cruelty which is a form of 
human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is not 
directly opposed to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher calls 
‗heroic‘ or ‗divine,‘ which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit. Consequently we can say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.
25
 
 
To relate gifts and virtues (or vices) makes sense only for infused virtues. Thus, we can take 
this quotation as an indirect hint for infused virtues. 
Last but not least, the final question (q. 170) is about the precepts of temperance. Aquinas 
argues: charity is the end of the Ten Commandments. Thus, they contain precepts which 
―direct to love for God and the neighbor.‖26 This is true also for the precepts of temperance – 
the prohibition of adultery and of the desire of adultery, since adultery is ―most of all opposed 
to the love of our neighbor.‖27 Therefore, even the discussion of the precepts of temperance 
illustrates the final purpose of this virtue: it is neither bodily health, nor better social living 
together, but love for God and the neighbor. Then, however, it is a question of infused 
temperance.  
These few hints may be enough to indicate how one could supply evidence for infused 
temperance in the Secunda secundae.  
 
 
c) Infused Virtues in ST II-II 171 to 189 
 
The Secunda secundae has two parts. The first long section treats the three theological and 
four cardinal virtues which are relevant for all men (qq. 1-170); the second part is concerned 
with acts pertaining to certain men (qq. 171-189). ―After having discussed the particular 
virtues and vices which pertain to conditions and states of all men, now we have to consider 
                                                 
25
 ST II-II 159.2 ad 1: ―Clementia est virtus humana, unde directe sibi opponitur crudelitas, quae est malitia 
humana. Sed saevitia vel feritas continetur sub bestialitate. Unde non directe opponitur clementiae, sed 
superexcellentiori virtuti, quam philosophus vocat heroicam vel divinam, quae secundum nos videtur pertinere 
ad dona spiritus sancti. Unde potest dici quod saevitia directe opponitur dono pietatis.‖ 
26
 ST II-II 170.1: ―Ordinantur ad dilectionem dei et proximi.‖ 
27
 ST II-II 170.1: ―Maxime dilectioni proximi videtur opponi adulterium, per quod aliquis usurpat sibi rem 
alienam, abutendo scilicet uxore proximi.‖ In the second article St. Thomas explains that the virtues annexed to 
temperance are not per se directed to charity, but their effects ―possunt respicere dilectionem dei vel proximi.‖ 
(ST II-II 170.2). 
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those things which pertain in a special way to particular men.‖28 Although the topic of these 
questions is not explicitly virtue, it would be a profitable project to look at the meaning of the 
term ―virtus‖ in this part. If our thesis is correct and if the ST II-II does not only discuss the 
theological virtues as infused habits but also the cardinal ones, the same understanding of 
virtue should also be used in these final questions. And conversely, if this assumption were 
affirmed, it would be a posteriori a strong argument for our claim regarding the previous 
section on the cardinal virtues.
29
  
We want to call attention to two notable facts. Of course, this does not substitute a detailed 
inquisition of these questions but it may prove at least the feasibility of such a work. 
First, the topics treated in this final part of the Secunda secundae are apparently taken from a 
theological context. In the prologue of q. 171 Aquinas subdivides the discussion in three 
major fields: (a) the diversity of gratuitous graces as prophecy, rapture, gift of tongues, 
miracles etc (qq. 171-178); (b) the diversity of lifestyles, i.e. the distinction between active 
and contemplative life (qq. 179-182); (c) the diversity of states of life, i.e. the general 
vocation to holiness and particular vocation to special kinds of perfection as the episcopacy 
and the religious life (qq. 183-189).
30
 Already this overview reveals the theological 
background of the whole discussion. All these issues make only sense on condition of a 
community of Christians. And this means: it presupposes people whose life is guided (or at 
least: it should be) by infused virtues. 
Secondly, from the first to the last question, the casual references to moral virtues presuppose 
an understanding of infused virtues. Some examples: In q. 171 Aquinas argues: ―It is 
necessary that all virtues exist simultaneously because of [propter] prudence or charity.‖31 We 
know from many other texts that charity (and prudence simpliciter) requires all infused moral 
virtues (see section 2.3). Some questions later: ―As prophecy extends to all things which can 
be known in a supernatural way [supernaturaliter], so the operation of virtues extends to all 
things which can be done in a supernatural way [supernaturaliter].‖32 Moreover, determining 
the relationship of moral virtues and the contemplative life, Aquinas emphasizes the 
predisposing function of moral virtues for the love of God.
33
 These assertions correspond 
                                                 
28
 ST II-II 171 prologus: ―Postquam dictum est de singulis virtutibus et vitiis quae pertinent ad omnium hominum 
conditiones et status, nunc considerandum est de his quae specialiter ad aliquos homines pertinent.‖ 
29
 The section knows some direct references to justice as the most perfect moral virtue (e.g. ST II-II 181.1 ad 1). 
30
 Cf. ST II-II 171 prologus. 
31
 ST II-II 171.4: ―Virtutes omnes necesse est esse simul propter prudentiam vel caritatem.‖ 
32
 ST II-II 178.1 ad 1: ―Sicut prophetia se extendit ad omnia quae supernaturaliter cognosci possunt, ita operatio 
virtutum se extendit ad omnia quae supernaturaliter fieri possunt.‖ 
33
 ST II-II 180.2 arg. 1 (affirmative): ―Omnes virtutes morales, de quarum actibus dantur praecepta legis, 
reducuntur ad dilectionem dei et proximi, quia plenitudo legis est dilectio.‖ 
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perfectly with the definition of infused virtues: they are given to dispose the graced agent to 
deal with earthly things without losing divine friendship.
34
 Another article raises the issue 
whether the active life remains in heaven. The answer makes use of the distinction between 
the acts of moral virtues which are either about the end or about the means. Only the first ones 
remain in heaven. But then they have to be infused virtues.
35
 And even the final article 
invokes the topic of infused virtues arguing that the entrance into the religious life does not 
provoke doubts if one does not rely on human virtue but beliefs in the help of divine virtue 
(virtus divina), since ―people who hope for the Lord, change fortitude and assume wings as an 
eagle.‖36 The implication of infused fortitude is obvious. 
This may be enough to demonstrate the possibility to give evidence for our claim, namely that 
the whole Secunda secundae is about infused virtue.  
 
 
8.3.2 Infused Justice and Its Consequences for Current Social Issues 
 
One of the most important findings of our engagement with infused justice was the insight 
that it provides (only) the inclination to render everybody his due insofar as necessary to 
preserve the order of grace. Infused justice allows a life in the human community without 
losing divine friendship. ―The service of God includes rendering to each one his due.‖37 This 
means vice versa: it does not work for building up the human society on earth, although it has 
of course important ramification for it. Because of this limited focus Aquinas‘s account of 
infused justice is – for the most part – valid for all times. It does not give concrete instructions 
for the organization of the human city; it only makes claims about the basic principles what 
does it mean to respect the other‘s life and corporeal integrity, his property, his good name etc. 
To make use of these timeless insights, however, requires a concrete application to each time 
and to each social situation; an application which has yet to be made.  
                                                 
34
 See also ST II-II 180.2 ad 1: ―Virtutes morales disponunt ad vitam contemplativam.‖ An Aristotelian 
understanding of moral virtues would argue: Moral virtues dispose us for a pleasant life in the human city. 
35
 Cf. ST II-II 181.4 (esp. ad 1). 
36
 ST II-II 189.10: ―Potest considerari religionis ingressus per comparationem ad vires eius qui est religionem 
ingressurus. Et sic etiam non est locus dubitationis de ingressu religionis, quia illi qui religionem ingrediuntur, 
non confidunt sua virtute se posse subsistere, sed auxilio virtutis divinae; secundum illud Isaiae XL, qui sperant 
in domino, mutabunt fortitudinem, assument pennas sicut aquilae, current et non laborabunt, ambulabunt et non 
deficient.‖ 
37
 ST II-II 58.1 ad 6: ―In hoc quod homo servit deo includitur quod unicuique reddat quod debet.‖ 
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What does this mean concretely? At first glance it may seem quite easy to apply the basic 
principles of St. Thomas to the current social situation. But in fact, it isn‘t. In his article 
―Economic Beatitude, or How I Learned to Stop Being Miserable and Love Economic 
Ethics,‖ K. Johnson mentions some particular assertions of the classical moral teaching, 
which are in themselves totally clear, whereas their application to the present situation raises 
serious questions.  
 
What, for example, are we to make of the thirteenth-century debates that eventually decided 
that confiscation of a necessity in the case of mortal danger was not theft? We, most of us, 
would concur that the starving man who steals to save his life is not guilty of theft. But what 
then of the owner of bread who does not give it? Or of the members of a large group (‗mob‘) 
who decide to act together to confiscate goods pertaining to another group (‗owner‘)? In a 
world that takes mortal inequality for granted, how can we meaningfully continue this debate? 
Or again, whatever happened to the usury debate? I would love to see someone take up again 
the claim that human work, the soil, and animals may be fruitful, but dollar bills cannot be, 
and therefore no one should profit from mere possession of currency. Is it moral to profit from 
savings rather than from work? Or rather, could we, as medieval scholars did, articulate a 
moral distinction between such acts as profiting from investment in a partnership with shared 
risk and profiting without risk or personal engagement in the work?
38
 
 
In fact, such issues are not just rhetoric but highly relevant. In December 2009, Rev. Tim 
Jones, pastor of St. Lawrence, York (UK), caused an international stir by a Sunday homily. 
For people, who found themselves in extreme need (in the course of the economic crisis), he 
suggested shoplifting as way out for obtaining the necessary things for life. This would be 
better than to turn to prostitution, mugging, or burglary. His advice for such people was quite 
concrete: ―I would ask that they do not steal from small family businesses but from large 
national businesses, knowing that the costs are ultimately passed on to the rest of us in the 
form of higher prices. I would ask them not to take any more than they need, for any longer 
than they need.‖39 Thus, did he deny the prohibition of thievery? The preacher continued: 
 
My advice does not contradict the Bible‘s Eighth Commandment because God‘s love for the 
poor and despised outweighs the property rights of the rich. Let my words not be 
misrepresented as a simplistic call for people to shoplift. Rather, this is a call for our society 
                                                 
38
 Kelly Johnson, ―Economic Beatitude, or How I Learned to Stop Being Miserable and Love Economic Ethics,‖ 
in New Wine, New Wineskins. A Next generation reflects on Key Issues in Catholic Moral Theology, ed. William 
C. Mattison (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 174-175. 
39
 Cited in: Valentin Low, ―Yorkshire Vicar Advises Hard-pressed Parishioners to Shoplift,‖ Times Online 
(December 22, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article6964050.ece (accessed January 30, 
2010). 
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no longer to treat its most vulnerable people with indifference and contempt. Providing 
inadequate or clumsy social support is monumental, catastrophic folly.
40
 
 
As expectable, the suggestions of Rev. Jones were not taken kindly by all people in the UK. 
The spokesman for North Yorkshire Police replied: 
 
Shoplifting is a criminal offence and to justify this course of action under any circumstances is 
highly irresponsible. Turning or returning to crime will only make matters worse. We 
recognize that some people find themselves in difficult circumstances but support is readily 
available and must be sought.
41
 
 
We don‘t want to pass a judgment on the case. Rev. Jones can refer to St. Thomas as authority 
who claims that in the case of extreme necessity things are common to all men, and therefore 
in taking what belongs legally to the other the poor only takes what is justly due to him.
42
 
From this viewpoint, the issue in question is not an exception from the prohibition of theft, it 
is not a ―licit theft‖, but no theft at all – on the contrary, it is an act of justice. Thus, from the 
general principles of St. Thomas the case is clear. On the other hand, the European states have 
well-developed social systems. Therefore, each citizen can obtain legally all necessary things 
for life – if he is ready to take the necessary steps (e.g. to contact the social welfare office 
etc.). At least in these countries, nobody has to starve to death because of poverty. Arguing 
from this perspective, it may be questionable whether there exist in England cases of hardship 
which would justify petty larceny of food.  
Thus, though the principles of Aquinas are clear and valid at all times, their application to 
current issues requires much more work.
43
 The purpose of such a challenging project would 
not be the elaboration of a wholly new economic system which might serve for a more stable 
and substantial economic growth and guarantee wealth for everybody. Christians may work 
on that, but we suppose that Aquinas‘s doctrine on justice would turn out less helpful for this. 
The work which should be done on the basis of St. Thomas consists in the description what it 
means to dwell on earth in the human society of the 21
st
 century in friendship with God. Or 
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41
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 ST II-II 66.7. 
43
 An interesting attempt to draw some conclusions from the classical prohibition of usury for modern times is 
undertaken by Christopher A. Frank, ―The Usury Prohibition and Natural Law: A Reappraisal,‖ The Thomist 72 
(2008): 625-660. 
Chapter 8. Conclusion. Consequences for the Understanding of the Moral Life 
 500 
for using an ancient expression: How Christians can ―dwell in the world, though they are not 
of the world.‖44  
As we have shown, this is the most proper purpose of infused justice. The effective inclination 
is given by divine grace. The basic principles are outlined by St. Thomas in the Secunda 
secundae. But the large field of particular consequences for our present days still waits for us 
to draw them. 
 
                                                 
44
 Letter to Diognet 6.3: ―‖ (Cf. the edition of 
the letter in Klaus Wengst, Schriften des Urchristentums: Didache (Apostellehre); Barnabasbrief; Zweiter 
Klemensbreif; Schrift an Diognet, vol. 2 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 320-322). The 
expression closely agrees with Jn 17.16: ―They are not of the word, as I am not of the world.‖ 
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